DUKE 

UNIVERSITY 


LIBRARY 


NAVAL  ADMINISTRATION 
AND  WARFARE 


Works  by  Capt.  A.  T.  Mahan 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  SEA  POWER  UPON 
HISTORY.  1660-1783. 

THE  INFLUENCE  OF  SEA  POWER  UPON 
THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION  AND  EM¬ 
PIRE.  Two  volumes 

SEA  POWER  IN  ITS  RELATION  TO  THE 
WAR  OP'  1812.  Two  volumes. 

THE  LIFE  OF  NELSON.  Two  volumes. 

THE  INTEREST  OF  AMERICA  IN  SEA 
POWER. 

LESSONS  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  ASIA. 

RETROSPECT  AND  PROSPECT. 

SOME  NEGLECTED  ASPECTS  OF  WAR. 

NAVAL  ADMINISTRATION  AND  WAR¬ 
FARE. 

TYPES  OF  NAVAL  OFFICERS. 


Naval  Administration 
and  Warfare 

Some  General  Principles 


With  Other  Essays 


BY 

CAPTAIN  A.  T.  MAHAN,  U.  S.  N. 

Author  of  “  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History  1660-1783," 
“The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  the  French  Revolution 
and  Empire,”  “  Sea  Power  in  Its  Relations 
to  the  War  of  1812,”  etc. 


BOSTON 

LITTLE,  BROWN,  AND  COMPANY 

1918 


Copyright ,  1903,  by  Charles  Scribners'  Sons ;  Copyright ,  1907,  Munn  Co. 
Copyright ,  1908,  by  P.  F.  Collier  Son; 

Copyright ,  1908,  Alfred  T.  Mahan. 


All  rights  reserved 


PREFACE 


HE  somewhat  miscellaneous  appearance 


A.  attaching  to  the  collection  of  articles  herein 
republished  requires  from  the  author  the  remark 
that  he  thinks  they  will  be  found,  by  discriminating 
readers,  to  possess  in  common  one  characteristic, 
which  however  is  probably  not  so  immediately 
obvious  as  to  dispense  with  indication.  The 
attempt  in  them  has  been  in  all  cases  to  omit 
details  to  the  utmost  possible,  in  order  that  atten¬ 
tion  may  fasten  at  once  more  readily  and  more 
certainly  upon  general  principles.  The  paper 
on  Subordination  in~~TTistoncal  Treatment,  for 
instance,  is  throughout  a  plea  for  consideration 
towards  general  readers,  who  have  not  the  time 
even  to  read  understandingly  the  mass  of  detail 
with  which  historians  are  prone  now  to  encumber 
their  narrative.  Much  less  can  they  work  out  for 
themselves  the  leading  features,  the  real  deter¬ 
minative  lines,  which  become  buried  under  the 
accumulation  of  incidents,  like  the  outlines  of  an 
ancient  city  hidden  under  the  ruin  of  its  buildings. 


v 


3940'?J 


VI 


Preface 


As  the  common  proverb  has  it,  the  wood  often  can¬ 
not  be  seen  for  the  trees. 

Few  persons,  probably,  have  escaped  the  de¬ 
spairing  sense  of  inability  to  find  on  a  map  some 
particular  place,  because  of  the  thicket  of  names 
spread  over  the  surface,  like  the  tanglewood  of 
a  forest.  Fewer  still  have  been  happy  enough 
to  look  at  a  map  intelligently  constructed  for  the 
special  purpose  of  showing  no  more  than  is  needed 
for  the  understanding  of  the  subject  which  the 
map  is  intended  to  illustrate;  but  those  who  have 
had  this  experience  will  recognize  that  the  advan¬ 
tage  is  not  only  that  of  finding  readily  a  feature, 
the  position  of  which  is  approximately  known,  but 
also  the  ease  with  which  can  be  appreciated  the 
relations  of  the  several  parts  to  one  another,  and 
to  the  whole.  The  composite  effect,  when  thus 
obtained  for  the  first  time,  is  illuminative  almost 
to  the  point  of  revelation. 

There  is,  of  course,  a  class  of  readers  to  whom 
the  mastery  of  details,  close  knowledge  of  all  in¬ 
cidents,  is  indispensable;  but  such  fall  almost 
entirely  under  the  head  of  students  of  history,  — 
or  of  the  particular  topic  treated,  —  which  is 
their  life  work.  Because  it  is  their  business, 
their  specialty,  they  must,  and  they  can,  find  time 
for  minute  study;  but,  in  most  other  subjects 
than  his  own,  the  specialist  is  himself  a  member 


Preface  vii 

of  the  general  public,  and  therefore  he  should  the 
more  remember  that  concerning  his  specialty 
the  general  public  can  learn,  and  wishes  to  learn, 
only  those  leading  features  which  enable  men 
to  bring  the  various  kinds  of  knowledge  into 
correlation  with  one  another,  and  with  their  own 
individual  careers.  The  matter  is  one  of  utility, 
and  not  merely  of  culture;  for  the  onward  move¬ 
ment  of  the  whole  body  of  mankind  —  which 
we  call  “  the  public  ”  —  is  dependent  upon  each 
man’s  thorough,  consummate  knowledge  of  his 
own  business,  supplemented  by  an  adequate 
understanding  of  the  occupations  and  needs  of 
his  neighbors.  That  this  is  profoundly  true  of 
social  questions,  strictly  so-called,  will  scarcely 
be  disputed;  but  in  some  measure,  often  in 
large  measure,  all  questions  are  social,  because 
they  affect  the  common  interest  of  the  body  politic. 

Adequate  understanding  can  be  had,  if  the  de¬ 
termining  features  of  the  particular  subject  are 
exposed  clear  of  the  complication  of  details 
which  cling  to  them,  and  even  in  part  constitute 
them ;  the  knowledge  of  which  is  obligatory  upon 
the  specialist,  but  to  the  outsider  impedes  ac¬ 
quirement.  I  quote  here  Sir  John  Seeley,  by 
specialty  an  historian,  but  who  in  his  Expansion 
of  England,  and  Growth  of  British  Policy,  gave 
to  his  public  outlines  of  historical  periods,  rudi- 


3'74G71 


Vlll 


Preface 


mentary  almost  as  a  skeleton;  and  thereby  en¬ 
abled  those  not  masters  of  the  periods  in  ques¬ 
tion  to  see  clearly  the  controlling  conditions,  like 
the  single  places  on  a  skeleton  map,  and  to  appre¬ 
ciate  those  inter-relations  of  cause  and  effect 
which  correspond  to  the  determining  features  of 
a  geographical  area.  He  says:  Public  under¬ 
standing  is  necessarily  guided  by  a  few  large, 
plain,  simple  ideas.  When  great  interests  are 
plain,  and  great  maxims  of  government  unmis¬ 
takable,  public  opinion  may  be  able  to  judge 
securely  even  in  questions  of  vast  magnitude. 

The  present  writer  is  by  specialty  a  naval  officer, 
who  has  been  led  by  circumstances  to  give  particu¬ 
lar  attention  to  Naval  History  and  to  its  illustra¬ 
tions  in  Naval  Warfare.  By  professional  occupa¬ 
tion,  and  by  personal  choice,  he  has  been  immersed 
in  the  details  pertaining  to  naval  life  on  the  ad¬ 
ministrative  and  military  sides.  The  principal 
articles  following  bear  upon  matters  immediately 
connected  with  these  topics;  and  in  them  he  has 
endeavored  to  follow  Seeley’s  thought,  by  fasten¬ 
ing  attention  upon  what  he  conceives  to  be,  or  to 
have  been,  the  chief  and  determinative  features 
in  the  particular  subjects  treated.  To  such  treat¬ 
ment  the  matter  of  date  is  indifferent.  General 
principles  endure;  and  the  illustrations  of  them, 
if  judiciously  selected,  are  as  effective  when  taken 


Preface 


IX 


from  one  era  as  from  another.  Indeed,  it  may  be 
claimed  that  a  certain  remoteness  is  desirable, 
as  contributing  to  clearness;  as  one  may  approach 
a  building  too  closely  to  appreciate  its  propor¬ 
tions.  The  activities,  prepossessions,  and  discus¬ 
sions,  of  a  current  day  constitute  in  themselves  de¬ 
tails,  often  non-pertinent  details,  which  go  to  swell 
the  mass  of  considerations  that  obscure  perception. 

Another  remark  applicable  to  military  opera¬ 
tions,  and  probably  to  active  life  in  general. 
While  war  is  waging,  much  that  happens  is 
unknown,  or  imperfectly  known,  outside  of  a 
very  restricted  number  of  persons.  This  ignorance, 
whether  total  or  partial,  is  an  element  in  all  con¬ 
temporary  appreciation  of  the  operations.  Spe¬ 
cifically,  one  of  the  conditions  which  enters  into 
the  decisions  of  the  commander-in-chief  of  either 
army  is  that  he  commonly  must  depend  upon 
imperfect  information  as  to  the  numbers  and 
movements  of  his  opponent.  This  ignorance  of 
the  general  is  just  half  that  of  the  outside  com¬ 
mentator,  whom  information  fails  from  both 
sides.  It  may  seem  to  follow  that  comment  should 
be  postponed;  or  at  all  events  that,  once  made,  it 
should  be  dismissed  as  obsolete  when  clearer  light 
is  obtained.  This,  however,  is  not  so;  for  this 
imperfect  intelligence  has  been  an  actual  factor 
in  the  operations.  To  know  the  manner  in  which 


X 


Preface 


imperfect  knowledge,  or  defective  forecast,  has 
affected  action  is  not  only  necessary  to  historical 
accuracy,  but  serves  also  to  illustrate  the  value  of 
principles ;  because  a  clear  eye  to  principle,  a  true 
appreciation  of  the  controlling  features  of  a  mili¬ 
tary  situation,  will  often  correct  an  inference  to 
which  faulty  intelligence  points,  whether  the  in¬ 
ference  be  that  of  the  responsible  general,  or  of  the 
irresponsible  critic.  These  considerations  have 
justified  to  the  author  the  reproduction  of  an  article 
written  during  the  heat  of  the  War  between  Japan 
and  Russia,  without  serious  alteration  by  subse¬ 
quent  knowledge. 

Substantial  additions  have  been  made  to  the 
articles,  Retrospect  on  the  War  between  J apan 
and  Russia,  and  The  Significance  of  the  Pacific 
Cruise  of  the  A  men  can  Fleet,  in  1908.  The  reasons 
for  these,  as  illustrative  of  fundamental  principles, 
it  is  hoped  will  appear  on  perusal.  They  are  be¬ 
lieved  to  merit  the  very  special  attention  and  sober 
consideration  of  the  American  people.  From  the 
first  of  these  have  been  also  omitted  some  con¬ 
cluding  paragraphs,  treating  the  question  of  the 
increasing  size  of  battleships;  a  tendency  which 
the  author  has  regretted  and  regrets.  Progress  in 
this  direction  has  become  so  emphasized  among  all 
naval  states  since  the  article  was  published,  that 
re-treatment  would  require  a  mass  of  detailed 


Preface 


xi 


explanations,  foreign  to  the  general  purpose  of 
the  collection,  as  above  indicated.  A  paragraph 
in  the  body  of  the  article  sufficiently  summarizes 
certain  general  considerations,  which  can  scarcely 
fail  to  assert  themselves  in  an  ultimate  arrest  of 
progress. 

The  author  expresses  his  thanks  to  the  editors 
and  proprietors  of  the  various  periodicals  in 
which  these  articles  first  appeared  for  their  kind 
consent  to  republication.  The  name  of  each  peri¬ 
odical,  and  the  date  of  issue,  will  be  found  in  the 
Table  of  Contents.  The  dates  under  each  chapter 
heading  are  approximately  those  of  writing;  a 
matter  of  no  particular  consequence  in  this  case, 
but  retained  to  conform  with  other  similar  works 
of  the  author,  where  it  had  some  significance. 

The  author  desires  also  to  acknowledge  his 
indebtedness  to  Lieutenant-Commander  Lloyd  H. 
Chandler,  Aid  to  Rear-Admiral  Robley  D.  Evans 
during  the  cruise  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  to  San  Fran¬ 
cisco,  for  the  trouble  taken  in  supplying  particular 
information  bearing  upon  the  practical  gains  to 
efficiency  from  this  cruise,  which  has  been  the 
object  of  much  ill-instructed  and  invidious 
comment. 

A.  T.  Mahan. 

July,  1908. 


CONTENTS 


The  Principles  of  Naval  Administration 
National  Review,  June,  1903 

The  United  States  Navy  Department  . 

Scribner’s  Magazine,  May,  1903 


Principles  Involved  in  the  War  Between  Japan  and 
Russia . 

National  Review,  September,  1904 

Retrospect  Upon  the  War  Between  Japan  and  Russia 

National  Review,  May,  1906 

Objects  of  the  United  States  Naval  War  College  . 

An  Address  at  the  Annual  Opening,  August  6,  1888 


The  Practical  Character  of  the  United  States 

Naval  War  College . 

An  Address  at  the  Annual  Opening,  September  6,  1892 

Subordination  in  Historical  Treatment 

President’s  Address  at  the  Annual  Meeting  of  the 
American  Historical  Association,  December  26,  1902 

The  Strength  of  Nelson . 

National  Review,  November,  1905 


PAGE 

I 

49 

87 

I3i 

175 

215 

243 

273 


XIV 


Contents 


The  Value  of  the  Pacific  Cruise  of  the  United 
States  Fleet,  1908  ....... 

Prospect:  The  Scientific  American,  December  7,  1907 
Retrospect:  Collier’s  Weekly,  August  29,  1908 

The  Monroe  Doctrine . 

National  Review,  February,  1902 


MAP 


PAGE 

307 


355 


Outline  Map  of  Seat  of  War  in  Manchuria 


173 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  NAVAL 
ADMINISTRATION,  HISTORICALLY 
CONSIDERED 

American  and  British  Systems  Compared 

THE  NATIONAL  REVIEW,  JUNE,  1 903 


Naval  Administration 
and  Warfare 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  NAVAL  ADMINIS¬ 
TRATION 

February,  1903 

DEFINITION  is  proverbially  difficult,  but  the 
effort  to  frame  it  tends  to  elicit  fulness  and 
precision  of  comprehension.  What  then  do  we 
mean  by  administration  in  general,  and  what  are 
the  several  and  diverse  conceptions  that  enter 
into  the  particular  idea  of  naval  administration  ? 

Considered  generally,  administration  is,  I  sup¬ 
pose,  an  office  committed  to  an  individual,  or  to 
a  corporate  body,  by  some  competent  authority, 
to  the  end  that  it  may  supply  a  particular  want 
felt.  At  a  point  in  its  historical  development 
a  country  finds  that  it  needs  a  navy.  To  supply 
the  need  it  institutes  an  office.  For  the  special 
purpose  it  vests  so  much  of  its  own  power  as 
may  be  necessary  in  a  particular  person  or 
persons,  and  requires  that  he,  or  they,  supply  to 
it  a  navy.  The  original  grant  of  powers  carries 


4 


Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


the  reasonable  implication  that  they  will  be  main¬ 
tained  and  amplified  as  occasion  requires.  That 
is  the  duty  of  the  State  to  the  administration 
it  has  created ;  and  for  that  reason  the  State  — 
which  in  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  is 
ultimately  the  people  —  requires  to  understand 
what  is  involved  in  the  office,  for  the  existence 
and  working  of  which  it  has  made  itself  respon¬ 
sible.  It  is  not,  indeed,  requisite  to  follow  out  all 
the  minutiae  of  action,  but  it  is  essential  to  com¬ 
prehend  the  several  great  principles  which  should 
receive  recognition  in  the  completed  scheme; 
which  of  them  should  govern,  and  which  should 
be  subordinate  in  function.  If  these  relations  be 
properly  adjusted,  the  system  is  sound  and  may 
be  trusted  to  work  itself,  provided  continuous  care 
be  taken  in  the  choice  of  persons.  The  engine 
will  be  good ;  but  the  engineers  must  be  good  also. 

Naval  administration  has  another  side,  and 
one  more  commonly  familiar.  It  faces  two  ways, 
towards  the  nation  and  towards  the  service.  It 
ministers  to  the  country  a  navy;  but  in  so  doing 
it  embraces  numerous  functions,  and  engages  in 
numerous  activities,  the  object  of  which  is  the 
navy  itself,  in  the  supply  of  all  that  is  needed  for 
its  healthy  existence.  It  is  to  these  in  their  en¬ 
tirety  that  the  term  naval  administration  is  most 
commonly  applied.  Thus  viewed  the  subject  is 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration 


5 


complex  and  demands  a  certain  amount  of  analysis; 
in  order  that  by  the  recognition  of  the  leading 
needs  and  principles  involved  there  may  be  a 
clearer  understanding  of  their  individual  bearings 
and  relative  importance.  It  will  be  found  here, 
as  in  most  practical  callings,  that  efficiency  depends 
upon  a  full  appreciation  of  elements  which,  though 
essential,  are  conflicting  in  tendency,  and  upon 
due  weight  being  given  to  each. 

Administration  being  a  term  of  very  general 
application,  it  will  be  expected  that  that  of  the 
navy  should  present  close  analogies,  and  even 
points  of  identity,  with  other  forms  of  adminis¬ 
tration  ;  for  instance,  that  in  it,  as  elsewhere, 
efficiency  of  result  will  be  better  secured  by  individ¬ 
ual  responsibility  than  by  collective  responsibility. 
But,  along  with  general  resemblance,  naval  ad¬ 
ministration  is  very  clearly  and  sharply  differen¬ 
tiated  by  the  presence  of  an  element  which  is 
foreign  to  almost  all  other  activities  of  life  in  coun¬ 
tries  like  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 
The  military  factor  is  to  it  not  merely  incidental, 
but  fundamental;  whatever  other  result  may  be 
achieved,  naval  administration  has  failed  unless 
it  provides  to  the  nation  an  efficient  fighting  body, 
directed  by  well-trained  men,  animated  by  a  strong 
military  spirit.  On  the  other  hand,  many  of  the 
operations  connected  with  it  differ  from  those 


6  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


common  to  civil  life  only  in  a  certain  particularity 
of  method.  This  is  true  in  principal  measure  of  the 
financial  management,  of  the  medical  establish¬ 
ment,  and  to  a  considerable  though  much  smaller 
degree  of  the  manufacturing  processes  connected 
with  the  production  of  naval  material.  The  busi¬ 
ness  routine  of  even  the  most  military  department 
of  a  naval  administration  is  in  itself  more  akin 
to  civil  than  to  military  life :  but  it  by  no  means 
follows  that  those  departments  would  be  better 
administered  under  men  of  civil  habits  of  thought 
than  by  those  of  military  training.  The  method 
exists  for  the  result,  and  an  efficient  fighting  body 
is  not  to  be  attained  by  weakening  the  appreciation 
of  military  necessities  at  the  very  fountain  head 
of  their  supply  in  the  administration.  This  neces¬ 
sary  appreciation  can  be  the  result  only  of  personal 
experience  of  good  and  bad  through  the  formative 
period  of  life. 

We  find,  therefore,  at  the  very  outset  of  our 
inquiry  two  fundamental  yet  opposing  elements, 
neither  of  which  can  be  eliminated.  Nor  can  they 
be  reconciled,  in  the  sense  of  becoming  sympa¬ 
thetic.  In  its  proper  manifestation  the  jealousy 
between  the  civil  and  military  spirits  is  a  healthy 
symptom.  They  can  be  made  to  work  together 
harmoniously  and  efficiently;  to  complement, 
not  to  antagonize  each  other;  provided  means 


Principles  o j  Naval  Administration  7 


are  taken  to  ensure  to  each  its  due  relative  prece¬ 
dence  and  weight  in  the  determination  of  practical 
questions. 

Historically,  the  institution  and  development 
of  naval  administration  has  been  essentially  a  civil 
process,  the  object  of  which  has  been  to  provide 
and  keep  in  readiness  a  national  weapon  for  war. 
The  end  is  war  —  fighting;  the  instrument  is  the 
navy;  the  means  are  the  various  activities  which 
we  group  under  the  head  of  administration.  Of 
these  three,  the  end  necessarily  conditions  the 
others.  The  proverb  is  familiar,  “  He  who  wills 
the  end  wills  the  means.”  Whatever  is  essential 
to  the  spirit  and  organization  of  the  Navy  afloat, 
to  its  efficiency  for  war,  must  find  itself  adequately 
represented  in  the  administration,  in  order  that 
the  exigencies  of  fighting  may  be  kept  well  to  the 
front  in  governmental  and  national  consideration. 
Since  armies  and  navies  have  existed  as  perma¬ 
nent  national  institutions,  there  has  been  a  con¬ 
stant  struggle  on  the  part  of  the  military  element 
to  keep  the  end  —  fighting,  or  readiness  to  fight  — 
superior  to  mere  administrative  considerations. 
This  is  but  natural,  for  all  men  tend  to  magnify 
their  office.  The  military  man  having  to  do  the 
fighting,  considers  that  the  chief  necessity;  the 
administrator  equally  naturally  tends  to  think 
the  smooth  running  of  the  machine  the  most  ad- 


8 


Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


mirable  quality.  Both  are  necessary;  but  the 
latter  cannot  obtain  under  the  high  pressure  of 
war  unless  in  peace  the  contingency  of  war  has 
dictated  its  system.  There  is  a  quaint,  well-worn 
story,  which  yet  may  be  new  to  some  readers,  of 
an  administrator  who  complained  that  his  office 
was  working  admirably  until  war  came  and 
threw  everything  out  of  gear. 

The  opposition  between  civil  and  military, 
necessitating  their  due  adjustment,  may  be  said 
to  be  original,  of  the  nature  of  things.  It  is  born 
with  naval  administration.  Corresponding  roughly 
to  these  primary  factors  are  the  two  principal 
activities  in  which  administration  is  exerted  — 
organization  and  execution.  These  also  bear 
to  each  other  the  relation  of  means  to  end.  Or¬ 
ganization  is  not  for  itself,  but  is  a  means  to  an 
ultimate  executive  action;  in  the  case  of  a  navy, 
to  war  or  to  the  prevention  of  war.  It  is,  therefore, 
in  its  end  —  war  —  that  organization  must  find 
the  conditions  dictating  its  character.  Whatever 
the  system  adopted,  it  must  aim  above  all  at  per¬ 
fect  efficiency  in  military  action;  and  the  nearer 
it  approaches  to  this  ideal  the  better  it  is.  It  would 
seem  that  this  is  too  obvious  for  mention.  It  may 
be  for  mention;  but  not  for  reiteration.  The  long 
record  of  naval  history  on  the  side  of  administra¬ 
tion  shows  a  constant  predominance  of  other  con- 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration 


9 


siderations,  and  the  abiding  necessity  for  insisting, 
in  season  and  out  of  season,  that  the  one  test  of 
naval  administration  is  not  the  satisfactory  or 
economical  working  of  the  office,  as  such,  but 
the  readiness  of  the  navy  in  all  points  for  war. 
The  one  does  not  exclude  the  other;  but  there  is 
between  them  the  relation  of  greater  and  less. 

Both  organization  and  execution  are  properties 
alike  of  the  active  navy,  the  instrument  for  war, 
and  of  the  naval  administration,  the  means  which 
has  been  constituted  to  create  and  maintain 
the  instrument;  but  from  their  respective  spheres, 
and  in  proportion  to  their  relative  nearness  to  the 
great  final  end  of  war,  the  one  or  the  other  char¬ 
acteristic  is  found  predominant.  The  naval  officer 
on  board  his  ship,  face  to  face  with  the  difficulties 
of  the  profession,  and  in  daily  contact  with  the  grim 
implements  which  remind  him  of  the  eventualities 
of  his  calling,  naturally  sees  in  organization  mainly 
a  means  to  an  end.  Some  indeed  fall  short.  The 
martinet  is  a  man  to  whom  the  organization  is 
more  than  a  means;  but  he  is  the  exception. 
Naval  administration,  on  the  other  hand,  in  the 
common  acceptation  of  the  term,  is  mostly  office 
work.  It  comes  into  contact  with  the  Navy  proper 
chiefly  through  official  correspondence,  less  by 
personal  intercourse  with  the  officers  concerned; 
still  less  by  immediate  contact  with  the  daily  life  of 


10  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


the  profession,  which  it  learns  at  second  hand. 
It  consequently  tends  to  overvalue  the  orderly 
routine  and  observance  of  the  system  by  which 
it  receives  information,  transmits  orders,  checks 
expenditure,  files  returns,  and,  in  general,  keeps 
with  the  service  the  touch  of  paper;  in  short,  the 
organization  which  has  been  created  for  facilitating 
its  own  labours.  In  due  measure  these  are  im¬ 
peratively  necessary;  but  it  is  undeniable  that 
the  practical  tendency  is  to  exaggerate  their  impor¬ 
tance  relatively  to  the  executive  end  proposed. 
The  writer  was  once  visiting  a  French  captain, 
who  in  the  course  of  the  interview  took  up  wearily 
a  mass  of  papers  from  a  desk  beside  him.  “  I 
wonder,”  said  he,  “  whether  all  this  is  as  bad  with 
you  as  with  us.  Look  at  our  Navy  Register;” 
and  dividing  the  pages  into  two  parts,  severally 
about  one-sixth  and  five-sixths  of  the  whole,  he 
continued,  “  This,  the  smaller,  is  the  Navy;  and 
that  is  the  Administration.”  No  wonder  he  had 
papers  galore;  administration  needs  papers,  as  a 
mill  needs  grist. 

Even  in  the  case  of  naval  officers  entering  ad¬ 
ministrative  offices,  the  influence  of  prolonged 
tenure  is  in  the  same  direction.  The  habits  of  a 
previous  lifetime  doubtless  act  as  a  check,  in  pro¬ 
portion  to  the  strength  they  have  acquired  in  the 
individual.  They  serve  as  an  invaluable  leaven. 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration  11 


not  only  to  his  own  thought  but  to  that  of 
his  associates.  Nevertheless,  the  experience  is 
general  that  permanence  in  an  office  essentially 
civil  tends  to  deaden  the  intimate  appre¬ 
ciation  of  naval  exigencies;  yet  upon  this 
alone  can  thrive  that  sympathy  between  the 
administrative  and  executive  functions  of  the 
navy  which  is  requisite  to  efficiency.  The  habit 
of  the  arm-chair  easily  prevails  over  that  of  the 
quarter-deck;  it  is  more  comfortable.  For  this 
reason,  in  the  best  considered  systems,  a  frequent 
exchange  between  the  civil  and  military  parts  of 
their  profession,  between  the  administrative  offices 
and  the  army  or  fleet,  is  thought  expedient  for 
officers  who  show  aptitude  for  the  former.  It  is 
better  for  them  personally,  better  for  the  adminis¬ 
tration,  and  consequently  better  for  the  service  at 
large.  It  prevails  extensively  in  the  United  States 
Navy,  where  it  is  frequently  the  subject  of  ill- 
instructed  outside  criticism  on  the  score  of  sea- 
officers  being  on  “  shore  duty.”  Without  asserting 
that  the  exact  proportions  of  service  are  always 
accurately  observed,  it  may  be  confidently  affirmed 
that  the  interchange  between  the  civil  and  military 
occupations  tends  to  facilitate  the  smooth  working 
of  both,  by  promoting  mutual  understanding  of 
conditions  and  difficulties. 

The  subject  of  this  paper  is  not  the  navy,  al- 


12  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


though  that  as  a  military  organization  has  neces¬ 
sarily  its  own  interior  administration.  What  we 
have  here  to  consider  is  an  organization  essentially 
civil,  although  it  has  naval  men  as  individual 
members  and  a  military  body  as  the  subject  of  its 
activities.  In  the  United  States  the  naval  adminis¬ 
tration  has  thus  been  continuously  regarded  as  a 
civil  occupation,  under  the  two  principal  forms 
given  it  since  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution. 
In  its  origin,  in  1798,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
was  the  sole  functionary  and  a  member  of  the 
President’s  Cabinet.  The  Board  of  Naval  Com¬ 
missioners,  which  from  1815  to  1842  was  charged 
with  all  the  ministerial  duties  under  the  Secretary, 
was  composed  of  three  naval  captains;  but  when 
one  of  them,  Captain  Charles  Morris,  was  selected 
for  a  temporary  command  at  sea,  he  insisted  upon 
resigning  his  office  of  Commissioner,  because  “  I 
believed  that  the  exercise  of  the  military  duties  of 
a  captain,  whilst  holding  a  district  commission 
of  a  civil  character,  would  be  exceedingly  dis¬ 
agreeable  to  the  feelings  of  the  officers,  even  if 
legal.”  When  the  Board  of  Naval  Commissioners 
gave  way  to  the  Bureau  System  which  now  exists, 
the  same  civil  character  inhered,  and  incumbents 
of  Bureaus  were  at  times  taken  directly  from  civil 
life.  In  the  British  Navy  the  understanding  was 
the  same  concerning  the  civil  nature  of  duties 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration  13 


assumed  by  naval  officers  unders  the  organization 
which  we  call  Naval  Administration.  One  of  the 
earliest  notable  incidents  of  Nelson’s  life,  when 
a  young  captain,  was  a  flat  refusal  to  obey  the 
order  of  an  officer  much  his  senior,  when  holding 
the  local  position  of  a  Dockyard  Commissioner 
in  the  civil  administration  of  the  Navy.  The 
administration  of  the  British  Navy  in  this  and 
cognate  matters  was  then  in  fact  distinctly 
styled  “  civil.”  It  had  a  large  history,  char¬ 
acterized  through  great  part  of  its  course  by 
incessant  struggle  with  the  military  administra¬ 
tion,  either  incorporate  in  the  single  person  of  the 
Lord  High  Admiral,  or  more  usually  placed  in 
commission  as  the  Board  of  Admiralty.  The 
latter  was  nominally  superior,  but  commonly 
strove  in  vain  to  assert  its  authority  against  an 
interest  strongly  entrenched  in  a  traditional  posi¬ 
tion. 

In  the  United  States  there  never  has  been  such 
formal  duality  of  functions  as  was  produced  by 
the  gradual  evolution  of  the  British  system,  which, 
like  the  British  Constitution,  rather  grew  than 
was  framed.  The  effect  in  the  latter,  by  the  exist¬ 
ence  of  the  two  Boards,  was  to  illustrate  and  inten¬ 
sify  an  antagonism  always  sufficiently  rooted  in 
the  opposition  between  civil  and  military.  Thence 
resulted  practical  evils  which  finally  compelled 


14  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


the  formal  abolition  of  the  Civil  Board,  and  the 
transfer  of  its  duties  to  the  Board  of  Admiralty, 
suitably  reinforced  for  that  purpose  by  a  number  of 
subordinate  technical  experts,  not  members  of  the 
Board,  and  no  longer  so  associated  together  as  to 
hold  the  power  of  concerted  action  which  attaches 
to  an  organic  group.  There  was  thus  restored,  or  it 
should  rather  be  said  established,  the  unity  essen¬ 
tial  to  all  military  administration;  the  unity  in 
this  case  of  a  single,  regularly  constituted  Board. 
From  this,  however,  the  logic  of  facts  has  gradu¬ 
ally  evolved  the  accepted  principle  of  a  supreme  in¬ 
dividual  responsibility,  that  of  the  First  Lord,  who 
is  a  member  of  the  Government.  Fie  is  responsible 
for  all  the  business  of  the  Admiralty;  while  each 
of  the  other  members  has  his  separate  functions, 
for  the  discharge  of  which  he  is  responsible  to  the 
First  Lord,  although,  as  we  are  informed  by  a 
recent  high  authority,  “  this  responsibility  is  not 
easy  to  define.” 

In  Great  Britain,  therefore,  as  in  the  United 
States,  one  man  is  now  ultimately  responsible; 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  the  one  State,  the 
First  Lord  in  the  other.  The  difference  between 
the  two  systems  is  that  the  United  States  Secretary, 
belonging  to  no  Board,  has  to  deal  with  subordi¬ 
nates  only,  not  with  associates.  The  First  Lord, 
as  member  of  the  Board,  which  assembles  fre- 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration  15 


quently,  necessarily  meets  his  assistants  not  merely 
singly,  but  together;  thus  undergoing  an  influence 
much  weightier  and  more  complex  than  that  of 
consulting  at  convenience  single  men,  each  of 
whom  appears  before  him  strong  only  in  his 
natural  strength  of  character,  modified  by  the 
military  habit  of  submission.  We  are  told  of  Sir 
Robert  Walpole  that  he  avoided  as  much  as 
possible  calling  Cabinet  councils,  lest  they  should 
furnish  the  elements  of  an  opposition.  The  First 
Lord  doubtless  may  absent  himself  from  the 
meetings  of  the  Board,  if  he  will,  but  the  spirit  ol 
the  system  would  in  that  case  be  violated.  Like  the 
American  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  he  is,  by  custom 
now  almost  invariable,  a  civilian.  Regarding  the 
expert  professional  members  of  the  naval  admin¬ 
istration  as  subordinate,  as  they  properly  are  in 
both  systems,  it  is  evident  that  the  British  tends 
to  a  greater  influence  of  the  military  element. 
It  is,  however,  influence,  not  authority;  two 
powers  of  very  different  natures.  There  appears 
to  be  in  practice  considerable  indeterminateness 
as  to  the  executive  functions  of  the  Admiralty 
Board  as  a  body,  an  absence  of  definition  charac¬ 
teristically  English;  but  the  single  ultimate  re¬ 
sponsibility  of  the  First  Lord  necessarily  carries 
with  it  single  uncontrolled  authority.  Without 
that  it  is  idle  to  speak  of  responsibility. 


16  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


In  main  outline,  both  systems  consist  of  a  single 
responsible  civil  head  with  a  number  of  professional 
subordinates,  among  whom  are  apportioned  the 
several  executive  duties  of  the  naval  administra¬ 
tion.  The  British  provides  in  addition,  by  dis¬ 
tinct  implication  and  by  usual  practice,  a  con¬ 
sultative  body,  which  does  not  exist  in  the  Ameri¬ 
can.  Although  it  is,  of  course,  open  to  any  Ameri¬ 
can  Secretary  to  call  such  into  being  for  his  own 
assistance,  its  opinions  would  not  give  him,  being 
its  creator,  the  moral  support,  nor  exert  over  him 
the  influence,  that  inheres  in  one  established  by 
statute.  This  difference  tends  to  emphasize  the 
single  responsibility  of  the  United  States  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  and  probably  has  the  result  of  pro¬ 
ducing  in  him  a  greater  sense  of  accountability. 
He  has  no  associates;  the  British  First  Lord  has. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  each  method  repro¬ 
duces  the  specific  political  genius  of  the  nation. 
In  the  United  States  the  executive  power  of  the 
general  government  rests  explicitly  in  one  man; 
so  also  that  of  the  Navy  Department.  In  Great 
Britain  the  executive  government  rests  in  a  Com¬ 
mittee  of  Parliament,  of  whom  one  is  Prime 
Minister;  the  administration  of  the  navy  is  also 
technically  “  in  commission,”  whatever  may  be 
the  practical  outcome  as  to  responsibility. 

There  is  yet  another  result  of  the  Board  system 


Principles  o j  Naval  Administration  17 


as  compared  with  ours,  in  that  an  officer  of  experi¬ 
ence  writing  about  it  can  say,  “  There  is  no  real 
separation  of  the  duties  of  the  Lords  of  the  Ad¬ 
miralty;  they  are  not  heads  of  departments  rigidly 
defined;  the  operations  they  superintend  are 
closely  inter-related.”  “  The  happy  constitution 
of  the  Board  enables  it  to  handle  a  mass  of  business 
now  grown  to  vast  complexity,  without  splitting 
it  up  into  over-specialized  departments,  presided 
over  by  independent  chiefs  with  duties  and  offices 
sharply  and  precisely  defined.”  The  contrast  here 
is  pronounced;  for  while  the  duties  of  the  bureau- 
chiefs,  who  are  the  professional  subordinates  of 
the  American  civil  head  of  department,  are  neces¬ 
sarily  closely  inter-related,  because  concerning  the 
same  common  profession,  they  are  nevertheless 
sharply  defined,  and  their  chiefs  mutually  inde¬ 
pendent.  This  condition  emphasizes  their  indi¬ 
vidual  responsibility;  but  it  also  fosters  a  separate¬ 
ness  of  interest  and  of  action  which  by  some 
officers  in  the  United  States  Navy  has  been  con¬ 
sidered  to  be  a  fruitful  cause  of  bad  adminis¬ 
tration.  The  unifying  force  is  not  the  consultation 
and  interaction  of  a  Board,  but  the  authority  of 
a  single  head;  and  he,  being  frequently  inexpert 
in  naval  practical  life,  is  not  always  best  fitted  to 
comprehend  the  relative  value  of  technical  or 
military  points,  or  to  adjust  to  the  best  advantage 


18  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


of  the  service  the  conflicting  demands  which  the 
bureau-chiefs  represent. 

We  are  here  in  presence  of  a  great  difficulty  of 
naval  administration;  which  is,  to  attain  and  pre¬ 
serve  substantial  unity  of  executive  action,  while 
at  the  same  time  providing  for  the  distribution 
among  several  individuals  of  a  mass  of  detailed 
duties,  beyond  the  power  of  one  man  to  discharge. 
This  need  of  unity  applies  not  only  to  high  con¬ 
siderations  of  policy,  or  a  few  larger  questions  of 
administration.  It  enters  into  every  dockyard, 
and  above  all  into  every  component  unit  of  the 
fleet.  In  the  United  States  seven  bureaus  have 
a  part  and  a  claim  in  every  ship  that  is  planned. 
When  it  is  remembered  that  the  necessarily  con¬ 
tracted  capacity  of  a  ship  of  war  has  made  the 
disposition  of  space  in  every  period  a  difficult 
problem,  it  will  be  understood  that  in  our  day, 
of  complicated  construction  and  armament,  we 
have  in  the  various  bureau  demands  the  elements 
of  a  conflict  that  may  aptly  be  called  intestine. 
To  this  must  be  added,  qualifying  and,  to  some 
extent,  contesting  the  whole  result,  the  military 
requirements  of  the  navy  outside  of  the  admin¬ 
istration,  which  has  the  combatant  duties  pressing 
upon  its  attention.  Nautical  qualities,  armament 
and  armour,  speed,  coal  capacity,  provisions  and 
stores,  accommodation  of  crew,  sanitary  provision, 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration  19 


all  these,  with  many  details  attendant  on  each, 
have  their  special  representative  in  the  central 
general  administration.  Beyond  these,  but  not 
specifically  represented  there,  is  the  military  body, 
which  demands,  or  should  demand,  observance 
of  the  pre-eminent  consideration  that  the  ship 
should  be  in  all  respects  fitted  for  the  special 
function  she  is  to  fulfil  in  a  fleet;  that  cruisers,  for 
instance,  should  not  only  be  fast,  but  in  all  things 
contrived  for  celerity  in  their  actions;  that  battle¬ 
ships,  being  meant  to  act  together,  should  not  only 
be  individually  good,  but  essentially  homogeneous, 
especially  in  tactical  qualities.  In  the  report  of  one 
of  the  early  American  Secretaries  it  was  noted, 
as  being  to  the  grave  discredit  of  the  Civil  Admin¬ 
istration  of  the  British  Navy,  that  the  existence  of 
“  numerous  distinct  classes  of  the  same  rate,  as 
well  in  their  hulls  as  in  masts,  sails,  and  equip¬ 
ment,  and  in  a  still  greater  degree  in  their  qualities 
for  combined  action,  demonstrates  the  prevalence 
of  caprice  and  prejudice,  instead  of  science  and 
system.”  Even  the  interchange  of  parts  and  of 
stores,  between  vessels  of  the  same  class,  upon 
which  he  further  comments,  though  perhaps  less 
important  to-day,  is  a  consideration  not  out  of 
date. 

Over  all  hovers,  not  unhealthfully,  the  consider¬ 
ation  of  expense.  A  very  high  official  in  a  navy 


20  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


which  entrusts  to  a  naval  officer  the  final  decisions 
as  to  the  assemblage  of  qualities  said  once  to  me: 
“  With  practically  unlimited  money,  such  as  your 
lucky  nation  can  give,  one  may  go  to  extremes 
in  experiments;  but  limited  as  we  are  in  means, 
and  with  large  establishments,  it  is  necessary  to 
digest  ideas,  to  compromise  on  size,  and  to  settle 
on  a  type.”  In  the  support  thus  given  to  unity  of 
design,  in  ensuring  a  just  predominance  to  military 
considerations,  considerations  that  think  first  of 
the  day  of  battle,  of  the  months  of  campaign, 
of  the  services  of  the  scout,  of  the  evolutions  of 
the  fleet,  of  the  need  for  numbers  as  well  as  for 
individual  size,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  pressure 
of  economy  may  be  an  invaluable  ally. 

The  two  great  oppositions  inherent  in  naval 
administration  —  civil  versus  military,  unity  of 
action  against  multiplicity  of  activities  —  are  but 
a  reflection  of  the  essential  problem  of  warfare. 
A  saying  has  been  attributed  by  Thiers  to  the 
great  Napoleon,  that  the  difficulty  of  the  Art  of 
War  consists  in  concentrating  in  order  to  fight,  and 
disseminating  in  order  to  subsist.  There  is  no 
other,  he  said,  aphoristically.  The  problem  is  one 
of  embracing  opposites.  That  we  have  here  on 
the  one  hand  unity  of  action,  and  on  the  other 
diffusion  of  activities,  in  the  harmonious  combina¬ 
tion  of  which  the  problem  of  war  consists,  is 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration  21 


probably  plain  enough;  but  it  may  be  less  obvious 
how  the  civil  element  enters  where  all  is  apparently 
military.  Nevertheless  it  is  there  in  full  adminis¬ 
trative  force.  The  army  concentrated  to  fight  is 
the  army  unified  in  the  final  action  for  which  it 
exists;  the  military  element  in  full  vigour  and 
predominance,  the  question  of  subsistence  reduced 
for  the  moment  to  the  barest  minimum,  yet  not 
even  so  wholly  discarded.  The  army  disseminated 
to  subsist  is  a  force  for  which  unity  of  action  is 
temporarily  subordinated  to  the  exigency  that  so 
many  men  cannot  live  on  the  resources  of  a  narrow 
district,  in  which  it  camps  or  through  which  it 
marches,  nor  conveniently  receive  even  its  own 
daily  supplies  from  a  single  centre.  Given  over 
now  chiefly  to  subsisting,  against  the  next  call 
for  action,  the  administrative  bodies,  civil  in  func¬ 
tion  if  military  in  rank,  assume  the  predominant 
role.  Nevertheless,  even  here  military  necessity 
exercises  the  prior  control;  for  the  position  of  the 
several  corps,  if  stationary,  or  the  lines  of  march 
of  the  several  columns,  if  in  movement,  must  be 
so  disposed  that  concentration  may  be  effected 
with  a  rapidity  which  shall  defy  an  enemy’s  at¬ 
tempt  to  strike  any  division  in  detail.  This  mili¬ 
tary  requirement,  though  latent,  subjects  to  itself 
the  whole  administrative  regulation,  whatever  the 
inconvenience. 


22  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


In  operations  of  actual  war  the  predominance 
of  the  military  end  in  view  is  easily  maintained, 
and  is  personified  in  the  officer  in  chief  command. 
The  principle  is  settled  that  in  the  field  all  purely 
administrative  bodies,  commonly  called  staff  corps, 
are  under  his  orders.  It  is  less  easy  in  peace  to 
ensure  the  due  balance  between  the  end  and  the 
means;  between  the  action,  and  the  activities 
which  underlie  action.  Administration  then  be¬ 
comes  the  bigger  and  more  imposing  activity, 
with  an  increasing  tendency  to  exist  for  itself 
rather  than  for  the  military  purposes  which  are 
its  sole  reason  for  existence.  One  of  the  greatest 
military  administrators  afloat  that  the  British 
Navy  has  ever  known  was  Admiral  the  Earl  of 
St.  Vincent.  Yet,  when  peace  supervened  during 
his  tenure  of  office  as  First  Lord,  preoccupation 
with  economies  of  administration  so  prevailed  with 
him  that,  when  war  broke  out  again,  the  material 
of  the  Navy  in  ships  and  stores  was  so  deteriorated 
and  exhausted  as  to  impair  dangerously  the  effi¬ 
ciency  of  the  fleets.  It  is  not  that  the  head  has 
ceased  to  be  military,  for  in  war  as  in  peace  the 
military  as  well  as  the  administrative  head  of 
the  navy  may  be  a  civil  official,  as  he  now  is  in 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States;  but  warlike 
action  having  ended,  the  importance  of  keeping 
military  necessities  predominant  is  gradually  sub- 


Principles  oj  Naval  Administration  23 


jected  to  other  considerations.  Yet  in  that  pre¬ 
dominance,  in  whatever  way  assured,  is  to  be 
found  the  unifying  principle  of  a  military  ad¬ 
ministration.  In  the  due  relation  and  subordi¬ 
nation  of  the  two  ideas,  military  and  civil,  unity 
of  action  with  distribution  of  activities  too  copious 
for  one  man’s  discharge,  consists  the  problem 
of  military  and  of  naval  administration.  It 
involves  execution,  concerning  which  it  is  a  com¬ 
monplace  to  say  that  in  its  greatest  efficiency 
it  is  the  function  of  one  solely  responsible;  and 
it  involves  also  organization,  which  by  its  very 
name  implies  multiplicity,  for  organization  is  an 
assemblage  of  organs  among  which  functions  are 
apportioned. 

As  usual,  history  sheds  an  illuminative  ray  on 
this  subject  by  its  narrative  of  progress.  Where 
a  naval  administrative  system  is  the  result  of  a 
natural  evolution,  it  will  usually  be  found  to  begin 
on  a  small  scale,  in  the  hands  of  a  single  person. 
It  has  then  but  one  organ,  however  many  the 
functions.  As  it  progresses  in  scope  and  number 
of  activities,  its  functions  differentiate  more  and 
more  and  it  is  led  to  evolve  organs.  In  the  process 
the  two  ideas  which  we  have  noted  will  be  found 
not  only  to  exist,  but  to  conflict  perpetually.  The 
subordinate  functions  embodied  in  the  problem 
of  maintenance,  however  distributed,  tend  ever 


24  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


to  assert  their  independence  of  one  another  and 
of  the  end  for  which  they  severally  and  collect¬ 
ively  exist.  The  complaint  of  this  tendency 
is  a  part  of  naval  history,  and  finds  its  natural 
voice  in  the  military  sea-going  body,  because  that 
is  the  chief  sufferer. 

The  naval  administration  of  Great  Britain, 
originating  in  a  political  organization  of  much 
lower  type  than  now  obtains,  and  so  continuing 
for  centuries,  affords  the  best  example  of  a  purely 
natural  evolution,  controlled  by  circumstances, 
the  successive  steps  of  which  can  be  very  briefly 
told.  Collated  with  that  of  the  United  States, 
the  contrast  illustrates  by  comparison.  In  the 
reign  of  John  is  first  found  a  single  official,  called 
the  Clerk  of  the  Ships.  He  had  from  time  to 
time  subordinates;  but  as  a  matter  of  organiza¬ 
tion  he  stood  alone,  charged  with  all  the  duties 
connected  with  the  maintenance  of  the  king’s 
ships.  The  navy,  so  far  as  it  existed  independ¬ 
ently  of  a  temporary  assemblage  of  merchant 
vessels  for  a  particular  purpose,  was  then  re¬ 
garded  less  as  national  than  as  the  personal  prop¬ 
erty  of  the  sovereign.  This  very  rudimentary 
civil  administration  lasted  to  the  days  of  Henry 
VIII  .,  who  throughout  his  life  interested  himself 
directly  in  the  development  of  naval  material; 
partly  from  political  recognition  of  the  value  and 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration  25 


scope  of  a  navy  for  England,  partly  through 
personal  bent.  Mr.  Oppenheim,  the  most  search¬ 
ing  investigator  in  this  field,  writes:  “For 
almost  thirty-eight  years,  nearly  every  year 
marked  some  advance  in  construction  or  ad¬ 
ministration,  some  plan  calculated  to  make  the 
navy  a  more  effective  fighting  instrument.” 
This  close  association  would  naturally  make  the 
ruler  aware  when  the  existing  administrative  sys¬ 
tem  had  become  inadequate  to  the  extension  it 
had  received.  Hence,  in  the  last  year  of  his 
reign,  Henry  constituted  a  board  of  five  officers, 
civil  functionaries,  among  whom  were  distributed 
the  various  administrative  duties.  To  this,  with 
considerable  interruptions  under  the  first  Stuarts 
and  the  Commonwealth,  the  care  and  develop¬ 
ment  of  the  material  of  the  navy  was  intrusted 
for  nearly  three  centuries.  The  members  were 
known  as  the  Principal  Officers,  and  later  as  the 
Navy  Board,  their  work  being  done  under  the 
superintendence  of  the  sovereign,  directly  or 
through  a  minister.  The  head  of  the  navy  as  a 
military  force  was  the  Lord  High  Admiral;  but 
in  early  days  that  officer  was  not  necessarily  expert 
in  naval  material,  not  necessarily  a  seaman  at  all, 
nor  the  office  itself  continuous.  He  was  there¬ 
fore  entirely  at  a  disadvantage  in  maintaining  his> 
side  of  any  technical  contention. 


26  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


This  condition  lasted  till  the  Restoration,  when 
the  Duke  of  York,  afterwards  James  II.,  became 
Lord  High  Admiral.  He  was  a  seaman  of  good 
administrative  ability,  and  with  the  personal 
prestige  of  royal  blood.  He  revived  the  Navy 
Board  under  his  own  control.  When  deprived 
of  his  position,  because  a  Roman  Catholic,  the 
office  of  Lord  High  Admiral  was  placed  in  com¬ 
mission;  an  Admiralty  Board,  military  in  char¬ 
acter,  succeeded  to  the  authority  which  the  Duke 
had  established.  From  this  time  there  were  the 
two  Boards,  the  Admiralty  and  the  Navy,  the 
military  and  the  civil.  The  former  was  nominally 
superior;  but  the  latter,  which  comprised  sub¬ 
stantially  all  that  we  call  naval  administration, 
being  older  and  well  established,  succeeded  in 
maintaining  a  position  which  has  been  character¬ 
ized  as  of  more  than  semi-independence.  The 
result  was  a  divided  control,  and  antagonism 
between  the  two  which  represented  respectively 
the  civil  and  military  functions;  nor  was  this 
lessened  by  the  fact  that  members  of  the  Navy 
Board  were  not  infrequently  sea  officers,  who  thus 
passed  into  a  civil  occupation,  practically  abandon¬ 
ing  their  former  profession.  The  fault  inhered 
in  the  system. 

Divided  control  means  divided  responsibility; 
and  that  in  turn  means  no  responsibility,  or  at 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration  27 


least  one  very  hard  to  fix.  The  abuses  that  grew 
up,  especially  in  the  dockyards,  the  effect  of 
which  of  course  was  transmitted  to  the  navy 
that  depended  upon  them,  led  to  a  loud  outcry 
throughout  the  service  towards  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century;  but  horses  are  not  swapped 
when  crossing  streams,  and  the  exigencies  of  the 
great  wars  which  ended  in  1815  made  it  long 
impossible  to  attempt  the  revolutionary  change 
needed.  This  was  carried  out  in  1832  by  the 
Government  which  came  in  with  the  Reform  Bill 
of  1830.  The  spirit  of  the  innovation  was  sum¬ 
marized  in  the  expression,  "  Individual  (undi¬ 
vided)  Responsibility.”  The  Navy  Board  dis¬ 
appeared  altogether.  The  civil  functions  which 
in  the  process  of  centuries  had  accumulated  in 
its  hands,  and  had  culminated  by  successive 
additions  into  a  very  numerous  and  loose  aggre¬ 
gation  of  officials,  were  concentrated  into  five 
heads,  having  separate  and  independent  respon¬ 
sibilities;  in  this  resembling  the  Chiefs  of  Bureau 
in  the  United  States  Naval  Administration.  Each 
of  the  five  was  specifically  under  one  of  the  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  Admiralty  Board,  who  thus  represented 
that  particular  interest  of  the  Navy  in  the  Board 
regarded  as  a  consultative  body.  Admiral  Sir 
Vesey  Hamilton  writes:  '‘This  was  a  consolida¬ 
tion  of  functions  and  a  subordination  of  the  civil 


28  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


branches  to  the  Admiralty  as  a  whole  .  .  .  under 
the  Board  of  Admiralty  collectively  and  under 
the  Lords  individually.”  While  the  First  Lord 
is  a  civilian,  the  majority  of  the  other  members 
of  the  Admiralty  are  naval  officers.  Authority, 
therefore,  is  in  civil  hands,  while  military  influence 
enters  strongly. 

While  I  highly  appreciate  the  value  of  this 
latter  factor,  particularly  as  the  sea  lords  do  not 
consequently  give  up  their  profession,  but  remain 
actively  connected  with  it,  it  appears  to  my  ob¬ 
servation  of  human  nature  that  the  system  has 
some  of  the  disadvantages  of  a  council  of  war,  tend¬ 
ing  to  make  responsibility  elusive.  I  question,  in 
short,  the  entire  soundness  of  a  scheme  which  by 
its  nature,  if  not  by  specific  provision,  inclines 
to  place  executive  action  in  the  hands  of  a  con¬ 
sultative  body.  It  seems  to  sap  individual  re¬ 
sponsibility;  not  perhaps  in  subordinates,  but, 
what  is  much  worse,  in  the  head,  in  the  com¬ 
mander-in-chief  of  the  administration,  upon  whom 
depend  the  great  determinative  lines  of  provi¬ 
sion  and  of  policy.  In  conception,  the  Admiralty 
is  primarily  a  Board,  secondarily  individual 
members.  For  individual  responsibility  at  the 
head,  too  much  depends  upon  the  personality 
of  the  First  Lord,  too  little  upon  his  position. 
Since  these  lines  were  first  written,  five  years  ago, 


Principles  oj  Naval  Administration  29 


it  may  fairly  be  inferred,  from  the  language  of  the 
English  Press,  that  very  decisive  changes  of  policy 
have  been  adopted  which  are  attributed  popularly, 
and  even  professionally,  to  the  dominating  influ¬ 
ence  of  one  of  the  “  Sea  ”  Lords.  During  a  brief 
period  in  1827,  as  two  centuries  before,  an  arrange¬ 
ment  more  formally  ideal  obtained.  The  Duke 
of  Clarence,  afterwards  William  IV.,  being  ap¬ 
pointed  Lord  High  Admiral,  the  Admiralty  Board 
lapsed  as  a  board  and  became  his  council.  The 
modification  here  made  in  deference  to  royal 
blood  might  well  serve  as  a  model  for  naval  ad¬ 
ministration;  a  head  with  advisers  feels  respon¬ 
sibility  more  than  a  head  with  associates.  It  should 
go  without  saying  that  in  any  case  the  head  must 
be  good. 

In  the  United  States  Naval  Administration  the 
head  is  one  man,  with  no  division  of  responsibility. 
His  own  superior,  the  President,  may  control 
his  action,  as  may  Congress  by  law;  but  this,  as 
far  as  it  goes,  is  simply  a  transfer  of  responsibility 
in  its  entirety.  It  is  not  a  division.  The  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  has  no  associates,  but  he  has  sub¬ 
ordinates.  In  them  he  has  capable  advisers,  so 
far  as  he  chooses  to  use  them;  but  he  can  transfer 
to  them  no  responsibility,  except  that  of  doing  as 
he  tells  them.  The  responsibility  of  decision  is 
his  alone.  The  law  constitutes  them  subordinate 


30  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


executive  officers,  just  as  it  constitutes  a  lieutenant 
in  the  navy;  but  it  does  not  constitute  them  ad¬ 
visers,  and  there  is  in  their  position  nothing  which 
compels  the  Secretary  to  hear  their  advice,  still 
less  to  accept  it.  Each  is  independent  of  the 
others,  and  there  is  nothing  in  law  to  compel 
conference  between  them.  The  Secretary  may 
assemble  them,  or  any  number  of  them,  as  a  board 
for  consultation,  in  his  presence  or  otherwise; 
but  there  is  nothing  in  the  system  which  obliges 
him  to  do  so.  Unity  of  action  between  several 
naval  technical  experts,  each  of  whom  is  repre¬ 
sented  in  the  planning  and  maintenance  of  every 
naval  vessel,  and  some  in  every  element  of  naval 
military  efficiency,  depends  entirely  upon  the 
co-ordinating  force  of  the  Secretary,  who  is  a 
civilian,  possibly  with  only  more  or  less  outside 
knowledge  of  the  subject.  The  system  provides 
no  strictly  professional  unifying  force,  such  as 
the  Board  of  Admiralty,  which  has  a  numerical 
preponderance  of  combatant  sea-officers,  each 
of  whom  has  in  individual  control  one  or  more 
of  the  technical  administrative  departments,  and 
may  be  supposed  therefore  to  be  fully  informed 
of  its  arguments  in  any  technical  matter  under 
discussion.  The  constitution  of  the  Admiralty 
Board  also  ensures  that  all  technical  details  and 
their  effect  upon  naval  efficiency  shall  be  scruti- 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration  31 


nized  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  men  who  shall 
do  the  work  of  war.  The  American  plan  fixes 
the  very  strictest  individual  responsibility  in  the 
Secretary,  and  in  his  principal  subordinates,  the 
chiefs  of  bureau.  His  duties  are  universal  and 
supreme,  theirs  sharply  defined  and  mutually 
independent.  This  result  appears  to  me  superior 
to  the  British,  but  it  has  the  defects  of  its  qualities; 
not  too  much  independence  in  responsibility,  but, 
so  far  as  the  system  goes,  too  little  co-ordination. 
As  I  said  of  the  responsibility  of  the  First  Lord, 
unity  of  action  depends  too  much  on  the  person¬ 
ality  of  the  Secretary. 

The  naval  administration  of  the  United  States 
has  also  a  history;  one  less  of  evolution  than  of 
successive  methods,  compressed  within  a  very 
few  years.  The  evolution  has  been  simply  a 
progressive  experience,  with  results  formulated 
in  ordinances.  The  navy  of  the  War  of  Inde¬ 
pendence  disappeared  entirely,  and  with  it  the 
several  systems  upon  which  Congress  had  at¬ 
tempted  to  administer  it.  In  the  first  organiza¬ 
tion  of  the  new  Government,  no  provision  was 
made  for  a  navy.  When  the  truce  between  Portu¬ 
gal  and  Algiers  in  1793  took  from  American  ship¬ 
ping  in  the  Mediterranean  the  incidental  protec¬ 
tion  of  the  Portuguese  navy,  it  was  resolved  to 
build  six  frigates;  but  as  this  was  to  be  only  a 


32  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


temporary  force,  not  to  be  continued  in  case  a 
peaceful  arrangement  with  the  piratical  community 
could  be  made,  the  administrative  care  of  the 
vessels  was  attached  to  the  War  Department. 
It  was  not  until  the  oppression  of  the  French 
Revolutionary  Government  upon  neutral  com¬ 
merce  culminated  in  the  decree  of  January,  1798, 
making  any  neutral  vessel  lawful  prize  if  it  had  on 
board  a  single  article  of  English  origin,  that  the 
United  States  determined  to  have  a  navy.  On 
April  27,  1798,  Congress  authorized  the  President 
to  build,  or  to  obtain,  twelve  vessels  of  a  force 
not  exceeding  twenty-two  guns  each;  and  on 
April  30  the  office  of  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
was  established  by  law.  The  first  Secretary 
entered  on  his  duties  the  following  June.  Until 
the  close  of  the  War  of  1812,  the  Secretary  in  person, 
like  the  Clerk  of  the  Ships,  was  the  naval  admin¬ 
istration.  He  no  doubt  had  assistants  and  ob¬ 
tained  assistance,  technical  and  military,  from 
experts  of  both  classes;  but  function  had  not  yet 
differentiated  into  organization,  and  he  not  only 
was  responsible,  but  had  to  give  personal  attention 
to  various  and  trivial  details  of  most  diverse  char¬ 
acter,  which  overburdened  him  by  their  mass,  and 
prevented  concentration  of  attention  upon  the  really 
great  matters  of  his  office.  A  difficulty  such  as  this 
of  course  reached  its  height  under  the  pressure 


Principles  oj  Naval  Administration  33 


of  war,  and  led  to  the  first  statutory  expansion 
of  the  system.  The  duties  of  the  Secretary,  as  a 
later  incumbent  of  the  office  wrote,  arrange  them¬ 
selves  under  two  distinct  heads.  First  in  impor¬ 
tance  are  those  connected  with  the  more  compre¬ 
hensive  interests  of  the  State,  the  general  policy 
of  the  navy  involved  in  the  increase  of  the  fleet, 
its  employment  and  distribution  when  created. 
Subordinate  to  these  are  the  functions  connected 
with  the  construction,  equipment,  and  mainte¬ 
nance  of  naval  force;  the  designing,  building, 
arming,  and  manning  of  ships.  These  latter  are 
strictly  technical;  but  the  policy  is  not.  It  there¬ 
fore  may  be  adequately  grasped  by  a  person  with¬ 
out  antecedent  professional  requirements,  which 
the  Secretary  often  must  be. 

In  this  analysis  it  is  easy  to  recognize  the  dual 
functions  of  the  British  Admiralty  and  Navy 
Board  before  consolidation.  It  is  correct  as  far 
as  it  goes,  and  was  sufficiently  comprehensive 
for  the  time,  1842,  when  it  was  written.  The 
naval  seaman  then  might,  and  very  shortly  before 
did,  receive  the  ship  from  the  builder  a  bare  shell; 
he  was  expected  to  be  able  to  mast  her,  rig  her, 
stow  her,  mount  her  guns,  bend  her  sails,  as  well 
as  to  take  her  to  sea,  handle  her,  and  fight  her. 
The  military  and  technical  parts  of  the  profession 
were  so  closely  entwined  in  the  same  men  that  to 


34  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


suggest  a  distinction  between  them,  however  real, 
would  have  seemed  superfluous.  Even  in  those 
days  of  very  simple  construction  and  armament, 
however,  the  evil  effects  of  valuing  the  technical 
above  the  military  was  anticipated  by  some. 
“  Keep  them  at  sea,”  said  Lord  St.  Vincent,  “  and 
they  cannot  help  being  seamen;  but  care  must  be 
taken  to  ensure  efficiency  at  the  guns.”  In  1812 
neglect  of  this  wise  maxim  showed  its  results  to 
the  British.  Since  1842  the  immense  technical 
advances  in  all  matters  connected  with  naval 
construction,  propulsion,  and  armament  have 
tended,  by  their  exaltation  of  the  technical  con¬ 
tribution  to  naval  power,  to  depreciate  in  popular 
recognition  the  element  of  military  efficiency. 
Yet,  so  long  as  navies  remain  they  will  exist 
for  fighting;  the  military  considerations  being  the 
end,  they  must  necessarily  continue  supreme. 
Naval  administration,  to  be  successful,  must  in 
its  constitution  reflect  this  condition.  A  necessary 
antecedent  to  doing  so  is  the  intellectual  apprecia¬ 
tion  of  the  relation  of  civil  to  military  in  a  service 
essentially  military;  and  not  merely  in  the  internal 
politics  of  a  nation.  Upon  this  must  follow 
formal  provision  for  the  due  representation  of 
both  in  the  system.  This  is  doubly  requisite, 
because  administration,  being  essentially  civil  in 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration  35 


function,  will  not  of  itself  evolve  military  energy. 
This  must  be  injected  by  design. 

The  American  naval  captains  of  1815  had  shown 
themselves  thorough  masters  in  practice  of  all 
sides  of  their  profession,  technical  and  military. 
They  had  learned  in  experience  the  essential 
underlying  principles  affecting  the  nautical  quali¬ 
ties  of  ships,  as  distinguished  from  the  mechanical 
processes  of  putting  them  together  by  the  ship 
builder.  They,  therefore,  were  fitted  to  oversee 
the  part  of  administration  “  connected  with  the 
construction  of  naval  force,”  as  well  as  the  “  equip¬ 
ment  and  maintenance.”  To  entrust  this  duty 
to  one  of  them,  or  to  a  board  of  several,  was  a 
recourse  so  natural  that  in  1801  it  had  been 
recommended  by  the  first  Secretary,  after  two  years 
incumbency.  “  The  business  of  the  Navy  De¬ 
partment  embraces  too  many  objects  for  the 
superintendence  of  one  person.  The  public  in¬ 
terest  has  suffered.  The  establishment  of  a  board 
of  three  or  five  experienced  navy  officers  to  super¬ 
intend  such  parts  of  the  duties  as  nautical  men  are 
best  qualified  to  understand  would  be  a  saving 
to  the  public.”  Such  a  board,  by  the  authority 
that  attaches  to  a  constituted  organ  as  distinct 
from  the  purely  personal,  unorganized,  and  un¬ 
authorized  efforts  of  single  officers,  might  have 
saved  the  country  from  the  gigantic  administrative 


36  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


mistake,  essentially  military  in  its  effects  on  effi¬ 
ciency,  of  building  gunboats  to  the  exclusion  of 
seagoing  ships;  locking  up  in  a  body  of  two  hun¬ 
dred  vessels,  impotent,  singly  and  collectively, 
officers  and  men  sufficient,  by  a  later  Secretary’s 
report,  to  man  thirteen  ships-of-the-line. 

The  recommendation  of  1801  fell  fruitless. 
There  followed  eight  years  of  a  President  who 
held  navies  in  abhorrence,  as  at  the  best  barely 
tolerable  evils.  The  War  of  1812,  with  the  vastly 
increased  burden  laid  upon  the  Secretary,  em¬ 
phasized  the  necessity  of  relief.  By  an  Act  of 
February  7,  1815,  there  was  constituted  a  Board 
of  Navy  Commissioners,  placed  explicitly  under 
the  superintendence  of  the  Secretary;  to  act  as 
his  agent,  or,  to  use  the  terms  of  the  Act,  “  to 
discharge  all  the  ministerial  duties  ”  of  his  office, 
to  which  further  it  was  expressly  “  attached.” 
Subordination  could  scarcely  be  more  distinctly 
affirmed.  Its  composition  was  purely  military, 
three  sea-officers  of  the  rank  of  captain,  then  the 
highest  in  the  Navy;  but  its  duties  were  civil  in 
character,  and  to  define  them  the  Act  quoted 
verbatim  the  terms  of  the  law  of  1798,  which 
created  the  Secretary’s  own  position:  “  All  matters 
connected  with  the  naval  establishment  of  the 
United  States.”  The  “  establishment  ”  is  the 
entire  organization  of  the  navy,  dockyards  and 


Principles  0}  Naval  Administration  37 


ships,  material  and  personnel,  from  inception 
to  completion,  considered  apart  from  its  active 
use  for  national  policy.  The  use  of  this  com¬ 
pleted  instrument  is  a  military  attribute,  and 
is,  of  course,  in  the  hands  of  the  constitu¬ 
tional  Commander-in-Chief,  the  President,  who 
may  exercise  his  office  through  the  Secretary 
or  such  other  person  as  he  selects. 

There  was  much  good  in  this  plan.  It  preserved 
the  single  accountability  of  the  Secretary,  provided 
him  with  the  responsible  assistance  of  a  compe¬ 
tent  board  of  experts,  and  secured  due  influence 
to  military  considerations  in  a  quarter  where 
they  tend  to  disappear.  The  grave  defect  was  that 
the  Board’s  responsibility  was  collective,  not 
individual;  and  its  action  in  all  matters  was 
joint,  not  several.  There  was  no  division  of  execu¬ 
tive  functions.  Everything  done  was  the  act  of 
all.  It  needs  but  little  experience  of  life  to  know 
that  under  such  circumstances  decision  is  inevi¬ 
tably  slow,  that  action  shares  the  defect,  and  that 
the  more  positive  and  the  firmer  the  individual 
members  in  their  convictions,  the  more  dilatory 
the  machine,  by  the  protraction  of  discussion. 
Ordinarily,  in  practice,  some  corrective  is  found 
in  the  disposition  of  one  or  more  of  any  three 
to  submit  to  the  stronger  character  of  another; 
and  one  or  two  will  take  the  most  of  the  work  for 


38  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


the  sake  of  exercising  all  the  power.  But  such  a 
result  neither  removes  the  evil  of  a  joint  responsi¬ 
bility,  nor  attains  the  beneficial  result  of  dividing 
the  administrative  labor.  Responsibility,  which 
should  be  single,  was  divided  among  three;  and 
activities  beyond  the  ability  of  one,  instead  of 
being  apportioned,  remained  the  charge  of  all, 
and  therefore  of  each. 

Thus  examined,  the  legislation  of  1815  is  seen 
to  signalize  the  second  step  in  the  process  of 
evolution,  which  it  would  seem  must  characterize 
the  process  of  a  military  administration  that 
springs  from  and  follows  the  natural  development 
of  national  wants.  First  the  one  man,  the  agent  of 
the  government;  the  seed  in  which,  for  the  time, 
are  embraced  all  the  potential  administrative 
functions.  These  in  last  analysis  are  reduced  to 
two  —  the  civil  and  military;  all  purely  technical 
work  falling  under  the  former  head.  As  the  office 
grows,  and  outstrips  the  knowledge  and  power 
of  one  man,  the  next  step  is  to  provide  him  a  body 
of  assistants  to  take  upon  them  severally  and  col¬ 
lectively  the  distinctively  technical  work,  which 
the  actual  incumbent,  either  through  ignorance 
or  pressure  of  occupation,  is  unable  to  discharge. 
The  Principal  Officers  of  Henry  VIII.  represent 
the  same  stage  as  the  Navy  Commissioners  of  the 
United  States. 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration  39 


This  first  differentiation  brings  out  at  once 
the  fact  that,  whatever  the  personal  status  of  the 
chief,  whether  civil  or  military,  his  office  is  essen¬ 
tially  military;  for  in  the  distribution  of  functions 
there  is  necessarily  reserved  to  his  immediate  care 
just  those  which  are  essentially  military  :  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  the  navy,  when  created.  All  that  relates 
to  the  establishment,  to  the  creation  and  mainte¬ 
nance  of  the  fleet  and  dockyards,  is  the  particular 
charge  of  the  technical  assistants;  and  this  is  essen¬ 
tially  a  civil  function,  even  though  the  officers 
entrusted  with  it  be  military  men.  This  is  the 
essence  of  the  step  taken  by  Henry  VIII.,  when 
he  called  into  being  the  Principal  Officers,  who 
became  the  Navy  Board.  In  the  then  compara¬ 
tively  simple  organization  of  the  state,  the  sover¬ 
eign,  who  was  the  actual  principal  and  head  of 
the  office,  instituted  in  the  place  of  a  single  inexpert 
official  a  body  of  technical  expert  agents,  answer- 
able  to  himself  in  person,  or  to  his  representative. 
In  the  military  direction  they  had  no  share;  it 
remained  in  his  hands,  to  be  exercised  directly 
or  by  such  person  as  he  might  designate.  Quite 
unconsciously,  in  both  the  British  and  American 
navies,  by  the  simple  logic  of  facts  and  felt  neces¬ 
sities,  and  not  as  a  result  of  previous  analysis,  the 
first  expansion  comes  by  aiding  the  head  of  the 
navy  in  the  technical  cares  of  the  establishment, 


40  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


and  leaving  to  him  in  their  entirety  the  military 
attributes  of  the  service.  Although  the  American 
Secretary  is  by  personal  status  a  civilian,  and 
retains  full  supervisory  control  of  all  technical 
matters,  his  immediate  duties  are  comprehen¬ 
sively  military.  They  have  so  remained  since 
the  first  expansion  of  his  administrative  staff. 

The  tree  of  naval  administration  in  the  United 
States  had  thus  begun  to  grow.  It  had  put  forth 
a  stem  in  which  were  latent  the  branches  that 
were  yet  to  be.  The  merits  and  defects  of  the 
scheme  have  been  indicated.  The  lapse  of  time 
emphasized  shortcomings,  and  gave  rise  to  com¬ 
plaints  which  increased  yearly  in  volume.  The 
Secretary,  however,  could  maintain  a  judicial 
attitude  towards  the  whole  controversy,  because 
it  involved  simply  the  best  means  of  giving  him 
the  technical  assistance  needed.  His  official 
supremacy  had  been  preserved,  and  was  not 
threatened.  In  the  discussion  preceding  the  Act 
of  1815,  the  suggestion  that  he  should  be,  ex- 
officio,  the  president  of  his  board  of  technical 
experts,  had  been  advanced  by  Commodore 
Decatur,  whose  distinguished  name  was  supported 
in  this  by  the  equally  strong  ones  of  Perry,  War¬ 
rington,  and  David  Porter.  The  proposition  was 
renewed  in  Congress  in  1820,  but  the  committee 
to  whom  it  was  referred  placed  the  matter  sue- 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration  41 


cinctly  on  the  proper  basis.  “  If  the  Secretary 
were  a  constituted  part  of  the  Board,”  a  member 
among  other  members,  “  and  at  the  same  time 
possessed  the  control  and  superintendence  of  its 
proceedings,  the  commissioners  would  be  little 
more  than  advisory,  and  in  that  proportion  bereft 
of  responsibility.”  If,  on  the  contrary,  he  was 
simply  a  presiding  officer,  with  a  casting  vote,  “  the 
benefit  derived  from  the  superintendence  of  one 
officer  over  others,  under  distinct  responsibilities, 
would  be  entirely  lost.” 

The  corporate  direct  responsibility  of  the  Board, 
under  and  to  the  Secretary,  had  been  thus  by 
statute  preserved  distinct  and  unimpaired.  Later 
secretaries  were  therefore  able  to  discuss  the  ques¬ 
tion  of  modification  without  sense  of  personal 
jealousy,  as  distinguished  from  official  interest; 
and  the  change  which  constituted  the  next  stage 
of  development  was  recommended  on  the  ground 
of  well-proved  faults  in  the  system,  not  in  individ¬ 
uals.  “  Not  only  has  there  been  defect  of  individ¬ 
ual  responsibility  to  the  public,  but  a  vast  accumu¬ 
lation  of  labor;  since  each  member,  being  an¬ 
swerable  alike  for  the  action  of  the  whole,  became 
equally  involved  in  an  obligation  to  take  personal 
cognizance  of  everything  that  was  done.  Under 
these  circumstances  it  has  been  impossible  to  go 
through  the  great  and  increasing  mass  of  business 


42  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


which  inevitably  devolved  upon  them  with  the 
decision  and  promptitude  required.”  As  the 
nation  grew  the  naval  administration  had  ex¬ 
panded;  and  inherent  errors  of  system,  tolerable 
on  a  small  scale,  became  unendurable  on  a  large. 

Mr.  Paulding,  the  Secretary,  whose  words 
written  in  1839  have  just  been  quoted,  recom¬ 
mended  the  adoption  of  measures  to  ensure  in¬ 
dividual  responsibility,  which,  it  will  be  recalled, 
was  the  watchword  of  the  corresponding  change 
of  system  in  the  British  administration  in  1832. 
He  emphasized  also  the  need  of  a  division  of 
labor,  “  a  classification  and  distribution  of 
duties,”  which  likewise  was  a  distinct,  though  not 
the  dominant,  note  of  the  British  reformation.  In 
this  third  stage  of  evolution  there  continues  in  the 
two  nations  the  parallelism  of  cause  and  effect 
noted  in  the  second.  The  action  of  each,  however, 
was  modified  by  its  constitutional  tradition,  and 
the  American  was  more  radical  than  the  British. 
The  board  system  disappeared  altogether,  giving 
place  to  that  of  bureaus,  mutually  independent. 
No  statutory  provision  for  their  co-operation 
exists,  except  in  the  supreme  control  of  the  Secre¬ 
tary.  The  essence  of  the  new  system  was  the 
constitution,  under  a  single  head,  of  several  dis¬ 
tinct  agents,  with  duties  sharply  defined,  and  with 
individual  responsibility.  Among  these  was  to 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration  43 


be  divided  a  mass  of  work,  hitherto  in  charge 
of  a  single  body,  which  both  in  executive  action 
and  in  responsibility  had  been  collective,  not  in¬ 
dividual. 

The  details  of  this  system,  which  still  obtains, 
are  relatively  unimportant;  but  a  brief  statement 
of  their  historical  development  throws  light  upon 
the  general  problem  of  naval  administration. 
Mr.  Paulding  recommended  three  bureaus,  cor¬ 
responding  in  number  to  the  former  commission¬ 
ers.  To  one  he  assigned  the  construction,  equip¬ 
ment,  and  maintenance  of  ships  of  war;  to  the 
second  the  maintenance  and  development  of 
navy  yards,  hospitals,  magazines,  etc.;  to  the 
third  the  purchase,  manufacture,  and  supply  of 
stores  of  all  kinds  to  the  navy.  These  will  be 
seen  to  correspond  to  (i)  the  naval  establishment 
afloat,  (2)  to  that  ashore,  and  (3)  to  the  furnishing 
of  supplies  for  both.  Over  each  of  the  first  two  he 
placed  a  sea-officer,  with  one  technical  subordin¬ 
ate;  this  assistant  to  the  first  to  be  a  naval  con¬ 
structor,  to  the  second  a  civil  engineer.  For  the 
third  bureau  there  was  to  be  a  “  chief,”  —  a 
term  evidently  chosen  to  admit  a  civilian,  —  and 
under  him  three  technical  subordinates,  viz. :  a 
naval  captain  as  inspector  of  ordnance,  a  naval 
captain  as  hydrographer,  and  a  surgeon  to  super¬ 
intend  the  provision  of  medical  stores.  This 


44  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


differentiation  of  the  duties  of  the  Board  into 
three  branches  represents  a  minimum  of  change; 
while  the  association  of  technical  subordinates 
to  each  of  the  three  heads  so  much  resembles  the 
British  Admiralty  scheme  of  1832  as  to  suggest  ir¬ 
resistibly  that  the  Secretary  had  had  this  under 
consideration;  as  he  very  properly  might.  His 
successor,  however,  thought  that  the  duties  thus 
distributed  would  be  too  much  for  the  several 
bureaus;  and  of  course  individual  responsibility, 
though  expressed  by  statute,  ceases  to  be  actual 
when  the  load  imposed  is  more  than  one  man 
can  bear. 

This  raises  again  the  question,  irrepressible 
because  one  of  proportion,  between  unity  of  action 
and  a  distribution  of  activities,  framed  to  ensure 
individual  responsibility.  The  more  numerous 
the  bureaus,  the  more  numerous  the  discordant 
wills  and  interests  that  must  be  made  to  act  to¬ 
gether;  but  if  they  be  too  few,  and  their  several 
charges  too  weighty,  there  results  for  the  chiefs, 
as  for  the  Secretary  before  1815,  the  necessity 
of  devolving  work  on  non-responsible  subordinates. 
Responsibility  lapses.  The  present  (1903)  Con¬ 
gress  has  had  to  review  the  same  line  of  thought, 
with  reference  to  the  proposition  of  a  recent  Secre¬ 
tary  to  consolidate  three  of  the  bureaus  now  exist¬ 
ing.  Consolidation  would  tend  to  bring  their 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration  45 


several  activities  into  harmony;  but  on  the  other 
hand  there  is  the  question  whether  the  whole 
might  not  be  too  much  for  one  man’s  reasonable 
responsibility.  It  is  to  be  remembered  that  the 
responsibility  of  a  bureau  chief  is  more  precise, 
more  detailed  and  immediate,  than  the  general 
responsibility  of  the  Secretary,  just  because  the 
field  allotted  to  him  is  restricted.  There  is  the. 
further  question,  more  urgent  in  public  than  in 
private  business,  as  to  the  amount  of  power  in¬ 
volving  expenditure  to  be  left  in  a  single  hand. 
After  discussion,  Congress  in  1842  established  five 
bureaus,  and  in  1862,  under  the  pressure  of  the 
War  of  Secession,  increased  them  to  eight,  the  num¬ 
ber  which  now  exists.  The  history  of  the  consider¬ 
ations  which  governed  this  further  development, 
though  instructive  and  useful,  is  not  essential. 
When  first  instituted,  it  was  stated  specifically 
that  the  bureaus  were  not  intended  to  perform  any 
more  or  different  duties  than  those  heretofore 
entrusted  to  the  Board  of  Commissioners.  As 
the  functions  of  the  latter  had  been  defined,  in 
1815,  in  words  taken  from  the  Act  of  1798,  con¬ 
stituting  the  office  of  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
continuity  of  legislation  was  preserved  through¬ 
out;  above  all  in  the  important  matter  of  not 
impairing  the  sole  control  of  the  Secretary.  The 
aim  was  simply  to  facilitate  business  by  a  division 


46  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


of  labor,  ensuring  at  the  same  time  personal 
responsibility  everywhere. 

It  is  to  the  spirit,  and  the  underlying  principles, 
that  I  have  thought  it  instructive  to  direct  atten¬ 
tion,  rather  than  to  the  details  of  their  application, 
in  the  subdivision  of  administrative  work.  It 
has  been  wisely  observed  by  Sir  John  Seeley  that 
“  public  understanding  is  necessarily  guided  by  a 
few  large,  plain,  simple  ideas.  When  great  inter¬ 
ests  are  plain,  and  great  maxims  of  government 
unmistakable,  public  opinion  may  be  able  to  judge 
securely  even  in  questions  of  vast  magnitude.” 
The  United  States  system  of  naval  administration 
has  progressed  successively,  and  without  breach 
of  legislative  continuity,  from  the  simple  rudi¬ 
mentary  organ,  the  one  man,  in  whom  all  func¬ 
tions  as  well  as  all  responsibility  were  centred, 
through  the  phase  of  a  complex  organ  with  aggre¬ 
gate  functions  and  responsibilities,  defined,  but 
still  undifferentiated,  into  an  organization  elabo¬ 
rate  in  form,  if  not  final  in  development.  The 
process  has  been  from  first  to  last  consistent  in 
principle.  The  sole  control  and  single  responsi¬ 
bility  of  the  Secretary  —  the  representative  of  the 
President  —  have  been  preserved  throughout,  and 
all  other  responsibility  is,  and  has  been,  not  only 
subordinate  to  him  but  derivative  from  him,  as  a 
branch  derives  its  being  from  the  root.  Moreover, 


Principles  of  Naval  Administration  47 


consistency  has  also  been  maintained  in  restrict¬ 
ing  the  administration  thus  evolved  to  the  civil 
function  which  it  essentially  is.  From  the  first 
departure,  in  the  institution  of  the  Board  of  Com¬ 
missioners,  to  the  present  time,  it  has  not  had 
military  authority  properly  so  called.  It  has  had 
necessary  authority  in  matters  pertaining  to  a 
military  establishment,  but  it  has  had  no  direction 
of  activities  in  themselves  essentially  military; 
that  has  remained  with  the  Secretary,  and  is  by 
him  transferred  only  to  officers  properly  military 
in  function.  Finally,  the  principle  of  particular 
responsibility  has  been  strictly  followed.  Within 
the  limits  of  the  duty  assigned,  the  corporate 
responsibility  of  the  Board  in  its  day  was,  and  the 
individual  responsibility  of  each  bureau  chief  now 
is,  as  certain  and  defined  as  that  of  the  Secretary. 

The  defect  of  the  system  is  that  no  means  is 
provided  for  co-ordinating  the  action  of  the  bu¬ 
reaus,  except  the  single  authority  of  the  Secretary. 
This,  in  his  beginning  days  of  inexperience,  to¬ 
gether  with  his  preoccupations  with  the  numerous 
collateral  engagements  attendant  upon  all  posi¬ 
tions  of  public  responsibility,  will  most  usually 
be  inadequate  to  the  task.  To  indicate  a  defect 
is  not  to  prescribe  a  remedy;  and  the  purpose 
of  this  article  is  to  show  things  as  they  are,  not  to 
advocate  particular  changes.  One  of  the  ablest 


48  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


administrative  sea-officers,  both  afloat  and  ashore, 
that  I  have  known  in  my  professional  career, 
stated  before  a  Congressional  committee  that  he 
had  “  always  believed  it  would  be  wise  to  have  a 
board  of  five  officers  for  the  purpose  of  harmoniz¬ 
ing  difficulties  between  bureaus,  settling  upon 
a  ship-building  policy,  and  other  matters  that 
embarrass  the  head  of  the  Department  on  account 
of  a  lack  of  professional  knowledge.”  I  do  not 
undertake  to  pass  an  opinion  upon  this  particular 
suggestion,  but  confine  myself  to  remarking  that 
the  fault  in  the  system  certainly  exists,  and  that 
any  remedy  requires  the  careful  observance  of  two 
points:  I,  that  the  adviser,  one  or  a  board,  be 
wholly  clear  of  administrative  activity;  and,  2, 
that  he  or  they  be  advisers  only,  pure  and  simple, 
with  no  power  to  affect  the  individual  responsibility 
of  decision.  This  must  be  preserved  under  what¬ 
ever  method,  as  the  Secretary’s  privilege  as  well 
as  his  obligation. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  NAVY 
DEPARTMENT 


THE  UNITED  STATES  NAVY  DEPART¬ 
MENT 


February,  1903 


IN  the  United  States,  the  Navy  Department 
is  the  constituted  organ  of  the  government 
for  administering  the  navy.  Naval  administra¬ 
tion  exists  for  the  purpose  of  providing  a  nation 
with  an  effective  navy.  Incidentally  it  also 
administers  —  directs  —  the  navy  which  it  has 
created  and  maintains.  Provision  is  the  object, 
administration  the  method;  the  one  is  the  end, 
the  other  the  means.  It  is  desirable  to  keep  intel¬ 
ligently  and  continually  in  mind  the  distinction 
between  the  two;  for  an  invariable  experience 
teaches  that  the  tendency  of  mankind,  and  es¬ 
pecially  of  administrators,  is  to  confound  them. 
Not  only  so,  but  even  to  raise  the  means  into  the 
seat  of  the  end;  usurpation  by  gradual  revolution. 
Administration  inclines  to  lose  itself  in  itself,  for¬ 
getful  of  the  end  for  which  it  has  been  established. 
It  is  essential  to  guard  against  this  error,  by  keeping 
the  end  always  in  the  foreground  of  consciousness, 


61 


52  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


as  being  the  standard  or  test  by  which  administra¬ 
tive  methods  are  to  be  judged. 

The  method  of  naval  administration  now  in  force 
in  the  United  States  is  the  outcome  of  a  gradual 
development,  into  the  particulars  of  which  it  is 
unnecessary  to  enter.  We  are  to  deal  with  the 
present;  with  historical  antecedents  only  so  far 
as  to  throw  light  on  existing  conditions.  The 
Navy  Department  began  with  the  institution  of 
the  office  of  Secretary  in  1798,  when,  also,  the  first 
incumbent  was  appointed;  and  after  various 
experiences  it  reached  its  present  constitution  in 
1842.  Since  then  it  has  remained  fixed  in  funda¬ 
mental  principles;  but  has  been  subject,  necessa¬ 
rily,  to  occasional  considerable  changes  of  detail 
and  adjustment,  as  the  navy  has  grown  with  the 
nation’s  growth,  and  as  naval  science  has  become 
more  complicated  in  its  demands.  The  gradual 
advance  of  the  world  in  the  mechanical  arts  has 
brought  with  it  a  corresponding  application  of 
those  arts  to  maritime  development  in  general, 
and  to  naval  warfare  in  particular. 

The  general  system  is  as  follows :  The  President 
being,  by  the  Constitution,  commander-in-chief 
of  the  army  and  navy,  Congress  has  created  by 
law  the  office  of  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  a  single 
person,  who  relieves  the  President  of  the  burden 
of  details.  These  details  are  of  two  principal  kinds; 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


53 


namely,  those  that  concern  the  operations  of  the 
fleet  all  over  the  world,  in  peace  and  in  war,  which 
is  the  military  side  of  naval  administration,  and 
those  that  relate  to  the  creation  and  preservation  of 
material  in  its  several  varieties,  —  ships,  guns, 
engines,  etc.,  —  which  is  the  civil  side.  As  the 
aggregation  of  duties  under  these  two  heads  has 
been  found  in  practice  far  too  great  for  any  one 
man  to  discharge,  they  have  been  again  sub¬ 
divided  by  law.  For  this  purpose  there  exist  side 
by  side  two  systems,  military  and  civil,  the  Secre¬ 
tary  being  at  the  head  of  both,  as  the  representative 
of  the  President.  For  the  management  of  the  fleet 
in  active  service,  in  peace  as  in  war,  the  end  for 
which  the  navy  exists,  the  stream  of  control 
descends  through  admirals,  captains,  and  their 
subordinate  officers.  Each  of  these,  in  the  measure 
of  his  particular  authority,  which  is  regulated 
by  law,  represents  the  Secretary,  as  the  Secretary 
does  the  President. 

In  practice,  the  extent  of  ocean  in  which  the 
United  States  habitually  maintains  forces  for 
the  benefit  of  American  interests  is  divided  into 
districts,  called  stations,  mutually  independent; 
that  is  to  say,  in  each  such  district  there  is  one 
officer  in  supreme  command  of  the  whole,  usually 
an  admiral,  responsible  directly  and  solely  to 
the  Secretary.  With  him  the  officers  in  similar 


54  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


command  of  other  districts  have  in  general  no 
authority  to  interfere.  If,  by  particular  circum¬ 
stances,  it  becomes  necessary  for  the  squadron  of 
one  such  admiral  to  go,  in  whole  or  in  part,  into 
the  sphere  of  another,  the  rule  is  that  the  one  senior 
in  rank  takes  command  of  the  joint  forces.  The 
independence  of  undivided  command  does  not 
then  cease;  it  is  simply  transferred.  Such  excep¬ 
tional  cases  do  not  invalidate  the  general  state¬ 
ment  of  the  independence  of  each  station.  If  the 
commander  of  one,  say  the  Asiatic  Station,  has 
incidentally  to  pass  through  the  district  com¬ 
manded  by  a  junior,  as,  for  instance,  going  through 
the  Mediterranean  on  his  way  to  the  East,  he  may 
indeed  by  his  temporary  presence  exercise  the 
authority  inherent  in  his  rank;  but  a  serious  inter¬ 
ference  with  the  arrangements  of  the  regular 
commander  would  need  justification,  and  might 
well  entail  censure,  for  the  obvious  reason  that 
the  measures  of  a  permanent  incumbent  should 
not  lightly  be  disturbed  by  an  ad  interim  and 
purely  casual  intruder,  whose  power  would  lapse 
entirely  as  he  passed  beyond  the  imaginary  lines 
bounding  the  station. 

The  military  movement  of  the  fleet,  the  military 
administration,  being  co-extensive  with  a  geograph¬ 
ical  area,  that  is  to  say,  with  the  seas  of  the  world 
which  require  the  presence  of  the  navy,  is  thus 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


55 


conducted  by  the  Secretary  through  means  of 
independent  geographical  districts,  each  with  its 
individual  head.  In  like  manner  the  field  of 
civil  administration,  which  is  concentrated  and 
localized  at  the  Navy  Department,  for  the  crea¬ 
tion  and  maintenance  of  material,  the  procure¬ 
ment  and  training  of  officers  and  seamen,  the 
purchase  and  distribution  of  supplies  of  all  kinds 
needed  by  the  navy,  is  districted  among  a  number 
of  departments,  mutually  independent,  called 
bureaus,  each  having  its  particular  head  styled 
the  chief  of  bureau.  Within  his  particular  range 
of  duties,  each  of  these,  by  specific  provision  of 
law,  is  invested  with  the  authority  of  the  Secretary. 
Orders  from  him  are  to  be  regarded  as  issued  by 
the  Secretary,  just  as  are  the  orders  of  the  admiral 
of  a  station;  and  no  one  of  his  colleague  chiefs 
of  bureaus  can  there  interfere  with  him.  In  their 
totality  the  functions  discharged  by  the  bureau 
chiefs  embrace  all  that  is  understood  by  the  “  es¬ 
tablishment  ”  of  a  navy;  the  establishment  being 
the  permanent  constituted  force,  —  ships  and  men, 
—  together  with  all  the  antecedent  activities,  such 
as  those  of  the  navy  yards,  by  which  ships  are 
built  and  kept  ready  for  service,  and  seamen 
gathered  and  organized  into  crews. 

At  this  point,  when  fully  prepared  to  act,  the 
strict  condition  of  establishment  merges  into  that 


56  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


of  military  operation,  and  passes  under  the  charge 
of  the  military  officers  —  the  admirals  and  their 
subordinates.  It  is  true,  certainly,  that  as  material 
and  supplies  require  frequent  repair  and  renewal, 
and  crews  occasional  reinforcement  and  relief, 
the  functions  of  the  establishment  need  in  some 
degree  to  follow  the  ships  in  their  career.  For 
this  purpose  the  several  bureaus  have  their  repre¬ 
sentatives  among  the  official  staff  of  each  vessel, 
the  captain  being  at  the  head  of  the  whole,  as  is 
the  Secretary  over  his  bureau  chiefs  in  Washing¬ 
ton.  In  this  manner  each  ship,  for  the  purposes 
of  naval  administration,  reflects  in  miniature 
the  Navy  Department,  with  which  it  is  in  continual 
correspondence  by  regulated  channels.  In  strict¬ 
ness  of  method,  as  reflecting  the  ultimate  respon¬ 
sibility  and  control  of  the  Secretary  in  the  Depart¬ 
ment,  and  the  commander  afloat,  —  admiral  or 
captain,  —  all  such  correspondence  is  addressed 
through  them,  and  by  them  distributed  at  either 
end  of  the  line.  Of  course,  much  of  this  is  purely 
routine  and  formal;  but  forms  which  represent 
facts,  as  in  this  case  unity  and  concentration  of 
authority  are  symbolized,  are  not  to  be  discarded 
lightly.  What  is  commonly  called  red  tape, 
the  circuition  of  documents,  proceeds  not  from 
concentration,  but  from  dispersion  and  subdivision 
of  responsibility. 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


57 


The  term  “  naval  administration,”  though  actu¬ 
ally  co-extensive  with  the  whole  range  of  the 
Secretary’s  authority,  both  in  the  establishment  and 
in  the  movements  of  the  fleets,  is  commonly  limited 
in  application  to  the  activities  antecedent  to  mili¬ 
tary  operations.  Thus  restricted,  it  becomes 
immediately  apparent  that  naval  administration 
is  essentially  civil  in  character,  conditioned  only 
by  the  fact  that  it  subserves  a  military  profession. 
In  its  methods  it  is  strictly  civil;  it  is  military  only 
in  its  end,  which  is  to  supply  a  military  organiza¬ 
tion  with  the  men  and  implements  needed  for 
operations  of  war.  Carpenters  use  tools  which 
they  could  not  make;  which  are  made  for  them. 
In  this  case  the  means  and  the  end  are  both  civil; 
but  the  distinction  is  the  same  as  that  which  obtains 
between  naval  administration  and  naval  opera¬ 
tions.  The  tools  of  the  naval  seaman,  from  ad¬ 
miral  to  enlisted  man,  are  ships,  guns,  engines. 
With  these  he  does  his  naval  work  of  every  kind, 
and  they  are  provided  for  him  by  the  naval  ad¬ 
ministration.  The  work  is  military,  the  provision 
civil. 

For  instance,  one  chief  function  of  naval  admin¬ 
istration  is  to  design  and  build  ships  of  war.  This 
is  only  a  particular  problem  of  marine  architecture, 
which  is  a  civil  calling;  in  application  to  naval 
needs  it  becomes  conditioned,  specialized,  but  not 


58  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


generically  distinct.  To  make  a  modern  gun  for 
a  specific  purpose  involves  ingenuity  of  conception, 
as  well  as  delicate  metallurgical  and  mechanical 
processes,  conditioned  by  particular  knowledge 
of  ordnance  questions;  but  there  is  nothing  in 
this,  from  design  to  completion,  that  demands 
a  military  cast  of  mind,  much  less  a  military  habit 
of  life.  The  naval  man,  the  combatant  officer,  can 
most  adequately  decide  the  kind  of  work  he  needs 
his  ship,  or  his  gun,  to  do;  he  ought  to  be,  by 
acquirement  and  experience  in  handling,  master  of 
the  reasons  which  make  such  and  such  qualities 
best  for  his  use;  but  it  by  no  means  follows  that 
this  aptitude  to  know  the  thing  wanted  entails 
ability  to  make  it.  A  man  does  not  need  to  be  a 
tailor  or  a  shoemaker  to  know  what  clothes  or  shoes 
are  best  suited  for  his  calling.  Military  capacity 
of  a  very  high  order  may  go  no  further  than  to  say, 
What  is  needed  in  a  ship,  or  a  gun,  is  such  and 
such  qualities;  but  it  no  less  has  a  right  to  demand 
that  its  opinions  on  this  practical  matter  should  be 
ascertained  and  duly  heeded.  Manufacturers 
of  articles  used  by  the  public  are  compelled  to 
furnish  what  the  public  requires;  for  if  they  do 
not  they  lose  their  customers.  The  man  who  uses 
the  tools  is  the  final  judge,  and  rightly;  for  he  best 
knows  which  of  several  is  fittest  for  his  purpose. 
This  is  as  true  of  a  public  military  service  as  of  a 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


59 


private  civil  handicraft.  In  the  latter,  however, 
competition  ensures  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  be¬ 
cause  there  is  individual  freedom  of  action  on  the 
part  of  the  workman.  In  the  other,  on  the  con¬ 
trary,  action  is  corporate,  and  there  is  no  com¬ 
petitor;  except,  indeed,  the  foreign  navies,  which 
may  become  enemies  on  occasions  of  great  national 
urgency. 

The  eight  bureaus  of  the  Navy  Department  are 
by  title  as  follows:  Yards  and  Docks,  Construc¬ 
tion  and  Repair,  Steam  Engineering,  Ordnance, 
Equipment,  Supplies  and  Accounts,  Navigation, 
Medicine  and  Surgery.  They  are  here  arranged 
in  what  may  be  considered  the  chronological  order 
of  their  relation  to  the  preparation  of  a  ship  of 
war  for  sea;  the  completion  of  her  as  a  unit  in 
the  naval  establishment,  ready  to  pass  into  the 
military  order  as  part  of  the  fleet  in  active  service. 
The  several  navy  yards,  with  their  docks,  are  the 
scene  where  goes  on  much  of  the  work  of  ship¬ 
building  and  repair,  of  gun-making,  of  placing 
on  board  the  engines.  There  supplies  of  all  sorts 
for  the  various  departments  are  stored,  and  there 
are  bestowed  the  final  touches  of  preparation  to 
ships  built  elsewhere.  At  a  yard  the  ship  receives 
on  board  her  crew  and  goes  into  commission;  to  it 
she  returns  for  repairs  or  to  be  laid  up  after  a 
cruise.  It  underlies  and  concentrates  the  local 


60  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


activities  of  the  several  bureaus.  Construction 
is  evidently  the  first  stage  in  the  evolution  of  the 
finished  ship;  the  engines  probably  will  be  being 
built  coincidently,  but  cannot  be  placed  until  the 
hull  has  made  a  very  considerable  advance  toward 
completion.  Ordnance  is  a  word  which  speaks 
for  itself;  the  shipping  of  the  guns  is  a  later  stage 
in  the  vessel’s  progress.  Equipment  is  a  term 
of  less  precise  signification,  because  of  more 
varied  and  minute  detail.  It  corresponds  to  fur¬ 
nishing  a  building  as  a  place  to  live  and  work  in. 
For  instance,  there  is  embraced  under  this  com¬ 
prehensive  idea  the  extensive  and  intricate  electric 
system  of  lighting  and  motors,  with  the  needed 
dynamos.  Hence,  also,  much  that  appertains  to 
the  movable  house  which  a  ship  is;  for  example, 
anchors,  charts,  compasses,  with  navigation  books 
and  instruments.  For  this  reason,  the  Naval 
Observatory  and  the  Hydrographic  and  Compass 
Offices,  whence  most  of  these  appliances  proceed, 
or  by  which  they  are  tested  and  corrected,  are  under 
the  Bureau  of  Equipment.  In  the  days  of  sail, 
Equipment  supplied  rigging  and  sails  —  the  motive 
power;  so,  in  strict  derivation,  it  now  provides 
coal,  the  motive  power  of  to-day,  distributing  it 
both  to  vessels  and  to  coaling  depots  on  foreign 
stations. 

The  Bureau  of  Supplies  and  Accounts  is  the 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


61 


purchasing  agency  of  the  navy.  It  buys  for  other 
bureaus,  subject  to  their  requisition  and  inspec¬ 
tion.  The  paymaster  of  each  ship  in  commission 
is  its  representative  in  this  matter,  under  the 
responsible  control  of  her  commander,  as  the 
bureau  itself  is  under  that  of  the  Secretary.  Spe¬ 
cifically,  it  buys  and  supplies,  on  its  own  account, 
the  stores  falling  under  the  two  great  heads  of 
provisions  and  clothing.  It  keeps,  also,  the  pay 
accounts  of  officers  and  men,  and  pays  them  at 
stated  times.  The  Bureau  of  Navigation  has, 
by  an  historical  devolution,  of  which  its  name 
gives  no  suggestion,  inherited  the  charge  of  the 
personnel  of  the  navy,  as  well  officers  as  enlisted 
men.  It  regulates  their  admission,  superintends 
their  training,  preserves  continuous  records  of 
their  service,  and  distributes  them  among  the 
vessels  of  the  fleet.  As  men  are  always  of  more 
account  than  their  tools,  the  function  of  the  Bureau 
of  Navigation  is  the  most  eminent  of  all;  but  also, 
in  the  preparation  of  a  ship  for  service,  it  is  chron¬ 
ologically  nearly  last,  as  the  crew  do  not  go  on 
board  till  the  ship  has  been  by  the  other  bureaus 
prepared  for  their  dwelling  upon  conditions  con¬ 
sistent  with  health.  This  final  requirement  is 
the  charge  of  the  Bureau  of  Medicine  and  Surgery, 
the  importance  of  which  may  be  measured  by 
considering  how  far  a  well  man  is  more  useful  than 
an  invalid. 


62  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


The  general  nature  of  the  duties  of  each  bureau 
is  sufficiently  apparent;  to  particularize  further 
in  this  connection  would  simply  involve  the 
reader  in  a  mass  of  technical  details.  The  essen¬ 
tial  fact  to  remark  is  that  each  bureau  —  except 
Yards  and  Docks  —  has  a  distinct  and  mutually 
independent  function  in  each  ship  built  and  com¬ 
missioned,  as  well  as  in  the  processes  which 
precede  completion.  This  is  the  essential  char¬ 
acteristic  of  the  United  States  Naval  Adminis¬ 
tration,  deliberately  adopted  in  1842  to  ensure 
efficiency  and  responsibility,  after  long  trial  of  a 
different  system.  The  Secretary’s  function,  in¬ 
trinsically  one,  was  then,  for  administrative  effect, 
divided  into  five,  and  subsequently  into  eight 
parts;  the  organic  unity  of  which  was  found  only 
in  their  subordination  to  him,  not  in  their  relations 
one  to  another.  Consistency  of  action,  therefore, 
depends  upon  the  Secretary’s  appreciation  of  the 
necessities  of  the  service  in  all  the  several  broad 
features  which  the  bureaus  represent  —  not  only 
from  the  side  of  the  bureaus,  but  also  from  that 
of  the  officers  afloat  —  and  upon  his  power  to 
reconcile  the  divergences  of  opinion  inevitable  be¬ 
tween  so  many  parties.  Both  for  the  purposes 
of  the  establishment  which  the  bureaus  sustain, 
and  for  the  direction  of  naval  operations  which 
admirals  and  captains  execute,  the  Secretary 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


63 


is  the  only  unifying  force.  He  has  further  to 
recognize  that  the  Navy  Department,  as  repre¬ 
sented  by  the  bureaus,  and  the  Department  as 
represented  by  the  sea-officers,  often  look  at 
important  matters  from  divergent  points  of  view. 

The  Secretary  frequently  comes  to  his  office 
without  previous  experience,  and  is  necessarily 
immensely  occupied  with  numerous  calls  on  the 
side  where  the  Department  touches  the  country 
rather  than  the  navy.  He  is  apt  to  find  himself, 
therefore,  not  only  called  upon  to  decide  between 
several  persons  advocating  different  views  on 
matters  largely  new  to  him,  but  to  do  so  under 
conditions  of  pre-occupation  which  impede  ade¬ 
quate  attention.  The  system  provides  him  neither 
a  formulated  policy  nor  an  adviser;  for,  while 
the  bureau  chief  can  properly  .give  advice  and 
argue  his  views,  it  needs  little  knowledge  of  human 
nature  to  see  that  he  can  seldom  be  free  from 
prepossession.  He  is,  in  short,  rather  an  advocate 
than  an  adviser. 

Under  this  stress  of  work  and  of  technical 
inexperience,  a  secretary  will  naturally  seek  advice 
by  instituting  boards;  committees  of  qualified 
men  to  discuss  subjects  and  report  to  him  con¬ 
clusions.  Such  a  board  may  be  constituted,  like 
one  the  differences  in  which  were  recently  reported 
by  the  press,  from  the  bureau  chiefs  themselves, 


64  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


with  perhaps  one  or  two  outside  men  to  hold  a 
balance.  In  the  case  cited  the  matter  under 
consideration  was  the  qualities  to  be  realized 
in  a  particular  class  of  ships.  Or,  again,  boards 
may  be  composed,  like  the  General  Board,  at  the 
head  of  which  the  admiral  of  the  navy  now  is, 
mostly  of  officers  external  to  the  administrative 
system,  to  discuss  questions  of  broad  policy 
connected  with  offensive  and  defensive  measures, 
requisite  in  case  of  war  with  this  or  that  country. 
Such  a  board  might  very  properly  influence  the 
general  direction  of  administrative  action,  though 
not  the  detailed  execution;  for  the  obvious  reason 
that  the  policy  of  the  Department,  as  regards 
number  and  qualities  of  ships,  should  rest  upon  a 
clear  appreciation  of  the  probable  nature  of  the 
operations  for  which  they  will  be  wanted.  These 
boards,  precisely  analogous  to  committees  of 
Congress,  and  to  commissions  frequently  insti¬ 
tuted  by  civil  authorities  for  special  investigation, 
are,  in  the  strictest  sense,  advisory  only.  They 
can  relieve  the  Secretary  of  no  responsibility,  but 
can  assist  him  greatly  by  digestion  of  facts  and 
summarizing  expert  opinion  upon  the  arguments 
pro  and  con.  During  the  Spanish  war  an  ex 
tempore  board  was  constituted  to  give  purely 
military  advice  upon  the  strategic  movements  of 
the  fleet.  It  had  no  powers  and,  therefore,  no 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


65 


responsibility,  except  for  expert  advice  given;  all 
orders  were  the  Secretary’s  own.  It  is  open  to 
serious  question  whether  in  actual  war  such  a 
recourse  is  desirable.  Responsibility  for  advice, 
as  well  as  for  action,  should  then  be  single,  un¬ 
divided;  but  in  peace  a  deliberative  board,  con¬ 
tinuous  in  existence,  may  be  of  the  utmost  service 
by  the  maturity  and  consecutiveness  of  the  policy 
evolved.  Had  there  been  such  in  1898  there 
would  have  been  no  need  to  create  an  instrumental¬ 
ity  specially  for  that  occasion.  In  the  hands  of  a 
strong  Secretary  it  would  constitute  a  much 
needed  balance  to  the  necessary,  but  somewhat 
exaggerated,  independence  in  action  of  the  bu¬ 
reaus;  for  it  would  naturally  regard  matters  from 
the  purely  service  point  of  view. 

The  utility  of  convening  bodies  of  competent 
men  for  the  discussion  of  particular  subjects  is 
indisputable;  all  experience  testifies  to  it.  The 
difficulty  with  the  navy  is  that  the  Secretary’s 
official  competency  to  combine  the  action  of  the 
several  bureaus,  in  a  steady,  well  digested,  and 
unified  progress,  demands  a  policy,  and  not  merely 
an  administrative  system  tempered  by  boards 
summoned  by  him.  The  test  of  a  system  of  naval 
administration,  strictly  so  called,  is  its  capacity 
—  inherent,  not  spasmodic  —  to  keep  the  estab¬ 
lishment  of  the  navy  abreast  of  the  best  professional 


6G  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


opinion  concerning  contemporary  necessities,  both 
in  quality  and  quantity.  It  needs  not  only  to  know 
and  to  have  what  is  best  to-day,  but  to  embody 
an  organic  provision  for  watching  and  forecasting 
to  a  reasonable  future  what  will  be  demanded. 
This  may  not  be  trusted  to  voluntary  action  or  to 
individual  initiative.  There  is  needed  a  constituted 
organ  to  receive,  digest,  and  then  officially  to  state, 
in  virtue  of  its  recognized  office,  what  the  highest 
instructed  professional  opinion,  the  opinion  of 
the  sea-officers,  holds  concerning  the  needs  of  the 
navy  at  the  moment;  and  for  the  future  as  far  as 
present  progress  indicates.  It  is  not  enough  that 
this  or  that  chief  of  bureau,  to  use  the  nomenclature 
of  the  United  States  administration,  during  his 
term  of  office  takes  such  measures  as  appear  to  him 
sufficient  to  ascertain  what  is  the  opinion  of  the 
combatant  sea-officer,  of  the  naval  workman, 
concerning  his  tools.  Granting  entire  sufficiency 
on  the  part  of  such  bureau  chief,  it  is  not  to  his 
office,  but  to  himself,  that  it  is  due.  The  system 
cannot  claim  the  credit;  nor  can  the  system  be 
sure,  for  it  makes  no  pretence  to  assure,  that 
such  enterprise  will  be  shown  in  other  bureaus,  or 
in  subsequent  incumbents  of  the  same  bureau. 
There  is  in  the  naval  administration,  as  consti¬ 
tuted  by  law,  no  organized  provision  to  do  the 
evolutionary  work,  the  sifting  process,  by  which 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


67 


in  civil  life  the  rough  fighting  test  of  supply  and 
demand,  of  competition  in  open  market  and  free 
usage,  pronounces  decisively  upon  the  practical 
merits  of  various  instruments  or  methods  of  manu¬ 
facture.  The  body  of  sea-officers,  the  workmen 
of  the  navy,  receive  for  use  instruments  upon 
which  the  system  provides  them  no  means  of 
expressing  the  professional  opinion  as  to  their 
adaptability,  relatively  to  service  conditions  or 
to  other  existing  instruments.  Whatever  harm 
may  result  from  this  falls  not  upon  the  work¬ 
men  only,  but  upon  those  also  for  whom  the  work 
is  done;  that  is,  the  nation. 

Since  the  above  was  written,  there  have  ap¬ 
peared  in  the  London  Times  a  series  of  three 
papers  by  the  late  Director  of  Naval  Construction 
for  the  British  navy,  Sir  William  White,  who  for 
eighteen  years  supervised  the  designing  of  all  its 
war-ships.  A  quotation  from  these  articles  defines 
aptly  the  just  relation  between  the  designation 
of  necessary  qualities,  by  the  combatant  sea- 
officers  of  the  navy,  and  the  embodiment  of  these 
qualities  in  the  finished  design  of  a  naval  vessel. 
Italics  are  mine. 

Sir  William  writes :  “  Ships  have  to  be  built  for 
many  different  services,  and  each  navy  has  its  special 
requirements.  It  is  inevitable,  therefore,  that  the 
decision  as  to  the  best  combination  of  qualities  to  be 


G8  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


embodied  in  any  type  must  be  left  to  the  respon¬ 
sible  authorities.  For  the  ships  of  the  Royal  Navy 
that  decision  rests  with  the  First  Lord  of  the  Ad¬ 
miralty  and  his  colleagues  on  the  Board.  The 
policy  of  naval  construction,  the  types  of  ships  to 
be  built,  and  the  qualities  of  offence,  defence, 
speed,  coal  endurance,  and  other  characteristics 
to  be  embodied  in  each  type,  are  considered  in 
detail  and  determined  by  the  Lords  Commissioners, 
the  Board  of  Admiralty,  acting,  with  the  assist¬ 
ance  of  their  technical  advisers,  as  a  ‘  Committee 
on  Designs.’  In  addition  to  the  large  experience 
of  the  distinguished  officers  serving  on  the  Board, 
there  are  available  reports  and  suggestions  from 
officers  afloat,  dealing  with  the  capabilities  and 
performances  of  existing  ships,  possible  improve¬ 
ments,  and  the  introduction  of  new  types.  The 
chief  responsibility  for  the  preparation  of  designs, 
embodying  the  decisions  of  the  Board,  rests  on  the 
Director  of  Naval  Construction,”  [called  in  the 
United  States  Navy  the  Chief  Constructor]  .  .  . 
“  But  for  the  conditions  themselves  the  First 
Lord  and  his  colleagues  are  responsible.  They 
decide  the  policy  of  our  naval  construction,  and 
determine  the  armament,  armour,  speed,  and  coal 
endurance  for  each  class  of  ship  added  to  the 
fleet.  .  .  .  My  duty  and  responsibilities  have  been 
to  design  and  direct  the  construction  of  strong, 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


69 


safe,  and  seaworthy  vessels,  having  the  offensive 
and  defensive  powers,  speeds,  and  coal  supplies, 
determined  by  successive  Boards  of  Admiralty.” 

In  a  succeeding  paper  Sir  William  writes:  “  In 
such  a  complex  and  difficult  question  as  the 
selection  of  armaments,  the  responsible  authority, 
fully  informed  and  constituted  as  the  Board  of 
Admiralty  is,  must  be  more  capable  of  balancing 
opposing  claims,  and  selecting  the  most  efficient 
combination,  than  any  individual.  The  questions 
involved  affect  fighting  efficiency,  and  are  not  pri¬ 
marily  questions  of  naval  architecture 

In  Great  Britain  the  Navy  Department  is  itself 
a  board — the  Board  of  Admiralty;  not,  as  with 
us,  an  individual.  In  general  principle,  and  as  an 
administrative  system,  I  prefer  our  own;  but  in 
the  particular  relation  established  between  military 
specification  of  desired  qualities,  and  the  narrower 
sphere  of  technical  design,  by  which  those  qualities 
are  to  be  realized,  I  find  the  method  above  de¬ 
scribed  much  superior,  for  the  Board  of  Admiralty 
embraces  an  extremely  strong  element  of  matured 
expert  professional  knowledge,  chosen  from  the 
commanding  officers  of  the  Navy.  There  is  in  our 
administrative  system  nothing  answering  to  it; 
and  the  defect  not  only  is  grave,  but  lies  at  the 
very  source  of  the  provision  for  naval  wants. 

As  has  been  said,  the  present  system  of  inde- 


70  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


pendent  bureaus  has  now  been  in  operation  for 
sixty  years.  This  fact  in  itself  affords  strong 
presumption  in  its  favor;  and  it  has  many  merits. 
It  has  also  shown  very  good  results,  regarded  as  a 
machine,  which  every  system  more  or  less  is. 
A  machine  is  an  organization,  an  assemblage  of 
parts,  which  has  great  powers  of  work  in  certain 
fixed  directions,  purely  routine.  It  is  the  essence 
of  a  machine  that  it  moves  round  and  round  in  an 
appointed  path;  but  it  has  within  itself  neither 
motive  force  nor  directive  impulse.  Both  these, 
which  are  the  two  factors  of  active  life,  come  to  it 
from  without.  As  the  steam  slackens,  the  engine 
works  feebly;  as  the  hand  at  the  helm  is  weak,  it 
errs  blindly.  All  the  time  it  is  the  same  machine. 
Consequently,  put  on  steam  in  a  national  impulse, 
or  supply  a  strong  master  in  a  particular  Secretary 
or  President,  and  after  a  few  jars  of  rusty  joints, 
the  renewal  possibly  of  some  worn-out  coupling, 
it  takes  up  at  once  its  intended  work,  doing  it 
steadily,  strongly,  and  efficiently. 

Such  fluctuations  of  efficiency,  dependent  upon 
external  conditions,  are  characteristic  of  all  ma¬ 
chines.  They  are  not  to  be  cured  radically  by  the 
introduction  of  new  parts,  adding  to  the  machinery; 
for  that  makes  it  none  the  less  a  machine  than 
before,  even  though  as  a  machine  it  may  be 
improved.  It  may  be  possible,  however,  so  to 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


71 


contrive  the  connection  between  machinery  and 
power,  which  with  us  is,  in  the  last  analysis,  the 
popular  understanding  and  will,  as  to  cause  energy 
to  be  supplied  and  sustained  in  reasonable  pro¬ 
portion  to  the  work  required;  which  work  is  the 
maintenance  and  development  of  the  navy  on  the 
lines  and  scale  demanded  by  the  possibilities  of 
war  to-day,  and  of  the  evident  to-morrow.  The 
grave  lapses  of  the  past,  in  this  respect,  are  facts 
not  to  be  ignored,  nor  safely  to  be  repeated.  Pro¬ 
vision  against  them,  to  be  enduring,  as  proposed, 
must  be  more  continuous  in  operation  than  a  suc¬ 
cession  of  individual  administrators  can  be. 
At  present  the  President  and  Secretary,  the  one 
by  the  Constitution,  the  other  by  law,  are  the 
administrative  connecting  links  between  the  coun¬ 
try  and  the  navy.  Broadly  considered,  in  their 
official  relation  to  the  administrative  system,  the 
President  and  Secretary  are  parts  of  the  machine, 
liable  with  the  rest  to  feel  the  slackening  of  energy 
when  it  relaxes  in  the  nation.  The  desired  stead¬ 
fastness  of  purpose  is  not  to  be  found  in  any  succes¬ 
sion  of  tenures  of  office;  for  with  the  expiry  of 
each  there  is  a  solution  of  continuity.  Only  cor¬ 
porate  life  endures,  and  there  is  none  such  in  our 
present  system. 

The  experience  of  the  great  War  of  Secession 
bears  abundant  evidence  to  the  capacity  for  work 


72  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


of  the  bureau  system,  composed  as  it  is  of  a  number 
of  chiefs  mutually  independent  in  their  respective 
spheres,  and,  therefore,  individually  and  solely 
responsible  for  the  work  entrusted  to  them.  Sel¬ 
dom,  if  ever,  in  the  history  of  the  world,  has  a 
naval  organization  had  thrown  upon  it  the  sudden 
and  immense  expansion  of  work  that  the  Navy 
Department  had  then  to  meet.  In  1865  there  were 
employed  in  active  operations  of  war  7,600  officers 
and  50,000  seamen,  more  than  five-fold  the  num¬ 
bers  prior  to  the  war;  and  the  fleet  had  increased 
from  69  vessels  to  671,  208  of  which  had  been  built 
or  begun  while  hostilities  were  going  on.1  No 
radical  administrative  change  was  made  by  Con¬ 
gress.  The  number  of  bureaus  was  increased 
from  five  to  eight,  with  a  corresponding  subdivision 
of  labor;  but  each  of  the  eight  chiefs  was  as  inde¬ 
pendent  in  his  own  office  as  the  five  had  been  in 
theirs.  This  was  the  essence  of  the  system;  there 
was  no  let  or  hindrance  to  any  one  of  them,  by  the 
interposition  of  a  recognized  authority,  —  manor 
board,  —  between  him  and  the  Secretary,  or  be¬ 
tween  him  and  his  work.  Urgent  decision  was  not 
fettered  by  the  requirement  of  consultation; 
responsibility  could  not  be  escaped  under  cover 
of  colleagues,  consenting  or  opposing.  The  bonds 

1  These  numbers  are  taken  from  Soley’s  “The  Blockade 
and  the  Cruisers.” 


U .  S.  Navy  Department 


73 


of  power  and  of  accountability  lay  upon  each  man, 
spurring  him  to  the  height  of  his  abilities,  freeing 
him  from  every  trammel  of  interference,  and  en¬ 
couraging  him  by  the  sense  that  credit  as  well  as 
blame  would  be  his  alone. 

Individual  power  and  individual  responsibility 
are  the  fundamental  merits  of  the  bureau  system. 
Its  defect  is  lack  of  co-ordination.  Happily,  this 
lucky  country,  which  at  its  first  cast  got  Farragut 
for  the  most  critical  command  of  the  War  of  Seces¬ 
sion,  as  in  1898  it  found  Dewey  at  Manila  and 
Sampson  off  Santiago,  in  1861  unwittingly  intro¬ 
duced  into  the  naval  administration  a  singularly 
fit  man;  an  official  who  filled,  without  particular 
definition,  the  precise  place  which  was  needed  then, 
and  is  equally  needed  now,  in  peace  as  in  war,  to 
impart  unity  of  direction  and  effort  to  the  eight 
distinct  impulses  under  which  naval  expansion  was 
advancing.  The  labors  of  the  chief  overseer,  the 
Secretary,  under  the  mandate  of  the  times  and  the 
people,  plainly  demanded  personal  assistance; 
and  it  happened  —  the  word  is  exact  —  that  there 
was  selected  for  Assistant  Secretary  a  man  whose 
particular  fitness  only  his  subsequent  performance 
could  have  demonstrated.  Mr.  Fox  had  been  a 
naval  officer  until  he  reached  maturity,  and  after¬ 
wards  became  an  active  business  man.  He  there¬ 
fore  brought  to  his  position  a  close  knowledge 


74  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


of  naval  conditions,  which  had  not  advanced 
materially  beyond  those  of  his  own  career,  and 
at  the  same  time  an  administrative  experience 
which  enabled  him  to  utilize,  without  impeding, 
the  separate  energies  of  the  Department’s  chief 
subordinates.  There  was  thus  introduced  into 
the  heart  of  the  administration,  in  close  contact 
with  and  influence  upon  the  bureau  system,  the 
special  aptitudes  of  the  naval  officer  for  the  guid¬ 
ance  of  the  war  in  its  military  phase,  and  for 
adapting  to  the  particular  conditions  the  broad 
lines  of  the  huge  expansion  which  the  then  estab¬ 
lishment  had  to  undergo.  The  activities  of  the 
establishment,  of  the  Navy  Department  on  its 
civil  side,  were  thus  harmonized  with  the  require¬ 
ments  of  the  military  situation. 

It  would  require  more  than  a  single  article  to 
express  in  detail  the  multifold  character  of  the 
work  thus  done  for  and  by  the  establishment;  the 
vessels  of  various  kinds  and  construction  designed 
and  built;  the  vessels  bought  and  altered  for  spe¬ 
cific  purposes;  the  corresponding  developments 
of  armament.  All  these  were  governed  in  concep¬ 
tion  by  the  necessity  to  meet  conditions,  varying 
from  expeditions  up  Southern  creeks  and  bayous, 
including  therein  the  whole  vast  river  system  of  the 
Mississippi  Valley,  to  deep-sea  cruises  extending 
to  the  waters  of  Asia  and  the  Mediterranean. 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


75 


There  was  involved  the  creation  of  armored  fleets 
to  contend,  some  with  fortifications  in  shallow, 
tortuous  inland  streams,  others  with  works  pro¬ 
tecting  seacoast  harbors.  There  was  to  be  insti¬ 
tuted  and  maintained  the  most  extensive  and 
grinding  blockade  ever  yet  made  effective,  actually 
as  well  as  technically.  Underlying  the  whole, 
however,  was  the  military  conception,  the  exact 
appreciation  of  the  military  necessities.  Under 
the  guidance  of  this  were  laid  down  the  general 
lines  upon  which  the  bureau  administrations  were 
to  advance  in  their  activities.  This  was  the  cutting 
out  of  the  work,  as  distinct  from  its  executive 
superintendence.  From  this  comprehension  of  the 
decisive  lines,  this  military  sense,  proceeded  the 
unity  of  effort  and  of  effect  wherein  consists  the 
excellence  of  a  work  of  art,  which  warfare  in  its 
highest  sense  is.  The  specific  character  of  any 
particular  war  creates  of  itself  certain  central 
features  upon  which  attention  must  fasten;  and 
to  which  effort  must  correspond,  if  success  is  to 
be  attained.  It  was  peculiarly  fortunate  that  the 
War  of  Secession  found,  placed  at  the  centre  of 
the  civil  administration  of  the  navy,  a  person  es¬ 
pecially  qualified,  by  nature  and  training,  to  con¬ 
centrate  in  his  own  person  professional  compre¬ 
hension,  broadened  to  meet  the  case  by  close 
intercourse  with  leading  officers;  and  with  this 


76  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


to  combine  influence,  real  if  not  formal,  upon  the 
general  direction  to  be  taken  by  the  eight  several 
branches  of  the  civil  administration. 

The  very  great  success  of  the  navy  in  the  War 
of  Secession  is  universally  admitted  and  needs 
no  insistence;  but,  though  frequently  narrated 
historically,  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  is  yet  philo¬ 
sophically  appreciated,  or  even  understood.  For 
present  purposes  it  is  sufficient  to  note  the  fact 
that  there  was  then  found  within  the  Navy  Depart¬ 
ment  —  not  existing  there  before,  but  introduced 
fortuitously  for  the  occasion  —  a  means  by  which 
the  enthusiastic  determination  of  the  nation  could 
take  shape  in  intelligent  comprehension  of  the 
issues  and  in  strongly  co-ordinated  effort;  while 
to  the  satisfactory  maintenance  of  the  activity 
thus  directed  the  bureau  system  was  found  ade¬ 
quate.  Adequate,  that  is,  to  meet  a  great  emer¬ 
gency  under  the  spur  of  a  great  impulse,  communi¬ 
cated  through  an  instrumentality  which  for  the 
purposes  of  the  war  focussed  the  several  separate 
energies.  It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that 
there  was  the  emergency  with  its  pressure;  that  it 
had  its  clear,  distinctive  features,  susceptible  of 
recognition;  and  that  there  was  present  somewhat 
accidentally  the  human  instrument  to  recognize 
them,  and  to  realize  in  the  work  of  the  Depart¬ 
ment  the  means  necessary  to  meet  them.  All 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


77 


these  constituted  pressure,  steam,  directive  force. 
Granted  this,  the  machine  showed  its  efficiency. 

Emergency  is  not  always  with  us,  though  the 
need  of  an  up-to-date  navy  is.  The  preparations 
of  peace  have  their  distinctive  features,  equally 
recognizable  with  those  of  war,  but  less  clearly 
visible  to  intelligence  unstartled  by  alarm  at  the 
doors.  The  bureau  system  carries  no  instru¬ 
mentality  to  study  and  formulate  them;  to  main¬ 
tain  constant  attention  upon,  not  this  or  that 
branch  of  naval  progress,  but  upon  the  field  as 
a  whole;  to  co-ordinate  the  various  elements  of 
advance  in  their  relative  importance;  and  by 
such  sustained  apprehension,  communicated  to  the 
nation,  to  maintain  a  pressure  which  shall  con¬ 
stantly  ensure  a  navy  abreast  of  the  contemporary 
situation  in  quantity  and  quality.  It  is  possible 
for  any  Secretary  to  create  such  an  instrumentality, 
and  the  tendency  of  recent  Secretaries  has  been 
in  that  direction;  but  it  depends  upon  the  will 
of  the  particular  incumbent;  its  influence  is  what 
he  chooses  to  attribute  to  his  own  creature;  and 
he  may  at  any  moment  discontinue  it.  It  is  no 
part  of  the  bureau  system,  and  its  life  is  always 
precarious.  Of  inferior  influence  to  a  bureau,  in 
that  it  has  no  legal  existence,  its  position  is  less 
that  of  a  subordinate  than  of  a  dependent. 

The  War  of  Secession  showed  the  merits  of  the 


78  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


bureau  system  under  favorable  forcing  conditions. 
Peace  speedily  demonstrated  its  defects;  rather, 
perhaps,  the  defects  of  a  system  constituted  wholly 
of  independent  departments  —  the  exact  opposite 
of  cabinet  government.  Independent  depart¬ 
ments  —  bureaus  —  through  lack  of  concert  to¬ 
gether,  lose  in  influence  upon  their  head  more 
than  they  gain  in  individual  freedom  of  action; 
and  the  loss  is  national.  In  1865  the  nation 
reacted  violently  from  the  extreme  tension  of 
war,  and  the  effect  was  manifest  inevitably 
throughout  the  military  branches  of  the  govern¬ 
ment,  as  constituted.  The  principal  work  of  the 
Departments  of  War  and  Navy  became  the  reduc- 
duction  of  the  huge  establishments,  and  the  dis¬ 
position  of  the  quantities  of  accumulated  material 
now  no  longer  needed.  Though  the  then  adminis¬ 
tration  had  nearly  four  years  to  run,  Mr.  Fox 
retired  shortly,  leaving  no  successor  in  name  or 
in  fact.  With  him  disappeared  what  had  been 
virtually  an  institution,  rather  than  an  individual 
or  an  office.  His  nominal  position  of  Assistant 
Secretary  was  not  revived  till  over  twenty  years 
later. 

Retrenchment  —  a  word  never  to  be  uttered 
with  disrespect  —  now  became  the  order  of  the 
day;  but  it  was  not  graduated  by  any  systematic 
provision  for  studying  the  needs  of  the  navy  as  a 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


79 


whole,  watching  contemporary  progress,  and 
defining  to  the  country  the  evident  necessities 
of  naval  policy.  There  was  no  sentinel  stationed 
on  the  watch-tower  to  take  note  of  danger;  and 
volunteers,  who  were  not  wanting,  rarely  have 
the  authority  or  perseverance  to  arouse  national 
attention.  The  bureaus  went  on  doing  their 
several  works,  and  doubtless  very  respectably. 
Excellent  boards,  constituted  by  the  Department, 
from  time  to  time  made  wise  reports.  Secretary 
succeeded  Secretary  in  a  complacency  that  the 
country  seemed  fully  to  share.  The  military 
branch,  of  course,  was  dissatisfied.  It  realized 
the  peril,  concrete  before  its  eyes  in  foreign  ships 
and  its  own  decadent,  obsolete  relics  of  former 
days;  but  the  military  branch  was  not  —  and  is 
not  —  represented  in  the  legalized  scheme  of 
naval  administration.  There  is  in  the  Navy  De¬ 
partment,  besides  the  Secretary,  no  daysman  that 
lays  his  hand  on  civil  and  military  both;  upon  the 
establishment  and  upon  the  ships  in  commission. 
In  the  Navy  Department,  as  constituted  by  law, 
there  are  sea-officers  at  the  head  of  bureaus; 
but  by  their  office  they  are  bureau  chiefs,  charged 
with  details  of  the  establishment,  not  representa¬ 
tives  of  the  military  necessities.  They  have  no 
obligation,  and  may  have  no  inclination,  to  meddle 
with  concerns  of  the  broad  naval  policy  which 


80  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


does,  or  should,  determine  and  co-ordinate  the 
general  march  of  the  system  as  a  whole. 

It  would  be  rash  to  affirm  that  there  was, 
for  nearly  two  decades  following  the  war,  any 
formulated  determination  that  could  be  called 
a  naval  policy.  In  result,  doubtless,  there  was 
realized  a  course  of  action,  which  might  be  styled 
a  policy;  that  of  apathetic  drift.  The  system  itself 
provided  no  instrument  for  studying  the  data,  or 
evolving  the  policy,  except  the  Secretary  himself; 
and  the  successive  Secretaries,  coming  often  new 
to  their  work,  were  as  chanced  by  choice  of  suc¬ 
cessive  Presidents.  The  several  bureau  chiefs 
were  personally  no  more  responsible  than  any  other 
individual  official  for  the  general  regress.  Each 
had  his  bureau;  but,  if  he  managed  it  as  well  as 
the  Secretary’s  measures  demanded,  the  rest  was 
not  his  concern.  There  was  nowhere  in  the 
Department  any  person,  or  any  body,  whose 
business  it  was  to  represent  to  the  Secretary  the 
perilous  decline  which  was  rapidly  verging  upon 
annihilation.  There  was  nobody  at  fault  for  not 
speaking,  nor  anybody  whose  office  required  the 
intrusion  of  a  scheme  of  resuscitation.  The  future 
depended  upon  the  personality  of  a  Secretary,  not 
upon  a  provident  system. 

Equally  with  the  details  of  the  War  of  Secession, 
it  is  inexpedient  to  enter  upon  the  instances  which 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


81 


illustrate  the  decadence  of  the  ensuing  period. 
To  patch  and  repatch  into  temporary  efficiency 
vessels,  excellent  for  their  day,  but  which,  if  still 
in  their  prime,  would  be  worthless  under  the 
changed  conditions ;  to  build  a  few,  a  very  few,  new 
ships  of  substantially  the  same  type  as  the  old, 
and  therefore  no  more  fitted  for  modern  warfare; 
to  mount  contentedly  on  their  ancient  carriages  the 
old,  and  in  their  time  most  useful,  guns  which 
had  fought  the  recent  war;  to  “convert”  a  few 
of  them,  from  the  large  stock  left  on  hand,  into 
makeshift  imitations  of  modern  weapons  —  such 
was  the  general  course  of  administration,  awaiting 
the  coming  of  a  Secretary  who  should  realize  that 
the  first  necessity  of  policy  was  to  sweep  away 
a  sham,  and  bring  the  country  face  to  face  with 
the  fact  that  it  had  no  navy.  The  bureaus  worked 
on  perfectly  respectably,  meeting  the  demands 
of  that  day  accordingly  as  they  had  met  the  stren¬ 
uous  period  of  the  War  of  Secession,  and  as  under 
a  new  impulse  they  were  again  to  meet,  and  fulfil, 
the  more  complicated,  if  not  more  onerous,  re¬ 
quirements  of  re-creating  the  establishment.  As 
a  machine,  in  short,  the  system  was  good;  it 
adapted  itself  readily  and  efficiently  to  the  work 
before  it,  be  it  more  or  less,  and  showed  conclu¬ 
sively  that  it  required  only  the  impulse  from  with¬ 
out,  and  the  necessary  supply  of  grist,  a  work 


82  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


at  high  speed  and  high  power  with  correspondent 
results. 

In  time,  though  much  overdue,  the  awaited 
man  came,  and  with  him  a  new  impulse.  By  the 
accident  of  a  Secretary  determined  to  face  the 
conditions,  the  just  discontent  of  the  active  navy 
found  voice  and  expression  in  a  new  and  positive 
policy.  It  is,  however,  clearly  a  great  evil  that 
throughout  a  prolonged  period  of  popular  reaction 
and  lethargy,  a  principal  department  of  the  gov¬ 
ernment  should  have  contained  within  itself  no 
principle  of  continuous  efficiency,  and  have  re¬ 
mained  dependent  upon  the  chances  of  a  series 
of  individuals,  bound  to  no  sequence  of  interest  or 
of  action,  and  very  possibly,  as  in  instances  ex¬ 
perience  has  shown,  incapable  of  realizing  a 
policy  or  imparting  an  impulse.  Most  branches 
of  the  executive  government  find  themselves  natu¬ 
rally  represented  in  the  continuous  interests  of 
civil  life,  which  constitute  for  them  an  abiding 
impulse,  directive  as  well  as  motive,  to  keep  abreast 
of  the  time.  The  navy  and  army  lack  this;  the 
navy  conspicuously  so.  It  is  therefore  not  suffi¬ 
cient  that  each  has  a  Secretary,  as  have  the  De¬ 
partments  of  the  Treasury,  the  Interior,  and 
others.  They  need  within  their  administrative 
constitution  something  which  shall  answer  to 
the  continuous  interest  of  the  people  in  civil  details ; 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


83 


something  which,  while  wholly  subordinate  to 
every  Secretary,  shall  embody  a  conservative 
and  progressive  service  idea,  and  in  so  doing  shall 
touch  both  the  public,  from  whose  sense  of  national 
needs  impulse  comes,  and  the  administration, 
ashore  and  afloat,  upon  whose  response  to  impulse 
efficiency  depends.  That  a  Secretary  can  do  this 
has  been  abundantly  shown;  the  dangerous  possi¬ 
bility,  also  amply  demonstrated,  is  that  several  in 
sequence  may  lack  either  will,  or  power,  or  pro¬ 
fessional  understanding.  Though  the  office  lives, 
the  Secretary  dies  every  four  years,  and  who 
shall  guarantee  the  succession  ?  The  value  of 
the  office  will  not  be  diminished  by  such  a  some¬ 
thing  as  here  advocated,  without  executive  author¬ 
ity,  consultative  only  and  advisory;  responsible 
not  for  action  taken  —  for  it  should  have  no  power 
to  act — but  for  opinion  expressed;  above  all, 
continuous  in  its  activity,  which  implies  corporate 
life,  maintaining  sound  tradition  by  its  consecu¬ 
tiveness,  yet  preserved  from  stagnation  by  changes 
of  membership,  periodical  but  not  simultaneous. 

Executive  authority,  like  executive  responsibility, 
must  be  undivided,  single.  No  qualification 
is  admissible  upon  the  powers  of  the  Secretary,  as 
the  President’s  representative.  The  bureaus, 
mutually  independent,  are  wholly  dependent  on 
him  when  he  sees  fit  directly  to  interpose.  Where 


84  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


they  clash,  as  at  times  they  do,  he  holds  the  bal¬ 
ance,  and  his  say  is  final.  These  conditions  no 
instructed  man  of  affairs  would  wish  to  modify. 
Yet  it  remains  that  in  these  various  matters  Secre¬ 
taries  have  often  to  act  upon  personal  judgment, 
with  limited  personal  knowledge.  Under  such 
conditions  one  man  may  easily  vacillate  in  a  line 
of  policy;  how  much  more  a  series  of  men  differing 
in  personal  traits  and  acquired  information.  The 
utility  of  a  steadying  factor,  of  a  body  of  digested 
professional  knowledge,  continuously  applied  to 
the  problems  of  naval  advance,  is  evident.  It  is 
demonstrated  also  by  the  increasing  disposition 
of  Secretaries  to  assemble  standing  boards  of 
officers  for  the  consideration  of  professional  prob¬ 
lems,  the  conclusions  of  whom  constitute  for  him 
expert  advice,  without  any  infringement  upon  his 
official  action.  Useful  though  these  may  be,  they 
have,  nevertheless,  no  place  in  the  administrative 
system.  Creatures  of  the  Secretary’s  will,  there 
is  no  assurance  of  their  permanency;  yet,  the 
essence  of  their  utility  will  consist  in  their  em¬ 
bodying  a  policy,  which  they  can  only  do  by  per¬ 
manence.  Such  policy,  like  the  action  of  a  bureau 
chief,  will  ever  be  subject  to  the  Secretary’s  alter¬ 
ation;  his  personal  characteristics  will  modify 
it;  but  there  can  be  no  more  doubt  of  the  utility 
of  such  an  embodied  policy  than  there  can  be 


U.  S.  Navy  Department 


85 


of  a  settled  national  tradition  like  those  about 
entangling  alliances,  or  against  European  inter¬ 
ference  in  this  hemisphere. 

It  is  in  the  lack  of  permanent  tenure  by  the  Secre¬ 
tary  himself  that  is  to  be  seen  the  most  cogent 
argument  for  such  a  continuous  institution,  inte¬ 
rior  to  the  legalized  system  of  administration.  A 
steady  incumbent,  personally  competent,  would  in 
time  become  like  the  president  of  a  great  railroad, 
or  other  business  corporation;  himself  an  embodied 
policy,  the  consistency  of  which  on  certain  general 
lines  is  a  recognized  advantage.  With  unlimited 
time  a  Secretary  should  acquire  that  personal 
knowledge  of  details,  and  acquaintance  with  the 
characteristics  of  his  subordinates,  which  are  es¬ 
sential  to  the  successful  administrator.  No  such 
incumbency  is  to  be  expected  under  our  general 
system  of  executive  government.  To  supply 
the  defect  inherent  in  temporary  tenure  and  period¬ 
ical  change,  there  is  required  for  the  Navy  Depart¬ 
ment  a  tradition  of  policy;  analogous  in  fact  to 
the  principles  of  a  political  party,  which  are  con¬ 
tinuous  in  tradition,  though  progressive  in  modifi¬ 
cation.  These  run  side  by  side  with  the  policy 
of  particular  administrations;  not  affecting  their 
constituted  powers,  but  guiding  general  lines  of 
action  by  an  influence,  the  benefit  of  which,  through 
the  assurance  of  continuity,  is  universally  admitted. 


PRINCIPLES  INVOLVED  IN  THE 
WAR  BETWEEN  JAPAN 
AND  RUSSIA 

Written  during  the  War 


PRINCIPLES  INVOLVED  IN  THE  WAR 
BETWEEN  JAPAN  AND  RUSSIA 


August,  1904 


NOTICEABLE  feature  of  the  current 


A  war  between  Japan  and  Russia  is  the  singu¬ 
lar  defect  and  inaccuracy  of  details  furnished 
concerning  the  successive  military  and  naval  situa¬ 
tions  and  movements.  Doubtless,  a  similar  im¬ 
perfection  of  information  is  encountered,  and 
must  be  expected,  in  all  sequences  of  current  events. 
Contemporaries  seldom  know  the  exact  truth 
concerning  that  which  passes  around  them,  and 
only  after  long  and  patient  study  does  the  chroni¬ 
cler  of  a  later  day  even  approach  a  full  and  correct 
statement  of  occurrences,  in  their  relation  of  cause 
and  effect.  The  complete  and  balanced  narrative, 
which  the  modern  historian  rightly  sets  before 
himself  as  an  ideal  standard,  is,  however,  a  very 
different  thing  from  the  substantially  accurate 
information  which  is  demanded  by  the  man  of 
affairs,  civil  or  military,  called  upon  to  keep 
abreast  of  the  professional  movement  of  his  day,  to 


89 


90  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


be  prepared  himself  to  act  in  the  light  of  the  fullest 
accessible  knowledge,  but  content  also  to  accept,  as 
an  inevitable  condition  of  all  practical  life,  some 
degree  of  obscurity,  of  doubt,  attaching  to  the 
problem  he  has  to  solve.  The  “  Faites  moi  savoir  ” 
of  Napoleon  is  checked  always  by  his  equally 
imperative  dictum  that  war  cannot  be  made  with¬ 
out  running  risks.  No  midway  position  between 
these  two  maxims  is  tenable;  reconcilement  is 
to  be  found  only  in  the  frank  and  cordial  em¬ 
bracing  of  both.  It  is  indispensable  to  get  the 
fullest  data  that  can  be  had,  by  the  exercise  of  every 
means  at  command;  but  it  is  no  less  indispensable 
then  to  go  forward,  working  from  the  basis  of 
what  has  been  learned,  however  imperfectly, 
and  advancing  tentatively,  but  firmly,  towards 
the  solution  of  the  difficulty  immediately  in  hand. 
The  man  who  waits  for  absolute  certainty,  before 
moving,  will  with  rare  exceptions  reach  his 
decisions  too  late. 

So  far  as  these  reflections  are  just,  they  apply 
not  only  to  the  general  officer  commanding  in 
actual  war,  whether  by  land  or  sea,  but  to  all  others 
who  belong  to  the  military  professions,  even 
though  their  nation  at  the  moment  be  in  the  happy 
enjoyment  of  peace.  The  application  is  not 
merely  to  those  especially  charged  with  the  collec¬ 
tion  of  intelligence,  and  the  digestion  from  it  of  a 


Principles  Involved  in  Japan-Russia  War  91 


formulated  military  policy;  whether  such  policy 
be  strategic,  or  tactical,  or  involve  a  serious  modi¬ 
fication  of  weapons  and  organization,  of  army 
or  fleet,  in  view  of  novel  experiences.  Men  thus 
situated,  at  the  headquarters  of  information  or 
control,  are  undoubtedly  favored  with  peculiar 
opportunity  for  learning  and  judging;  but  the 
greater  precision  and  certainty  thus  afforded  to 
the  few,  in  virtue  of  their  momentary  duties,  by 
no  means  absolves  from  similar  effort  those  who, 
at  a  distance  and  engaged  in  more  secular  routine, 
possess  only  the  fragmentary  data  to  be  gathered 
or  inferred  from  the  daily  reports  of  the  press. 
Indeed,  as  a  mere  matter  of  exercising  military 
intelligence,  the  man  who  thus  employs  his  reason, 
upon  the  partial  and  often  contradictory  rumors 
of  the  flying  hours,  occupies  more  nearly  the  posi¬ 
tion  of  a  responsible  commander  in  war,  whose 
estimate  of  the  situations  confronting  him  depends 
upon  tidings  coming  through  a  dozen  channels, 
continually  flowing  in  from  divergent  quarters,  all 
partial,  mostly  colored  with  error,  and  often  at 
variance  with  each  other. 

The  advantage  of  accustoming  the  mind  to 
such  valuations  is  very  great.  Natural  or  acquired, 
the  faculty,  like  every  other,  grows  in  the  using, 
and  tends  ever  to  be  most  ready  when  most  wanted. 
In  the  sphere  of  reflection  it  corresponds  to  the 


92  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


trained  military  “  judgment  of  ground  ”  by  the 
physical  eye,  an  aptitude  of  the  highest  and  most 
universally  recognized  importance.  I  was  im¬ 
mensely  gratified,  as  well  as  interested,  to  receive 
a  few  days  ago  from  a  young  officer  of  our  Ameri¬ 
can  navy  just  such  an  analysis  and  criticism  of 
the  respective  movements  of  the  Japanese  and 
Russian  fleets  on  June  23,  when  the  latter  as¬ 
tonished  the  world  by  bringing  into  the  open  the 
ducks  long  supposed  to  be  not  only  lame  but 
hopelessly  crippled.  The  facts  were  those  given 
in  Admiral  Togo’s  despatch,  communicated  to  the 
world  in  ample  detail  in  the  Times  (weekly  edition) 
of  July  I ;  but,  abortive  as  the  proceeding  proved, 
the  attention  of  the  officer  in  question  was  arrested, 
and  he  supplied  an  interpretation  and  inferences 
which  by  their  justness  of  appreciation  gave  evi¬ 
dence,  to  my  mind,  of  one  who  had  contem¬ 
plated  the  possibilities  open  to  fleets  situated  as 
these  were,  and  was  consequently  prepared  at 
once  to  understand  and  value  the  several  move¬ 
ments.  None  will  question  that  such  an  one  is,  pro 
tanto,  more  ready  to  act  intelligently  and  instantly, 
should  occasion  arise  for  him.  Situations  will  not 
be  unfamiliar;  just  as  the  eye  trained  to  judge 
ground  quickly  detects  essential  identity  amid 
superficial  divergences,  or  at  least  finds  the 
recurrence  of  certain  features,  the  bearing  of 


Principles  Involved  in  Japan-Russia  War  93 


which  upon  the  field  of  action  is  at  once  appar¬ 
ent. 

An  apt,  and  somewhat  comical,  illustration  of 
the  general  darkness,  with  occasional  rays  of  light, 
amid  which  the  outside  observer  of  the  present 
war  gropes,  is  to  be  found  in  the  unintelligible 
names,  variously  spelled,  of  the  unfamiliar  locali¬ 
ties,  which  encumber  without  elucidating  the  des¬ 
patches  of  generals  and  the  accounts  of  corre¬ 
spondents.  The  same  feature  prevails  in  the  maps, 
between  which  and  the  texts  there  is  that  fre¬ 
quent  discrepancy  which  the  officer  in  the  field 
finds  in  the  reports  of  spies  or  deserters.  I  have 
just  (August  5)  been  damaging  my  eyes,  and  keep¬ 
ing  my  temper,  holding  in  one  hand  a  map  and  in 
the  other  a  narrative;  the  general  result  being 
that,  with  the  exception  of  certain  points  of  major 
interest,  the  reader  must  be  content  to  find  any 
particular  name  in  one  and  not  expect  the  luxury 
of  seeing  it  in  both.  Nevertheless,  even  with  these 
disadvantages,  and  the  imperfect  knowledge  of 
the  face  of  the  country,  which  I  apprehend  em¬ 
barrasses  most  inquirers  —  except,  perhaps,  the 
general  staffs  of  the  contending  armies  —  here  and 
there  a  clue  emerges  which  seems  to  justify  some 
inferences  as  to  the  strategic  plan  of  the  Japanese, 
to  whom  constantly  superior  numbers  permit  the 
advantage  of  initiative.  Such  inferences,  so  far 


94  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


as  correct,  and  after  all  allowance  for  their  merely 
partial  accuracy,  possess  a  distinct  advantage. 
They  involve,  as  before  said,  a  habit  of  mind  which 
tends  always  to  improve.  Nor  is  this  practice 
useful  to  military  men  only,  but  to  laymen  as  well; 
because  in  these  days,  although  military  questions 
in  their  details  are  a  specialty,  the  welfare  of  the 
nation,  above  all  in  representative  governments, 
is  furthered  by  a  wide  interest  and  appreciation 
of  military  necessities  among  citizens  of  average 
intelligence.  To  affirm  this  is  to  say  no  more  than 
all  recognize  with  reference  to  social  and  econom¬ 
ical  questions,  the  solution  of  which  depends  upon 
general  interest  and  understanding  of  the  broader 
bearings,  although  minute  detailed  knowledge  is 
the  prerogative  of  specialists. 

Again,  and  more  notably,  the  very  imperfection 
of  current  information  to  a  certain  extent  promotes 
comprehension,  by  preventing  the  intelligence  from 
losing  itself  amid  a  mass  of  details  —  a  very  com¬ 
mon  infirmity.  This  uncertainty  forces  attention  to 
fasten  on  the  broad  general  lines  of  action,  which 
constitute  the  determinative  features  of  military 
situations;  whether  these  are  limited  to  a  narrow 
area,  or  are  of  world-wide  geographical  extension, 
as  are  the  military  interests  of  the  British  Empire. 
For  the  specialist,  even,  these  are  the  most  im¬ 
portant;  while  for  the  outsider,  they  are  at  once 


Principles  Involved  in  Japan-Russia  War  95 


the  most  easy  and  the  only  ones  to  be  securely 
grasped.  They  resemble  essentially  general  prin¬ 
ciples,  which  undoubtedly  in  the  first  instance 
are  formulated  only  by  the  observation  and  colla¬ 
tion  of  innumerable  details;  but  which,  once 
established,  far  exceed  in  illuminative  and  directive 
value,  as  guides  to  opinion  and  action,  any  un¬ 
digested  accumulation  of  the  details  on  which  they 
are  based.  A  principle  in  warfare,  like  a  generali¬ 
zation  in  science,  is  a  result;  but,  when  firmly 
grounded,  the  details  by  which  it  was  reached 
may  be  disregarded  by  the  average  man,  who  for 
his  own  guidance  needs  to  know  only  the  result, 
not  the  method  of  its  attainment.  The  case  of 
weapons  is  precisely  analogous.  What  a  given 
ship,  or  gun,  or  submarine  boat  will  do,  what  the 
result  reached  in  it,  this  the  military  man,  or  the 
interested  citizen,  needs  to  know;  but  this  ascer¬ 
tained,  the  details  of  construction  or  manipulation, 
which  issue  in  the  result,  are  not  necessary  to  all, 
but  only  to  those  specially  concerned  in  manu¬ 
facture  or  handling. 

It  is  this  general  line  of  thought  that  I  propose  to 
follow  in  this  paper,  basing  my  examination  of  the 
salient  facts,  commonly  if  not  quite  precisely 
known,  upon  the  broad  general  principles  which 
seem  to  me  applicable  to  the  particular  case,  and 
neglecting  details;  not  as  being  in  themselves 


96  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


immaterial,  but  still  secondary  and  in  a  measure 
confusing.  Imperfect  and  contradictory  state¬ 
ments,  being  among  the  inevitable  conditions  of 
the  problem,  I  accept  in  such  degree  as  judgment 
may  assign  to  them,  in  developing  or  modifying 
conclusions  not  depending  primarily  upon  them, 
but  otherwise  reached.  In  this  Russo-Japanese 
war,  as  in  others,  much  that  is  instructive  to  the 
specialist,  and  ultimately  must  be  sifted  and  ap¬ 
preciated  by  him,  may  safely  be  passed  over  for 
the  moment  even  by  the  military  professions 
themselves  in  general,  and  yet  more  by  the  lay 
observer.  These  are  of  the  nature  of  details,  of 
methods,  and  correspond  essentially  to  the  various 
processes  of  manufacture  by  which  the  result 
of  a  finished  implement  is  produced;  or,  more 
nearly  still,  to  the  several  stages  of  progress,  of 
alternate  failure,  perplexity,  and  success,  through 
which  the  conceiver  of  some  great  design  advances 
to  the  full  development  and  materialization  of  his 
idea.  The  particularities  of  tactics,  the  special 
difficulties  or  advantages  presented  by  the  ground 
over  which  the  armies  are  fighting,  the  efficacy 
of  the  several  weapons  employed  in  the  different 
branches  of  the  two  services,  the  problem  of  trans¬ 
portation  involved,  are  all  of  this  character  of 
detail.  They  minister  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  great 
design  of  the  war,  and  are  to  it  indispensable 


Principles  Involved  in  J  a  pan- Russia  War  97 

factors;  but  they  are  means,  not  ends.  Whether 
well  or  ill  managed,  they  are  without  effect  upon 
the  general  principles  which  should  dictate  the 
direction  to  be  given  to  military  effort.  It  is  not 
said,  nor  will  for  a  moment  be  maintained,  that 
the  capacity  or  incapacity  displayed  in  the  direction 
of  these  matters  will  not  affect  very  seriously  the 
outcome  of  the  operations  involved.  The  worth 
of  the  best  modelled  ship  would  be  seriously 
vitiated  by  bad  materials  used  in  building,  or  bad 
workmanship;  but  the  designing  of  the  model 
is  after  all  the  loftiest,  as  it  is  the  most  determina¬ 
tive  element  of  efficiency,  and  the  model  of  the 
ship,  having  reference  to  the  work  for  which  she 
is  intended,  corresponds  with  great  precision  to 
the  plan  of  a  campaign  by  land  or  sea,  to  compass 
the  objects  of  a  war.  That  plan,  carried  out,  is 
the  grand  result  to  which  all  the  minor  details 
are  the  ministers.  They  may  for  the  time  very  well 
remain  invisible  to  the  observer  who  wishes  to 
appreciate  the  conduct  of  the  war;  just  as  the 
vast  array  of  calculations,  which  underlie  the  dis¬ 
positions  of  weights  in  a  finished  ship,  are  not 
necessary  in  order  fully  to  comprehend  a  state¬ 
ment  of  her  powers  or  weaknesses  as  a  weapon  of 
war,  or  to  criticize  the  manner  of  her  handling  in 
particular  circumstances. 

When  carried  to  successful  conclusion,  a  plan 


98  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


of  campaign  stands  revealed  as  a  result;  but  while 
in  execution,  on  lines  known  only  to  the  few 
persons  responsible,  there  is  seen  only  a  military 
process,  a  sequence  of  action,  the  study  of  which 
from  day  to  day,  by  the  stimulus  it  imparts  to 
reasoned  speculation,  to  forecast,  is  profoundly 
educative  to  military  men.  It  is  also  illuminative  to 
others,  who  will  be  at  the  trouble  to  furnish  their 
intellects  with  the  few  chief  ascertained  principles 
of  warfare.  In  the  case  before  us,  owing  to  the 
secluded  character  of  the  scene  of  war,  to  the  care 
taken  by  both  parties  to  conceal  the  essential 
facts  of  their  numbers  and  conditions,  and,  it 
must  be  added,  to  the  strong  national  bias  color¬ 
ing  the  reports  of  many  individual  correspondents, 
and  others,  there  is  an  imperfection  of  detailed  in¬ 
formation,  which  gives  the  additional  zest  of  diffi¬ 
culty  to  the  problem,  and  of  enjoyment  to  progress 
made  in  its  solution.  It  is  in  this  condition  that 
the  subject  is,  at  this  moment  of  writing;  but  a 
stage  of  development  has  been  reached  which 
permits,  with  some  degree  of  certainty,  an  expres¬ 
sion  of  opinion  on  leading  questions  of  principle. 

Prominent  among  these  doubtless  is  that  of  the 
retention  of  Port  Arthur  by  the  Russians,  during 
the  moments  when  evacuation  was  possible.  They 
did  not  abandon  it;  and,  if  I  correctly  remember, 
this  determination  was  widely  and  severely  cen- 


Principles  Involved  in  Japan- Russia  War  99 


sured  as  a  concession  to  national  pride,  to  political 
considerations  of  humiliation  involved,  but  in 
contradiction  to  sound  military  principle.  The 
question  has  additional  interest,  because  analo¬ 
gous  to  the  still  recent  instance  of  Ladysmith, 
in  the  South  African  War,  with  which  possibly 
may  be  conjoined  the  less  defensible  tenure  of 
Glencoe  and  Dundee.  In  matters  of  detail  the 
two  cases  present  large  differences;  but  how  is 
it  as  to  the  principle  involved  ?  I  should  imagine 
that  there  must  now  (August,  1904)  be  much 
less  doubt  of  the  propriety  of  the  Russian  resolu¬ 
tion  than  there  was  three  months  ago;  just  as  I 
cannot  but  think  that,  as  time  leaves  farther 
behind  the  period  of  the  Boer  War,  there  will  be 
an  increasing  conviction  that  the  occupation  of 
Ladysmith  was  neither  an  error  in  the  beginning 
nor  a  misfortune  to  the  future  of  the  war.  Why  ? 
Because,  in  the  first  place,  it  arrested  the  Boer 
invasion  of  Natal,  by  threatening  their  line  of 
communications;  and,  secondly,  it  detained  before 
the  besieged  place  a  body  of  enemies  which  in  the 
later  part  of  the  hostilities  would  have  been  more 
formidable  elsewhere.  I  apprehend  that  Port 
Arthur  has  fulfilled,  and  continues  to  fulfil,  the 
same  function  towards  the  Japanese,  though  it 
seems  much  more  evident  now  than  at  first. 
The  gradual  development  of  operations  makes  it 


100  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


to  my  mind  increasingly  clear  that  the  number 
of  Russians  there,  plus  their  artificial  advantages 
of  fortification,  —  which  evacuation  would  have 
surrendered,  —  are  much  more  useful  to  the 
general  plan  of  campaign  than  they  would  be  if 
with  Kuropatkin.  To  carry  Port  Arthur,  or  even 
to  maintain  an  investment,  the  Japanese  must  be 
more  numerous  than  the  garrison;  therefore,  had 
the  place  been  abandoned,  the  aggregate  of  troops 
transferred  to  Kuroki  would  have  exceeded  de¬ 
cisively  those  added  to  his  opponent. 

But  the  Japanese  might  have  given  Port  Arthur 
the  go-by.  Scarcely;  no  more  than  the  Boers 
could  have  invaded  Natal  in  force,  leaving  Lady¬ 
smith  in  their  rear.  It  is  not  disputed,  I  believe, 
that  the  control  of  the  sea  is  fundamental  to 
Japan.  Abandonment  of  the  place  by  Russia 
meant  destruction  to  the  fleet  within;  and  that 
destruction  meant  the  release  of  Togo’s  ships 
from  a  wearing  and  injurious  blockade,  with 
freedom  to  concentrate  effort  in  protection  of  the 
general  communications  of  his  country,  as  well 
commercial  as  military.  The  recent  exploits 
of  the  Vladivostok  squadron  would  have  been 
much  curtailed,  if  not  absolutely  prohibited,  had 
Togo  been  able  to  leave  the  neighborhood  of  Port 
Arthur.  Apparently,  if  Port  Arthur  holds  out,  it 
will  be  impossible  to  check  the  Vladivostok  ships 


Principles  Involved  in  Japan-Russia  War  101 


seriously  before  ice  forms;  and  the  derange¬ 
ment  of  Japanese  communication  with  the  outer 
world,  particularly  in  the  matter  of  warlike  sup¬ 
plies,  may  prove,  probably  will  prove,  a  very 
serious  matter  to  a  nation  still  relatively  unde¬ 
veloped,  and  carrying  a  heavy  financial  burden. 
The  Japanese  Natal  has  been  invaded,  and  the 
timidity  of  neutral  commerce,  being  under  no 
strong  bonds  of  necessity  to  seek  Japan,  will 
indirectly  second  the  direct  action  of  the  Russian 
commerce  destroyers.  It  is  not  necessary  to  deny 
the  illegality  of  the  Russian  action,  in  sinking 
an  uncondemned  neutral,  in  order  to  recognize  the 
importance  of  the  Vladivostok  squadron’s  freedom 
to  act  as  a  belligerent  factor.  Several  prizes  have 
reached  Vladivostok,  and  with  proper  provision 
of  supernumerary  crews  it  should  be  possible 
frequently  to  carry  in  vessels  as  long  as  Port 
Arthur  stands.  Recapture  by  Japanese  cruisers, 
unless  distinctly  rather  the  rule  than  the  exception, 
will  not  detract  from  the  moral  effect  upon  in¬ 
tending  shippers,  nor  from  its  material  result 
in  rarer  supply  and  enhanced  cost  to  the  custo¬ 
mer. 

Since  this  was  written,  a  letter  of  a  Times  corre¬ 
spondent,  dated  July  io  ( Times  of  August  16) 
reveals,  what  was  perhaps  before  known  but  had 
escaped  my  own  attention,  that  the  effect  of  the 


102  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


first  exploits  of  the  Vladivostok  squadron  had  been 
to  transfer  Kamimura’s  division  from  before  the 
port  itself  to  the  Straits  of  Tsu  Shima;  a  strategic 
position  vital  to  occupy,  in  defence  of  the  Japanese 
transports  maintaining  the  military  communica¬ 
tions  with  Manchuria  and  Korea.  “  Kamimura’s 
squadron  is  not  powerful  enough  to  blockade  the 
two  entrances  to  Vladivostok.  It  has  been  com¬ 
pelled  to  adopt  the  minor  role  of  sealing  the  Tsu 
Shima  Straits,  so  as  to  cover  the  line  of  communi¬ 
cation  southward  of  that  point.  The  naval  people 
pray  daily  for  freedom  to  wipe  out  the  score  Vla¬ 
divostok  has  run  up  against  them.”  It  is  obvious, 
of  course,  that  if  Port  Arthur  had  been  aban¬ 
doned,  this  desired  freedom  would  be  had;  if  it 
falls,  Kamimura  can  be  reinforced,  Vladivostok 
adequately  blockaded,  and  the  whole  naval  situa¬ 
tion  reversed.  This  is  only  another  way  of  saying 
that  the  retention  of  Port  Arthur  has  caused  all 
this  embarrassment  to  the  Japanese,  including  the 
serious  possible  effects  to  their  communications 
with  the  external  world.  The  effect  over  a  month 
ago,  the  date  of  the  letter  quoted,  is  graphically 
portrayed  by  the  writer: 

“  The  three  big  cruisers  stationed  in  Vladivos¬ 
tok,  and  their  accompanying  swarm  of  torpedo 
craft,  are  so  many  thorns  in  the  side  of  Japan. 
It  irks  her  grievously  that,  while  winning  signal 


Principles  Involved  in  Japan-Russia  War  103 


successes  on  the  principal  stage,  there  should  be 
a  by-play  of  unpunished  raids  against  her  own 
merchantmen,  transports,  and  peaceful  settlers; 
that  the  sea  which  goes  by  her  name  should  be  an 
open  field  for  her  enemy’s  enterprises;  that  her 
shores  should  be  exposed  to  attack  by  a  com¬ 
paratively  petty  force;  and  that,  while  she  has 
swept  the  main  body  of  the  Russians  out  of  Western 
Korea,  marauding  bands  of  Cossacks  should  defy 
her  along  the  northwestern  shore  of  the  peninsula. 
It  is  difficult  to  remedy  this  flagrant  fault  in  the 
situation,  until  the  fleet  can  be  freed  from  its 
all-absorbing  duties  at  Port  Arthur.” 

With  all  this  should  be  coupled  the  fact  that 
after  the  sinking  of  the  Petropavlovsk,  April  14, 
Togo  had  detached  several  ships  to  reinforce 
Kamimura.  It  would  seem  probable  that  he  had 
to  recall  them,  after  the  Russian  ships  had  been 
repaired  within  the  port.  No  wonder,  then,  in 
view  of  all  that  has  been  quoted,  and  may  reason¬ 
ably  be  inferred,  that  the  same  correspondent 
notes  that,  while  a  concentration  in  the  north 
might  be  wisest  from  a  purely  military  point  of 
view,  “  it  is  commonly  rumored  in  Tokio  that 
the  naval  authorities  advocate  the  reduction  of 
Port  Arthur  at  the  earliest  possible  moment, 
and  without  any  reference  to  developments  north¬ 
ward  of  the  peninsula.  .  .  .  After  October  the 


104  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


northern  parts  of  the  Sea  of  Japan  pass  under 
the  protection  of  winter.”  Whatever  criticisms 
may  justly  be  passed  on  the  details  of  Russian 
management,  the  Japanese  themselves  thus  testify 
to  the  correctness  of  the  decision  to  retain  the  port. 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  evidence  of  the  value 
of  commerce  destroying,  given  by  the  Vladivostok 
squadron,  as  a  hostile  measure  most  important, 
though  secondary,  may  receive  timely  recognition 
before  the  great  naval  states  are  induced  hastily 
to  sign  away  any  part  of  their  control  over  the  com¬ 
munications  of  the  world,  on  an  ill-considered 
idea  that  private  property,  so  called,  is  more  en¬ 
titled  to  immunity  than  is  human  life  in  the  persons 
of  their  citizens.  After  all,  the  life  of  a  warrior  is 
as  really  a  private  life  as  the  goods  of  the  trader 
are  private  property;  and  is  no  less  entitled  to 
respect  because  risked  for  the  public  welfare,  in¬ 
stead  of  for  individual  gain.  The  whole  subject 
has  been  regarded,  in  my  opinion,  in  the  false  light 
of  a  supposed  humanitarianism,  rather  than  from 
the  true  point  of  view  of  its  weight  as  an  un¬ 
questionably  effective  belligerent  measure.  The 
question  is  not,  as  commonly  posed,  whether  in¬ 
dividual  property  in  transit  for  commercial  pur¬ 
poses  is  private,  in  the  same  sense  as  a  man’s  house, 
or  clothes,  or  furniture.  Even  so,  the  two  kinds 
differ  essentially,  regarded  as  contributory  to 


Principles  Involved  in  Japan- Russia  War  105 


national  military  power,  which  is  the  point  at  issue. 
Accurately  stated,  the  question  runs  thus:  Is  the 
suppression  of  an  enemy’s  external  commerce 
a  means  powerfully  conducive  to  exhausting  his 
strength,  and  so  shortening  the  war  ?  If  so  — 
and  the  answer  can  be  little  doubtful  —  the  query 
follows,  Is  it  not  then  perfectly  proper  to  forbid 
it,  and  to  punish,  by  forfeiture  of  goods  involved, 
belligerent  citizens  who  disregard  the  prohibition, 
exactly  as  the  neutral  who  disregards  a  blockade 
is  punished  by  confiscation  of  vessel  and  cargo  ? 
I  admit  that,  logically,  the  neutral  who  carries  the 
belligerent  goods  which  the  belligerent  no  longer 
can,  also  violates  the  lawful  command  of  the 
other  party  to  the  war;  and  so  Charles  James 
Fox,  an  eminent  and  most  liberal  authority,  said 
that  “  Free  ships,  free  goods,”  was  neither  good 
law  nor  good  sense.  The  principle,  however, 
has  been  adopted  by  consent  of  the  great  naval 
states ;  but  the  making  of  one  mistaken  concession 
is  no  reason  for  another.  The  true  standard  of 
civilized  warfare  is  the  least  injury  consistent 
with  the  end  in  view;  but  the  end  should  not  be 
lost  to  sight  in  glittering  generalities.  Russia 
herself  may  now  see  cause  to  regret  that  she  thus 
lost  sight  of,  or  could  not  anticipate,  what  in  an 
hour  of  need  would  be  the  result  of  her  ancient 
zeal,  and  consequent  treaties,  which  now  deny  her 


106  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


the  old  belligerent  right  to  capture  enemies’  goods 
in  neutral  ships. 

It  is  yet  to  appear  whether  the  Russian  retention 
of  Port  Arthur  will  prove  as  distinctive  and  deter¬ 
minative  a  factor  in  the  general  campaign  as  Lady¬ 
smith  did  in  the  Transvaal.  In  the  present  war, 
there  is  not  between  the  opponents  the  same  dis¬ 
parity  of  ultimate  strength  as  in  the  earlier;  and 
the  approach  to  equality  is  still  closer  because  of 
the  evident  great  superiority  in  organization  of 
the  one  weaker  in  material  power,  which  possesses 
also  the  immense  advantage  of  nearness  to  the 
scene,  with  consequent  shortness  and  facility  of 
communications.  Yet,  while  the  final  outcome  — 
the  result,  —  to  which  the  parties  are  working, 
remains  unknown  while  these  words  are  writing, 
the  process  which  we  are  watching  tends  more  and 
more  to  confirm  the  forecast  that  the  tenure  of 
the  port  may  prove,  and  still  more  might  have 
proved,  the  turning-point  of  final  success  for  the 
one  which  lost  the  first  and  very  important  moves 
of  the  game,  through  being  inexcusably  unpre¬ 
pared,  and  still  more  inexcusably  off  her  guard,  at 
a  most  perilous  moment.  Port  Arthur  has  meant, 
and  still  means,  delay,  the  great  need  of  all  defence, 
but  especially  of  that  particular  defensive  which 
requires  time  to  organize  resources  incontestably 
superior.  Whether  it  avails  finally  has  yet  to  be 


Principles  Involved  in  Japan-Russia  War  107 


shown  in  the  result;  but  in  the  process  its  influence 
is  steadily  visible,  with  a  clearness  to  which  even 
success  can  scarcely  add  demonstration.  It  im¬ 
posed  upon  the  Japanese  at  once  two  objectives; 
two  points  of  the  utmost  importance,  between 
which  they  must  choose,  whether  to  concentrate 
upon  one  or  divide  between  the  two;  and  at  a 
moment  of  general  numerical  inferiority,  it  re¬ 
tained,  in  the  fortifications  of  the  place,  a  passive 
strength,  which  is  always  equivalent  to  a  certain 
number  of  men;  the  number,  namely,  by  which 
besiegers  must  always  outnumber  the  besieged. 
These  divergent  objects  were  Port  Arthur  and  the 
discomfiture  of  the  northern  Russian  army,  nec¬ 
essary  to  assure  the  Japanese  the  control  of  Korea 
and  the  release  of  Manchuria,  the  professed 
motives  of  the  war. 

That  the  Japanese  leaders  realized  and  gravely 
appreciated  the  dilemma  may  be  confidently  in¬ 
ferred  from  their  action,  immediately  after  their 
first  prompt  and  judicious  steps  had  secured  for 
them  the  control  of  the  sea,  in  degree  sufficient 
for  military  transportation.  The  frequent  des¬ 
perate  attempts  to  seal  the  mouth  of  the  harbor 
were  meant  in  effect  to  destroy  the  military  value 
of  the  place;  for  it  has  none  other  than  that  of 
a  seaport  containing  an  effective  squadron.  Closed 
to  ingress  or  egress,  there  would  have  remained 


108  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


for  the  Japanese  army  but  one  position  to  assume; 
that  is,  a  concentration  between  the  two  hostile 
corps.  Having  failed  in  their  efforts,  and  unable 
decisively  to  injure  the  Russian  fleet  as  an  efficient 
entity,  the  port  remains  essentially  untouched.  It 
either  must  be  taken,  or,  if  neglected,  remains  a 
naval  potentiality,  of  evil  omen  to  their  cause.  It 
can  be  neutralized  only  by  a  naval  blockade,  a 
temporary  measure,  which  accident,  or  weather,  or 
some  fortuitous  unexpected  disaster  —  such  as  the 
sinking  of  the  Hatsuse  —  may  cripple  or  remove. 
Doubt,  amounting  to  derision,  has  been  expressed 
as  to  the  Baltic  fleet  going  to  the  Far  East.  I  have 
been  myself  too  far  away  from  sources  of  informa¬ 
tion  to  know  how  far  it  was  possible  for  that  fleet 
to  start,  or  in  what  force;  but  I  have  always  be¬ 
lieved  that,  if  properly  equipped  to  start,  it  was 
perfectly  feasible  for  it  —  so  far  as  coaling  was 
involved  —  to  proceed  to  the  scene  during  the 
summer  weather,  and  this  season  has  been  pecul¬ 
iarly  propitious.  Had  it  so  done,  and  the  Port 
Arthur  fleet  been  as  far  restored  as  it  has  given 
demonstration  of  being,  its  enemy  would  have 
found  on  the  sea,  as  on  land,  two  divergent  ob¬ 
jects,  two  mobile  opponents,  unitedly  very  superior 
to  himself,  co-operation  between  which,  or  even 
junction,  would  have  been  difficult  to  prevent. 

These  various  possibilities,  some  of  which  have 


Principles  Involved  in  J  a  pan-Russia  War  109 


been  realized  already  in  the  sequel,  were  to  my 
mind  ample  justification  for  the  Russian  deter¬ 
mination  to  hold  the  place,  quite  apart  from  the 
secondary,  but  not  therefore  unimportant,  consid¬ 
erations  of  general  policy.  Of  more  interest  than 
my  personal  opinion,  however,  is  the  divergence 
of  views  witnessed  in  military  observers;  some 
condemning  the  Russian  course,  while  others 
find  fault  with  the  Japanese  for  being  by  it  lured  to 
a  division  of  their  forces,  which  apparently  is 
making  itself  felt  in  a  certain  dilatoriness  in 
pushing  their  otherwise  very  correct  strategic 
dispositions  and  movements,  in  the  advance 
toward  Liao-Yang,  or  Mukden  —  whichever  be 
their  ultimate  goal.  This  dilatoriness,  which 
begins  to  affect  the  tone  of  critics  hitherto  favor¬ 
able  even  to  the  verge  of  partiality,  may  be  the 
result  of  caution,  due  or  undue;  or  it  may  reflect 
an  actual  deficiency  of  strength,  attributable  to  the 
corps  detached  for  the  siege  of  Port  Arthur.  The 
army  confronting  Kuropatkin  is  evidently  nu¬ 
merically  superior  to  his;  but  is  this  superiority  as 
great  as  is  needed  to  carry  on  the  flanking  move¬ 
ments,  and  the  assaults  upon  the  successive  posi¬ 
tions,  presumably  well  selected  and  reasonably 
strengthened,  which  it  is  the  privilege  of  a  well- 
conducted  defence  to  oppose  to  the  advance  of 
heavier  numbers  ?  To  outflank  means  to  overlap, 


110  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


so  threatening  doubly,  from  front  and  side,  the 
flank  involved,  and  by  its  defeat  or  disorder  men¬ 
acing  the  rear  of  the  army  and  its  communications. 
To  effect  this,  however,  requires  largely  superior 
numbers,  or  else  a  weakening  of  some  other  part 
of  the  line  attempting  it;  thereby  offering  the 
enemy  an  opportunity  for  a  severe  counter-stroke, 
as  was  the  case  at  Austerlitz. 

Despite  the  difficulty  of  following  the  reported 
movements,  owing  to  the  confusion  of  names,  it 
seems  clear  that  the  Japanese  from  the  first  have 
been  continuously  massing  and  extending  beyond 
Kuropatkin’s  left  (east)  flank;  and  his  recent 
incidental  mention  of  their  apparent  intention 
to  operate  along  the  right  (north)  bank  of  the 
Tai-tse-ho,  which  runs  westward  through  Liao- 
Yang,  indicates  distinctly  a  purpose  to  crush  that 
flank,  and  thereby  either  intercept  his  retreat,  or 
throw  him  westward,  off  the  railroad  which  is  his 
main  line  of  communication.  Success  in  either 
would  mean  to  the  Russians  utter  material  dis¬ 
aster,  irrespective  of  moral  effect;  but  that  a 
scheme  so  well  conceived  should  be  executed 
with  so  little  apparent  impetuosity  inevitably 
elicits  comment.  Is  there  here  traceable  just  that 
inadequate  superiority  which  means  caution  rather 
than  vigor  of  attack  ?  And  is  this  attributable 
to  the  Port  Arthur  siege  ?  Data  for  positive  reply 


Principles  Involved,  in  Japan-Russia  War  111 


are  wanting;  but,  as  before  remarked,  the  transfer 
of  both  the  opposing  forces  at  the  port  to  their 
respective  main  bodies  would  redound  much  more 
to  the  advantage  of  the  Japanese  than  of  the  Rus¬ 
sians,  and  in  every  event  the  influence  of  the  port 
upon  the  course  of  the  campaign  is  conspicuous. 
Nor  can  the  final  result,  whichever  way  it  turn, 
impair  the  significance  of  this  renewed  illustration 
of  the  determining  effect  of  well-placed  fortresses 
upon  military  operations  —  and  upon  naval  also. 
And  here  I  may  well  quote  an  incidental,  but  very 
significant,  expression  from  the  Times  corre¬ 
spondent  already  quoted,  whose  letter  had  not 
been  published  when  I  was  writing  hitherto :  “  The 
Japanese  undoubtedly  intended  to  send  forward 
the  correspondents,  and  undoubtedly  expected 
that  the  military  situation  would  speedily  enable 
them  to  do  so.  But  events  did  not  shape  them¬ 
selves  to  order,  and  every  one  has  been  disap¬ 
pointed.” 

On  the  naval  side,  the  tenure  of  the  fortress  not 
only  has  constrained  the  presence  before  it  of  the 
main  Japanese  navy,  which  is  the  strategic  effect, 
but  also  has  afforded  in  some  measure  lessons, 
tactical  in  character,  as  to  the  probable  dispositions 
and  operations  of  blockading  and  blockaded  fleets 
under  modern  conditions.  The  most  important 
and  decisive  novel  factor  is  the  torpedo,  and  es- 


112  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 

pecially  the  automobile  torpedo,  which  it  is 
scarcely  too  much  to  say  now  makes  its  first  ap¬ 
pearance  in  actual  war.  The  distinguishing 
feature  of  the  torpedo  of  course  is  that  it  directs 
its  attack  against  the  ship’s  bottom.  This  is  the 
part  most  difficult  to  reach;  but,  like  the  heel  of 
Achilles,  it  is  likewise  the  least  protected,  and 
therefore  both  most  vulnerable  and  most  fatal, 
if  attained.  The  stationary  torpedo,  more  accu¬ 
rately  styled  a  submarine  mine,  is  deadly,  if 
struck,  as  was  shown  full  forty  years  ago,  in  the 
American  War  of  Secession,  by  several  appalling 
disasters;  but  under  ordinary  conditions  it  could 
be  avoided,  and  at  all  events  it  did  not  entail 
the  same  continual  anticipation  of  a  stab  in  the 
dark,  from  behind,  nor  the  sustained  anxiety, 
necessarily  occasioned  by  the  automobile,  capable 
of  projection  from  a  long  distance.  The  moral 
strain,  and  consequent  physical  exhaustion,  as 
well  as  the  material  danger,  from  this  cause  has 
been  recognized  to  be  among  the  very  disturbing 
factors  in  future  attempted  blockades;  and  the 
question  how  best  to  deal  with  such  a  condition 
has  weighed  heavily  upon  the  naval  mind. 

No  solution  can  be  said  to  have  received  uni¬ 
versal  acceptance.  In  default  of  experience  it 
was  plausible  to  argue,  a  priori,  and  upon  gen¬ 
eral  principles,  that  whatever  may  be  said  of 


Principles  Involved  in  Japan- Russia  War  113 


torpedoes  launched  from  one  battleship  against 
another,  which  is  a  separate  problem,  the  attack 
by  torpedo  vessels  upon  a  blockading  fleet  is 
simply  a  particular  form  of  the  general  question 
of  surprises,  and  must  be  met  by  precautions  anal¬ 
ogous  to  those  used  by  all  great  armed  masses, 
which  cover  their  front  and  flanks  with  a  system 
of  advanced  detachments,  diminishing  in  numerical 
strength  until  the  outermost  of  all,  called  the  picket 
line,  is  reached.  By  these  means  is  ensured,  to  a 
greater  or  less  degree,  that  timely  alarm  will  be 
given,  and  also  a  certain  amount  of  resistance 
opposed,  all  tending  to  prolong  the  period  during 
which  the  main  body  will  be  preparing  to  meet  the 
attack,  thus  reduced  from  a  surprise  to  the  normal 
conditions  of  warfare.  This  is  the  simply  defensive 
resource  by  which  an  investing  body,  military  or 
naval,  protects  itself  against  attack  unawares  from 
within  or  without,  whether  by  sortie  in  force,  or 
by  some  special  enterprise  on  a  minor  scale  in¬ 
tended  to  inflict  a  particular  injury;  such  as  dis¬ 
abling  a  battery  approaching  completion,  inter¬ 
cepting  a  train  of  supplies,  etc.  The  offensive 
purpose,  whether  it  be  siege  or  blockade,  demands 
further  dispositions;  but,  whatever  these  may  be, 
there  is  always  necessity  to  guard  against  offensive 
returns,  by  surprise,  from  the  opponent  within. 

It  appears  to  me,  from  the  numerous  though 


114  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


often  very  brief  and  partial  accounts  which  reach 
us,  that  Admiral  Togo’s  measures  have  reflected 
these  conditions.  Since  the  discontinuance  of 
the  bombardments  by  the  fleet,  and  of  the  efforts 
to  close  the  harbor’s  mouth,  the  conspicuous 
feature  of  the  naval  operations,  as  reported,  has 
been  the  recurrent  encounters  between  small  ves¬ 
sels,  singly  or  in  groups.  These  have  been  mainly 
of  the  torpedo  class,  or  unarmored  cruisers,  evi¬ 
dently  engaged  in  outpost  work,  for  which  their 
size  particularly  designates  them.  The  Japanese 
battle  fleet  has  presumably  maintained  a  position 
where  its  commander  believed  that,  under  all 
ordinary  circumstances,  by  its  system  of  lookouts, 
it  would  receive  timely  notice  of  an  attempt  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy  to  come  out  in  force.  In  offensive 
purpose  we  know  that  on  more  than  one  occasion, 
conspicuously  on  June  23,  these  precautions  were 
adequate,  for  the  fleet  came  up  in  accordance  with 
signals;  while  on  the  defensive  side  we  also  know 
that  no  successful  attack  has  been  made  by  a 
torpedo  vessel  on  the  Japanese  main  blockading 
fleet,  the  Hatsuse  having  been  sunk  by  a  station¬ 
ary  mine.  I  have  been  told,  by  a  person  in  a  posi¬ 
tion  to  speak  with  assurance,  that  the  inactivity 
of  the  Russians,  with  the  very  respectable  torpedo 
flotilla  at  their  command,  is  attributed  in  part 
to  the  personal  characteristics  of  their  naval 


Principles  Involved  in  J a pan-Russia  War  1 15 


commander-in-chief;  to  his  excess  of  caution  or 
lack  of  enterprise.  To  this  correspond  expres¬ 
sions  attributed  by  a  correspondent  of  the  Times 
(June  18)  to  Captain  Arima,  the  Japanese  naval 
officer  who  commanded  in  the  first  two  attempts 
to  block  the  entrance.  “  The  one  thing  essential 
to  Russia  above  all  others  was  to  prevent  Japan 
from  securing  undisturbed  use  of  the  waterways 
to  the  continental  seat  of  war.  It  was  for  her  to 
assume  and  to  hold  the  offensive.  Her  passivity 
has  been  astonishing.  It  may  be  doubted  whether 
she  yet  knows  where  the  Japanese  have  their  naval 
base.  When  Makaroff  had  reorganized  his  fleet,  we 
expected  to  find  his  destroyers  and  torpedo  boats 
scouting  through  an  arc  of  a  hundred  miles 
radius.  We  expected  to  find  him  taking  active 
steps  to  discover  what  route  our  vessels  habitually 
followed  in  approaching  Port  Arthur.  Even  if, 
having  tracked  us  to  our  base,  he  found  it  in  un¬ 
surveyed  waters,  knowledge  of  our  course  must 
have  afforded  him  many  opportunities.  But  he 
did  nothing.  His  vessels  lay  tamely  awaiting  our 
attacks.” 

If  these  criticisms  be  just,  —  and  it  is  not  easy 
to  contest  them,  —  they  qualify  by  so  far  the  natu¬ 
ral  inference  from  the  present  operations;  which, 
with  that  exception,  have  been  confirmatory  of  the 
opinion,  already  held  by  some,  that  torpedo  vessels 


116  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


would  find  it  exceedingly  difficult  to  get  within 
range  —  at  night  even  within  sight  —  of  a  hostile 
battle  fleet,  well  picketed  by  lookouts  close  in  with 
the  harbor  mouth,  and  itself  occupying  a  position 
unknown  to  the  would-be  assailants.  Judging 
from  reports  at  this  moment  of  writing  (August 
13),  the  annual  manoeuvre  period  of  the  British 
fleet  points  to  the  same  conclusion.  There  is  also  a 
statement,  made  upon  good  authority,  that  in  one 
of  the  sorties  of  the  Vladivostok  squadron,  it  was 
sighted  by  Kamimura’s  division  and  kept  in  view 
till  nightfall,  the  pursuing  torpedo  vessels  reaching 
within  two  or  three  miles;  but  upon  the  Russian 
lights  being  extinguished  all  trace  was  lost.  Like¬ 
wise  it  is  familiar  to  students  of  naval  history  that 
a  chased  vessel,  the  exact  position  of  which  at  dusk 
was  visible,  frequently  escaped  by  the  simple 
trick  of  showing  no  lights,  or  false  lights,  and 
changing  her  course.  This  expedient  was  effective 
even  against  intent  eyes  looking  towards  a  point 
already  discerned,  and  from  a  comparatively  lofty 
deck.  Owing  to  the  lowness  of  torpedo  craft,  vision 
is  much  more  restricted  in  range;  and  through 
their  unsteadiness,  it  is  more  difficult  to  retain. 

That  “  frigates  are  eyes  of  the  fleet  ”  is  a  saying 
probably  older  than  Nelson,  by  whom  it  is  known 
to  have  been  adopted.  In  his  day,  however,  the 
eyes  were  almost  wholly  for  offensive  purposes; 


Principles  Involved  in  Japan-Russia  War  117 


to  ascertain  the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy,  in 
order  to  guide  one’s  own  movements  of  attack.  The 
ancient  line-of-battle  ships  were  not  liable  to  sur¬ 
prise,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  although 
the  unexpected  doubtless  often  occurred.  Now, 
however,  the  seaman  is  reduced  to  the  full  level 
of  the  exposure  which  in  this  respect  has  long 
dogged  the  soldier,  and  the  eyes  of  Argus  scarcely 
would  exceed  the  demand  for  defensive  outlook. 
If  the  unusually  smooth  weather,  which  has 
marked  the  recent  British  manoeuvres,  enlarged 
in  consequence  the  range  of  action  and  effect  of  the 
submarine,  as  is  thought,  it  suggests  also  that 
many  steamboats  of  the  outside  fleet,  not  capable 
of  meeting  heavy  seas,  could  be  utilized  for  de¬ 
fence  in  such  circumstances. 

It  will  remain  a  question  for  some  time  how  near 
a  harbor’s  mouth  a  blockading  battle-force  will 
venture  to  lie.  If  its  object  be  merely  to  support 
a  commercial  blockade,  maintained  chiefly  by 
lighter  and  swifter  cruisers,  this  end  may  be  se¬ 
cured  without  very  close  approach;  but,  if  charged 
with  preventing  the  escape  of  a  division  within, 
distance  will  be  a  matter  of  importance.  The  latter 
has  been  the  condition  of  Admiral  Togo’s  block¬ 
ade,  and  the  escape  of  the  Russians,  to  which 
every  motive  should  prompt  them,  has  so  far  been 
thwarted.  We  do  not  know  what  his  proceeding 


118  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


has  been,  but  we  do  know  that  his  battle  fleet 
is  frequently  out  of  sight;  and  yet,  on  the  un¬ 
expected  appearance  of  the  enemy  with  his  re¬ 
paired  ships,  on  June  23,  Togo  was  promptly  on 
hand.  Under  the  particular  conditions  of  Port 
Arthur,  which  made  the  issue  of  a  fleet  onerous 
and  protracted,  the  vessels  having  to  come  out  one 
by  one,  ample  time  is  allowed  for  conveying 
warning  to  a  distance.  The  difficulty  would  be 
far  greater  where  egress  was  easy,  and  could  be 
effected  independently  of  tide  conditions.  Under 
such  circumstances,  to  sustain  its  offensive  role,  the 
outside  battle  fleet  must  take  a  position  which  will 
greatly  increase  its  danger,  and  impose  further 
strain  upon  its  defensive  powers.  By  day  the 
range  of  modern  ordnance,  and  by  both  night 
and  day  the  establishment  of  outside  mine  fields 
to  the  extreme  limit  of  the  belligerent’s  waters, 
suffice  to  prevent  very  close  approach  by  ar¬ 
mored  vessels,  the  draft  of  which  is  unavoidably 
heavy.  These  factors,  however,  are  stationary, 
and  can  readily  be  allowed  for.  It  is,  as  always, 
the  mobile  foes,  in  this  case  the  division  wishing 
to  escape,  the  enemy’s  defensive  body,  with  the 
torpedo  flotilla  as  its  offensive  covering  arm, 
which  constitute  the  difficulty.  The  problem  is 
probably  no  more  troublesome,  nor  more  unequal 
between  the  two  contestants,  than  those  which  our 


Principles  Involved  in  Japan- Russia  War  119 


predecessors  encountered;  but  the  particular 
danger  of  unexpected  sudden  assault,  directed 
at  a  peculiarly  vital  spot,  by  assailants  not  readily 
visible,  is  new,  and  we  have  not  yet  the  experi¬ 
mental  data  necessary  for  even  an  approximate 
answer  as  to  its  degree,  or  as  to  the  facility  of 
counteraction.  One  thing  we  know;  risks  must 
be  run  by  those  who  would  make  war.  Admiral 
Sampson  well  said  in  one  of  his  general  orders, 
the  escape  of  the  Spanish  squadron  is  so  serious 
a  matter  that  the  risk  of  the  torpedo  must  be 
accepted. 

Yet  how  far  may  not  such  a  sound  general 
maxim  be  qualified  by  conditions  of  political 
urgency,  or  of  ultimate  military  success,  as  con¬ 
trasted  with  immediate  victory.  There  is  such  a 
thing  as  the  “  sterile  glory  ”  of  fighting  battles,  and 
still  more  of  running  risks,  the  object  of  which  is 
not  worth  the  possible  loss.  The  best  victories, 
said  Tourville,  are  those  which  cost  least  in  blood, 
hemp,  and  iron.  It  has  been  noted  of  Nelson, 
truly,  I  think,  that  he  was  more  cautious  about 
his  top-gallant  masts  in  bad  weather  than  about 
his  whole  fleet  in  battle.  It  has  seemed  to  me  all 
along  very  much  of  a  question  whether  Admiral 
Togo  would  be  well  advised  to  court  action  with 
his  battleships,  provided  he  could  prevent  the 
enemy’s  escape  without  it.  It  would  be  better 


120  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


to  throw  the  weight  of  the  destruction  of  the 
enemy’s  squadron  upon  his  torpedo  vessels  and 
upon  the  army.  His  conditions  are  not  those  of 
Sampson,  though  even  in  that  case  obvious  polit¬ 
ical  considerations  precluded  all  needless  hazard 
of  battleships.  Japan  has  abundance  of  men, 
but  she  has  not  superabundance  of  ships.  For  an 
adequate  object  she  can  afford  to  risk  much,  and 
under  some  conditions  must  risk  everything,  if 
necessary;  but,  after  all,  the  winning  of  victories 
is  worth  while  only  to  the  one  supreme  decisive 
object  of  her  naval  operations  —  the  control  of 
the  sea;  and  if  that  can  be  attained  equally  well 
by  other  means,  the  battle  fleet  should  be  pre¬ 
served  as  both  a  political  and  military  factor  of 
the  first  importance.  There  did  not  seem  to  me 
eagerness  to  engage  in  his  operations  of  June  23; 
although  here  again  information,  still  imperfect, 
prevents  positiveness  of  judgment.  Opinion  con¬ 
cerning  his  motives  must  repose  rather  upon 
apparent  expediency,  conjoined  with  such  indica¬ 
tions  as  the  reports  contain.  Again,  what  force  has 
he  had  recently  before  Port  Arthur  ?  Has  he  not 
drawn  thither  the  greater  part  of  the  armored 
cruisers  which  once  appeared  to  be  with  Kami- 
mura  before  Vladivostok  ?  This  measure,  if  rec¬ 
ognized  by  the  Russians,  would  deter  them  from 
desperate  attempts  to  leave,  and,  should  they  try 


Principles  Involved  in  Japan- Russia  War  121 


it,  would  ensure  comparative  immunity  for  his 
own  fleet  by  an  overwhelming  superiority  of 
force,  thus  shortening  the  time  of  engagement, 
and  lessening,  as  well  as  distributing,  the  amount 
of  injury  which  the  enemy  could  effect.  It  would 
account  also  for  the  apparent  inefficiency  of  the 
Japanese  Vladivostok  squadron,  which  has  so 
far  failed  to  bring  to  book  the  audacious  enemy 
within. 

After  writing  these  words,  rummaging  through 
some  cuttings  relative  to  the  war,  which  I  had 
put  aside,  I  turned  out,  among  other  things, 
the  report  of  Captain  Arima’s  remarks,  before 
forgotten,  from  which  I  have  already  introduced 
one  quotation.  He  further  confirms,  and  was 
doubtless  in  a  position  to  speak  knowingly,  that 
the  necessity  for  care  of  the  battleships  was  clearly 
recognized,  and  was  a  dominant  motive  in  Japan¬ 
ese  councils: 

“  Our  general  strategy  has  been  largely  guided 
by  the  consideration  that  our  navy  is  not  elastic. 
Whatever  resources  we  take  into  the  fight  must 
suffice  us  until  the  finish.  Our  first  thought, 
therefore,  was  to  expose  our  squadrons  to  a  mini¬ 
mum  of  danger,  so  long  as  their  destructive  po¬ 
tency  was  not  thereby  impaired.  We  have  not 
courted  conflicts  at  close  ranges.  We  have  avoided 
them,  preferring  to  utilize  to  the  full  the  immense 


122  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


potentialities  of  modern  cannon.  Hence  our  fre¬ 
quent  employment  of  high  angle  fire,  which  it  is 
not  our  experience  is  specially  severe  on  a  gun. 
Besides,  we  have  no  lack  of  guns.  .  .  .  Our 
attempts  to  seal  Port  Arthur  were  inspired  pri¬ 
marily  by  these  same  economical  considerations. 
Whatever  we  could  do  to  paralyze  the  enemy’s 
squadron  without  hurting  our  own  ships,  that 
we  had  to  do.” 

The  reasoning,  I  think,  is  conclusive,  and  justi¬ 
fies  Arima’s  further  remark: 

“  The  same  considerations  that  dictated  for  us 
a  programme  as  economical  as  possible  should 
have  impelled  our  enemy  to  assume  the  offensive 
with  all  the  destructive  force  he  could  command. 
Russia  had  reserves  to  draw  on;  and  she  has 
building  yards  on  an  incomparably  larger  scale 
than  those  of  Japan.  The  loss  of  a  few  ships 
could  not  have  mattered  for  her,  could  she  have 
crippled  or  destroyed  an  equal  number  of  Jap¬ 
anese  vessels.  With  regard  to  Makaroff’s  strategy, 
and  the  Russian  naval  strategy  in  general,  it 
appears  to  us  that  they  have  erred  seriously 
throughout.” 

In  these  words  I  infer  a  very  evident  reference 
to  the  Baltic  fleet;  for  in  Far  Eastern  waters  Russia 
certainly  had  neither  original  equality,  nor  re¬ 
serves,  nor  dockyard  capacity  to  vie  with  Japan. 


Principles  Involved  in  Japan- Russia  War  123 


Apparently,  Japanese  naval  authorities  reckoned 
the  coming  of  a  Baltic  squadron  as  among  very 
possible  contingencies.  The  nautical  difficulties 
of  every  kind  confronting  it  were  in  no  wise 
insuperable;  in  fact,  were  very  moderate;  and  its 
failure  to  appear  can  be  attributed  only  to  a  very 
serious  lack  of  appreciation  of  naval  conditions, 
or  to  the  general  unpreparedness  which  made  a 
timely  start  impracticable.  The  process  of  re¬ 
pairing,  which  finally  on  June  23  enabled  the 
Russian  fleet  to  put  into  line  the  two  battleships, 
Cesarevitch  and  Retvizan,  would  have  justified 
Makaroff  in  delaying  action  until  he  could  bring 
his  whole  force  against  an  enemy  so  decidedly 
superior;  but  that  accomplished,  —  and  its  period 
would  be  known  antecedently  at  St.  Petersburg, 
—  the  despatch  of  the  Baltic  fleet,  coincident  in 
purpose,  if  not  in  time,  with  a  determined  attack 
upon  the  Japanese  fleet  by  the  Port  Arthur  division, 
would  be  a  combination  not  only  feasible  but 
highly  promising  of  decisive  effect.  Port  Arthur 
has  held  out  to  a  time  apparently  far  exceeding 
Japanese  anticipations  at  the  date  (May  14) 
when  Arima  uttered  the  words  reported;  for, 
speaking  of  certain  attempts  that  might  be  made  by 
the  Russian  fleet  within,  he  concluded  his  remarks 
by  saying,  “  We  believe  that,  unless  our  estimate 
of  our  army  be  erroneous,  there  will  not  remain  to 


124  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


Port  Arthur  much  time  for  such  enterprises.” 
The  garrison  has  endured  beyond  the  expectation 
of  many;  but  where  is  the  relieving  force  ? 

This  article  was  begun,  and  mostly  written, 
before  the  sortie  of  the  Russian  fleet  from  Port 
Arthur,  August  io;  but  it  has  been  concluded  — 
and  revised  —  under  the  full  impression  produced 
by  its  failure.  Precision  of  details  as  to  what 
actually  occurred,  of  the  successive  stages  of  the 
combat  which  led  up  to  the  final  result,  are  still 
wanting;  but  the  material  outcome  is  sufficiently 
evident  for  all  practical  purposes,  for  forming  a 
workable  estimate  of  the  situation  as  it  now  is,  and 
of  the  probabilities  of  the  immediate  future.  As 
the  matter  of  the  engagement  of  August  io  now 
(August  19)  stands,  there  could  scarcely  be  asked 
an  apter  illustration  of  that  aspect  of  the  subject 
of  warfare  —  and  of  all  practical  action  —  upon 
which  I  dwelt  at  the  beginning.  There  can  be 
little  doubt  that  when  the  details  are  known,  and 
have  been  collated,  studied,  and  weighed,  by  men 
of  special  aptitudes,  there  will  be  found  much  that 
will  throw  needed  experimental  light  upon  the 
conditions  of  modern  warfare,  and  much  room 
for  criticism,  favorable  or  adverse,  upon  the 
conduct  of  the  respective  fleets.  But  important 
as  all  this  is  in  its  place  and  time,  and  conducive 
as  it  may  prove,  when  well  digested,  to  the  formu- 


Principles  Involved  in  Japan- Russia  War  125 


lation  of  professional  opinion  upon  questions 
still  in  dispute,  it  is  not  immediately  imperative; 
nay,  it  is  necessarily  a  matter  of  time  and  delibera¬ 
tion.  Those  who  have  tried  to  balance  opposing 
statements  of  eye-witnesses,  to  reconcile  official 
reports,  to  supplement  defective  testimony,  know 
how  troublesome  it  is  to  reconstruct  the  course 
of  a  naval  battle.  At  present  the  one  feature  which 
engages  my  own  attention,  standing  out  from 
the  fog  of  unexplained  details,  is  the  apparent 
continued  care  of  Togo  to  preserve  his  battleships. 
It  is  incredible  that  after  the  experience  of  June  23 
he  should  not  have  been  in  superior  force,  and 
certainly  he  had  the  best  of  the  fighting;  his  fleet 
remains  on  the  field,  and  his  enemy  dispersed. 
But  why  did  he  not  push  home  his  advantage  ? 
Why  was  the  Cesarevitch  permitted  to  escape,  and 
the  other  battleships  to  return  ?  He  can  scarcely 
expect,  if  the  place  falls,  that  they  will  be  given 
up  “alive;”  or  have  felt  about  battering  them, 
as  Nelson  about  using  shell  against  an  enemy, 
that  it  would  be  burning  “  our  own  ”  ships.  To 
surmise  that  there  may  remain  more  life  in  the 
place  than  appears  may  cover  me  with  confusion, 
ere  the  words  appear  in  print;  but  under  the  most 
natural  conclusion,  that  Japan  does  not  feel  even 
yet  that  she  has  any  margin  of  sea  power  to  spare, 
what  a  comment  on  Russian  naval  management, 


126  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


and  what  a  justification  of  the  tenure  of  Port 
Arthur,  and  the  consequent  harassment  of  the 
enemy’s  little  navy ! 

This  battle  in  fact  is  part  of  the  process ,  of  the 
method,  of  the  detail,  appertaining  to  the  drama 
of  war  passing  before  our  eyes;  and  it  is  not  so 
much  the  particulars  of  its  own  action  which  is 
important,  but  the  part  which  it  itself,  as  a  whole, 
bears  to  the  final  result.  Due  consideration  of 
this  part  demands  reference  not  only  to  that  which 
is  to  come,  intervening  between  the  present  and 
the  anticipated  future,  but  also  to  the  irrecoverable 
past.  Properly  to  value  it,  we  should  work  back¬ 
ward  as  well  as  forward,  and  regard  the  broad 
aspect  of  the  general  contest  not  only  with  eyes 
enlightened  by  recognition  of  fundamental  prin¬ 
ciples  of  war,  but  also  with  attention  undistracted 
by  multiplication  of  irrelevant  detail.  Whatever 
the  cause,  and  wherever  the  fault,  Russia,  though 
much  the  greater  in  ultimate  resources,  permitted 
herself  to  drift  into  war  unprepared,  and  gravely 
inferior  in  force  upon  the  decisive  scene  of  con¬ 
flict.  This  was  especially  the  case  upon  the  sea; 
the  control  of  which  was,  and  has  continued,  so 
absolutely  essential  to  Japan,  that  apart  from  it 
she  would  be  helpless  for  the  offensive  action  she 
had  to  take. 

Under  these  circumstances  two  things  were  nec- 


Principles  Involved  in  J a  pan-Russia  War  127 


essary  to  Russia  —  delay,  in  order  to  gather  her 
resources,  and  promptitude  in  repairing  the  neglect 
of  the  past.  Herein  appears  the  importance  of  Port 
Arthur  in  the  past;  it  has  obtained  delay.  The 
time  occupied  in  the  siege  has  been  ample  for  a 
government,  which  recognized  that  the  whole  Jap¬ 
anese  movement  turned  upon  the  control  of  the  sea, 
to  have  despatched  a  fleet  that  by  this  time  could 
have  reached  the  scene,  and  very  well  might  have 
turned  the  scale  —  allowing  only  for  the  fortune  of 
war.  Before  this  writing,  the  aggregate  of  Russian 
naval  force  in  the  East  might  have  been  made  very 
decidedly  superior  to  that  of  Japan;  and  the  prob¬ 
lem  of  bringing  the  separated  sections  into  co¬ 
operation  against  a  concentrated  enemy,  though 
difficult,  would  be  by  no  means  hopeless.  Success 
would  have  ended  the  war. 

The  Japanese,  having  this  danger  staring  them 
in  the  face,  have,  I  think,  seen  it  more  clearly 
than  many  of  their  critics.  As  shown  by  the  course 
of  the  war,  by  their  action,  they  have  recognized 
that  Port  Arthur  was  the  key,  not  only  to  the  naval 
war  but  to  the  whole  campaign,  land  and  sea. 
It  would  have  been  to  them  an  immeasurable 
calamity  had  the  naval  season,  already  approach¬ 
ing  its  close,  ended  with  Port  Arthur  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy.  Amid  all  the  uncertainty  in  which 
we  are  as  to  the  respective  numbers  of  the  oppos- 


128  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


ing  armies,  one  thing  seems  clear,  —  that  Kuro- 
patkin  up  to  the  present  has  profited,  and  con¬ 
tinues  to  profit,  by  the  siege  of  Port  Arthur;  and 
that  to  a  degree  which  still  renders  inconclusive 
the  whole  Japanese  movement  against  him. 
They  gain  ground,  undoubtedly;  but  the  Russian 
army  continually  escapes  them.  It  is  not  to  be 
believed  that  leaders  with  the  high  order  of  military 
intelligence  shown  by  them  would  permit  this 
had  they  the  power  to  prevent  it.  Each  successful 
retreat  leaves  the  Russian  army  still  an  organized 
force,  still  “  in  being;  ”  draws  it  nearer  to  its 
resources,  and  lengthens  its  enemy’s  communica¬ 
tions.  A  naval  base  is  an  element  of  sea-power. 
It  may  be  no  less  determinative  of  a  naval  issue 
than  the  fleet  itself,  because  it  is  essential  to  its 
existence.  The  tenure  of  Port  Arthur,  equally 
with  the  control  of  the  Far  Eastern  waters,  has 
contributed  to  the  demonstration  of  the  influence 
of  sea-power.  It  has  modified  the  whole  tenor 
of  the  land  operations,  and  who  shall  say  that  even 
the  delay  so  far  procured  may  not  sensibly  affect 
the  outcome  of  the  war,  even  though  the  place 
itself  shortly  fall  ?  The  defence  of  Port  Arthur 
must  not  be  looked  upon  as  an  isolated  considera¬ 
tion  dependent  upon  its  particular  merits,  but  as 
part  of  a  general  plan  of  operations.  Every  day  it 
holds  out  is  a  gain;  not  perhaps  for  itself  but  for 


Principles  Involved  in  J  a  pan- Russia  War  129 


Russia.  No  principle  of  warfare  is  more  funda¬ 
mental  than  that  no  one  position  stands,  or  falls, 
for  itself  alone,  but  for  the  general  good.  The  ques¬ 
tion  is  not,  Can  Kuropatkin  bring  the  Japanese  to 
a  stand  as  yet  ?  Probably  he  cannot,  if  the  besieg¬ 
ing  force  is  released.  It  is,  Can  he  continue  a  suc¬ 
cessful  retreat, untilthe season  brings  theoperations 
to  a  close  ?  “  Though  our  military  position  was  im¬ 
posing,”  wrote  Bonaparte  to  the  Directory  in  1797, 
“  it  must  not  be  thought  that  we  had  everything 
in  our  hands.  Had  the  enemy  awaited  me,  I  should 
have  beaten  him;  but  had  he  continued  to  fall 
back,  continually  augmenting  his  resources,  the 
situation  might  have  become  embarrassing.” 
Whether  Port  Arthur  has,  or  has  not,  obtained  for 
Kuropatkin  all  the  time  needed  to  organize  a 
campaign  of  this  character,  remains  to  be  seen; 
but  I  think  the  verdict  of  history  must  be  that  such 
was  the  tendency  of  its  resistance,  and  that  failure, 
if  it  comes,  must  be  attributed  to  insufficiency 
of  means,  not  to  error  in  strategic  conception. 
The  time  it  has  held  out  justifies  the  risk  taken 
in  the  original  calculation. 

Lake  Lucerne,  August  19,  1904. 


RETROSPECT  UPON  THE  WAR 
BETWEEN  JAPAN  AND 
RUSSIA 


RETROSPECT  UPON  THE  WAR  BE¬ 
TWEEN  JAPAN  AND  RUSSIA 

March,  1906 

MEASURED  by  the  external  and  obvious 
incidents  of  its  progress,  time  certainly 
flies  in  these  days.  Momentous  events  come 
swiftly  into  view,  shoot  rapidly  by,  and  with  equal 
speed  disappear  into  the  past,  crowded  out  of 
sight  and  mind  by  the  successors  which  tread  upon 
their  heels.  Nor  is  this  due  only  to  the  immediate¬ 
ness  with  which  intelligence  is  transmitted  to  the 
four  quarters  of  the  globe.  The  facility  of  physical 
movement,  and  for  the  communication  of  facts 
and  interchange  of  thought,  between  persons  or 
nations  co-operating  to  a  common  end,  the  be¬ 
quests  to  us  of  the  last  century,  have  accentuated 
perceptibly  the  pace  of  mankind,  the  making  of 
history.  The  still  recent  war  between  Japan  and 
Russia  is  a  conspicuous  instance.  Not  merely 
the  first  thunderbolt  blow  of  Admiral  Togo  upon 
the  Russian  fleet  exposed  before  Port  Arthur,  but 
the  final  maturing  of  the  quarrel,  and  the  progress 

133 


134  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


of  the  war  itself,  were  marked  by  a  quick  decisive¬ 
ness  unattainable  under  similar  conditions  a 
century  ago.  Among  similar  conditions  I  include, 
of  course,  the  capacity  of  the  leaders,  as  well  as 
the  circumstances  under  which  they  are  called 
to  act;  the  difference  between  a  Napoleon  and 
lesser  men  would  be  as  great  to-day  as  it  was  in 
his  own  time,  and  likewise  as  great  under  one 
set  of  external  conditions  as  under  another. 
Again,  when  the  fighting  in  Manchuria  had  reached 
what  proved  to  be  its  end,  the  peace  itself,  owing 
to  the  ease  with  which  the  plenipotentiaries  and 
their  governments  could  exchange  ideas  and  mes¬ 
sages,  was  concluded  with  a  suddenness  which 
took  by  surprise  a  doubting  world ;  while  no  sooner 
is  the  war  over  than  it  is  forgotten  in  public  inter¬ 
est.  Here  and  there  a  professional  writer  gives 
forth  his  views,  to  which  some  brief  comment 
is  accorded ;  but  that  the  war  itself,  and  its  lessons, 
have  ceased  to  engage  general  attention,  is  at¬ 
tested  alike  by  the  columns  of  journals  and  the 
lists  of  articles  in  the  reviews. 

Underlying  the  external  and  obvious  character¬ 
istics,  that  thus  pass  out  of  sight  and  mind,  there 
are  in  every  period  factors  more  permanent  in 
operation  and  longer  in  development,  which  for 
these  reasons  demand  closer  scrutiny  and  more 
sustained  attention.  For  instance,  the  recent 


Retrospect  upon  Ja pan-Russia  War  135 


elections  (1906)  in  Great  Britain  have  probably 
corresponded  in  kind,  in  general  outcome,  to 
general  expectation,  as  did  also  the  issue  of  the 
war  between  Japan  and  Russia;  but  in  degree 
each  has  taken  the  world  —  at  least  the  outside 
world  —  by  surprise.  The  events  are  obvious; 
but,  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other,  what  account 
is  to  be  given  ?  Does  the  magnitude  of  the  imme¬ 
diate  result  indicate  in  either  case  a  final  deter¬ 
mination  of  the  current  of  history,  definitive  direc¬ 
tions  to  be  henceforth  maintained  by  three  mighty 
nations  ?  or  is  there  reason  to  suppose  that,  like 
a  river  forced  to  adapt  its  course  to  the  country 
through  which  it  flows,  we  see  only  a  mo¬ 
mentary  deflection,  or  a  momentary  persistence, 
beyond  which  may  be  discerned  already  condi¬ 
tions  which  must  substantially  change  what  may 
now  appear  an  irreversible  decision  ?  Has  the  war 
itself  revolutionized,  or  seriously  modified,  ante¬ 
cedent  teachings  of  military  and  naval  history  ? 

In  military  matters,  so  far  as  they  can  be  sepa¬ 
rated  from  political,  the  obvious  and  external  be¬ 
long  chiefly  to  the  field  of  tactics,  as  distinguished 
from  strategy.  The  relative  significance  of  these 
two  terms  may  be  assumed  familiar  to  the  public 
through  the  discussions  of  the  past  score  of  years. 
Great  battles,  great  surrenders,  the  startling  mile¬ 
stones  of  a  campaign  or  a  war,  remain  vividly 


136  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


impressed  upon  minds  that  may  never  have  ap¬ 
preciated  or  suspected  the  underlying  stream  of 
causes  which  from  time  to  time  emerges  in  these 
conspicuous  results.  And  as  such  popular  recog¬ 
nition  is  essentially  narrow  in  scope,  so  the  matters 
to  which  it  relates  are  the  most  narrowly  technical, 
and  consequently  those  which  in  fact  the  general 
public  can  least  accurately  weigh.  A  broad  out¬ 
come  —  victory  or  defeat  —  is  within  its  compre¬ 
hension;  the  fitness  or  the  errors  of  the  military 
means  employed  are  much  less  so,  except  in  very 
general  statement.  Politicians,  doubtless,  find 
the  same  in  their  campaigns.  Great  considerations 
of  policy,  appreciation  of  conditions,  especially 
those  of  the  future,  which  correspond  to  the  strate¬ 
gic  diagnosis  of  the  warrior,  are  much  less  effect¬ 
ive  at  the  moment  than  some  telling  phrase,  or 
suggestion  of  immediate  interest,  which  can  be 
quickly  fashioned  into  a  campaign  cry  that  hal- 
loes  down  reasonable  opposition.  Such  victories, 
however,  are  fruitless  in  war  or  in  politics.  Unless 
the  position  won  is  strategically  decisive,  by  its 
correspondence  to  the  conditions  of  the  war  or 
of  the  nation,  the  battle  might  as  well,  or  better, 
never  have  been  fought.  In  military  affairs  the 
choice  of  action,  being  in  the  hands  of  one  man, 
may  by  him  be  determined,  for  good  or  ill,  with¬ 
out  regard  to  his  followers;  and  in  the  analogous 


Retrospect  upon  Japan-Russia  War  137 


position  of  a  despotic  ruler,  if  an  able  man,  a  for¬ 
tunate  solution  may  be  reached  independent  of 
popular  will.  Happily  for  those  who  love  freedom, 
this  case  is  rare.  In  popular  government  the  fore¬ 
sight  of  the  statesman  must  wait  upon  the  con¬ 
version  of  the  people,  often  extorted  only  by  the 
hard  logic  of  experience.  The  good  of  national 
conviction  and  support  must  be  purchased  at  the 
expense  of  national  suffering,  consequent  upon  the 
slowness  with  which  nations  comprehend  condi¬ 
tions  not  at  once  apparent.  Yet  in  the  end  it  is 
the  country  ahead,  not  that  behind,  which  will 
control  the  future  course  of  the  river. 

Justly  appreciated,  military  affairs  are  one 
side  of  the  politics  of  a  nation,  and  therefore  con¬ 
cern  each  individual  who  has  an  interest  in  the 
government  of  the  state.  They  form  part  of  a 
closely  related  whole;  and,  putting  aside  the 
purely  professional  details,  which  relate  mostly 
to  the  actual  clash  of  arms,  —  the  province  of 
tactics,  —  military  preparations  should  be  deter¬ 
mined  chiefly  by  those  broad  political  considera¬ 
tions  which  affect  the  relations  of  states  one  to 
another,  or  of  the  several  parts  of  the  same  state 
to  the  common  defence.  Defence,  let  it  be  said 
parenthetically  to  the  non-military  reader,  implies 
not  merely  what  shall  be  done  to  repel  attack,  but 
what  is  necessary  to  do  in  order  that  attack  may 


138  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


not  be  attempted,  or,  if  undertaken,  may  be 
resisted  elsewhere  than  at  the  national  frontier, 
be  that  land  or  sea.  From  this  point  of  view, 
which  is  strictly  accurate,  defence  may  be  defined 
broadly  as  provision  for  national  well-being  by 
military  means.  It  was  the  primary  misfortune, 
or,  more  correctly,  the  primary  error  of  Russia, 
that  by  neglect  of  this  provision  her  statesmen 
placed  her  in  such  a  condition  that,  upon  the  out¬ 
break  of  the  recent  war,  she  was  forced  at  once  into 
a  position  of  pure  defence;  the  scene  of  which  was 
her  land  and  sea  frontiers,  as  constituted  through 
her  several  measures  of  acquisition  or  aggression 
during  the  preceding  years  of  peace. 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  will  appear  that 
such  considerations  as  may  naturally  arise  from 
the  naval  point  of  view,  through  reflection  upon 
the  still  recent  war,  will  divide  into  two  classes: 
those  that  concern  the  direction  of  national  policies, 
and  those  which  affect  the  construction,  armament, 
and  management  of  fleets,  which,  in  the  last  analy¬ 
sis,  are  simply  instruments  of  national  policy. 
The  question,  for  instance,  of  the  possession, 
fortification,  and  development  of  Port  Arthur,  as 
a  naval  station,  as  was  done  by  Russia,  is  one  of 
broad  national  policy;  one  upon  which  every 
naval  state  has  to  reach  decisions  in  reference  to 
the  ports  available  for  naval  purposes,  which  it 


Retrospect  upon  Japan- Russia  War  139 


may  control  in  various  quarters  of  the  world; 
one  also  concerning  which  there  obtain,  in  both 
military  and  nayal  circles,  differences  of  opinions 
that  have  to  be  weighed  by  governments.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  question  whether  Port  Arthur, 
developed  as  it  had  been  by  Russia,  and  under  the 
other  existing  conditions,  should  have  been 
abandoned  at  the  beginning,  as  some  contend,  or 
retained  and  obstinately  defended,  as  it  actually 
was,  is  more  closely  military  in  scope;  although, 
belonging  as  it  does  to  the  province  of  strategy, 
the  arguments  pro  and  con  can  be  more  easily 
and  quickly  apprehended  by  the  non-professional 
mind.  Conversely,  it  is  open  to  argument  whether 
Japan  was  well  advised  to  attach  as  much  im¬ 
portance  as  her  course  of  action  indicated  to  the 
downfall  of  the  fortress,  to  its  actual  capture,  as 
distinguished  from  neutralizing  its  military  effect 
by  a  simple  corps  of  observation,  sufficient  to  pre¬ 
vent  evacuation  by  the  garrison  to  reinforce  the 
Russian  field  army,  or  to  stop  the  entrance  of 
reinforcements  or  supplies  from  without,  which 
might  prolong  resistance.  This  question  also  is 
military  in  character;  and  strategical,  not  tactical. 
It  affects  the  conduct  of  the  war,  and  by  no  means 
necessarily  the  wisdom  of  the  decision  of  the  Rus¬ 
sian  government  to  establish  an  adequate  naval 
base  at  that  point.  Whatever  opinion  may  be  held 


140  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


as  to  the  proper  line  of  action  in  the  particular  in¬ 
stance,  after  war  had  begun,  it  is  quite  conceivable 
that  a  government  may  be  perfectly  justified,  by 
considerations  of  general  policy,  in  establishing  a 
military  or  naval  base  for  the  support  of  one  of  its 
frontiers  at  some  particular  point;  and  yet  that,  by 
conditions  of  a  subsequent  moment,  the  com¬ 
mander-in-chief  on  the  spot,  or  his  superiors  at 
home,  may  properly  decide  that  the  exigencies  of 
the  immediate  situation  dictate  its  abandonment. 
These  immediate  conditions  may  be  imputable  as 
a  fault  to  either  the  government  or  its  general;  they 
may  arise  from  inadequate  preparation  by  the  one 
or  mistaken  management  by  the  other;  but  they 
do  not  therefore  necessarily  impeach  the  wisdom 
of  the  original  decision,  which  rested  upon  quite 
other  grounds.  It  is  precisely  the  same  in  other 
incidents  of  statesmanship.  One  administration 
may  secure  a  national  advantage  of  far-reaching 
importance,  which  a  successor  may  forfeit  by 
carelessness  in  improvement,  or  by  some  mis¬ 
managed  negotiation;  by  prolonged  neglect,  or 
by  a  single  mistake.  Neither  outcome  would  con¬ 
demn  the  original  measure,  which  rests  on  its 
own  merits;  recognizing  the  possibilities,  and 
presupposing  —  quite  legitimately  —  a  consistent 
furtherance  of  the  steps  first  taken. 

Such  considerations  are  so  obvious  that  the 


Retrospect  upon  Japan-Russia  War  141 


statement  of  them  at  length  may  probably  seem 
tedious.  Yet  I  am  confident  that  it  is  the  failure 
thus  explicitly  to  analyze  to  oneself  the  several 
lights  in  which  a  complex  problem  may  be  re¬ 
garded,  the  tendency  to  view  them  too  exclusively 
together,  as  a  composite  single  result,  that  leads 
to  much  confusion  of  thought,  with  the  probable 
consequence  of  erroneous  determination.  Take, 
for  instance,  the  question  of  the  speed  of  battle¬ 
ships.  No  one  will  deny  for  an  instant  that,  other 
things  being  equal,  additional  speed  —  the  high¬ 
est  —  is  desirable.  This,  however,  is  not  the 
question.  It  is  the  question  mixed  up  with  the 
assumption  that  other  things  are  equal,  that  you 
are  getting  your  additional  speed  for  nothing; 
or,  to  express  it  otherwise,  there  is  the  momentary 
forgetfulness  that  something  else  in  the  way  of 
efficiency  must  he  sacrificed,  and  that,  when  a 
certain  speed  has  been  attained,  a  small  increment 
must  be  purchased  at  a  very  great  sacrifice.  What 
shall  the  sacrifice  be  ?  Gun  power  ?  Then  your 
vessel,  when  she  has  overtaken  her  otherwise  equal 
enemy,  will  be  inferior  in  offensive  power.  Ar¬ 
mor  ?  Then  she  will  be  more  vulnerable.  Some¬ 
thing  of  the  coal  she  would  carry  ?  But  the  ex¬ 
penditure  of  coal  in  ever  increasing  ratio  is  a 
vital  factor  in  your  cherished  speed.  If  you  can 
give  up  none  of  these  things,  and  it  is  demon- 


142  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


strable  that  without  some  sacrifice  you  cannot 
get  the  speed,  will  you  then  —  and  this  is  what 
all  navies  are  now  doing  —  increase  the  size  of 
the  ship  ?  Yes,  you  say,  by  all  means.  Well, 
then,  where  will  you  stop  ?  Or,  the  same  question 
in  other  words,  what  will  you  sacrifice  in  order 
to  get  your  greater  dimensions  ?  Will  you  have 
fewer  ships;  smaller  numbers  with  larger  in¬ 
dividual  power  ?  You  will  sacrifice  numbers  ? 
Then  you  sacrifice  so  far  that  power  of  com¬ 
bination  which  is  essential  to  military  dispositions, 
whether  they  relate  to  the  distribution  of  the  fleet 
in  peace,  with  reference  to  possible  war,  or  to  the 
exigencies  of  the  campaign,  or  to  the  battlefield. 
But,  if  the  final  decision  be  we  will  have  numbers 
as  well,  then  the  reply  is  you  must  sacrifice  money; 
which,  starting  from  the  question  of  speed,  brings 
us  face  to  face  with  one  of  the  great  present  prob¬ 
lems  of  national  policy  among  all  naval  nations, 
the  size  of  the  budget.  For  the  line  of  reasoning 
which  applies  to  the  18,000  or  20,000  ton  ship  will 
hold  good  when  you  have  reached  30,000,  and 
your  neighbor  “  goes  one  better,”  by  laying  down 
one  of  32,000.  No  matter  how  big  your  ship  may 
be,  a  bigger  can  be  built.  The  skill  of  the  naval 
architect  and  engineer  is  equal  to  producing  it, 
and  the  open  sea  at  least  will  be  able  to  float  it. 
Whether  it  can  enter  harbors  is  another  question; 


Retrospect  upon  Japan- Russia  War  143 


some  at  least  will  be  deep  enough.  But  it  must 
be  borne  in  mind  that  this  progression  is  endless; 
the  same  problems  recur  with  each  increase. 
Those  who  remember  the  geometry  of  their  boy¬ 
hood  will  recall  that  similar  triangles  remain 
similar,  be  the  sides  ten  feet,  or  ten  yards,  or  ten 
miles.  The  determining  angles  remain  the  same, 
and  in  this  matter  the  above  considerations  are  the 
constant  angles. 

This  question  of  speed,  thus  developed,  may  be 
illustrated  perfectly  aptly  from  that  of  Port  Arthur. 
In  the  case  of  that  port,  the  question,  fully  stated, 
was  not  simply,  “  Is  the  position  in  itself  one  good 
for  Russia  to  keep,  or  for  Japan  to  capture  ?  ” 
It  was,  “  Is  the  place  worth  the  sacrifice  which 
must  be  made  to  hold  or  to  win  it  ?  ”  If  Russia 
wished  to  keep  it,  she  must  sacrifice  from  Kuro- 
patkin’s  too  small  army  some  forty  or  fifty  thou¬ 
sand  men.  If  Japan  was  bent  on  taking,  she  must 
withdraw  from  her  field  army  to  the  siege  opera¬ 
tions,  from  first  to  last,  from  seventy-five  to  one 
hundred  thousand;  and,  if  she  was  in  a  hurry, 
she  must  be  prepared  for  the  further  sacrifice, 
otherwise  unnecessary,  of  many  thousands  of  lives, 
in  the  desperate  assaults  made  to  hasten  the 
end.1  It  is  to  be  supposed  that  each  party  meas- 

1  The  Japanese  losses  at  the  siege  have  been  estimated  at 
59,000.  “  Journal  of  the  Royal  Artillery,”  October,  1905, 

322. 


144  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


ured  adequately  the  sacrifice  either  way,  and  took 
the  alternative  adopted  in  full  view  of  the  cost; 
yet  it  is  by  no  means  sure  that  this  was  the  case. 
It  is  at  least  very  possible  that  to  each  Port  Arthur 
derived  its  importance  from  attention  fixed  upon 
it  to  the  exclusion  of  qualifying  considerations; 
as  may  be  supposed  the  case  with  speed,  from  the 
extravagant  demands  now  made  for  it  in  ships, 
the  chief  function  of  which  should  be  to  give  and 
to  take  hard  knocks,  and  that  not  severally,  but  in 
conjunction  with  others  of  their  like,  which  we 
style  a  fleet. 

The  question  of  Port  Arthur,  indeed,  was  one 
so  important  in  the  general  campaign  up  to  the 
moment  of  its  fall,  and  afterwards  by  the  effect 
of  the  delay  caused  by  the  siege  upon  subsequent 
operations,  that  among  military  critics  it  has 
given  rise  to  very  diverse  opinions,  affecting  more 
or  less  the  question  of  national  policy  in  establish¬ 
ing  such  bases.  There  is  found  on  the  one  side 
the  unqualified  assertion  of  a  cardinal  mistake 
by  the  Russians  in  not  at  once  evacuating  a  posi¬ 
tion  which  could  not  be  ultimately  held,  and  con¬ 
centrating  with  Kuropatkin  every  available  sol¬ 
dier.  On  the  other  there  is  an  equally  sharp  criti¬ 
cism  by  soldiers — not  by  seamen  —  of  Japan, 
for  having  diverted  so  many  troops  from  Oyama 
as  seriously  to  affect  the  vigor  and  conclusiveness 


Retrospect  upon  Japan-Russia  War  145 


of  his  operations,  thereby  enabling  the  enemy  con¬ 
tinually  to  escape.  It  is  clear  that  the  argument 
is  not  wholly  one-sided.  If  the  Japanese  were 
compelled,  or  induced,  it  matters  little  which,  to 
devote  to  the  siege  a  number  of  men  who  in  the 
early  part  of  the  war  might  have  been  used  de¬ 
cisively  against  Kuropatkin’s  relatively  feeble 
army,  it  follows  that  the  leaving  the  place  garri¬ 
soned  had  an  effect  favorable  to  the  Russians  at  a 
very  critical  moment.  That  the  Japanese  felt 
compelled,  and  really  were  compelled,  to  their 
course  can  scarcely  be  doubted,  unless  one  views 
the  land  and  sea  campaigns  as  wholly  separate 
operations.  For  purposes  of  discussion  they  may 
be  so  severed,  but  actually  they  were  one  whole; 
and  ultimate  conclusions  cannot  be  accurately 
reached  without  bearing  in  mind  their  inter-rela¬ 
tion.  It  was  essential  to  the  Russians  to  protract 
the  land  campaign,  to  gain  time  to  develop  their 
naval  strength;  it  was  essential  to  the  Japanese 
to  destroy  the  fleet  in  Port  Arthur  before  such 
development,  in  order  to  secure  the  sea  communica¬ 
tions  upon  which  their  land  campaign  depended. 
To  ensure  this  end  it  was  imperative  to  gain  con¬ 
trol  of  the  port.  That  the  Russians  actually 
made  no  adequate  use  of  the  chance  obtained 
for  them  by  its  prolonged  resistance  is  nothing  to 
the  purpose.  It  is  difficult  to  find  an  adjective 


146  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


fitted  to  characterize  the  delays  in  despatching 
the  Baltic  fleet.  The  fact  remains  that  they  had 
their  chance  through  the  protraction  of  the  siege. 

My  own  opinion  from  the  first  has  been,  and  now 
continues,  that  regarded  in  itself  alone,  and  with 
reference  to  the  land  campaign  only,  the  retention 
by  Russia  was  correct;  and  that,  had  her  naval 
campaign  in  its  entirety  been  managed  with  any¬ 
thing  like  the  ability  shown  by  Kuropatkin,  the 
event  of  the  war  in  Manchuria  might  have  been 
different.  That  to  naval  success  a  long  tenure  of 
Port  Arthur  was  absolutely  essential  is  too  obvious 
for  comment;  but  imagine  the  effect  upon  nego¬ 
tiations,  had  the  conditions  on  shore,  including 
the  fall  of  Port  Arthur,  been  precisely  as  they  were 
when  peace  was  signed,  but  that  a  timely  previous 
co-operation  between  the  Port  Arthur  and  Baltic 
divisions  had  left  the  Russians  in  sure  control  of 
the  sea.  That  the  view  here  outlined  was  held 
by  the  Japanese,  rightly  or  wrongly,  is  clear  from 
the  persistence  of  Admiral  Togo  in  his  attempts 
to  block  the  port,  and  to  injure  the  fleet  within 
by  long  range  firing;  and  afterwards  from  the 
sustained  vigorous  character  of  the  prolonged 
siege  operations.  We  now  know  that  in  the 
Russian  naval  sorties  of  June  23  and  August 
10  the  Japanese  had  but  four  battleships  to  the 
Russian’s  six  on  the  spot.  Togo,  doubtless,  could 


Retrospect  upon  Japan-Russia  War  147 


not  have  anticipated  so  cruel  a  stroke  of  fate  as 
that  which,  on  May  15,  1904,  deprived  him  of  two 
battleships  in  one  day  by  submarine  mines.  Yet, 
whatever  the  value  of  his  fleet  in  its  largest  numbers, 
it  was  quite  evident  that  the  Russian  fleet,  “  in 
being  ”  in  Port  Arthur,  by  itself  alone  constituted 
a  perpetual  menace  to  the  sea  communications 
of  Japan,  the  absolutely  determining  factor  of  the 
war:/  while  taken  in  connection  with  the  Russian 
Baltic  fleet,  still  in  existence,  the  possibilities  of 
fatal  disaster  to  the  Japanese  depended  wholly 
upon  the  skill  with  which  the  Russians  managed 
the  naval  resources  remaining  to  them  after  the 
first  torpedo  attack  of  February  8,  and  upon  the 
time  they  were  able  to  obtain  format  object  by 
the  resistance  of  Port  Arthur.  Whether  that 
resistance  was  protracted  as  long  as  it  could  be 
is  beyond  my  competency  to  say;  but  it  certainly 
continued  long  enough  to  afford  Russia  oppor¬ 
tunity  to  bring  into  play  all  her  naval  means, 
if  her  schemes  for  imperial  defence,  in  its  broadest 
sense,  had  corresponded  to  the  necessities  of  the 
situation. 

In  fact,  on  land,  Port  Arthur  bore  to  this  war 
much  the  relationship  that  Ladysmith  did  to  that 
in  South  Africa.  Whether  Sir  George  White 
should  have  retreated  towards  Durban,  to  concen¬ 
trate  with  other  British  forces  to  be  expected; 


148  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


whether  the  Boers  should  have  settled  down  to 
a  siege  protracted  by  their  indolence,  as  that  of 
Port  Arthur  was  by  the  inherent  and  developed 
strength  of  the  position,  are  questions  which  will 
be  differently  answered.  What  admits  of  little 
doubt  is  that  the  effect  produced  upon  the  Japanese 
action  in  the  later  instance  was  the  same  as  that 
upon  the  Boers  in  the  earlier,  and  with  greater 
reason;  for,  while  the  menace  of  Port  Arthur 
was  in  kind  the  same  as  that  of  Ladysmith,  it 
was  far  greater  in  degree.  The  characteristics 
may  be  more  convincingly  illustrated  by  recalling 
the  effect  of  Mantua  upon  Bonaparte’s  operations 
of  1796.  The  parallelism  is  here  confined  to  the 
land  operations,  reserving  the  very  direct  influence 
of  Port  Arthur  upon  naval  operations  for  further 
discussion.  The  entire  distance  advanced  by  the 
Japanese  from  Chemulpo  to  Mukden,  and  by  the 
French  from  Savona  to  Leoben,  where  the  pre¬ 
liminaries  were  dictated  by  Bonaparte,  is  about 
350  miles  in  each  case.  Two  months  after  leaving 
Savona  the  French  reached  Mantua,  120  miles. 
There  they  were  delayed  eight  months,  June  4 
to  February  2,  during  which  period  Bonaparte 
fought  several  battles,  or  rather  made  several  cam¬ 
paigns,  to  defeat  the  attempts  of  the  Austrians  to 
relieve  the  place;  but  he  could  make  no  advance, 
for  he  had  no  disposable  force  beyond  that  needed 


Retrospect  upon  J apan-Russia  War  149 


for  the  blockade.  The  Japanese  were  more  for¬ 
tunate,  through  their  previous  preparations  and 
their  full  control  of  the  sea.  Nevertheless,  from 
the  victory  of  Liao-Yang,  August  30,  to  the 
battle  of  Mukden,  February  24,  they  advanced  but 
thirty-five  miles.  The  siege  of  Port  Arthur  lasted 
from  May  27  to  January  1,  seven  months;  upon 
its  fall  followed  a  period  of  preparation,  corre¬ 
sponding  to  that  passed  by  Bonaparte  after  the 
surrender  of  Mantua  in  securing  his  rear  against 
possible  enemies.  (Then  advance  in  each  case 
was  resumed,  with  forces  thenceforth  liberated 
from  the  fear  as  to  their  communications,  which 
was  the  detaining  effect  exerted  in  their  several 
days  by  Mantua,  Ladysmith,  and  Port  Arthur. J 
The  conduct  of  the  Japanese  with  relation  to 
Port  Arthur,  prior  to  its  surrender,  and  even  to  its 
serious  investment,  cannot  but  exert  a  salutary  in¬ 
fluence  upon  the  celebrated  theory  of  the  “  fleet 
in  being,”  to  which  has  been  freely  attributed 
a  determining  influence  that  has  always  to  me 
appeared  exaggerated.  From  the  argument  de¬ 
veloped  above,  it  must  appear  that  I  appreciate 
vividly  the  bearing  of  the  fleet  in  Port  Arthur  upon 
the  war.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that,  in  the 
strategic  sense,  the  fleet  was  the  Port,  which  with¬ 
out  it  possessed  no  value  and  would  never  have 
been  fortified  nor  acquired.  The  naval  possibili- 


150  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


ties  involved  were  the  strongest  inducement  to 
the  acquisition  of  the  Liao-tung  Peninsula;  and 
the  fact  that  the  Japanese  main  communications 
were  by  sea  constitutes  the  analogy  of  the  position 
to  Mantua.  The  signal  of  Admiral  Togo  to  his 
fleet  off  Tsu-shima  may  be  invoked  to  show  that 
the  Japanese  thus  regarded  the  Port,  purely  as 
harboring  the  fleet.  If  the  fate  of  the  Empire 
depended  upon  the  results  of  that  day,  when  only 
the  Baltic  division  was  in  face,  how  much  more 
serious  the  situation  so  long  as  the  Port  Arthur 
ships  remained  a  valid  force,  before  they  had 
supinely  allowed  their  throats  to  be  cut  like  stalled 
cattle.  Yet,  while  recognizing  by  their  acts  all  the 
menace  of  that  “  fleet  in  being,”  the  Japanese 
did  not  hesitate  to  adventure  the  fortunes  of  a 
war  essential  to  national  progress  upon  an  over¬ 
sea  expedition,  which  not  only  was  to  make  a 
passage  once  for  all  across  a  belt  of  water,  but 
must  there  be  maintained  until  a  settled  peace 
restored  freedom  of  transit.  Even  before  knowing 
the  issue  of  the  first  torpedo  attack,  of  February  8, 
12,000  troops  put  to  sea  to  land  at  Chemulpo,  like 
the  advanced  detachment  hazarded  to  seize  the 
opposite  bank  of  a  river,  and  hold  there  a  position 
at  which  the  remainder  of  the  army  can  disembark. 
The  instance  is  the  more  impressive  because  of 
-the  immensity  of  the  stake,  when  it  is  remembered 


Retrospect  upon  J apan-Russia  War  151 


what  defeat  would  have  meant  to  Japan  in  this 
infancy  of  her  progress,  economical  and  political, 
in  the  new  world  of  modern  civilizations 

It  may  certainly  be  replied,  and  justly,  that  the 
very  greatness  of  the  emergency  demanded  the 
hazard,  upon  the  sound  principle  that  desperate 
conditions  require  desperate  remedies.  It  is  likely 
enough  that  to  attempts  important,  yet  secondary, 
where  the  danger  incurred  by  failure  exceeds  the 
advantage  to  be  gained  by  success,  a  “  fleet  in  be¬ 
ing  ”  may  prove  a  sufficient  deterrent.  This  was 
the  case  with  Louis  XIV’s  projected  landing  in 
England  in  1690,  which  elicited  Admiral  Tor- 
rington’s  historic  phrase,  “  fleet  in  being.”  In 
expeditions  of  similar  secondary  importance,  how¬ 
ever,  Great  Britain  continually  adventured  bodies 
of  troops  during  the  Napoleonic  wars;  not  to  men¬ 
tion  Wellington’s  army  in  the  Peninsula,  rein¬ 
forcements  and  supplies  to  which  were  certainly 
to  some  extent  endangered,  and  occasionally 
molested,  by  the  cruisers  or  naval  divisions  of  an 
inferior  enemy.  But,  after  attributing  the  utmost 
effect  upon  the  councils  of  an  enemy  produced 
by  the  presence  of  a  “  fleet  in  being,”  at  a  point 
favorable  for  acting  upon  communications,  the 
fact  remains  that  in  this  very  crucial  instance  the 
Japanese  have  practically  defined  its  actual 
powers.  They  met  the  threat  to  them,  not  by 


152  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


submitting  to  inaction  until  the  enemy’s  fleet 
was  destroyed,  but  by  doing  just  what  a  general 
on  shore  does,  when  he  cannot  at  once  capture 
a  fortress  menacing  his  line  of  advance.  (  Port 
Arthur  was  masked  by  the  Japanese  fleet,  stationed 
at  a  fitting  position,  and  kept  informed  of  the 
enemy’s  movements  by  a  well-developed  scouting 
system.  )  To  these  measures  for  repelling  a  sortie 
in  force  was  committed  the  safety  of  the  army 
to  be  transported  in  the  rear;,. and  the  undoubted 
possibilities  of  occasional,  (even  serious,  injury 
to  a  body  of  transports  was  accepted,  secure  that 
the  “  fleet  in  being,”  being  essentially  inferior  to 
the  Japanese  navy  as  a  whole,  could  not  perma¬ 
nently  interrupt  the  forward  flow  which  consti¬ 
tutes  communications./1  If,  as  I  have  understood 
the  advocates  of  the  ■  fleet  in  being  ”  theory,  the 
mere  existence  of  a  powerful,  though  inferior,  body 
of  ships  should  deter  an  enemy  from  committing 
himself  to  over-sea  operations,  the  Japanese  have 
certainly  demonstrated  a  contrary  possibility. 
Were  they  therein  wrong  ?  /Though  successful 
has  their  success  been  achieved  in  defiance  of  a 
clear  rule  of  warfare,  or  has  it  rather  been  in 
observance  of  a  well-established  practice,  with  its 
necessary  precautions  f) 

The  example  is  the  more  provocative  of  inquiry, 
and  of  reconsideration  of  accepted  maxims,  in  that, 


Retrospect  upon  Japan-Russia  War  153 


as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Japanese  sea  communica¬ 
tions,  though  maintained  substantially  secure, 
did  not  escape  harassment,  and  yet  more  serious 
threat.  Here  and  there  a  transport,  here  and 
there  a  merchant  vessel,  was  captured  by  the 
not  too  excessive  activity  of  the  Vladivostok  squad¬ 
ron,  the  operations  of  which  might  have  been 
increased  in  scope  and  frequency  had  the  Port 
Arthur  division,  taking  its  life  in  its  hands,  flung 
itself  desperately  upon  Togo’s  fleet,  determined 
to  effect  the  utmost  injury  at  whatever  cost.  The 
irresolute  sortie  of  August  io  produced  results 
sufficient  to  show  that  the  consequence  of  such  a 
move  might  be  so  far  to  weaken  Togo  as  to  com¬ 
pel  him  to  draw  upon  Kamimura’s  squadron  to 
reinforce  the  watch  over  Port  Arthur;  a  step 
which  would  by  so  much  facilitate  the  move¬ 
ment  of  the  Vladivostok  ships.  Such  increase  of 
activity,  with  consequent  Japanese  necessary 
precaution,  would  not  only  have  illustrated  further 
the  pros  and  cons  of  the  “  fleet  in  being  ”  theory. 
It  would  have  thrown  desirable  light  also  upon  the 
question  of  the  influence  which  the  molestation  of 
commerce,  whether  by  direct  capture  or  by  the 
paralysis  induced  by  menace  and  apprehension, 
can  exert  upon  the  economical  conditions  of  a 
state,  and  through  them  upon  military  efficiency. 
The  contemporary  files  of  papers  published  in 


154  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


Japan  bear  witness  to  the  immediate  effect  pro¬ 
duced;  but  the  danger  passed  too  rapidly  to 
demonstrate  the  possible  reaction  from  this  dis¬ 
play  of  the  proverbial  timidity  of  capital,  whether 
invested  in  shipping  or  otherwise. 

Such  result  as  was  open  to  the  Vladivostok 
squadron  to  produce  was  further  limited  by  the 
fact  that  it  was  composed  of  armored  cruisers,  a 
compromise  double-faced  type  of  vessel,  the  ad¬ 
visability  of  which  has  long  been  questioned  by 
respectable  professional  opinion,  and  now  more 
and  more  loudly  than  ever.  The  decision  is  one  of 
national  policy,  by  no  means  purely  of  technical 
character;  the  considerations  on  which  it  must 
turn  are  perfectly  easy  of  comprehension.  If, 
instead  of  being  ships  built  with  one  eye  on  fighting 
and  one  on  speed,  the  Vladivostok  ships  had  been 
fairly  and  frankly  cruisers,  pure  and  simple,  un¬ 
armored,  and  gunned  only  so  as  to  meet  their 
like,  and  if  the  tonange  thus  economized  had  been 
devoted  to  speed  and  coal  endurance,  their  fitness 
for  the  work  of  molesting  commerce  and  trans¬ 
portation  would  have  been  distinctly  increased. 
The  same  aggregate  tonnage  might  have  given 
two  or  three  additional  swift  ships  of  the  type 
suggested.  But  the  armored  cruiser  is  a  fighting 
ship,  though  grievously  marred  as  such  by  the 
lack  of  the  single  eye,  of  unity  of  design,  of  Na- 


Retrospect  upon  Japan-Russia  War  155 


poleon’s  “  exclusiveness  of  purpose.”  Those  in 
Vladivostok  constituted  a  respectable  portion  of 
the  total  Russian  battle  fleet  in  the  far  East,  and 
therefore  could  not  be  freely  hazarded  as  ordinary 
cruisers  might.  It  is  very  probable  that  their  pres¬ 
ence  in  Vladivostok  induced  the  merely  tentative 
character  of  the  sortie  of  August  io  from  Port 
Arthur;  that  the  desire  to  concentrate  the  whole 
fleet  dictated  an  attempt  to  escape,  instead  of  the 
pitched  naval  battle  which  the  exigencies  of  the 
Russian  general  situation  then  demanded. 

It  is  to  this,  rather  than  to  the  effect  of  a  fortified 
port  upon  the  navy  using  it,  that  I  should  be  in¬ 
clined  to  ascribe  the  failure  of  the  Port  Arthur 
division  to  improve  its  opportunities  with  military 
intelligence  and  energy.  Having  kept  the  Jap¬ 
anese  at  a  distance,  and  obtained  for  Russia  the 
opportunity  to  restore  her  fleet  after  the  torpedo 
attack  of  February  8,  the  fortifications  can  scarcely 
be  held  responsible  for  the  failure  to  use  the  ad¬ 
vantage  thus  gained.  There  are  indications, 
however,  in  a  forthcoming  book  by  Captain 
Klado,  of  the  Russian  Navy,  advance  sheets  of 
which  I  have  been  permitted  to  see,  that  there  is 
prevalent  in  high  military  circles  in  Russia  a 
radically  erroneous  conception  of  the  relations  of 
a  fleet  to  coast  operations,  and  especially  to  coast 
defence.  This  conception  is  held  so  strongly  as 


156  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


to  take  form  in  the  phrase  “  fortress-fleet,”  under 
which  misguiding  title  the  movement  of  the  fleet 
is  restricted  to  the  neighborhood  of  the  port,  is 
made  subordinate  to  the  defence  of  the  position, 
and  to  the  orders  of  the  fortress  commander.  I  By 
this  school  of  thought  it  is  considered  a  positive 
calamity,  almost  a  catastrophe,  that  the  fleet 
should  launch  out  in  wide  independent  action, 
leaving  the  fortress  to  its  own  resources.)  It  de¬ 
mands  the  dispersion  of  force,  among  several  for¬ 
tresses,  as  opposed  to  concentration  in  a  single 
port.  Such  conclusions  are  difficult  to  under¬ 
stand,  especially  when  we  recall  the  signal  histori¬ 
cal  example  of  the  siege  of  Gibraltar,  which  so 
conspicuously  illustrated  the  relative  functions 
of  fleet  and  fortress.  Although  these  views  are 
vigorously  contested  and  refuted  by  Captain 
Klado,  it  would  seem  probable,  from  the  opinions 
in  support  of  them  quoted  by  him,  that  they  may 
have  dictated  the  futile  and  abortive  management 
of  the  Port  Arthur  division;  and  that  this  did  not 
represent  the  professional  judgment  of  its  own 
officers,  but  the  burden  of  a  command  laid  upon 
them  by  higher  and  non-naval  authority.  Cer¬ 
tainly  Klado’s  own  opinion,  formulated  and  set 
down  before  the  final  catastrophe,  shows  con¬ 
clusively  that  in  intelligent  naval  circles  there 
obtained  much  juster  and  more  comprehensive 


Retrospect  upon  Japan-Russia  War  157 


recognition  of  the  part  to  be  played  by  a  fleet,  even 
regarded  from  a  distinctly  defensive  standpoint 
of  national  policy.  “  The  only  rational  defence 
of  the  shores  is  a  strong  fleet,  and  in  this  case  the 
chief  hope  must  be  placed  in  it,  and  not  in  the 
army.  The  fortress  is  subsidiary.”  Incidentally 
to  the  discussion  he  makes  also  a  remark  relative 
to  the  Chinese  fleet  in  1894,  which  not  only  illus¬ 
trates  his  general  argument  but  may  throw  light 
upon  the  purposes  of  the  Port  Arthur  division  in 
its  last  sortie  of  August  10.  “  In  abandoning  Port 
Arthur  the  Chinese  fleet,  under  the  given  circum¬ 
stances,  acted  quite  rightly,  since  that  port  was  so 
situated  that  it  could  be  taken  from  the  land;  and, 
if  this  had  happened,  the  fleet  would  have  found 
itself  in  an  inland  roadstead,  and  would  not  have 
been  able  to  take  part  in  repelling  the  land  attack. 
Had  it  remained  in  Port  Arthur,  it  would  have 
been  taken  alive  when  the  fortress  fell.  Instead  of 
this,  by  going  over  to  Wei-hai-wei,  it  forced  the 
Japanese  to  a  most  difficult  winter  expedition  in 
order  to  gain  this  last  port.  If  only  the  Chinese 
had  had  a  fleet  capable  of  vanquishing  that  of  their 
enemies,  they  would  have  been  victorious  in  the  end 
despite  the  sad  condition  of  their  army.”  For 
“  Chinese  ”  read  “  Russian,”  and  for  “  Wei-hai- 
wei  ”  “  Vladivostok,”  and  we  may  have  in  this 
comment  on  the  past  the  explanation  of  the  Rus- 


158  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


sian  attempt,  as  we  certainly  have  a  prophecy  of 
the  necessary  outcome  of  the  war. 

In  the  general  deplorable  result,  something 
must  be  attributed  to  the  lack  of  initiative,  so 
general  as  to  appear  almost  a  national  quality, 
that  was  shown  in  the  Russian  operations;  but 
original  faults  of  distribution  at  least  tended  to 
increase  the  paralysis  which  in  every  direction 
characterized  their  action.  By  the  tenure  of  two 
ports,  remote  from  one  another,  they  in  the  begin¬ 
ning  possessed  the  advantage  which  a  two-fold 
source  of  danger  imposes  on  an  enemy’s  disposi¬ 
tions.  Under  most  conditions  of  coast  conforma¬ 
tion,  two  ports,  so  far  separated,  would  have  much 
increased  the  perplexity  of  Admiral  Togo,  had 
the  Baltic  fleet  been  despatched  so  as  to  reach 
the  scene  while  the  defence  of  Port  Arthur  was 
still  hopeful.  Even  minimized  as  the  difficulty 
would  have  been  by  the  projection  of  Korea,  giving 
him  at  its  southern  end  a  central  position,  well 
adapted  for  moving  towards  either  port,  he  would 
still  have  been  obliged  somewhat  to  uncover  Port 
Arthur,  in  order  to  be  on  hand  to  meet  Rozhest- 
vensky,  because  ignorant  of  which  destination 
he  would  seek.  Such  conditions,  which  were  as 
evident  the  first  month  of  the  war  as  they  are  now, 
rightly  determined  the  Japanese  to  reduce  Port 
Arthur  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  and  equally 


Retrospect  upon  Japan-Russia  War  159 


rightly  determined  the  Russians  to  hold  it.  What¬ 
ever  may  be  considered  the  effect  of  the  place 
upon  the  land  operations,  it  threatened  the  Jap¬ 
anese  communications  by  sea  so  long  as  it  held 
out  effectively,  and  it  kept  open  to  the  Baltic  fleet 
two  ports  of  entry  to  distract  Togo’s  attention, 
and  to  move  him,  rightly  or  wrongly,  to  divide 
his  fleet  between  them.  Such  considerations,  if 
valid,  afford  matter  for  reflection  to  all  govern¬ 
ments  and  people,  as  to  the  constitution  and  de¬ 
fence  of  naval  bases  in  regions  where  their  interests 
may  induce  naval  operations.  (  As  soon  as  Port 
Arthur  fell,  the  Japanese  admiraTknew  that  there 
was  but  one  port  open  to  his  opponent;  that,  turn 
or  twist  as  he  might,  there  he  must  at  last  turn  up / 
But,  while  the  embarrassment  to  an  enemy  of 
such  a  double  objective  is  clear  and  proverbial, 
it  is  not  in  itself  sufficient,  unless  improved  by 
proper  dispositions.  It  is  not  enough  to  fortify 
the  ports.  For  the  offensive  purposes  which  alone 
constitute  danger  to  the  enemy,  they  are  helpless, 
almost  as  turtles  on  their  backs,  unless  they  con¬ 
tain  forces,  adequate  to  issue  with  intent  and  power 
to  inflict  injury.  The  Russians  being  at  the  outset 
locally  inferior  in  battleship  strength,  estimating 
therein  the  armored  cruisers  of  both  parties,  every 
ship  of  that  description  should  have  been  con¬ 
centrated  in  one  of  the  two  ports;  the  other 


160  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


should  have  been  utilized  for  commerce  destroy¬ 
ing,  and  such  other  desultory  operations  as  are  open 
to  cruisers.  Instead  of  this,  the  same  nonchalance 
—  essentially  consistent  with  the  lack  of  initiative 
already  noted  —  that  exposed  the  whole  division, 
improperly  picketed,  before  Port  Arthur,  and  left 
the  Varyag  and  Korieits  a  helpless  prey  at  Che¬ 
mulpo,  retained  also  at  Vladivostok  three  powerful 
armored  cruisers,  the  proper  place  of  which,  being 
in  the  line  of  battle,  was  wherever  the  main  fleet 
was.  It  would  be  interesting  to  know,  if  know- 
able,  how  far  the  appellative  “  cruiser  ”  was  re¬ 
sponsible  for  this  error.  This  much  at  least  can 
be  said;  that  in  treating  them  as  cruisers,  not  as 
battle-vessels,  the  Russian  officer  responsible  was 
at  least  consistent  with  the  original  idea  of  armor¬ 
ing  cruisers,  the  efficiency  of  which  should  depend 
primarily  upon  speed  and  coal  endurance,  not 
upon  armour;  and  to  which  fighting  —  except 
with  equals  —  is  not  committed,  and  should 
rarely  be  indulged.  To  this  same  double  eye 
to  two  sets  of  functions,  radically  distinct,  is  to 
be  attributed  the  undue  stress  upon  extreme 
speed  for  battleships,  with  the  consequent  reckless 
progress  in  the  size  of  these  vessels.  They,  by  the 
accepted  spirit  of  the  day,  are  not  only  to  fight 
but  also  to  run;  between  which  two  stools  a  fall 
may  be  looked  for. 


Retrospect  upon  Japan- Russia  War  161 


That  Vladivostok,  at  least  during  the  open 
season,  was  the  proper  rendezvous  for  cruisers  is 
evident  for  two  reasons.  First,  being  easier  to 
leave  and  to  enter  than  Port  Arthur,  it  is  so  far 
favorable  to  vessels  whose  mission  is  evasion;  and, 
secondly,  it  could  not  be  the  position  for  the  battle- 
fleet,  because  that,  when  frozen  in,  became  to  the 
enemy  a  fleet  non-existent.  At  this  port  should 
have  been  the  protected  —  unarmored  —  cruisers, 
which  were,  on  the  contrary,  congregated  at  Port 
Arthur,  and  thence  accompanied  the  fleet  in  its 
futile  attempt  to  get  away  to  Vladivostok.  From 
this  centre,  itself  possessing  two  exits,  and  leading 
equally  to  the  Japan  Sea  and  to  the  east  coast  of 
the  islands  by  way  of  Tsugaru  Straits,  the  field  to 
commerce  destroyers  was  as  clear  as  conditions 
often  allow.  In  the  particular  kind  of  vessel 
needed  for  this,  the  Japanese  had  largely  superior 
numbers;  but  as  the  mission  of  the  Russian 
cruisers  would  be  to  escape  detection,  while  that 
of  the  Japanese  was  to  find,  it  is  plain  that  the 
latter  needed  to  be  much  the  more  numerous. 
Also,  as  the  respective  objects,  the  destruction  and 
protection  of  commerce,  required  that  the  Rus¬ 
sians  should  run  and  the  Japanese  fight,  the 
former  could  act  singly  while  the  latter  must  con¬ 
gregate  in  squadrons.  Uncertainty  whether  the 
enemy  were  acting  severally  or  in  groups  would 


162  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


compel  concentration  to  some  extent,  to  avoid 
being  surprised  by  a  superior  force,  and  so  would 
decrease  the  dispersion  of  the  look-outs,  while  in¬ 
creasing  their  strength.  I  will  not  deny  my  belief 
that,  despite  all  this,  in  the  long  run  the  Russian 
cruisers  would  one  by  one  have  been  picked  up  — 
that  is  the  necessary  penalty  of  inferior  numbers; 
but  if  their  design  provided  both  speed  and  coal 
endurance,  as  it  should,  the  time  should  have  been 
protracted  sufficiently  to  demonstrate  to  some  de¬ 
gree  what  influence  such  operations  may  in  this 
day  exert  upon  the  general  war-power  of  a  nation, 
thus  assailed  in  its  financial  resources  which  de¬ 
pend  upon  the  freedom  of  commerce. 

As  it  is,  the  indications  are  clear,  though  slight. 
In  the  Japan  Times  cff  July  23,  1905,  it  is  stated 
that  up  to  that  time  the  Vladivostok  squadron  had 
captured  only  twenty-two  Japanese  vessels,  of 
which  nine  were  steamers.  Such  paucity  of  results 
shows  most  probably  that  the  armored  cruisers 
were  too  valuable  to  be  freely  exposed  to  capture 
by  Kamimura’s  superior  division,  and  that  their 
enterprise  was  fettered  by  this  consideration, 
which  would  not  have  applied  to  unarmored  ships 
of  half  their  tonnage.  The  result,  such  as  it  is,  is 
merely  direct;  and  it  is  the  indirect  effect  upon 
commercial  movement  which  most  weighs  when 
the  attack  is  well  concerted  and  vigorous.  During 


Retrospect  upon  J a  pan-Russia  War  163 


the  cruise  of  the  Vladivostok  squadron  on  the  east 
coast  of  japan,  which  lasted  but  little  over  a  week 
at  the  end  of  July,  1904,  although  only  four 
steamers  were  captured  by  it,  sailings  from  the 
ports  of  Japan  were  generally  stopped.  At  a  meet¬ 
ing  of  the  Nippon  Yusen  Kaisha,  held  but  two  days 
before  the  battle  off  Tsu-shima,  May  27,  1905,  the 
report  stated  that  in  consequence  of  the  Govern¬ 
ment’s  requisitions  for  transports  the  Company’s 
business  had  been  carried  on  by  hiring  foreign 
steamers.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  charter 
rate  was  extremely  high,  but  had  lately  depre¬ 
ciated  owing  to  the  secure  retention  of  the  control 
of  the  sea  by  the  navy.  This,  it  will  be  observed, 
was  nine  months  after  the  Russian  naval  disasters 
of  August,  1904,  at  which  time  the  Port  Arthur 
and  Vladivostok  divisions  attempted  to  unite. 
The  report  continued,  that  in  the  current  fiscal 
term  the  presence  of  the  Russian  Baltic  fleet  in 
Far  Eastern  seas  would  affect  the  shipping  trade 
to  some  extent,  but  the  Company  was  determined 
to  endure  to  the  end.  The  same  paper  states  that, 
a  Russian  transport  having  entered  Shanghai, 
May  26,  the  local  underwriters  were  refusing  to 
insure.  June  17,  it  is  announced  that  the  steam¬ 
ship  services  to  China  and  Korea,  which  had  been 
suspended  by  Rozhestvensky’s  approach,  would 
now  be  resumed;  and  mention  is  made  of  the 


164  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


fall  of  freights  in  the  coastwise  coal  trade,  in  con¬ 
sequence  of  the  victory,  as  well  as  an  easier  coal 
market. 

It  appears  also  that  in  India  even,  insurance 
on  cotton  for  Japan,  which  Russia  was  reported 
to  have  declared  contraband,  rose  threefold  upon 
a  report  of  Russian  cruisers  in  the  Indian  Ocean. 
Considering  the  complete  control  of  the  sea,  in  a 
military  sense,  held  by  the  Japanese,  and  the 
lethargy  of  the  Russian  naval  conduct  in  general, 
the  results  have  a  meaning  which  will  be  recog¬ 
nized  immediately  by  any  one  who  has  had  even 
casual  opportunity  to  note  the  effect  of  apprehen¬ 
sion,  and  of  fluctuations  in  trade,  upon  the  welfare 
of  a  community,  which  in  turn  affects  the  income 
of  the  state.  The  significance  is  increased  in  the 
present  instance  by  the  unfavorable  situation  of 
the  Russian  ports,  in  point  of  distance  from  the 
Japanese  main  lines  of  sea  communication,  mili¬ 
tary  and  commercial.  Had  control  been  reversed, 
by  a  Russian  naval  victory,  the  Japanese  army 
in  Manchuria  would  have  been  isolated;  but  a 
glance  at  the  map  will  show  that  Russian  communi¬ 
cations  by  ships  to  Port  Arthur  would  have  been 
much  more  easily  molested,  through  the  nearness 
of  Japanese  ports  to  the  waters  through  which 
vessels  must  pass.  As  Cuba  lies  across  the  ap¬ 
proaches  to  the  Mississippi,  and  Ireland  across 


Retrospect  upon  Ja pan-Russia  War  165 


those  to  Great  Britain,  so  does  Japan  to  the 
communications  of  Manchuria  and  Vladivostok 
wijh  the  outer  world. 

There  seems  to  be  a  general  professional  consent 
that  the  experience  of  this  war  has  confirmed  the 
supremacy  of  the  battleship  relative  to  the  control 
of  the  sea,  which  is  the  great  object  of  naval  war¬ 
fare.  The  torpedo  vessel  has  achieved  less  than 
was  expected  — -  at  least  outside  of  naval  circles 
—  and  what  it  has  accomplished  has  been  almost 
exactly  that  which  was  anticipated  twenty  years 
ago  by  naval  men.  It  has  come  in  at  the  end  of  the 
battle,  to  complete  the  disaster  of  the  defeated. 
I  have  not  seen  attention  called  to  the  diffi¬ 
culty  experienced  by  vessels  of  this  class  in  find¬ 
ing  the  object  of  their  attack,  when  once  lost 
to  them  in  the  dark,  their  own  most  suitable 
moment  for  action.  In  measure,  of  course, 
all  vessels  feel  this;  but  especially  these,  which 
from  lying  low  in  the  water  have  a  limited  hori¬ 
zon,  and  from  their  small  size  and  consequent 
liveliness  have  particular  trouble  in  catching 
and  holding  sight  of  an  object.  Admiral  Togo’s 
report  states  that  during  the  night  succeeding 
the  battle  his  torpedo  flotillas  were  searching 
in  every  direction  for  their  flying  enemy,  but 
with  little  or  no  success  until  5.20  A.  M.,  when 
returning  daylight  showed  smoke.  It  will  doubt- 


166  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


less  be  found  in  the  future  that  these  vessels, 
and  submarines,  seeking  to  harass  a  blockading 
fleet,  will  be  gravely  hampered  by  these  draw¬ 
backs,  when  ignorant  of  the  whereabouts  of 
the  enemy’s  main  force;  an  ignorance  easily 
imposed  by  the  latter  shifting  its  position  after 
nightfall.  The  value  of  the  cruiser  class,  as 
scouts  and  equipped  with  modern  facilities, 
was  abundantly  established  by  the  certainty 
with  which  Togo,  though  invisible  beforehand, 
appeared  betimes  at  each  attempted  sortie  from 
Port  Arthur;  and  yet  more  notably  by  the  in¬ 
formation  of  Rozhestvensky’s  appearance  when 
the  Baltic  division  was  still  over  a  hundred  miles 
distant  from  his  anchorage.  He  was  thus  en¬ 
abled  not  merely  to  choose  his  field  of  action, 
and  anticipate  the  enemy  there,  but  to  plan  his 
battle  with  full  knowledge  of  his  opponent’s 
order;  a  result  facilitated  by  Rozhestvensky’s 
failure,  or  inability,  to  advance  his  scouting  line 
so  far  as  to  drive  in  that  of  his  antagonist,  thereby 
concealing  his  own  motions  and  probable  in¬ 
tentions.  Comparatively  little  attention  has  been 
given  to  this  singular  advantage,  although  Togo 
himself  in  his  report  dwells  upon  it  at  large, 
and  with  the  reiteration  of  satisfaction.  The 
possible  contribution  of  cruisers  to  the  ends  of 
war  by  endangering  an  enemy’s  commerce  has 


Retrospect  upon  Japan-Russia  War  1G7 


not  received  adequate  elicitation,  owing  to  the 
reasons  already  mentioned. 

But  among  the  most  important  lessons  of  this 
war  —  perhaps  the  most  important,  as  also  one 
easily  understood  and  which  exemplifies  a  prin¬ 
ciple  of  warfare  of  ageless  application  —  is  the 
inexpediency,  the  terrible  danger,  of  dividing 
the  battle-fleet,  even  in  times  of  peace,  into  frac¬ 
tions  individually  smaller  than  those  of  a  pos¬ 
sible  enemy.  The  Russian  divisions  at  Port 
Arthur,  at  Vladivostok,  and  in  the  European 
ports  of  Russia,  if  united,  would  in  1904  have 
outweighed  decisively  the  navy  of  Japan,  which 
moreover  could  receive  no  increase  during  hos¬ 
tilities.  It  would  have  been  comparatively  im¬ 
material,  as  regards  effect  upon  the  local  field 
of  operations,  whether  the  ships  were  assembled 
in  the  Baltic,  in  Vladivostok  or  in  Port  Arthur. 
Present  together,  the  fleet  thus  constituted  could 
not  have  been  disregarded  by  Japan  without  a 
risk  transcending  beyond  comparison  that  caused 
by  the  Port  Arthur  division  alone,  which  the 
Japanese  deliberately  put  out  of  court.  For, 
while  they  undertook,  and  successfully  carried 
out,  measures  which  during  a  period  of  four 
months  disabled  it  as  a  body  menacing  their  sea 
communications,  they  none  the  less  before  the 


1G8  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


torpedo  attack  of  February  8  had  begun  the 
movement  of  their  army  to  the  continent.  It  is 
most  improbable  that  they  would  have  dared 
the  same  had  the  available  Russian  navy  been 
united.  It  would  have  mattered  nothing  that 
it  was  frozen  in  in  Vladivostok.  The  case  of  Japan 
would  not  have  been  better,  but  worse,  for  having 
utilized  the  winter  to  cross  her  troops  to  the 
mainland,  if,  when  summer  came,  the  enemy 
appeared  in  overwhelming  naval  force.  If  Togo, 
in  face  of  Rozhestvensky’s  division  alone,  could 
signal  his  fleet,  “  The  salvation  or  the  fall  of  the 
Empire  depends  upon  the  result  of  this  engage¬ 
ment,”  how  much  more  serious  the  situation  had 
there  been  with  it  the  Port  Arthur  ships,  which 
had  handled  his  vessels  somewhat  roughly  the 
preceding  August. 

To  an  instructed,  thoughtful,  naval  mind  in 
the  United  States,  there  is  no  contingency  affecting 
the  country,  as  interested  in  the  navy,  so  men¬ 
acing  as  the  fear  of  popular  clamor  influencing 
an  irresolute,  or  militarily  ignorant,  adminis¬ 
tration  to  divide  the  battle-ship  force  into  two 
divisions,  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific.  A  de¬ 
termined  President,  instructed  in  military  matters, 
doubtless  will  not  yield,  but  will  endeavor  by 
explanation  to  appease  apprehension  and  quiet 
outcry.  Nevertheless,  the  danger  exists;  and 


Retrospect  upon  Ja pan- Russia  War  169 


always  will  exist  in  proportion  as  the  people  do 
not  understand  the  simple  principle  that  an 
efficient  military  body  depends  for  its  effect  in 
war  —  and  in  peace  —  less  upon  its  position  than 
upon  its  concentrated  force.  This  does  not  ig¬ 
nore  position,  and  its  value.  On  the  contrary,  it 
is  written  with  a  clear  immediate  recollection  of 
Napoleon’s  pregnant  saying,  “  War  is  a  business 
of  positions.”  But  the  great  captain,  in  the 
letter  in  which  the  phrase  occurs,  goes  on  directly 
to  instruct  the  marshal  to  whom  he  is  writing  so 
to  station  the  divisions  of  his  corps,  for  purposes 
of  supply,  around  a  common  centre,  that  they 
can  unite  rapidly;  and  can  meet  the  enemy  in 
mass  before  he  can  attack  any  one  of  them,  or 
move  far  from  his  present  position  against  an¬ 
other  important  French  interest. 

Concentration  indeed,  in  last  analysis,  may  be 
correctly  defined  as  being  itself  a  choice  of  positions 
viz. :  that  the  various  corps,  or  ships,  shall  not  be 
some  in  one  place,  and  some  in  others,  but  all 
in  one  place.  We  Americans  have  luckily  had  an 
object  lesson,  not  at  our  own  expense,  but  at 
that  of  an  old  friend.  There  is  commonly  be¬ 
lieved  to  have  been  little  effective  public  opinion 
in  Russia  at  the  time  the  war  with  Japan  was  at 
hand;  such  as  did  manifest  itself,  in  the  use  of 
dynamite  against  officials,  seems  not  to  have 


170  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


taken  into  consideration  international  relations, 
military  or  other.  But  in  the  councils  of  the  Em¬ 
pire,  however  constituted,  and  whatever  the 
weight  of  the  military  element,  there  was  shown 
in  act  an  absolute  disregard  of  principles  so  simple, 
so  obvious,  and  so  continually  enforced  by  pre¬ 
cept  and  experience,  that  the  fact  would  be 
incomprehensible,  had  not  we  all  seen,  in  civil 
as  in  military  life,  that  the  soundest  principles, 
perfectly  well  known,  fail,  more  frequently 
than  not,  to  sustain  conduct  against  preposses¬ 
sion  or  inclination.  That  communications  dom¬ 
inate  strategy,  and  that  the  communications  of 
Japan  in  a  continental  war  would  be  by  sea, 
were  clear  as  daylight.  That  the  whole  navy  of 
Russia,  united  on  the  scene,  would  be  sufficient, 
and  half  of  it  probably  insufficient,  certainly 
hazardous,  was  equally  plain.  Yet,  ship  by  ship, 
half  was  assembled  in  the  far  East,  until  Japan 
saw  that  this  process  of  division  had  been  carried 
as  far  as  suited  her  interests  and  declared  war; 
after  which  of  course  no  Russian  battle-ship 
could  go  forward  alone. 

From  the  military  point  of  view  the  absurdity 
of  the  procedure  is  clear;  but  for  national  safety 
it  has  to  be  equally  clear  to  statesmen  and  to 
people.  An  outside  observer,  with  some  little 
acquired  knowledge  of  the  workings  of  men’s 


Retrospect  upon  Japan-Russia  War  171 


minds,  needs  small  imagination  to  hear  the  argu¬ 
ments  at  the  Russian  council  board.  “  Things 
are  looking  squally  in  the  East,”  says  one;  “  the 
fleet  ought  to  be  increased.”  “  Increased,”  says 
another,  “  you  may  say  so.  All  the  ships  we  have 
ought  to  be  sent,  and  together,  the  instant  they 
can  be  got  ready.”  “  Oh  but,”  rejoins  a  third, 
“  consider  how  exposed  our  Baltic  shores  would 
be,  in  case  of  war  against  us  should  be  declared  by 
Great  Britain,  which  already  has  an  under¬ 
standing  with  Japan.”  The  obvious  reply,  that, 
in  case  Great  Britain  did  declare  war,  the  only 
thing  to  be  done  with  the  Baltic  fleet  would  be 
to  snuggle  it  close  inside  of  the  guns  of  Cronstadt, 
would  probably  be  made;  if  it  was,  it  was  not 
heeded.  In  a  representative  government  would 
doubtless  have  been  heard  the  further  remark, 
“  The  feeling  in  our  coast  towns,  at  seeing  no 
ship  left  for  their  protection,  would  be  so  strong, 
that  I  doubt  if  the  party  could  carry  the  next 
election.”  Against  this  there  is  no  provision, 
except  popular  understanding;  operative  per¬ 
haps  in  the  interior,  where  there  is  no  occasion 
for  fright. 

The  most  instructive  feature  of  this  Russian 
mistake,  inexcusable  in  a  government  not  brow¬ 
beaten  by  political  turmoil,  is  that  it  was  made 
in  time  of  peace,  in  the  face  of  conditions  threat- 


172  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


ening  war.  In  fact,  as  is  often  the  case,  when 
war  came  it  was  already  too  late  to  remedy  ade¬ 
quately  the  blunders  or  neglects  of  peace.  More 
than  twenty  years  ago  the  present  writer  had 
occasion  to  quote  emphatically  the  words  of  a 
French  author,  “Naval  Strategy”  —  naval  stra¬ 
tegic  considerations  —  “  is  as  necessary  in  peace 
as  in  war.”  In  1904,  nearly  a  decade  had  elapsed 
since  Japair~had  been  despoiled  of  much  of  her 
gains  in  her  war  with  China.  Since  then  Russia 
had  been  pursuing  a  course  of  steady  aggression, 
in  furtherance  of  her  own  aims,  and  contrary  to 
what  Japan  considered  her  “  vital  interests  and 
national  honor.”  1  \t  is  not  necessary  to  pronounce 
between  the  views  of  the  two  parties  to  see  that 


the  action  of  Russia  was  militarily  preposterous, 
unless  her  fleet  grew  in  proportion  to  that  of 
Japan,  and  of  her  own  purposes,  and  was  ke.pt 
in  hand;  that  is,  kept  concentrated.  It  would 
have  mattered  little  whether,  being  united,  the 
outbreak  of  war  found  it  in  the  Baltic,  or  in 
Vladivostok.  That  it  could  come,  as  did  Ro- 
zhestvensky,  but  in  double  his  force,  would  have 
been  a  fact  no  less  emphatic  when  in  the  Baltic 
than  in  the  farther  East. 

It  is  precisely  the  same,  in  application  as  well 
as  in  principle,  with  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
coasts  of  the  United  States.  Both  are  exposed. 


.  •> 


Retrospect  upon  Japan-Russia  War  173 


Neither  need  be  more  exposed  than  the  other; 
for,  in  virtue  of  our  geographical  position  rel¬ 
atively  to  the  other  great  Powers  of  the  world, 
it  is  not  the  momentary  location  of  the  fleet,  but 
its  simple  existence,  adequate  in  numbers  and  effi¬ 
ciency,  and  concentrated  in  force,  which  pro¬ 
tects  both  coasts.  Any  invader  from  the  one 
side  or  the  other  must  depend  upon  sea  com¬ 
munications  to  support  his  army  throughout  the 
war;  not  merely  for  the  three  months  needed  to 
bring  the  United  States  fleet  from  one  side  to 
the  other.  But,  if  the  war  begin  with  the  fleet 
divided  between  the  two  oceans,  one  half  may 
be  overmatched  and  destroyed,  as  was  that  of 
Port  Arthur;  and  the  second  on  coming  prove 
unequal  to  restore  the  situation,  as  befell  Ro- 
zhestvensky.  That  is  to  say,  Concentration 
protects  both  coasts,  Division  exposes  both. 
It  is  of  vital  consequence  to  the  nation  of  the 
United  States,  that  its  people,  contemplating  the 
Russo-Japanese  naval  war,  substitute  therein,  in 

THEIR  APPREHENSION,  ATLANTIC  FOR  BALTIC,  AND  PA¬ 
CIFIC  for  Port  Arthur.  So  they  will  comprehend 
as  well  as  apprehend. 


OBJECTS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
NAVAL  WAR  COLLEGE 


OBJECTS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
NAVAL  WAR  COLLEGE 


AN  ADDRESS 
August ,  1888 

GENTLEMEN  of  the  Navy;  — It  has  been 
the  custom,  during  the  very  few  years  in 
which  the  NavalWar  College  has  been  in  existence, 
to  begin  each  session  by  an  opening  address,  in¬ 
tended  mainly  to  describe  the  objects  and  methods 
of  the  institution,  concerning  which  there  has  been 
and  still  continues  a  certain  amount  of  misappre¬ 
hension.  In  the  natural  course  of  things,  this 
custom  must  at  last  come  to  an  end  with  the  rea¬ 
son  that  has  occasioned  it;  but  it  is  perhaps  too 
much  to  assume  that  the  need  has  as  yet  altogether 
passed  away  for  a  few  words  of  explanation,  par¬ 
taking  partly  of  the  character  of  defence,  by 
showing  the  necessity  for  this  undertaking,  and 
partly  of  the  character  of  limitations,  defining 
what  is  not  proposed,  as  well  as  what  is. 

Before  entering  upon  this  duty  of  explanation, 
177 


17S  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


mention  may  properly  be  made  of  the  growing 
favor  of  the  College  in  the  mind  of  the  Navy  at 
large,  as  testified  by  the  words  and  actions  of  many 
officers;  as  well  as  of  certain  difficulties  and  dis¬ 
couragements  through  which  it,  in  common  with 
most  human  enterprises,  has  had  to  pass  —  is  still 
passing.  Last  year,  as  is  generally  known,  Con¬ 
gress  refused  to  make  any  appropriation  for  it, 
and  the  work  has  been  pursued  during  the  last 
twelvemonth  and  more  under  the  apprehension 
that  similar  action  would  be  taken  in  the  present 
session,  and  so  compel  the  abandonment  of  the 
work.  This  fear  has  happily  been  removed;  and 
that  it  has,  is  to  be  ascribed  chiefly  to  the  change 
of  sentiment  in  the  Navy  itself,  as  the  objects  of 
the  College  have  come  to  be  really  understood; 
as  the  officers  who  have  attended  the  course  have 
gone  back  to  their  duties  and  to  their  brother 
officers  with  a  report  which  has  compelled  ap¬ 
proval,  and  changed  an  attitude  of  doubt,  or 
even  opposition,  into  one  of  conviction  and  sup¬ 
port.  Such  professional  opinion  cannot  but  be 
felt,  however  insensible  the  method  of  its  action. 
It  will  be  an  evil  day  for  the  country  when  it 
ceases  to  have  weight;  for  such  impotence  could 
proceed  only  from  degeneracy  of  officers  them¬ 
selves,  or  from  an  unwillingness  on  the  part  of 
the  outside  public  to  listen  to  those  most  com- 


Objects  of  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  179 


petent  to  appreciate  the  wants  of  the  Navy; 
both  contingencies  fatal  to  the  efficiency  of  the 
service. 

Besides  the  doubt  as  to  the  action  of  Congress, 
involving  the  whole  question  as  to  whether  our 
really  arduous  work  would  be  wholly  thrown 
away,  there  have  been  other  drawbacks  and 
disappointments  which,  as  they  affect  the  course, 
must  be  mentioned.  The  explanation  is  due  to 
those  who  attend  it,  that  they  may  understand 
why  they  receive  less  than  might  justly  be  ex¬ 
pected;  and  it  is  due  to  the  College  that  it  should 
not  suffer  in  reputation  from  such  disappointment, 
from  a  failure  to  appreciate  the  obstacles  which 
have  been  met,  and  which  could  neither  be 
avoided  nor  wholly  overcome.  Chief  among 
these  has  been  the  difficulty  in  finding  officers  at 
once  willing  and  free  to  devote  their  abilities  to 
the  service  of  the  College  and  to  the  development 
of  the  course  which  has  to  be  built  up.  Few 
realize,  until  they  are  forced  to  do  so,  to  what 
an  extent  the  brains  and  energies  of  the  service 
are  mortgaged  in  advance  by  the  numerous 
activities  and  specialties  that  have  developed  of 
late  years.  In  consequence  of  these,  it  has  been 
found  that  not  only  are  officers  otherwise  desirable 
already  employed  on  other  shore  duty,  but  those 
actually  at  sea,  and  who  may  be  expected  to 


180  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


return  in  one,  two,  or  three  years,  have  engaged 
themselves  for  duty  at  other  stations. 

Doubtless  the  War  College  will  by  degrees  gather 
to  itself  the  small  body  of  instructors  which  will  be 
needed,  and  who  will  readily  seek  a  duty  that  I 
venture  to  predict  will  be  found  both  interesting 
and  pleasant,  as  well  as  most  valuable  profession¬ 
ally;  but  as  yet  it  has  not  had  time  to  do  so.  The 
search  of  its  president  has  been  met  with  a  general 
result  of  “  already  engaged,”  and  dependence 
has  had  to  be  upon  the  voluntary  assistance  of 
officers  on  other  duty  who  have  consented  to  aid 
the  College  by  treating  one  and  another  of  the 
topics  that  fall  within  its  scope.  I  cannot  too 
heartily  thank  those  who  have  thus,  at  much 
trouble  to  themselves,  undertaken  tasks  which 
could  bring  no  reward,  beyond  the  satisfaction 
which  good  work  always  carries  in  itself  and  the 
appreciation  of  their  small  audience  here.  The 
assistance  thus  given  has  been  invaluable,  and  the 
results  most  important;  but  it  is  easy  to  see  that 
when  other  duties  have  the  first  claim  upon  the 
attention  of  the  individual,  it  will  not  be  possible 
to  realize  as  much  as  when  the  College  course 
has  no  rival,  and  that  a  man  will  often  find  himself 
prevented  from  accomplishing  even  as  much  as 
he  expected.  Several  instances  of  such  involuntary 
and  unblamable  shortcoming  have  occurred  within 


Objects  oj  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  181 


the  past  year;  and  to  these  was  added  a  mis¬ 
fortune,  which  at  the  time  of  its  happening  was 
wholly  unexpected,  in  the  sudden  detachment,  of 
Lieut.  Bliss  1  of  the  Army.  This  accomplished 
officer,  who  to  very  considerable  acquirements 
addfed  a  facility  for  teaching  and  a  lucidity  in 
explanation,  which,  combined  with  untiring  readi¬ 
ness  to  undertake  any  amount  of  labor,  made  him 
an  admirable  lecturer  on  Military  Science,  had 
not  been  quite  three  years  at  the  College.  I  was 
therefore  confident,  despite  occasional  misgivings, 
that  he  would  remain  through  the  next  term; 
and  his  detachment,  wholly  without  warning, 
was  a  painful  surprise.  The  uncertainty  of  the 
future  did  not  permit  an  application  for  an  officer 
to  take  his  place  in  time  to  lecture  during  the 
present  session.  Finally,  it  was  hoped  that  this 
opening  address  would  have  been  given  either  by 
the  Admiral  of  the  Navy,  or  by  General  Sher¬ 
man,  both  of  whom  were  requested  to  do  so;  but 
these  distinguished  officers,  who  have  extended 
their  cordial  approval  and  sympathy  to  the 
College  and  its  objects,  did  not  feel  able  to  under¬ 
take  the  task. 

Hindrances  and  disappointments  are,  however, 
only  incidents  in  the  infancy  and  life  of  any 
undertaking,  and  are  from  the  first  destined  to 

1  Now  Brigadier-General  Tasker  H.  Bliss. 


182  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


be  overcome  if  the  institution  has  its  origin  in  a 
felt  necessity,  and  has  been  wisely  planned.  It 
remains,  therefore,  to  show  that  the  War  College 
has  sprung  from  and  represents  a  real  need  of 
the  service  and  the  country,  and  that  the  general 
lines  upon  which  it  has  so  far  been  conducted  are 
such  as  promise  to  fulfil  the  actual  want,  without 
duplicating  work  adequately  provided  for  else¬ 
where  in  the  Navy.  In  making  this  explanation 
I  shall  be  traversing  ground  very  familiar  to 
myself,  and  shall  have  to  use  arguments  thread¬ 
bare,  to  me,  from  frequent  use.  To  some  extent 
they  have  appeared  in  print;  but  while,  on  the 
one  hand,  I  cannot  hope  that  they  have  attracted 
the  attention  of  all  this  audience,  so,  on  the  other, 
the  opportunity  cannot  be  foregone  of  bringing 
them  before  you,  now  that  by  coming  here  you 
have  put  yourselves  at  the  mercy  of  the  speaker. 

It  will  probably  clear  away  embarrassing  mis¬ 
apprehensions  to  state  first,  to  some  extent,  what 
the  College  does  not  propose  to  do.  The  term 
“  post-graduate,”  which  has  been  frequently  and 
not  unnaturally  applied,  which  was  indeed  used 
by  the  original  board  that  recommended  the 
establishment  of  the  College,  has  been  unfor¬ 
tunate;  suggesting  as  it  does  the  continuance  here, 
on  a  higher  and  broader  scale,  of  the  studies  pur¬ 
sued  by  the  graduates  of  Annapolis  while  cadets 


Objects  of  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  183 


at  the  Academy.  If  the  course  here  is  really 
post-graduate,  it  must  be  in  direct  sequence  of 
the  course  at  the  only  institution  from  which  all 
naval  officers  are  graduated;  and  the  inference 
naturally  follows  that  the  professors  and  instructors 
there,  who  have  so  long  and  ably  directed  the 
student  before  graduation,  are  best  fitted  to  con¬ 
tinue  his  guidance  in  the  higher  developments  of 
which  also  they  are  masters.  To  this  undoubtedly 
was  due,  and  not  improperly,  a  certain  amount  of 
opposition  that  was  at  one  time  manifested  from 
the  Naval  Academy.  It  was  perfectly  true  that 
at  that  place  were  both  the  men  and  the  plant  by 
which  could  best  be  furthered  a  strictly  “  post¬ 
graduate  ”  course,  and  to  carry  such  elsewhere 
was  to  waste  government  money,  and  cast  an 
undeserved  slight  upon  the  well-proved  teachers 
of  an  admirable  institution. 

But  if,  on  the  contrary,  the  line  of  professional 
study  proposed  here  was  in  no  strict  sense  a 
sequence  of  any  one  branch,  or  any  number  of 
branches,  followed  at  Annapolis;  if  it  demanded 
neither  the  specialties  nor  the  appliances  to  be 
found  there;  if  it  were  “  post  ”  —  after  —  only  in 
the  sense  of  subsequent  time,  and  not  of  consecu¬ 
tive  development,  the  objection  falls  to  the  ground. 
When  we  pass  from  the  negative  explanation  of 
what  the  College  is  not,  to  the  positive  statement 


184  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


of  what  it  is,  it  will,  I  think,  be  granted  that  this 
course  is  “  post-graduate  ”  only  in  the  same  sense 
that  the  special  professional  training  of  a  man  fol¬ 
lows  after  and  presupposes  the  instruction  of  the 
home,  of  the  school,  and  of  the  college,  where 
youths  having  widely  different  futures  pursue  for  a 
time  common  studies.  In  a  way  the  term  “  post¬ 
graduate  ”  has  its  uses;  it  is  understopd,  or,  what 
is  much  the  same  thing,  people  think  they  under¬ 
stand  it;  it  appeals  to  the  mania  for  increase  of 
teaching  which  pervades  our  time,  and  so  attracts 
support;  but  it  was  most  unfortunate  for  the  in¬ 
fancy  of  the  War  College,  when  submitted  to  clear¬ 
headed  men  more  concerned  for  the  honor  of  their 
own  alma-mater  than  to  foster  a  new  and  pos¬ 
sibly  rival  institution.  “  Post-graduate  !  a  further 
development  of  the  Annapolis  course !  where 
can  this  be  better  done  than  at  Annapolis  ?  ” 
The  cry  went  through  the  service;  and  if  the 
premise  were  conceded,  it  was  difficult  to  resist 
the  conclusion. 

I  pass  now  to  another  negative  qualification, 
in  making  which  considerable  care  is  needed,  on 
the  part  of  both  speaker  and  hearers,  to  avoid 
misunderstanding.  It  is  important  that,  in  ex¬ 
cluding  from  the  purposes  of  the  College  any  pro¬ 
fessional  interest,  there  should  not  be  a  seeming 
disposition  to  undervalue  it.  It  is  to  be  said, 


Objects  of  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  185 


then,  that  the  War  College  does  not  propose  to 
devote  its  energies  to  the  question  of  the  material 
and  mechanical  development  of  the  Navy,  except 
in  a  secondary  and  incidental  manner;  except, 
that  is,  so  far  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  further¬ 
ance  of  its  main  objects.  These  objects  by  them¬ 
selves  will  require  all  the  time  for  which  officers 
can  be  spared  by  the  Department  from  other 
professional  demands.  Methods  of  construction 
designed  to  increase  the  speed,  strength,  manoeu¬ 
vring  power,  stability,  invulnerability  of  ships; 
methods  of  gun-building,  by  which  the  power  and 
accuracy  of  the  gun  is  developed,  or  the  strains 
upon  the  gun  decreased;  improvements  in  engines, 
by  which  increase  of  speed  and  economy  of  fuel 
and  space  are  hoped  to  be  effected;  the  details 
of  advance  made  in  explosives,  or  in  torpedoes,  — 
with  none  of  these  are  we  concerned  immediately 
and  chiefly,  but  only  incidentally;  and  that  if 
for  but  one  reason,  which  will  be  recognized  as 
soon  as  stated,  namely,  that  all  these  matters  are 
already  in  the  hands  of  a  sufficient  number  of 
accomplished  officers.  They  —  ships,  guns,  en¬ 
gines,  explosives  —  are  now  receiving  all  the 
attention  that  the  government  owes  them. 

Let  me  not,  however,  be  misunderstood;  the 
concern  of  the  College  with  all  these  matters  is 
nevertheless  very  close,  but  it  is  with  the  results  ob- 


186  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


tained,  not  with  the  methods  followed.  How  fast  a 
ship  will  go  and  for  how  long;  within  what  space 
she  will  turn  and  how  quickly;  what  resistance 
she  presents  to  injuries,  and  what  effect  certain 
injuries  will  have  on  her  safety,  speed,  or  handi¬ 
ness;  in  regard  to  guns  and  torpedoes,  their  range, 
accuracy,  the  rapidity  with  which  they  can  be 
fired  and  the  injury  they  can  produce;  with 
engines,  the  important  considerations  of  speed  and 
coal  endurance  —  such  are  the  factors  that  are 
needed  for  the  investigations  of  the  College,  and 
you  will  notice  that  they  denote  the  accomplished 
results,  they  characterize  the  finished  weapons 
which  are  put  into  the  hands  of  the  military  sea¬ 
man  to  go  forth  to  battle,  to  wage  war.  If  his 
ship  will  make  a  certain  speed,  she  may,  for  all 
he  cares,  be  driven  by  a  tallow-candle;  if  his  gun 
will  do  so  much  work,  it  may,  so  far  as  he  is  con¬ 
cerned,  be  made  of  paste-board.  The  strategic 
and  tactical  capabilities  in  which  the  labors  of 
the  designer  and  builder  have  resulted,  are  those 
with  which  the  admiral  and  captain,  in  their 
properest  sphere,  are  alone  concerned;  and  the 
antecedent  methods  by  which  those  results  are 
reached  are  of  secondary  importance  to  the 
artist  in  war.  Doubtless  this  argument  may  be 
pushed  to  extreme  by  an  unbalanced  mind;  the 
proverbial  difficulty  of  drawing  the  line  will  be 


Objects  0}  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  187 


felt  at  times,  and  the  line  perhaps  drawn  too  much 
on  one  side  or  the  other  by  this  or  that  person 
responsible  for  the  direction  of  the  College  course; 
but,  speaking  broadly,  it  may  be  said  that  the 
true  aim  is  to  promote,  not  the  creation  of  naval 
material,  but  the  knowledge  how  to  use  that 
material  to  the  best  advantage  in  the  conduct  of 
war. 

A  very  strong  argument  for  thus  withdrawing, 
and,  so  to  speak,  protecting,  the  study  of  the 
art  of  war  from  too  close  contact  with  that  mechani¬ 
cal  and  material  advance  upon  which  its  modifica¬ 
tions  depend,  is  to  be  found  in  the  spirit  of  our 
age,  and  the  effect  of  that  spirit  upon  our  naval 
officers.  For,  is  not  the  study  of  material  phenom¬ 
ena,  and  the  bending  of  the  forces  of  nature  to 
the  service  and  comfort  of  man,  one  of  the  leading 
interests  of  our  generation  ?  And  is  not  this 
tendency  reflected  in  the  Navy  by  the  almost 
exclusive  attention  paid  by  administrations  and 
officers  to  the  development  of  the  material  of 
the  service  ?  Who,  and  how  many,  are  studying 
how  best  to  use  that  material  when  war  has 
broken  out  ?  If  you  ask  for  authorities  on  guns, 
on  powder,  on  steel,  on  questions  connected  with 
navigation,  on  steam,  on  mathematics,  almost 
any  one  of  us  can  name  them;  but  who  are  our 
authorities  on  the  art  of  war  ?  Look  at  the  Navy 


188  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


Register;  how  many  are  the  officers  who  are 
working  at  the  art  of  war  ?  Consult  the  index  of 
the  publications  of  our  Naval  Institute;  what 
proportion  do  articles  on  waging  war  bear  to 
those  on  mechanical  or  physical  progress  in  naval 
material  ?  Is  there  then  no  reason  for  separating 
and  nursing  the  study  of  this  art  for  a  while  from 
too  close  contact  with  the  related  subjects  ?  I 
will  venture  to  say  that  if  questions  of  develop¬ 
ment  of  material  be  admitted  to  an  equal  share  of 
the  College’s  attention  in  its  early  years,  it  will 
be  but  a  short  time  before  the  art  of  war  will  be 
swamped  by  them  and  disappear  from  the  course. 

And  what  wonder  then,  gentlemen  of  the  Navy, 
that  we  find  our  noble  calling  undervalued  in 
this  day  ?  Have  we  not  ourselves  much  to  blame 
for  it  in  this  exclusive  devotion  to  mechanical 
matters  ?  Do  we  not  hear,  within  and  without, 
the  scornful  disparaging  cry,  that  everything  is 
done  by  machinery  in  these  days,  and  that  we  are 
waxing  old  and  decaying,  ready  to  vanish  away  ? 
Everything  done  by  machinery  !  as  if  the  subtlest 
and  most  comprehensive  mind  that  ever  wrought 
on  this  planet  could  devise  a  machine  to  meet  the 
innumerable  incidents  of  the  sea  and  of  naval 
war.  The  blind  forces  that  work  on  ever  in  the 
same  routine,  in  storm  or  calm,  buried  deep  in 
the  bowels  of  the  ship,  that  would  drive  her  with 


Objects  of  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  189 


equal  serenity  against  friend  or  foe,  through  the 
open  sea  or  against  a  rock-bound  coast,  do  every¬ 
thing!  The  watchful  eye,  the  trained  courage,  the 
ready  skill  which  watch  storm  and  foe  through 
the  countless  phases  of  the  sea  and  of  battle, 
which  plan,  which  execute,  do  nothing!  The 
steed  is  all ;  the  rider  naught !  Machinery  revolves 
the  turret,  disposes  the  heavy  gun  to  receive  its 
charge,  brings  the  charge  from  below,  enters  it 
into  the  gun,  brings  the  gun  into  action  —  there¬ 
fore  machinery  does  everything !  The  quick  eye 
that  seizes  the  fleeting  moment,  the  calm  mind 
that  prepares  and  watches  its  opportunity,  the 
cool  temper,  instinct  with  life  in  the  face  of  death, 
that  can  suffer  and  knows  its  danger,  yet  is  master 
alike  of  itself  and  of  the  unconscious  force  it  guides, 
does  nothing  !  Have  we  not  all  heard  these  sayings, 
with  unpleasant  deductions  from  them  ?  But 
let  us  ask,  are  not  we  ourselves  to  blame  for  them  ? 
Have  not  we,  by  too  exclusive  attention  to  mechani¬ 
cal  advance,  and  too  scanty  attention  to  the  noble 
art  of  war,  which  is  the  chief  business  of  those 
to  whom  the  military  movements  of  the  Navy  are 
entrusted,  contributed  to  the  reproach  which 
has  overtaken  both  us  and  it  ? 

Having  laid  down  these  negative  lines  of  limita¬ 
tion,  the  need  of  which  has  been  shown  by  the 
history  of  the  College  in  its  early  struggle  for  exist- 


190  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


ence,  we  now  come  to  such  definition  of  its  position 
and  aims,  and  demonstration  of  its  necessity  at 
the  present  time,  as  a  decent  regard  to  the  endur¬ 
ance  of  an  audience  will  allow. 

The  general  reply  to  the  question,  “  What  is 
the  object  of  the  War  College  ?  ”  will  have  been 
anticipated  by  you  from  what  has  already  been 
said.  It  is  the  study  and  development,  in  a 
systematic,  orderly  manner,  of  the  art  of  war  as 
applied  to  the  sea,  or  such  parts  of  the  land  as 
can  be  reached  from  ships.  Taking  the  ships 
and  weapons  supplied  by  the  science  of  our  age, 
and  formulating  their  powers  and  limitations  as 
developed  by  experience,  we  have  the  means 
placed  in  naval  hands  by  which  to  compass  the 
great  ends  of  war.  How  best  to  adapt  these  means 
to  the  end  under  the  various  circumstances  and 
in  the  various  fields  where  ships  and  fleets  are 
called  to  act,  is  the  problem  proposed.  Could  we 
find  a  perfect  solution,  we  should  have  a  perfect 
theory  of  the  way  to  wage  war;  and,  it  may  be 
added,  the  art  of  war  would  be  a  far  simpler 
matter,  and  its  successful  conduct  a  much  less 
noble  achievement  of  man’s  faculties,  than  they 
actually  are.  Could  the  course  of  the  warrior, 
given  certain  circumstances,  be  reduced  to  a 
rigorous  demonstration,  to  a  mathematical  cer¬ 
tainty,  it  would  approach  more  closely  to  the 


Objects  of  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  191 


mechanical,  unvarying  action  of  those  blind  forces 
of  nature,  in  harnessing  which  our  age  is  fain  to 
see  its  greatest  glory;  but  in  so  approaching,  it 
would  part  with  those  rarer  qualities  —  intuition, 
sagacity,  judgment,  daring,  inspiration  —  which 
place  great  captains  among  creators,  and  war 
itself  among  the  fine  arts;  and  the  warrior  himself 
would  descend  from  the  artist  to  the  mechanic. 

If,  however,  absolute  certainty  in  this  field  is 
not  attainable  by  thought;  if  the  conduct  of  war 
is  controlled,  not  by  cast-iron  rules  of  invariable 
application,  immutable  as  the  laws  of  nature, 
but  by  general  principles,  in  adapting  which  to 
ever-shifting  circumstances  the  skill  of  the  warrior 
is  shown  —  are  study  and  reflection  therefore  use¬ 
less  ?  Must  we  trust  our  decision  in  every  case 
to  the  inspiration  of  the  moment,  unguided  by 
any  precedents,  uninformed  by  any  experience  ? 
The  great  Napoleon,  himself  a  close  student  of 
war  before  he  became  one  of  its  greatest  masters, 
summarized  the  reply  in  one  of  those  epigrams 
of  which  his  genius  was  prolific:  On  the  field  of 
action  the  happiest  inspiration  is  often  only  a 
recollection.  No  two,  perhaps,  of  the  myriad 
battles  of  history  have  been  exactly  alike,  either 
in  the  ground  contested  or  in  their  tactical  com¬ 
binations;  no  theatre  of  war,  great  or  small,  on 
land  or  sea,  is  without  features  that  differentiate 


192  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


it  from  every  other,  in  the  apprehension  of  the 
strategist;  but  still  among  them  all  are  marked 
resemblances,  common  general  characteristics, 
which  admit  of  statement  and  classification,  and 
which,  when  recognized  and  familiar  to  the  mind, 
develop  that  aptitude,  that  quickness  to  seize 
the  decisive  features  of  a  situation  and  to  apply 
at  once  the  proper  remedy,  which  the  French 
call  coup  d’ceil,  a  phrase  for  which  I  know  no 
English  equivalent.  This  faculty  may  be,  probably 
is,  inborn;  but  none  is  more  susceptible  of  de¬ 
velopment  by  training,  either  in  the  school  of 
actual  war,  or,  when  that  experience  cannot  be 
had,  by  study  and  well-considered  practice.  Thus, 
a  French  naval  author  says:  “  The  infinite  num¬ 
ber  of  conditions  which  go  to  make  up  all  the 
possible  positions  in  which  a  fleet,  a  squadron,  or 
single  ships  may  be  found,  causes  that  an  officer 
will  very  rarely  find  himself  in  a  position  precisely 
similar  to  any  one  of  those  he  has  tried  to  foresee. 
Whence  it  follows  that  all  suppositions  as  to  the 
movements  of  fleets  should  be  conformed  to  cer¬ 
tain  general  principles,  fruitful  in  consequences, 
the  application  of  which  to  all  possible  positions 
should  train  the  mind  and  fix  the  ideas  of  officers, 
in  order  that  they  may  be  early  accustomed  to  seek 
out  and  combine  all  those  movements,  famil¬ 
iarity  with  which  is  absolutely  necessary  to  them.” 


Objects  oj  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  193 


There  have  long  been  two  conflicting  opinions 
as  to  the  best  way  to  fit  naval  officers,  and  indeed 
all  men  called  to  active  pursuits,  for  the  discharge 
of  their  duties.  The  one,  of  the  so-called  practical 
man,  would  find  in  early  beginning  and  constant 
remaining  afloat  all  that  is  requisite;  the  other 
will  find  the  best  result  in  study,  in  elaborate 
mental  preparation.  I  have  no  hesitation  in 
avowing  that  personally  I  think  that  the  United 
States  Navy  is  erring  on  the  latter  side;  but, 
be  that  as  it  may,  there  seems  little  doubt  that 
the  mental  activity  which  exists  so  widely  is  not 
directed  toward  the  management  of  ships  in  battle, 
to  the  planning  of  naval  campaigns,  to  the  study 
of  strategic  and  tactical  problems,  nor  even  to 
the  secondary  matters  connected  with  the  main¬ 
tenance  of  warlike  operations  at  sea.  Now  we 
have  had  the  results  of  the  two  opinions  as  to  the 
training  of  naval  officers  pretty  well  tested  by  the 
experience  of  two  great  maritime  nations,  France 
and  England,  each  of  which,  not  so  much  by 
formulated  purpose  as  by  national  bias,  com¬ 
mitted  itself  unduly  to  the  one  or  the  other.  The 
results  were  manifested  in  our  War  of  Indepen¬ 
dence,  which  gave  rise  to  the  only  well-contested, 
wide-spread  maritime  war  between  nearly  equal 
forces  that  modern  history  records.  There  remains 
in  my  own  mind  no  doubt,  after  reading  the  naval 


194  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


history  on  both  sides,  that  the  English  brought 
to  this  struggle  much  superior  seamanship,  learned 
by  the  constant  practice  of  shipboard;  while  the 
French  officers,  most  of  whom  had  been  debarred 
from  similar  experience  by  the  decadence  of  their 
navy  in  the  middle  of  the  century,  had  devoted 
themselves  to  the  careful  study  of  their  profession. 
In  short,  what  are  commonly  called  the  practical 
and  the  theoretical  man  were  pitted  against  each 
other,  and  the  result  showed  how  mischievous  is 
any  plan  which  neglects  either  theory  or  practice, 
or  which  ignores  the  fact  that  correct  theoretical 
ideas  are  essential  to  successful  practical  work. 
The  practical  seamanship  and  experience  of  the 
English  were  continually  foiled  by  the  want  of 
correct  tactical  conceptions  on  the  part  of  their 
own  chiefs,  and  the  superior  science  of  the  French, 
acquired  mainly  by  study.  It  is  true  that  the 
latter  were  guided  by  a  false  policy  on  the  part 
of  their  government  and  a  false  professional 
tradition.  The  navy,  by  its  mobility,  is  pre¬ 
eminently  fitted  for  offensive  war,  and  the  French 
deliberately  and  constantly  subordinated  it  to 
defensive  action.  But,  though  the  system  was 
faulty,  they  had  a  system;  they  had  ideas;  they 
had  plans  familiar  to  their  officers,  while  the 
English  usually  had  none  —  and  a  poor  system 
is  better  than  none  at  all. 


Objects  0}  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  195 


This  decisive  advantage,  gained  by  scientific 
military  theory  over  mere  practical  ship-handling, 
is  the  more  remarkable  because  the  French  art  of 
naval  war  was  itself  then  of  slender  proportions, 
and  but  little  diffused  throughout  their  navy.  It 
prevailed,  because  the  English  had  none  until 
Rodney  appeared.  Thus,  La  Serre,  an  officer 
of  that  War,  wrote :  “  We  have  several  works 

which  treat  of  the  manoeuvres  of  ships  and  the 
evolutions  of  squadrons,  but  we  have  none  treating 
the  attack  and  defence  of  fleets.  It  is  possible  that 
the  circumstances  in  which  two  squadrons  may 
meet  are  so  varied  that  a  regular  treatise  upon 
them  cannot  be  made.  This  reason  would  render 
more  interesting  a  work  which  should  contain 
detailed  and  critical  accounts  of  sea-fights  which 
have  actually  occurred.  Theory  has  already 
done  much  to  teach  the  seaman  the  art  of  com¬ 
bating  the  elements,  and  every  day  it  is  adding 
to  this  sort  of  knowledge,  but  there  is  too  great 
neglect  to  consider  ships  when  engaged  in  battle. 
The  infinite  number  of  incidents  which  can 
occur  during  an  action  should  not  be  a  reason  for 
putting  aside  this  study.  By  it  only  can  we 
successfully  estimate  what  will  be  the  effect  of 
movements  which  we  contemplate,  and  what  must 
be  done  to  counteract  the  designs  of  the  enemy. 
So  long  as  these  ideas  are  not  familiar  to  officers, 


196  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


the  fear  of  compromising  themselves  by  manoeuvres 
will  lead  them  to  limit  naval  actions  to  simple 
cannonades,  which  will  end  by  leaving  the  rival 
squadrons  in  the  same  respective  conditions  in 
which  they  were  before  fighting.” 

We  are  not  to  understand  from  this  that  the 
knowledge  of  the  art  of  war  was  absolutely  non¬ 
existent,  but  that,  not  having  yet  been  written 
down,  it  existed  only  in  the  minds  of  a  few  choice 
spirits.  Thus,  Ramatuelle,  another  officer  of 
that  day,  wrote  (about  1802):  “The  art  of  war 
is  carried  to  a  great  degree  of  perfection  on  land, 
but  is  far  from  being  so  at  sea.  It  is  the  object 
of  all  naval  tactics;  but  it  is  scarcely  known 
among  us,  except  as  a  tradition.  Many  authors 
have  written  on  the  subject  of  naval  tactics,  but 
they  have  confined  themselves  to  the  manner  of 
forming  orders  or  passing  from  one  order  to 
another;  they  have  entirely  neglected  to  establish 
the  principles  for  regulating  conduct  in  the  face 
of  the  enemy;  for  attacking  or  refusing  action; 
for  pursuit  and  retreat;  according  to  position, 
i.e.y  to  windward  or  to  leeward;  or  according 
to  the  relative  strength  of  the  opposing  forces.” 
In  a  word,  the  management  of  ships  in 
battle  was  a  matter  dependent  upon  oral 
tradition,  not  upon  recognized  authority;  upon 
the  zeal  of  the  individual  officer  for  profes- 


Objects  oj  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  197 


sional  improvement,  not  upon  governmental 
instruction. 

These  two  independent  witnesses  —  for,  though 
brought  up  in  the  same  service,  one  went  into 
exile  with  the  royalists  while  the  other  dedicated 
his  work  to  Bonaparte  —  agree  also  as  to  the 
necessity  of  governmental  action  to  promote 
general  professional  improvement.  Thus,  La 
Serre  says:  “  The  instruction  of  a  corps  of  officers 
should  be  directed  by  the  government,  for  if  it 
should  be  abandoned  to  itself  in  this  matter, 
some  individual  members  might  become  accom¬ 
plished,  but  the  mass  would  remain  ignorant; 
and  the  reverse  happens  when  the  government 
interests  itself  in  the  matter.”  And  Ramatuelle 
says:  “The  naval  art  has  made,  in  the  century 
which  is  just  finished,  progress  which  requires 
from  officers  deep  and  serious  study.  No  one 
more  than  myself  pays  sincere  homage  to  the 
knowledge  and  talents  of  those  who  have  shed 
lustre  upon  the  French  navy  —  above  all,  in 
the  war  of  1778;  but  instruction  relative  to 
grand  manoeuvres  was  concentrated  in  far  too 
few  men;  it  was  propagated  only  by  tradition. 
This  means  was  often  wanting  to  the  officer 
who  might  have  been  most  capable  of  profiting, 
if  chance  had  only  brought  him  in  contact  with 
able  men.  It  may  be  remarked  that  Du  Pavilion, 


198  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


who  had  been  chief  of  staff  to  Admiral  D’Orvilliers, 
who  showed  superior  talents  in  all  circumstances, 
who  is  considered  to  have  brought  naval  tactics 
out  of  chaos,  belonged  to  the  department  of 
Rochefort;  and  that  Buord,  Vaugiraud,  Leguille, 
who  had  exercised  with  the  utmost  distinction 
the  post  of  chief  of  staff  in  the  principal  squadrons, 
belonged  to  the  same  department.  It  is  to  be 
presumed  that  the  other  departments  would 
also  have  furnished  a  proportionate  contingent, 
if  they  had  had  a  Du  Pavilion  who  might  have 
constantly  communicated  to  them  his  ideas  and 
his  knowledge.”  To  provide  for  the  study  and 
dissemination  of  knowledge  on  these  very  matters 
is  the  object  of  the  War  College. 

To  return  now  to  the  positive  definition  of  the 
objects  of  the  College: 

The  heads  under  which  this  study  of  the  art 
of  war  may  be  subdivided  and  grouped  are 
numerous;  and  there  are  also  certain  collateral 
subjects,  which  will  appear  in  the  programme 
of  the  course,  the  immediate  bearing  of  which 
upon  the  effective  conduct  of  war  will  not  be  at 
once  apparent,  and  will  therefore  require  some 
words  of  explanation  in  their  turn.  I  propose, 
however,  first  to  speak  of  those  divisions  the 
importance  of  which  is  obvious  and  will  be  at 
once  recognized,  but  concerning  which  there  are 


Objects  o }  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  199 


some  remarks  to  be  made  in  the  nature  of  closer 
definition,  and  also  enlargement  beyond  the 
scope  usually  associated  with  them. 

The  two  principal  heads  of  division  are  of  course 
Strategy  and  Grand  Tactics.  The  meanings  of 
each  of  these  two  terms  may  be  assumed  to  be 
apprehended,  with  some  accuracy  and  clearness, 
by  such  an  audience  as  the  present.  There  is, 
however,  a  certain  radical  distinction  in  the  con¬ 
ditions  by  which  each  of  these  divisions  of  the 
great  subject  are  modified,  which  I  wish  to 
enforce. 

“  Strategy,”  says  Jomini,  speaking  of  the  art 
of  war  on  land,  “  is  the  art  of  making  war  upon 
the  map,  and  comprehends  the  whole  theatre 
of  warlike  operations.  Grand  tactics  is  the  art 
of  posting  troops  upon  the  battle-field,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  accidents  of  the  ground;  of  bringing 
them  into  action;  and  the  art  of  fighting  upon  the 
ground  in  contradistinction  to  planning  upon  a 
map.  Its  operations  may  extend  over  a  field  of 
ten  or  twelve  miles  in  extent.  Strategy  decides 
where  to  act.  Grand  tactics  decides  the  manner 
of  execution  and  the  employment  of  troops,” 
when,  by  the  combinations  of  strategy,  they 
have  been  assembled  at  the  point  of  action. 

If  these  definitions  are  accurate,  it  follows  that 
strategy,  having  to  do  with  a  class  of  military 


200  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


movements  executed  beyond  the  reach  of  the 
adversary’s  weapons,  does  not  depend  in  its 
main  principles  upon  the  character  of  the  weapons 
at  any  particular  age.  When  the  weapons  begin 
to  enter  as  a  factor,  and  blows  are  about  to  be 
exchanged,  strategy  gives  place  to  grand  tactics. 
Hence  it  follows,  with  easy  clearness,  that  “  in 
great  strategic  operations,  victory  will  now,  as 
ever,  result  from  the  application  of  the  principles 
which  have  led  to  the  success  of  great  generals  in 
all  ages,  of  Alexander  and  Caesar,  as  well  as  of 
Frederick  and  Napoleon.”  The  greatest  master 
of  the  art  of  war,  the  first  Napoleon,  has  in  like 
manner  laid  down  the  principle  that,  to  become  a 
great  commander,  the  soldier  must  study  the  cam¬ 
paigns  of  Hannibal,  Caesar,  and  Alexander,  as 
well  as  those  of  Turenne,  Prince  Eugene,  Fred¬ 
erick,  and  other  great  modern  leaders.  In  short, 
the  great  warrior  must  study  history. 

I  have  wished  to  bring  out  this  point  clearly,  if 
briefly,  for  there  is  a  very  natural,  though  also 
very  superficial,  disposition  in  the  Navy,  at 
present,  to  look  upon  past  naval  history  as  a  blank 
book  so  far  as  present  usefulness  is  concerned. 
Yet  few,  if  any,  will  maintain  that  the  introduction 
of  firearms  did  not  differentiate  the  wars  of 
Frederick  and  Napoleon  from  those  of  Hannibal 
and  Caesar,  fully  as  much  as  our  modern  inventions 


Objects  of  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  201 


have  changed  the  character  of  naval  warfare. 
Take  some  of  the  points  upon  which  strategy  is 
called  to  decide,  and  see  how  independent  they 
are  of  the  particular  weapons,  which  must  be 
assumed  as  not  very  unequal  between  the  two 
enemies;  or,  if  they  are  unequal,  that  very  neglect 
on  the  part  of  the  one  is  a  good  historical  lesson. 
Such  points  are:  the  selection  of  the  theatre  of 
war;  the  discussion  of  its  decisive  points,  of  its 
principal  lines  of  communication ;  of  the  fortresses, 
or,  in  case  of  the  sea,  the  military  ports,  regarded 
as  a  refuge  for  ships,  or  as  obstacles  to  progress; 
the  combinations  that  can  be  made,  considering 
these  features  of  the  strategic  field;  the  all- 
important  point  of  the  choice  of  the  objective; 
the  determination  of  the  line  to  be  followed  in 
reaching  the  objective,  and  the  maintenance  of 
that  line  practically  undisturbed  by  an  enemy; 
such,  and  many  other  kindred  matters,  fall  within 
the  province  of  strategy,  and  receive  illustration 
from  history.  This  illustration  will  be  fullest  and 
most  satisfactory  when  there  is  an  approach  to 
equality  between  the  belligerents;  but  most 
valuable  lessons  may  be  derived  also  from  the 
study  of  those  wars,  more  numerous  by  far,  in 
which  the  naval  preponderance  of  one  nation  has 
exercised  an  immense  and  decisive  effect  upon 
the  issues  of  great  contests  both  by  land  and  sea; 


202  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


in  which,  if  I  may  so  say,  the  Navy  has  been  a 
most,  perhaps  the  most,  important  single  strategic 
factor  in  the  whole  wide  field  of  a  war. 

It  is  obviously  impossible,  in  an  address  the 
chief  merit  of  which  should  be  brevity,  to  follow 
far  this  line  of  thought;  but  I  wish  to  throw 
whatever  weight  my  personal  opinion  may  carry 
against  that  easy  assumption  that  we  have  nothing 
to  learn  from  the  naval  past.  During  the  three 
years  that  I  have  been  attached  to  the  College, 
my  reading  and  thought  have  been  chiefly,  though 
not  exclusively,  devoted  to  Naval  History,  with 
an  ever  growing  conviction  of  the  value  and  the 
wide  scope  of  the  lessons  to  be  drawn  therefrom; 
and  I  will  sound  again  the  note  of  warning  against 
that  plausible  cry  of  the  day  which  finds  all  prog¬ 
ress  in  material  advance,  disregarding  that 
noblest  sphere  in  which  the  mind  and  heart  of 
man,  in  which  all  that  is  god-like  in  man,  reign 
supreme;  and  against  that  temper  which  looks 
not  to  the  man,  but  to  his  armor.  And  indeed, 
gentlemen  of  the  Navy,  if  you  be  called  upon 
some  day  to  do  battle,  it  will  be  for  the  country  to 
see  that  your  weapons  are  fit  and  your  force 
respectable;  but  upon  your  own  selves,  under 
God,  must  you  rely  to  do  the  best  with  the  means 
committed  to  your  charge.  For  that  discharge 
you  will  be  responsible,  not  to  the  country  only, 


Objects  oj  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  203 


but  to  your  own  conscience;  which  will  condemn 
you  if,  in  the  eager  curiosity  to  know  how  your 
weapons  are  manufactured,  you  have  neglected 
to  prepare  yourself  for  their  use  in  war. 

To  pass  now  from  Strategy  to  Tactics.  I  wish 
first  to  impress  upon  you  that  the  word  tactics 
has,  unfortunately,  a  double  application.  It 
means  in  one  case  those  movements,  more  or 
less  simple,  by  which  military  units  pass  from 
one  formation  to  another,  e.  g.,  from  line  to 
column,  etc.  As  you  know,  there  are  various 
systems  of  evolutions  by  which  these  transfor¬ 
mations  are  made.  While  the  discussion  of  the 
merits  of  such  systems  is  a  proper  subject  for 
this  College,  the  authoritative  adoption  of  any 
system  must  rest  with  the  government. 

The  second  application  of  the  word  tactics 
has,  for  the  sake  of  distinction,  received  the 
qualifying  epithet  of  “  grand  ”  tactics.  It  relates 
to  combinations  upon  the  battle-field,  or  in  its 
immediate  neighborhood;  when  strategy,  having 
done  or  failed  to  do  its  work,  gives  place  to  the 
clash  of  arms.  Since  the  weapons  of  the  day 
enter  here  as  great  and  decisive  factors,  it  is 
evident  that  the  method  of  applying  the  principles 
of  war  on  the  battle-field  will  differ  from  age  to 
age.  “  Naval  tactics,”  says  Morogues,  a  French 
tactician  of  the  eighteenth  century,  “  is  not  a 


204  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


science  founded  upon  principles  absolutely  in¬ 
variable;  it  is  based  upon  conditions,  the  chief 
causes  of  which,  namely,  the  arms,  may  change; 
which  in  turn  causes  a  change  in  the  construction 
of  ships,  the  manner  of  handling  them,  and  so 
finally  in  the  disposition  and  handling  of  fleets.” 

Is  then  the  study  of  the  grand  tactics  of  the 
past,  of  history,  useless  ?  To  answer  this  ques¬ 
tion  let  us  consider  what  is  the  object  of  education, 
of  study  ?  Is  it  only  to  accumulate  facts  of  im¬ 
mediate  visible  use  ?  or  does  mental  training  count 
for  much  ?  Do  not  instructors  at  our  naval  and 
military  academies  recognize  often  that  the  trouble 
with  this  or  that  lad  is  not  deficiency  of  brain, 
but  lack  of  the  habit  of  application  ?  Is  there  not 
attributed  to  the  study  of  mathematics  and  of  the 
classics  a  value  for  mental  training  quite  inde¬ 
pendent  of  that  utilitarian  value  which  the  Ameri¬ 
can  mind  tends  to  regard  exclusively  ?  If  so,  the 
study  of  past  tactics  must  have  a  value.  For  what 
is  strategy,  and  what  tactics,  but  the  adaptation 
of  means  to  ends  ?  Such  an  end,  so  much  force  to 
achieve  it,  so  many  difficulties  in  the  way  —  these 
are  the  elements  of  every  problem  of  war  in  any 
age;  while  the  adaptation  of  the  means  to  the 
end  by  various  leaders,  whether  accurate  or  faulty; 
the  fertility  of  combination  or  of  resources  dis¬ 
played  by  them;  are  so  many  studies,  which, 


Objects  oj  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  205 


though  they  may  cease  to  have  use  as  precedents, 
nevertheless  exercise,  train  and  strengthen  the 
mind  which  seeks  to  elicit  from  them  the  princi¬ 
ples  of  war. 

And  herein  also  is  the  great  justification  of 
the  study  of  land  warfare  as  established  at  this 
institution.  When  we  consider  only  the  great 
difference  existing  between  the  tactical  units  of  a 
modern  army  and  of  a  modern  fleet,  or  between  the 
diversified  difficulties  of  a  land  theatre  of  war  as 
contrasted  with  the  comparatively  plain  surface 
of  the  ocean,  we  may  be  tempted  to  think  that 
the  study  of  war,  as  applied  to  one,  can  throw  no 
light  upon  the  other.  But,  even  if  history  had 
not  shown  that  the  principles  of  strategy  have 
held  good  under  circumstances  so  many  and  so 
various  that  they  may  be  justly  assumed  of  uni¬ 
versal  application,  to  sea  as  well  as  to  land,  there 
would  still  remain  the  fine  mental  training  afforded 
by  the  successive  modifications  that  have  been 
introduced  into  the  art  of  war  by  great  generals 
They  indicate  the  means  adopted  by  brilliant 
men,  either  to  meet  the  new  exigencies  of  their 
own  day,  or  by  some  new  and  unexpected  com¬ 
bination  to  obtain  advantages  while  retaining  old 
weapons.  In  short,  they  are  lessons  in  the 
use  of  means  to  attain  ends  in  war;  they 
bring  into  play  and  strengthen  those  muscles 


206  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


of  the  mind  which  do  the  work  of  conducting 
war. 

Between  Strategy  and  Grand  Tactics  comes 
logically  Logistics.  Strategy  decides  where  to 
act;  Logistics  is  the  art  of  moving  armies;  it 
brings  the  troops  to  the  point  of  action  and  con¬ 
trols  questions  of  supply;  Grand  Tactics  decides 
the  methods  of  giving  battle. 

There  are  obvious  differences  of  condition  be¬ 
tween  armies  and  fleets  that  must  modify  the 
scope  of  the  word  logistics,  which  it  yet  may  be 
convenient  to  retain.1  Fleets,  to  a  great  extent, 
carry  their  communications  with  them,  in  the  holds 
of  the  ships;  while  details  analogous  to  marching 
and  quartering  troops,  and  in  great  degree  to  main¬ 
tenance  of  supplies,  are  not  to  be  found  with  navies. 
Nevertheless,  in  a  distant  operation  the  question 
of  supplies  will  assume  importance.  We  have  at 
least  two  great  needs  now,  over  and  above  those 
of  sailing  ships  —  coal  and  more  frequent  renewal 
of  ammunition.  These  introduce  the  question 
of  lines  of  supply  and  their  protection.  If,  for 
instance,  it  were  necessary  for  us  to  maintain 
military  possession  of  a  point  on  the  Isthmus, 
or  to  conduct  any  great  operation  there,  there 
must  be  a  line  of  communication  thereto.  How 

1  The  recent  (1908)  cruise  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  to  Magda¬ 
lena  Bay,  in  the  Pacific,  among  other  bearings,  has  been  an 
experimental  study  in  Logistics. 


Objects  of  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  207 


shall  it  be  protected  ?  What  is  the  best  means  of 
guarding  and  distributing  supply  vessels  ?  Would 
a  line  of  communications  be  best  safe-guarded 
by  sending  out  a  large  body  of  colliers  and  supply 
ships,  convoyed  by  a  heavy  detachment  of  men- 
of-war;  or  by  patrolling  the  routes  by  scattered 
cruisers  always  on  the  wing  ?  We  shall  have  for 
this  at  least  one  historical  instance  in  our  course. 
Again,  the  coal  supply  of  commerce-destroyers 
is  a  very  important  question  which  nobody 
seems  to  care  to  face.  It  would  be  amusing,  were 
it  not  painful,  to  see  our  eagerness  to  have  fast 
ships,  and  our  indifference  to  supplying  them 
with  coal.  What  neutral  power  will  sell  us  coal 
when  engaged  in  war  with  a  more  powerful 
maritime  State  ?  and  what  is  a  commerce-destroyer 
without  coal  ?  1 

1  The  following  quotation  from  the  well-known  French 
writer  on  naval  matters,  Admiral  Jurien  de  la  Gravifere,  has 
interest  for  those  who  look  to  commerce-destroying  as  the 
main  reliance  in  an  offensive  war.  Speaking  of  the  early  years 
of  this  century,  he  says:  “The  period  of  disasters  was  about 
to  succeed  the  period  of  captures — inevitable  issue  of  our 
commerce-destroying  campaigns.  How  could  it  have  been 
otherwise  ?  All  our  ports  were  blockaded;  even  before  Tra¬ 
falgar,  English  fleets  covered  the  seas.  What  unrelenting  pur¬ 
suit  had  not  our  frigates  to  expect,  when  once  our  great  fleets 
were  annihilated  ?  It  would  be  much  worse  at  the  present  day. 
It  would  not  be  long  before  our  coal-depots  would  be  taken 
from  us,  and  we  would  go  about  from  neutral  port  to  neutral 
port,  seeking  in  vain  the  fuel  which  would  be  everywhere 
denied  us.”  ( Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  October,  1887). 


208  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


Such  are  the  leading  features  of  our  study 
upon  which  I  care  to  enlarge  to-day.  Of  less 
conspicuous  subjects  I  will  hastily  explain  their 
presence  in  the  course.  Hygiene,  besides  being 
by  law  a  necessary  part  of  instruction  in  every 
Government  institution,  has  such  bearing  upon 
the  efficiency  of  armed  forces  that  its  place  in 
warfare  cannot  be  denied.  As  to  its  usefulness 
to  line  officers,  I  will  venture  to  quote  words  of 
my  own :  “  The  responsibility  for  the  health  of 

crews  rests  ultimately  with  the  commanding 
officers;  who,  however  they  be  guided  ordinarily 
by  the  opinion  of  the  surgeon,  must  be  able  on 
occasion  to  overrule  intelligently  the  professional 
bias  of  the  latter.”  A  doctor’s  business  is  to  save 
life;  the  admiral’s  or  captain’s  to  risk  it,  when 
necessary  and  possible  to  attain  a  given  end. 

The  importance  of  the  efficiency  of  the  units  of 
a  fleet  to  the  efficiency  of  the  whole,  indicates  the 
point  where  naval  construction  touches  the  art 
of  war.  A  crippled  ship  affects  all  the  tactical 
combinations  of  a  fleet;  a  collision  between  two 
ships  has  ere  now  led  to  a  great  battle,  and  the 
results  of  the  battle  have  modified  the  issue  of  a 
war.  With  the  delicately  calculated  constructions 
of  the  present  day,  a  single  great  injury  to  a  ship’s 
hull  may  affect  her  tactical  qualities,  her  speed, 
handling,  stability,  to  a  disastrous  degree.  In  what 


Objects  of  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  209 


way  and  to  what  extent  particular  local  injuries 
may  thus  affect  her,  and  how  they  may  be  partially 
remedied  in  battle,  are  so  obviously  tactical 
questions  as  to  need  no  further  comment.  In 
accordance  with  what  has  before  been  said,  the 
effort  has  been  to  direct  the  teaching  in  construc¬ 
tion  toward  tactical  effects,  rather  than  to  con¬ 
structional  methods  pure  and  simple.  The  eminent 
ability  of  Mr.  Gatewood,  who  possesses  not  only 
great  knowledge,  but  a  readiness  and  lucidity  of 
explanation  that  I  have  rarely  heard  equalled, 
gives  me  hope,  if  his  services  are  continued,  that 
we  shall  reach  very  valuable  results  in  the  tactical 
management  of  ships  and  remedying  of  injuries. 

In  the  matter  of  Coast  Defence  and  Attack,  I 
will  only  say  that  it  is  intended  always  to  have  the 
subject  treated  by  both  an  army  and  naval  officer, 
in  order  to  bring  out  both  sides  of  a  large  and 
intricate  question.  Very  different  views  are  held 
on  either  side;  those  of  extremists  seem  at  times 
mutually  destructive.  If  precise  agreement  cannot 
be  reached,  much  may  be  hoped  from  dispas¬ 
sionate  discussion,  in  getting  rid  of  all  differences 
that  are  due  only  to  misapprehension.  And 
where  differences  are  fundamental,  we  shall 
learn  at  least  to  understand  one  another’s  meaning 
and  reasons,  to  argue  at  least  to  the  other  man’s 
point;  not  beating  the  air,  nor  laboriously  over- 


210  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


throwing  men  of  straw.  I  beg  of  you  all  not  to 
consider  a  difference  of  opinion,  however  radical, 
to  be  an  injury  or  an  insult.  The  caution  may 
seem  unnecessary,  but  I  swear  by  my  experience 
that  it  is  not. 

And  now,  gentlemen,  I  must  apologize,  after 
the  manner  of  speakers,  for  having  detained 
you  so  long.  If  the  fault  has  been  somewhat 
deliberate,  I  hope  the  pardon  will  not  be 
refused.  It  remains  only  to  thank  you  for 
your  patience,  and  to  welcome  cordially,  on  the 
part  of  the  College,  the  officers  who  are  about 
to  follow  the  course.  We  are  here  as  fellow- 
students.  The  art  of  naval  war  may  have  a  big 
future,  but  it  is  yet  in  its  babyhood.  I,  at  least, 
know  not  where  its  authorities  are  to  be  found. 
Let  us  take,  as  indicating  our  aim,  these  words 
of  Bismarck  in  a  very  recent  speech :  “  It  must 

not  be  said,”  urged  he,  “  that  other  nations  can 
do  what  we  can.  That  is  just  what  they  cannot 
do.  We  have  the  material,  not  only  for  forming 
an  enormous  army,  but  for  furnishing  it  with 
officers.  We  have  a  corps  of  officers  such  as  no 
other  Power  has.”  The  higher  we  head,  the 
higher  we  shall  fetch. 


Objects  oj  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  211 


Intended  Programme  of  Naval  IV ar  College  for 

Session  of  1888,  beginning  August  6 

Naval  History  considered  with  reference  to 
the  effect  of  Naval  power  upon  general  history; 
indicating  the  strategic  bearing  of  naval  power 
as  a  particular  factor  in  general  wars,  and  dis¬ 
cussing  the  strategic  and  tactical  use  of  the  naval 
forces  on  their  own  element,  as  illustrative  of 
the  principles  of  war.  —  Captain  A.  T.  Mahan, 

U.  S.  N. 

The  true  naval  conditions  during  the  War  of 
1812,  at  home  and  abroad,  on  the  sea  and  on 
the  lakes;  and  their  bearing  upon  the  course  of 
the  war,  on  both  frontiers  and  on  the  ocean.  — 
Theodore  Roosevelt,  Esq. 

Naval  Gunnery:  the  practical  use  of  the  gun 
at  sea,  and  the  tactical  power  and  limitations  of 
the  weapon.  —  Lieutenant  J.  F.  Meigs,  U.  S.  N. 

Present  condition  of  commerce  and  commercial 
sea  routes  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific, 
with  an  estimate  of  the  effect  produced  upon 
them  by  a  trans-isthmian  canal,  including  a  view 
of  the  military  and  political  conditions  of  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  the  Carib¬ 
bean  Sea.  —  Lieut. -Com.  C.  H.  Stockton,  U.  S.  N. 

Naval  Strategy.  —  Captain  A.  T.  Mahan, 
U.  S.  N. 


212  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


Strategic  features  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  and 
Pacific  Coast  of  the  United  States.  —  Lieut. -Com. 
C.  H.  Stockton,  U.  S.  N. 

Strategic  features  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and 
Caribbean  Sea.  —  Captain  A.  T.  Mahan,  U.  S.  N. 

Strategic  Study  of  the  Lake  Frontier  of  the 
United  States.  —  Lieut.  C.  C.  Rogers,  U.  S.  N. 

Strategic  Study  (outline)  of  the  Sea-coast  of 
the  United  States  from  Portland,  Maine,  to  and 
including  Chesapeake  Bay.  —  Captain  A.  T. 
Mahan,  U.  S.  N. 

Coast  Defence  and  Attack.  —  Lieut.  Duncan 
Kennedy,  U.  S.  N. 

Defence  of  the  Sea-coast  of  the  United  States.  — 
General  H.  L.  Abbot,  U.  S.  Engineers. 

Military  History,  Strategy,  and  Tactics.  — 
Lieut.  J.  P.  Wisser,  U.  S.  Artillery. 

Tactics  of  the  Gun.  —  Lieut.  J.  F.  Meigs, 
U.  S.  N. 

Tactics  of  the  Torpedo.  —  Lieut.  Duncan  Ken¬ 
nedy,  U.  S.  N. 

Tactics  of  the  Ram.  —  Commander  P.  F. 
Harrington,  U.  S.  N. 

Fleet  Battle  Tactics.  —  Captain  A.  T.  Mahan, 
U.  S.  N. 

Naval  War  Game.  —  Lieut.  McCarty  Little, 
U.  S.  N. 

Naval  Reserves,  and  the  recruiting  and  training 


Objects  oj  the  U.  S.  Naval  War  College  213 


of  men  for  the  Navy.  —  Lieut.  S.  A.  Staunton, 
U.  S.  N. 

Naval  Logistics;  maintenance  of  coal,  ammuni¬ 
tion  and  other  supplies  to  a  fleet  acting  at  a 
distance;  establishment  of  depots  and  chains  of 
seaports.  —  Lieut.  C.  C.  Rogers,  U  S.  N. 

General  Staff;  Intelligence  Branch.  Foreign 
War  Colleges  and  Staff  Academies;  their  relation 
to  the  General  Staff.  Intelligence  Systems  of 
Foreign  Armies.  General  Consideration  of  Naval 
Intelligence  Departments  at  home  and  abroad. 
Meaning  of  Naval  Intelligence  in  detail.  Strategic 
value  of  Trade  Routes;  their  defence  and  attack 
in  war.  Reconnaissances.  Reasons  for  General 
Staff.  Essence  of  Intelligence  work  is  prepara¬ 
tion  for  war.  —  Lieut.  C.  C.  Rogers,  U.  S.  N. 

Preservation  and  Care  of  Iron  Ships  and  injuries 
to  which  they  are  liable.  The  Ship  considered 
as  a  Gun  Platform.  —  Naval  Constructor  R. 
Gatewood,  U.  S.  N. 

Naval  Hygiene.  —  Medical  Director  R.  C. 
Dean,  U.  S.  N. 

International  Law,  treated  with  special  refer¬ 
ence  to  questions  with  which  naval  officers  may 
have  to  do.  —  Professor  J.  R.  Soley,  U.  S.  N. 


THE  PRACTICAL  CHARACTER  OF 
THE  UNITED  STATES  NAVAL 
WAR  COLLEGE 


THE  PRACTICAL  CHARACTER  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  NAVAL  WAR  COL¬ 
LEGE. 

AN  ADDRESS 

September,  1892 

GENTLEMEN  of  the  Navy:  —  It  had  been 
my  hope,  and  I  may  say  my  expectation, 
that  upon  this  occasion  when,  after  a  prolonged 
and  to  some  extent  disastrous  interruption  of  its 
career  of  usefulness,  the  War  College  is  about  to 
resume  its  course  under  new  auspices  and  with 
better  hopes,  the  opening  ceremonies  would  have 
been  signalized  by  a  formal  address  from  the 
Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Mr.  James 
Russell  Soley.  To  him,  under  the  Secretary 
himself,  is  mainly  due  that  a  start  this  year  has 
been  made  at  all.  He  has  been  in  past  years, 
and  from  the  very  origin  of  the  College,  closely 
connected  with  it;  both  generally,  by  sympathy 
with  its  ideas,  and,  especially,  as  a  most  able 
lecturer  upon  international  law.  It  is  probable  that 
some  of  those  now  among  my  hearers  may  have 


218  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


been  so  fortunate  as  to  hear,  at  former  sessions, 
his  admirable  exposition  of  the  principles  of  that 
law,  with  particular  reference  to  the  circum¬ 
stances  of  naval  officers,  and  the  perplexities 
which  they  may  encounter.  This  association  of 
the  past,  together  with  his  present  official  position, 
combined  to  indicate  him  pointedly  as  the  most 
proper  person  to  deliver  this  opening  address; 
for,  in  addition  to  the  strong  personal  reasons  I 
have  mentioned,  his  presence  would  have  been 
the  manifest  token  of  the  cordial  interest  now 
extended  by  the  Navy  Department,  the  want  of 
which  was  keenly  felt  in  the  first  strong  and,  I 
may  boldly  say,  not  unsuccessful  effort  here  to 
develop  the  art  of  naval  war.  The  premature 
blight  that  fell  upon  our  early  endeavors  did  not 
wholly  obliterate  the  recognition  of  the  decisive 
advance  made  during  our  brief  and  checkered 
existence.  Of  this  I  have  had  the  assurance,  both 
directly  by  word  and  indirectly  by  action,  from 
so  many  who  attended  the  former  courses,  that 
no  fond  self-deception  can  account  for  the  con¬ 
viction  I  now  express,  of  the  results  obtained  by 
those  of  whom  I  was  for  most  of  the  time  the 
nominal  head. 

To  my  urgent  and  repeated  requests  the  As¬ 
sistant  Secretary  gave  no  more  than  a  conditional 
promise;  and  I  owe  only  to  myself  that  I  so  far 


Character  of  the  Naval  War  College  219 


depended  upon  it  as  to  have  deferred  to  the  last 
three  days  such  hurried  preparations  as  I  have 
made,  personally,  to  meet  this  audience,  and,  so 
far  as  in  me  lies,  to  replace  the  loss  which  we 
have  to  regret.  To  the  embarrassment  of  scanty 
time,  for  which  I  have  to  blame  my  want  of  pre¬ 
vision,  is  added  in  my  case  the  fact  that  I  have 
already,  on  a  former  opening,  delivered  an  address 
in  which  I  explained  at  some  length  the  objects 
and  aims  of  the  College  from  my  own  point  of 
view;  which  I  may  add  was  that  of  my  then 
immediate  superior,  the  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of 
Navigation,  who  to-day  is  with  us  as  the  com¬ 
mander  of  the  Squadron  of  Evolution.  Had 
that  address  gone  no  further  than  the  ears  of  its 
auditors,  it  might  now,  after  the  lapse  of  four 
years,  have  been  resurrected  like  the  sermon 
from  the  proverbial  barrel  and  done  duty  again; 
but  having  incautiously  been  allowed  to  pass  into 
print,  and  somewhat  widely  distributed  within 
the  service,  this  resource  is  not  now  open  to  me. 

Like  all  new  departures,  however,  the  College 
has  to  encounter  not  merely  constructional  diffi¬ 
culties,  the  friction  which  inevitably  attends 
every  effort  to  do  something  which  has  not  been 
done  before,  and  which  formed  the  subject  of 
my  former  address.  It  has  to  encounter  the  more 
formidable,  because  more  discouraging,  obstacles 


220  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


of  direct  objection,  based  often  on  reasonable 
grounds;  more  often,  perhaps,  on  unconsidered 
prejudice.  Of  the  former,  the  reasonable  criticism, 
I  shall  now  only  say  that  I  trust  there  will  always 
he  found  in  the  College  representatives  an  open 
and  dispassionate  mind,  ready  to  receive,  consider, 
and  profit  by  suggestions;  from  whomsoever 
coming.  I  propose  to-day  to  devote  my  remarks 
only  to  those  objections  which,  while  superficially 
plausible,  are,  I  am  convinced,  due  to  lack  of 
reflection  and  to  the  tendency  we  all  have  to  be 
influenced  by  words  or  phrases,  without  pausing 
to  reflect  that,  in  their  true  and  commonly  re¬ 
ceived  meaning,  they  are  not  really  applicable 
to  the  thing  to  which,  for  the  moment,  they  are 
applied. 

Take,  for  instance,  the  word  “obsolete.”  I 
doubt  if  there  is  any  one  word  in  the  language 
that  did  so  much  harm  to  the  United  States 
Navy  as  this  little  one  in  its  misapplied,  yet 
common,  use,  during  a  period  of  years  with  which 
I  and  many  of  my  hearers  have  been  contemporary. 
The  ship  built  to-day,  it  has  been  freely  said,  will 
be  “obsolete”  ten  years  hence;  nay,  we  were 
fortunate  if  we  escaped  the  stronger  yet  equally 
positive  assertion  that  the  ship  laid  down  to-day 
will  be  “  obsolete  ”  by  the  time  she  can  be 
launched.  What  was  the  result  of  this  seemingly 


Character  0}  the  Naval  War  College  221 


slight  and  harmless  exaggeration  of  talk  ?  Why, 
simply  this:  That  with  all  the  valuable  services 
and  prestige  of  the  navy  during  the  War  of  Seces¬ 
sion,  with  the  popular  favor  still  green,  with 
Farragut  scarcely  yet  in  his  grave,  everything 
like  naval  advance  was  stopped  because  of  the 
threat  of  obsolescence.  “  Of  what  use,”  asked 
the  unprofessional  citizen,  safe  in  an  immense 
professional  backing  in  the  use  of  this  word 
and  its  ideas,  “  of  what  use  to  build  ships  which 
are  so  soon  to  be  obsolete  ?  Let  us  wait  until 
we  have  reached  something  that  will  not  become 
obsolete.”  So  we  waited,  with  our  hands  and 
energies  ironed  by  the  little  word  “  obsolete,” 
until,  less  than  ten  years  ago,  the  material  of  the 
American  navy  was  the  derision  of  the  world 
and  the  mortification  of  our  officers;  and  even 
now,  despite  the  judicious  and  untiring  efforts 
of  recent  secretaries,  we  have  not,  and  for  some 
years  to  come  will  not  have,  a  navy  commen¬ 
surate  with  our  national  importance,  or  fitted  to 
fulfil  our  fast  growing  sense  of  our  proper  sphere 
and  influence  in  the  world  outside  our  borders. 
Within  two  years  1  I  have  seen  the  American 
navy  styled  a  phantom  fleet  by  an  English  news¬ 
paper  of  the  first  rank. 

How  ready,  all  this  time,  the  country  really 

1  Written  in  1892. 


222  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


was  to  respond  to  an  intelligent  presentation  of 
the  necessities  of  a  navy,  has  been  shown  by  the 
liberal  appropriations,  and  yet  more  by  the  liberal 
expressions  of  men  of  all  parties  and  shades  of 
opinion;  despite  this  being  a  time  in  which, 
until  very  lately,  party  divisions  turned  more 
on  tradition  than  on  living  issues.  What  stopped 
advance  was  not  the  unwillingness  of  the  country, 
but  the  cry  of  “  obsolete.”  Yet  in  what  other 
practical  walk  of  life  is  advance  thus  conditioned  ? 
What  technical  calling  refuses  to  make  a  step  for¬ 
ward,  because  the  ground  it  reaches  to-day  will 
be  abandoned  to-morrow  ?  Who  would  say 
that  iron  rails  are  obsolete,  in  the  sense  that  they 
are  of  no  use  at  all,  because  steel  rails  are  found 
to  be  better  ?  And  finally,  before  quitting  the 
subject,  what  is  the  last,  and,  in  my  judgment, 
most  rational,  expression  of  foreign  professional 
opinion  concerning  these  so-called  “  obsolete  ” 
ships  ?  Simply,  yet  most  significantly,  this : 
That  the  nation  which,  in  the  later  stages  of  a 
war,  be  it  long  or  short,  when  the  newest  ships 
have  received  their  wear  and  undergone  their 
hammering,  the  nation  which  then  can  put  for¬ 
ward  the  largest  reserve  of  ships  of  the  older  types, 
will  win  the  struggle. 

So  much  for  “  obsolete.”  Before  passing,  how¬ 
ever,  to  the  word  upon  the  erroneous  application 


Character  of  the  Naval  War  College  223 


of  which  I  desire  chiefly  to  fix  your  attention,  I 
want  to-day  to  allude  to  an  idea  closely  akin  to 
“  obsolete,”  which,  though  widely  spread  and 
accepted,  has  not,  so  far  as  I  know,  been  formu¬ 
lated  into  a  phrase  with  which  to  pass  current. 
I  allude  to  the  view  that  naval  history,  in  which 
is  embodied  the  naval  experience  of  past  ages,  has 
no  present  utility  to  us.  When  I  was  first  ordered 
to  the  College,  before  even  I  had  begun  to  develop 
the  subjects  intrusted  to  me,  an  officer,  con¬ 
siderably  my  senior  in  rank,  asked  what  I  was  going 
to  undertake.  On  my  naming  naval  history,  he 
rejoined,  “  Well,  you  won’t  have  much  to  say 
about  that.”  The  words,  I  fear,  voiced  a  very 
general  feeling,  an  impression  of  that  vague  and 
untested  character  which  is  ever  to  be  deprecated 
when  it  is  allowed  to  become  a  potent  factor  in 
determining  action.  It  struck,  I  am  free  to  con¬ 
fess,  a  chord  in  my  own  breast.  Nay,  I  am  glad 
to  avow  that  it  did  so;  for  whatever  small  value 
my  own  opinion  may  possess  can  lose  nothing, 
but  rather  gain,  by  the  admission  that  study  and 
reflection  have  resulted  in  displacing  that  most 
powerful  of  resistant  forces,  an  unintelligent 
prejudice.  I  am,  however,  happy  to  be  able  to 
support  my  own  conclusions,  which  rest  upon 
no  proofs  of  personal  capacity  for  the  manage¬ 
ment  of  modern  naval  fleets,  by  that  of  one  of 


224  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


the  foremost  admirals  now  living,  belonging  to  the 
largest  navy  in  the  world.  The  name  and  repute 
of  Admiral  Sir  Geoffrey  Phipps-Hornby  is  known, 
I  presume,  to  all  naval  officers;  certainly  in  his 
own  service,  where  he  has  commanded  the  most 
modern  fleets  with  distinction,  his  opinions  are 
quoted  with  respect  not  far  removed  from  rever¬ 
ence.  In  a  letter  he  was  kind  enough  to  write 
me  on  a  published  work  of  mine,  which  embodied 
the  results  of  my  lectures  at  this  College,  he  said: 
“  I  am  glad  to  see  that,  like  the  German  army, 
you  base  your  conclusions  upon  the  history  of 
the  profession.” 

I  come  now  to  the  matter  upon  which  I  wish 
more  particularly  to  speak;  and  here  again  I 
will  illustrate  by  one  of  those  casual  conversa¬ 
tions,  which,  like  straws,  often  show  more  clearly 
than  deliberate  utterances  how  the  wind  of  pro¬ 
fessional  prejudice  is  blowing.  I  was  in  Washing¬ 
ton  a  few  months  ago  and,  coming  out  of  one  of 
the  clubs,  I  met  on  the  door  step  a  couple  of 
naval  officers.  We  stopped  to  talk,  and  one  asked 
me :  “  Do  you  expect  a  session  of  the  College 

this  year  ?  ”  I  replied  that  I  hoped  so.  “  Well,” 
he  said,  “  are  you  going  to  do  anything  practical  ?  ” 
I  recognized  my  enemy  at  once  in  the  noble 
word  “  practical,”  which  has  been  dropped 
like  an  angel  of  light  out  of  its  proper  sphere 


Character  0}  the  Naval  War  College  225 


and  significance,  and  made  to  do  duty  against 
its  best  friends;  as  a  man’s  foes  are  often  those  of 
his  own  household.  I  endeavored  to  get  out  of 
the  scrape,  which  would  involve  an  extempore 
discussion  of  the  true  scope  and  meaning  of  the 
word  practical,  by  resorting  to  the  Socratic  method, 
liberally  practised  by  the  modern  Irish,  which 
would  throw  the  burden  of  explanation  upon  my 
questioner.  “  What  do  you  mean  by  practical  ?  ” 
I  said.  The  reply  was  a  little  hesitating,  as  is 
apt  to  be  the  case  to  a  categorical  question,  and 
after  a  moment’s  pause  he  said :  “  Well,  torpedo- 
boats  and  launches  and  that  sort  of  thing.” 

Of  course,  I  knew  in  a  general  way  what  was 
coming,  when  I  asked  my  question;  nor  did  I 
in  the  least  contest  the  application  of  the  word 
practical  to  torpedo-boats  or  launches.  Con¬ 
cerning  the  latter,  in  fact,  it  was  a  recommendation 
of  my  first  report  as  president  of  the  College,  that 
such  should  be  provided  for  practice  in  the 
delicate  and  difficult  management  of  the  ram 
in  action  —  a  problem  with  which,  I  am  bold  to 
say,  the  naval  mind  has  not  begun  to  deal.  But, 
while  willing  to  concede  this  positive  meaning, 
given  to  the  word  practical,  I  do  most  decidedly 
object  to  the  implied  negative  limitation,  which 
confines  it  to  the  tangible  utilitarian  results,  to 
that  which  can  be  touched,  weighed,  measured, 


226  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


handled,  and  refuses  to  concede  the  honor  of 
“  practical  ”  to  those  antecedent  processes  of 
thought  and  reflection,  upon  which  the  results  of 
rational  human  effort  always  depend,  and  without 
which  they  cannot  be  reached  —  unless,  indeed, 
by  the  bungling,  tedious  and  painful  method 
which  is  called  “  butt  end  foremost.”  It  is  to 
this  view  of  the  matter,  and  to  the  full  legitimate 
force  of  the  word  “  practical,”  that  I  wish  to-day 
to  direct  your  attention;  for  the  limitation  so 
frequently  imposed  on  it,  and  so  generally  ac¬ 
cepted  by  thoughtless  prejudice,  is  the  great 
stumbling  block  in  the  way  of  the  College,  just 
as  I  have  tried  to  show  that  the  word  “  obsolete  ” 
so  long  held  the  United  States  Navy  in  a  state  of 
suspended  animation. 

In  discussing  the  word  “  practical,”  I  do  not 
of  course  propose  to  go  into  its  etymology,  for 
the  sake  of  making  a  barren  argument  as  to 
what  it  ought  to  mean.  I  intend  to  accept  it  in 
its  common  significance,  as  familiar  to  us  in  cur¬ 
rent  speech;  and  I  propose  to  maintain  that,  in 
that  sense,  it  is  just  as  applicable  to  the  processes 
of  thought  which  precede  action  as  it  is  to  the 
action  which  follows  thought  and  reflection;  the 
only  difference  being  that,  taking  the  whole 
process  of  thought  and  action  together,  the 
thought  which  dictates  the  action  is  more  practical, 


Character  of  the  Naval  War  College  227 


is  of  a  higher  order  of  practicalness  than  the 
resultant  action  itself.  Of  this  the  old  and  com¬ 
mon  proverb  “  Look  before  you  leap  ”  is  a  vig¬ 
orous  presentment.  The  word  “  practical,”  how¬ 
ever,  has  become  so  warped  —  not  in  its  meaning, 
but  in  its  application  —  that  the  practical  man  is 
he  who  disdains  the  theoretical  process  of  looking; 
that  is,  who  will  have  no  study,  no  forethought, 
no  reflection,  but  simply  leaps  —  that  is,  acts. 

Of  course,  when  you  reach  a  reductio  ad  absur- 
dum  —  if  you  do  —  the  victim  cries  out :  He  never 
meant  any  such  thing.  Neither  does  the  man 
who  leaps  without  looking  mean  to  reach  the 
possibly  uncomfortable  berth  in  which  he  lands. 
But  let  it  be  observed,  it  is  not  man’s  nature  to 
leap  without  looking;  the  irrational  brute  does 
not  do  that.  Men  leap  without  looking,  because 
they  have  failed  to  prepare,  because  they  have 
neglected  the  previous  processes  of  thought  and 
reflection,  and  so,  when  the  sudden  call  for  action 
comes,  it  is  “leap  at  all  hazards;”  and  so,  to 
quote  Holy  Writ,  while  they  are  saying  “  peace 
and  safety,  sudden  destruction  comes  upon  them 
like  travail  upon  a  woman  with  child,  and  they 
cannot  escape.”  How  often  have  we  —  I  speak 
at  least  to  men  of  my  own  time  —  been  told  that 
presence  of  mind  consists  largely,  for  the  average 
man  mainly,  in  preparation  of  mind.  When 


228  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


you  take  the  deck,  think  what  you  will  do  in 
any  emergency  likely  to  arise  —  a  man  falls  over¬ 
board,  a  collision  threatens  from  this  or  that 
quarter,  land  or  reef  may  be  unexpectedly  sighted. 
Good.  But  is  the  thought,  which  is  simply  study 
without  books,  less  practical  than  the  resultant 
action  ?  Is  it  less  practical,  even  if  no  call  for 
action  arises  ? 

Let  us,  for  illustration,  draw  upon  an  art  which 
has  supplied  many  useful  analogies  to  describe 
processes  of  gradual  development  —  that  of  the 
architect.  Before  erecting  a  building,  be  it  one 
of  simple  design  and  unpretentious  appearance, 
like  that  in  which  we  are  now  seated,  or  be  it  one 
of  the  complicated  and  elaborate  designs  which 
decorate  the  cliffs  of  Newport  —  what  careful 
study,  plotting  and  planning  goes  on  in  the  offices 
of  the  architect !  What  calculations  to  ensure 
convenience,  to  economize  space,  to  please  the 
eye.  It  is  pure  student’s  work,  beyond  which  lie, 
not  merely  the  experience  of  the  architect,  but 
also  years  of  patient  study,  devoted  to  mastering 
the  principles  of  his  art  as  embodied  in  the  ex¬ 
perience  of  his  predecessors.  Before  a  brick  is 
laid,  perhaps  before  the  sod  is  turned,  the  com¬ 
plete  design  —  the  future  house  —  exists  upon 
paper. 

Is  all  this  prior  labor  of  the  architect  in  his 


Character  oj  the  Naval  War  College  229 


office,  and  all  the  varied  study  that  has  enabled 
him  to  perform  it  not  “  practical  ?  ”  and  does  the 
“  practical  ”  work  begin  only  when  the  carpenter 
and  the  bricklayer  put  their  hands  to  it  ?  If 
you  think  so,  gather  your  mechanics  and  your 
hod  carriers,  provide  your  material  of  bricks 
and  mortar,  and  then,  setting  to  work  without 
your  designs  and  calculations,  rejoice  in  the 
evidence  of  practical  efficiency  you  have  dis¬ 
played  to  the  world  ! 

All  the  world  knows,  gentlemen,  that  we  are 
building  a  new  navy;  the  process  has  begun,  is 
going  on,  and  its  long  continuance  is  an  avowed 
purpose.  We  are  to  have  a  navy  adequate  to  the 
sense  of  our  needs;  and  that  sense  is  bound  to 
expand  as  our  people  appreciate  more  and  more, 
and  as  they  are  beginning  to  realize  more  and 
more,  that  a  country’s  power  and  influence  must 
depend  upon  her  hold  upon  regions  without  her 
own  borders,  and  to  which  the  sea  leads.  The 
influence  of  the  little  British  islands  gives  a  lesson 
our  people  will  surely  learn.  Well,  when  we  get 
our  navy,  what  are  we  going  to  do  with  it  ?  Shall 
we,  like  the  careless  officer-of-the-deck,  wait  for 
the  emergency  to  arise  ?  If  we  do,  we  shall  pretty 
surely  leap  without  much  looking.  Or  do  you 
think  that  when  the  time  of  war  comes  you  will 
find  a  vade  mecum,  a  handy  pocket  manual,  the 


230  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


result  of  other  men’s  labors,  which  will  tell  you 
just  what  to  do;  much  like  one  of  those  old  sea¬ 
manship  problems:  Riding  to  a  single  anchor 
and  ebb  tide,  with  the  wind  on  the  starboard 
bow  and  a  shoal  on  the  port  quarter,  get  under¬ 
way  and  stand  out  to  sea.  A  remark  to  that  effect 
was  made  by  an  officer,  a  commander  now  afloat, 
who  I  think  is  regarded  by  all  as  one  of  our  most 
intelligent,  as  he  certainly  is  one  of  our  most 
advanced  men.  “  I  thought,”  he  said,  in  dis¬ 
cussing  some  naval  problems  of  the  kind  with 
which  the  College  proposes  to  grapple,  “  that, 
the  case  arising,  I  could  turn  to  some  work  where 
the  dispositions  of  a  fleet,  of  a  convoy,  and  other 
various  questions  connected  with  maritime  expe¬ 
ditions  would  be  treated  and  their  solution  stated; 
but  I  find  there  is  none,  and  I  myself  do  not  know.” 
At  present  the  matter  is  perhaps  of  little  conse¬ 
quence;  but  will  it  not  be  unfortunate  for  the 
responsible  officers  to  be  in  like  plight,  when  the 
call  for  action  arises  ? 

It  is  a  singular  comment  upon  the  line  in  which 
naval  thought  has  long  been  running,  that  the 
reproach  to  the  French  navy,  though  it  was  then 
a  very  accomplished  service,  near  a  hundred  years 
ago,  by  one  of  its  most  thoughtful  members,  is 
equally  applicable,  perhaps  even  more  applicable 
to  the  naval  profession  of  all  countries  in  our 


Character  of  the  Naval  War  College  231 


own  day.  “  The  art  of  war,”  said  the  writer, 
“  is  carried  to  a  great  degree  of  perfection  on 
land,  but  it  is  far  from  being  so  at  sea.  It  is 
the  object  of  all  naval  tactics,  but  it  is  scarcely 
known  among  us  except  as  a  tradition.  Many 
authors  have  written  on  the  subject  of  naval 
tactics,  but  they  have  confined  themselves  to  the 
manner  of  forming  orders  or  passing  from  one 
order  to  another.  They  have  entirely  neglected 
to  establish  the  principles  for  regulating  conduct 
in  the  face  of  an  enemy,  for  attacking  or  refusing 
action,  for  pursuit  or  retreat,  according  to 
position  or  according  to  the  relative  strength  of 
the  opposing  forces.” 

This  is  painfully  the  case  now.  Not  only  during 
the  time  I  was  actually  resident  here,  but  in  the 
four  years  which  have  since  then  elapsed,  I  have 
made  a  practice  of  sending  for  the  catalogues  of 
the  leading  military  and  naval  booksellers,  at 
home  and  abroad,  and  carefully  scanning  their 
lists.  Whatever  could  be  found  bearing  in  any 
way  on  the  Art  of  Naval  War  I  have  had  ordered 
for  the  College  library;  with  the  result  that  a 
single  one  of  the  short  book  shelves  you  can  see 
downstairs  contains  all  that  we  have  to  show 
on  the  subject  of  naval  tactics;  and  of  that  space 
nearly  one-half  is  occupied  with  elaborate  treatises 
upon  the  tactics  of  sailing  ships,  from  Paul  Hoste 


232  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


to  Chopart.  Of  the  remainder,  none  can  be 
quoted  as  an  authority;  and  it  may  be  questioned 
if  any  rises  to  the  dignity  of  a  systematic,  well- 
digested  system.  They  are  simple,  short  essays, 
more  or  less  suggestive;  but  that  they  possess  no 
great  weight  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  the 
authors’  names  suggest  nothing  to  the  hearer. 

The  significance  of  this  fact,  however,  does  not 
lie  in  the  mere  absence  of  treatises.  Did  such 
exist,  had  we  the  vade  mecums,  the  pocket  manuals, 
with  their  rules  and  standards,  the  work  of  some 
one  or  two  masters  in  the  art,  their  usefulness  to 
the  profession  would  be  very  doubtful  if  they 
did  not  provoke  others  to  search  for  themselves  — 
to  devote  time  and  thought  to  mastering  the 
facts,  and  the  principles  upon  which  the  sup¬ 
posed  masters  had  based  their  own  conclusions. 
War  cannot  be  made  a  rule  of  thumb;  and  any 
attempt  to  make  it  so  will  result  in  disaster, 
grave  in  proportion  to  the  gravity  with  which 
the  issues  of  war  are  ever  clothed. 

No;  the  lamentable  fact  indicated  by  this 
meagre  result  is  that  the  professional  mind  is  not 
busying  itself  with  the  considerations  and  prin¬ 
ciples  bearing  upon  the  Conduct,  or  Art,  of  War. 
There  is  no  demand,  and  therefore  there  is  no 
supply.  There  is  little  or  no  interest,  and  con¬ 
sequently  there  are  no  results.  In  what  other 


Character  oj  the  Naval  War  College  233 


department  of  contemporary  life  is  a  lively  pro¬ 
fessional  interest  unaccompanied  by  publication  ? 
Does  a  total  neglect  of  the  great  medium  of  print, 
by  which  men  communicate  their  thoughts  to 
others,  indicate  an  active  gathering  and  dis¬ 
semination  of  results  ?  In  other  branches  of  our 
own  profession  —  in  gun  construction,  in  ship 
construction,  in  engine  building,  in  navigation  — 
there  are  treatises  in  plenty,  indicating  that  interest 
is  there,  that  there  is  life;  but  when  we  come  to 
the  waging  of  war  there  is  silence,  because  there 
we  meet  sleep,  if  not  death.  It  was  said  to  me 
by  some  one :  “  If  you  want  to  attract  officers  to 
the  College,  give  them  something  that  will  help 
them  pass  their  next  examination.”  But  the 
test  of  war,  when  it  comes,  will  be  found  a  more 
searching  trial  of  what  is  in  a  man  than  the  verdict 
of  several  amiable  gentlemen,  disposed  to  give 
the  benefit  of  every  doubt.  Then  you  will  en¬ 
counter  men  straining  every  faculty  and  every 
means  to  injure  you.  Shall  we  then,  who  prepare 
so  anxiously  for  an  examination,  view  as  a  “  practi¬ 
cal  ”  proceeding,  worthy  of  “  practical  ”  men,  the 
postponing  to  the  very  moment  of  imperative 
action  the  consideration  of  how  to  act,  how  to 
do  our  fighting,  either  in  the  broader  domain  of 
strategy,  or  in  the  more  limited  field  of  tactics, 
whether  of  the  single  ship  or  of  the  fleet  ?  Navies 


234  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


exist  for  war;  and  the  question  presses  for  an 
answer:  “  Is  this  neglect  to  master  the  experience 
of  the  past,  to  elicit,  formulate  and  absorb  its 
principles,  is  it  practical?  ”  Is  it  “  practical  ” 
to  wait  till  the  squall  strikes  you  before  shortening 
sail  ?  If  the  object  and  aim  of  the  College  is  to 
promote  such  study,  to  facilitate  such  results,  to 
foster  and  disseminate  such  ideas,  can  it  be 
reproached  that  its  purpose  is  not  “  practical,” 
even  though  at  first  its  methods  be  tentative  and 
its  results  imperfect  ? 

The  word  “  practical  ”  has  suffered  and  been 
debased  by  a  misapprehension  of  that  other  word 
“  theoretical,”  to  which  it  is  accurately  and 
logically  opposed.  Theory  is  properly  defined 
as  a  scheme  of  things  which  terminates  in  specu¬ 
lation,  or  contemplation,  without  a  view  to  practice. 
The  idea  was  amusingly  expressed  in  the  toast, 
said  to  have  been  drunk  at  a  meeting  of  mathe¬ 
maticians,  “  Eternal  perdition  to  the  man  who 
would  degrade  pure  mathematics  by  applying  it 
to  any  useful  purpose.”  The  word  “  theoretical,” 
therefore,  is  applied  rightly  and  legitimately  only 
to  mental  processes  that  end  in  themselves,  that 
have  no  result  in  action;  but  by  a  natural,  yet 
most  unfortunate,  confusion  of  thought,  it  has 
come  to  be  applied  to  all  mental  processes  what¬ 
soever,  whether  fruitful  or  not,  and  has  trans- 


Character  of  the  Naval  War  College  235 


ferred  its  stigma  to  them,  while  “  practical  ”  has 
walked  off  with  all  the  honors  of  a  utilitarian  age. 

If  therefore  the  line  of  thought,  study  and 
reflection,  which  the  War  College  seeks  to  pro¬ 
mote,  is  really  liable  to  the  reproach  that  it  leads 
to  no  useful  end,  can  result  in  no  effective  action, 
it  falls  justly  under  the  condemnation  of  being  not 
“  practical.”  But  it  must  be  said  frankly  and 
fearlessly  that  the  man  who  is  prepared  to  apply 
this  stigma  to  the  line  of  the  College  effort  must 
also  be  prepared  to  class  as  not  “  practical  ”  men 
like  Napoleon,  like  his  distinguished  opponent, 
the  Austrian  Archduke  Charles,  and  like  Jomini, 
the  profuse  writer  on  military  art  and  military 
history,  whose  works,  if  somewhat  supplanted  by 
newer  digests,  have  lost  little  or  none  of  their 
prestige  as  a  profound  study  and  exposition  of 
the  principles  of  warfare. 

Jomini  was  not  merely  a  military  theorist,  who 
saw  war  from  the  outside;  he  was  a  distinguished 
and  thoughtful  soldier,  in  the  prime  of  life  during 
the  Napoleonic  wars,  and  of  a  contemporary 
reputation  such  that,  when  he  deserted  the  cause 
of  the  emperor,  he  was  taken  at  once  into  a  high 
position  as  a  confidential  adviser  of  the  allied 
sovereigns.  Yet  what  does  he  say  of  strategy  ? 
Strategy  is  to  him  the  queen  of  military  sciences; 
it  underlies  the  fortunes  of  every  campaign.  As 


236  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


in  a  building,  which,  however  fair  and  beautiful 
the  superstructure,  is  radically  marred  and  im¬ 
perfect  if  the  foundation  be  insecure  —  so,  if  the 
strategy  be  wrong,  the  skill  of  the  general  on  the 
battlefield,  the  valor  of  the  soldier,  the  brilliancy 
of  victory,  however  otherwise  decisive,  fail  of  their 
effect.  Yet  how  does  he  define  strategy,  the  effects 
of  which,  if  thus  far-reaching,  must  surely  be  es¬ 
teemed  “  practical  ?  ”  “  Strategy,”  he  said,“  is  the 
art  of  making  war  upon  the  map.  It  precedes  the 
operations  of  the  campaign,  the  clash  of  arms  on 
the  field.  It  is  done  in  the  cabinet,  it  is  the  work 
of  the  student,  with  his  dividers  in  his  hand 
and  his  information  lying  beside  him.”  In  other 
words,  it  originates  in  a  mental  process,  but  it 
does  not  end  there;  therefore  it  is  practical. 

Most  of  us  have  heard  an  anecdote  of  the  great 
Napoleon,  which  is  nevertheless  so  apt  to  my 
purpose  that  I  must  risk  the  repetition.  Having 
had  no  time  to  verify  my  reference,  I  must  quote 
from  memory,  but  of  substantial  accuracy  I  am 
sure.  A  few  weeks  before  one  of  his  early  and  most 
decisive  campaigns,  his  secretary,  Bourrienne, 
entered  the  office  and  found  the  First  Consul, 
as  he  then  was,  stretched  on  the  floor  with  a 
large  map  before  him.  Pricked  over  the  map, 
in  what  to  Bourrienne  was  confusion,  were  a 
number  of  red  and  black  pins.  After  a  short 


Character  of  the  Naval  War  College  237 


silence  the  secretary,  who  was  an  old  friend  of 
school  days,  asked  him  what  it  all  meant.  The 
Consul  laughed  goodnaturedly,  called  him  a  fool, 
and  said  :  “  This  set  of  pins  represents  the  Austri¬ 
ans  and  this  the  French.  On  such  a  day  I  shall 
leave  Paris.  My  troops  will  then  be  in  such  posi¬ 
tions.  On  a  certain  day,”  naming  it,  “I  shall  be 
here,”  pointing,  “  and  my  troops  will  have  moved 
there.  At  such  a  time  I  shall  cross  the  mountains, 
a  few  days  later  my  army  will  be  here,  the  Aus¬ 
trians  will  have  done  thus  and  so;  and  at  a  certain 
date  I  will  beat  them  here,”  placing  a  pin.  Bour- 
rienne  said  nothing,  perhaps  he  may  have  thought 
the  matter  not  “  practical;  ”  but  a  few  weeks  later, 
after  the  battle  (Marengo,  I  think)  had  been 
fought,  he  was  seated  with  the  general  in  his 
military  travelling  carriage.  The  programme 
had  been  carried  out,  and  he  recalled  the  incident 
to  Bonaparte’s  mind.  The  latter  himself  smiled 
at  the  singular  accuracy  of  his  predictions  in  the 
particular  instance. 

In  the  light  of  such  an  incident,  the  question 
I  would  like  to  pose  will  receive  of  course  but  one 
answer.  Was  the  work  on  which  the  general  was 
engaged  in  his  private  office,  this  work  of  a  student, 
was  it  “  practical  ?  ”  Or  can  it  by  any  reasonable 
method  be  so  divorced  from  what  followed,  that 
the  word  “  practical  ”  only  applies  farther  on. 


238  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


Did  he  only  begin  to  be  practical  when  he  got 
into  his  carriage  to  drive  from  the  Tuileries,  or 
did  the  practical  begin  when  he  joined  the  army, 
or  when  the  first  gun  of  the  campaign  was  fired  ? 
Or,  on  the  other  hand,  if  he  had  passed  that 
time,  given  to  studying  the  campaign,  in  arranging 
for  a  new  development  of  the  material  of  war, 
and  so  had  gone  with  his  plans  undeveloped, 
would  he  not  have  done  a  thing  very  far  from 
“  practical  ?  ” 

But  we  must  push  our  inquiry  a  little  farther 
back  to  get  the  full  significance  of  Bourrienne’s 
story.  Whence  came  the  facility  and  precision 
with  which  Bonaparte  planned  the  great  cam¬ 
paign  of  Marengo  ?  Partly,  unquestionably,  from 
a  native  genius  rarely  parallelled ;  partly,  but  not 
by  any  means  wholly.  Hear  his  own  prescription: 
“  If  any  man  will  be  a  great  general,  let  him  study.” 
Study  what  ?  “  Study  history.  Study  the  cam¬ 

paigns  of  the  great  generals  —  Alexander,  Hanni¬ 
bal,  Caesar  ”  (who  never  smelt  gun-powder,  nor 
dreamed  of  ironclads)  “  as  well  as  those  of  Tu- 
renne,  Frederick,  and  myself,  Napoleon.”  Had 
Bonaparte  entered  his  cabinet  to  plan  the  cam¬ 
paign  of  Marengo,  with  no  other  preparation  than 
his  genius,  without  the  mental  equipment  and 
the  ripened  experience  that  came  from  knowledge 
of  the  past,  acquired  by  study,  he  would  have 


Character  oj  the  Naval  War  College  239 


come  unprepared.  Were,  then,  his  previous 
study  and  reflection,  for  which  the  time  of  action 
had  not  come,  were  they  not  “  practical,”  because 
they  did  not  result  in  immediate  action  ?  Would 
they  even  have  been  “  not  practical  ”  if  the  time 
for  action  had  never  come  to  him  ? 

As  the  wise  man  said,  “  There  is  a  time  for 
everything  under  the  sun,”  and  the  time  for  one 
thing  cannot  be  used  as  the  time  for  another. 
That  there  is  time  for  action,  all  concede;  few 
consider  duly  that  there  is  also  a  time  for  prep¬ 
aration.  To  use  the  time  of  preparation  for 
preparation  is  practical,  whatever  the  method; 
to  postpone  preparation  to  the  time  for  action  is 
not  practical.  Our  new  navy  is  preparing  now; 
it  can  scarcely  be  said,  as  regards  its  material, 
to  be  yet  ready.  The  day  of  grace  is  still  with 
us  —  or  with  those  who  shall  be  the  future  cap¬ 
tains  and  admirals.  There  is  time  yet  for  study; 
there  is  time  to  imbibe  the  experience  of  the  past, 
to  become  imbued,  steeped,  in  the  eternal  prin¬ 
ciples  of  war,  by  the  study  of  its  history  and 
of  the  maxims  of  its  masters.  But  the  time  of 
preparation  will  pass;  some  day  the  time  of 
action  will  come.  Can  an  admiral  then  sit  down 
and  re-enforce  his  intellectual  grasp  of  the  prob¬ 
lem  before  him  by  a  study  of  history,  which  is 
simply  a  study  of  past  experience?  Not  so;  the 


240  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


time  of  action  is  upon  him,  and  he  must  trust  to 
his  horse  sense.  The  mere  administration  and 
correspondence  of  a  fleet  leaves  all  too  little  time. 
Even  with  captains,  the  administration  of  a 
single  ship  of  the  modern  type  makes  demands 
that  leave  little  room  for  the  preparation  of  study. 
Farragut  bewailed  this  burden;  and  Napoleon 
himself  in  his  later  days  admitted  that  he  never 
did  better  work  than  in  his  first  campaign,  to 
which  he  brought  preparation  indeed,  but  the 
preparation  rather  of  the  student  than  that 
which  is  commonly  called  “  practical.”  The 
explanation  he  gave  was  this :  That  in  the  first, 
though  inexperienced,  he  had  more  time  for 
thought,  more  time  maturely  to  consider  and 
apply  the  knowledge  he  possessed,  and  which 
he  then  owed,  not  to  what  is  called  “  practical 
work,”  but  to  the  habits  of  study.  Ten  years 
later  he  had  had  much  more  practice,  but  he  did 
not  excel  the  early  work,  for  which  his  chief 
preparation  lay  in  a  course  of  action  that  is  now 
commonly  damned  as  “  theoretical.”  At  the  later 
day  the  burden  of  administration  lay  too  heavy, 
but  he  had  so  used  his  time  of  preparation  that, 
though  he  did  not  improve,  he  was  able  to  bear 
it. 

Bonapartes,  doubtless,  are  rare;  for  which 
very  reason,  perhaps,  that  which  he  found  neces- 


Character  of  the  Naval  War  College  24l 


sary  cannot  be  inexpedient  for  lesser  men.  Even 
below  the  rank  of  great  genius  few  can  expect  to 
attain  the  highest  degree  of  excellence;  but  we 
all  look  forward  to  command,  in  one  way  or 
another,  and  command  in  our  profession  means 
liability  to  be  called  on  for  action,  of  a  rare  and 
exceptional  type,  for  which  preparation  by  previous 
action  may  not  have  been  afforded;  probably 
will  not.  To  each  and  all  of  us  that  test  may 
come,  and  according  to  our  previous  preparation 
it  may  be  opportunity,  or  it  may  prove  to  be 
ruin.  Let  us  not  deceive  ourselves  by  the  un¬ 
questionable  excellence  which  our  service  has 
attained  in  the  common  and  peaceful  line  of  its 
daily  duties.  That  it  has  so  done  has  been  due 
to  two  causes:  first,  the  admirable  preparatory 
study  of  the  Naval  Academy;  second,  the  oppor¬ 
tunity  for  putting  in  practice  what  is  there  learned. 
But  neither  in  study  previous,  nor  in  practice, 
is  due  provision  being  made  for  the  stern  test  of 
war;  nor  do  the  occupations  of  peace  provide 
other  than  a  part,  and  that  the  smaller  part,  of 
the  equipment  there  needed.  The  College  has 
been  founded  with  a  view  to  supply  the  prepara¬ 
tion;  by  antecedent  study,  and  by  formulation  of 
the  principles  and  methods  by  which  war  may  be 
carried  on  to  the  best  advantage.  That  this 
purpose  is  “  practical,”  seems  scarcely  open  to 


242  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


question.  That  success  may  be  attained  only  after 
many  mistakes  and  long  effort,  is  merely  to  say 
that  it  shares  the  lot  of  all  human  undertak¬ 
ings. 


SUBORDINATION  IN  HISTORICAL 
TREATMENT 


# 


SUBORDINATION  IN  HISTORICAL 
TREATMENT1 


October ,  1902 


MEMBERS  of  the  American  Historical  As¬ 
sociation,  ladies  and  gentlemen: 

The  distinguished  office  with  which  you  have 
honored  me,  of  being  your  president  for  a  civil 
year,  involves  the  duty  of  making  an  address 
upon  the  occasion  of  our  annual  meeting.  As 
time  passes,  and  call  succeeds  call  in  an  in¬ 
creasing  series,  the  difficulty  of  contributing  any¬ 
thing  new  to  the  thought  of  our  fellow-workers 
becomes  ever  more  apparent.  One  can  only 
hope  that  by  searching  into  his  personal  experi¬ 
ence,  by  a  process  of  self-examination,  seeking  to 
know  and  to  formulate  that  which  has  perhaps 
been  undergone  rather  than  achieved,  passively 
received  rather  than  actively  accomplished,  there 
may  emerge  from  consciousness  something  which 
has  become  one’s  own;  that  there  may  be  recog- 

1  President’s  address  before  the  American  Historical  Asso¬ 
ciation,  December  26,  1902, 


246  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


nized,  as  never  before,  precisely  what  has  been 
the  guidance,  the  leading  tendency,  which  has 
characterized  intentions  framed,  and  shaped  con¬ 
clusions  reached. 

One  of  the  most  distinguished  of  our  recent 
predecessors  in  the  walks  of  history,  the  late 
Bishop  of  London,  Mandell  Creighton,  has  said 
with  much  force: 


There  is  only  one  thing  we  can  give  to  another,  and  that 
is  the  principles  which  animate  our  own  life.  Is  not  that  the 
case  in  private  life  ?  Is  not  that  the  case  in  your  relationship 
with  those  with  whom  you  come  in  contact  ?  Do  you  not 
feel  increasingly  that  the  one  thing  you  can  give  your  brother 
is  a  knowledge  of  the  principles  upon  which  your  own  life 
rests  ?  It  is  assuredly  the  most  precious  possession  that  you 
have.  It  is  assuredly  the  one  that  is  the  most  easily  com¬ 
municated. 


Although  by  him  urged  with  immediate  refer¬ 
ence  to  considerations  of  moral  or  religious  effect, 
these  sentences  have  in  my  apprehension  their 
application  to  influence  of  every  kind.  That 
which  you  are  in  yourself,  that  you  will  be  to 
others.  Out  of  the  abundance  of  the  heart  the 
mouth  in  the  long  run  speaketh;  and  if  you  have 
received  the  gift  of  utterance,  more  or  less,  you 
will  utter  most  profitably  that  which  is  your  own 


Subordination  in  Historical  Treatment  247 


by  birthright,  or  which  has  been  made  your 
own  by  effort  and  reflection. 

To  communicate  to  others  that  which  one’s 
self  has  acquired,  be  it  much  or  little,  be  it  money 
or  any  other  form  of  human  possession,  is  not  only 
a  power  but  a  duty ,  now  so  commonly  recognized, 
so  much  a  note  of  to-day’s  philosophy  of  life  — • 
if  somewhat  less  of  to-day’s  practice  —  as  to  need 
no  insistence  here.  If  it  be  in  any  measure  a 
reproach  to  a  man  to  die  rich,  as  has  been  some¬ 
what  emphatically  affirmed,  it  is  still  more  a 
reproach  to  depart  with  accumulations  of  knowl¬ 
edge  or  experience  willingly  locked  up  in  one’s 
own  breast.  For  the  wealth  of  money  remains, 
to  receive  such  utilization  as  others  may  give  it; 
the  man  can  not  carry  it  away  with  him;  but  his 
thoughts  and  his  treasures  of  knowledge  perish 
with  him,  if  he  has  not  had  the  unselfish  pains 
to  communicate  them  to  others  before  he  dies. 
Thus  only  do  they  become  part  of  the  common 
stock  of  mankind;  like  the  labors,  for  example, 
of  the  great  captains  of  industry,  whose  works, 
even  when  conceived  and  executed  in  the  spirit 
of  selfishness,  remain  for  the  benefit  of  posterity. 

Under  the  pressure  of  the  emergency  to  make 
an  address,  which  my  momentary  office  requires, 
such  a  line  of  thought  is  peculiarly  forced  upon 
me;  for  it  must  be  obvious,  to  all  who  in  a  general 


248  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


way  know  my  past  profession,  that  the  study  of 
history  has  been  to  me  incidental  and  late  in  life, 
which  is  much  the  same  as  to  say  that  it  has 
been  necessarily  superficial  and  limited.  It  is 
not  possible,  under  my  conditions,  to  claim 
breadth  and  depth  of  historical  research.  I  can 
not  be  expected  to  illustrate  in  my  own  person 
the  protracted  energy,  the  extensive  delving  into 
materials  hitherto  inaccessible,  the  vast  accumula¬ 
tion  of  facts,  which  have  been  so  forcibly  de¬ 
scribed  by  the  late  Lord  Acton,  in  his  inaugural 
lecture  on  the  Study  of  History,  as  the  necessary 
equipment  of  the  ideal  historian  to-day.  Had  I 
attempted  this,  beginning  when  I  did,  I  must 
have  died  before  I  lifted  pen  to  put  to  paper; 
and  in  necessary  consequence  it  follows  that 
upon  this,  as  upon  topics  closely  related  to  it, 
I  am  as  unfit  to  address  you  as  Lord  Acton  was 
most  eminently  qualified  by  his  immense  stores 
of  acquirement,  the  most  part  of  which  he  un¬ 
fortunately  took  away  with  him. 

I  am  therefore  forced  to  introspection,  if  I  am 
to  say  anything  the  least  worthy  of  the  recog¬ 
nition  which  you  have  too  generously  accorded 
me  by  your  election.  I  have  to  do  for  myself 
that  which  but  for  this  call  I  probably  never 
should  have  attempted;  namely,  to  analyze  and 
formulate  to  my  own  consciousness  the  various 


Subordination  in  Historical  Treatment  249 


impressions  —  the  “  unconscious  cerebration,”  to 
use  a  current  phrase  sufficiently  vague  for  my 
purpose  —  which  have  formed  my  mental  experi¬ 
ence  as  a  writer  of  history,  and  have  probably 
been  reflected  in  my  treatment  of  materials.  Do 
not,  however,  fear  that  I  propose  to  inflict  upon 
you  a  mental  autobiography.  What  I  have  so 
far  said  has  been  explanatory  of  shortcomings, 
and  apologetic, —  at  least  in  intention;  I  trust, 
also,  in  impression.  Being  now  finally  delivered 
of  it,  I  hope  to  get  outside  and  clear  of  myself 
from  this  time  forth,  and  to  clothe  such  thought 
as  I  may  give  you  in  the  impersonal  terms  which 
befit  an  attempted  contribution  to  a  perennial 
discussion,  concerning  the  spirit  which  should 
inform  the  methods  of  historical  writing. 

There  are  certain  fundamental  factors  upon 
which  I  shall  not  insist,  because  they  need  only 
to  be  named  for  acceptance.  They  are  sum¬ 
marized  in  thoroughness  and  accuracy  of  knowl¬ 
edge;  intimate  acquaintance  with  facts  in  their 
multitudinous  ramifications;  mastery  of  the 
various  sources  of  evidence,  of  the  statements, 
usually  conflicting,  and  often  irreconcilable,  of 
the  numerous  witnesses  who  have  left  their 
testimony.  The  critical  faculty,  so  justly  prized, 
is  simply  an  incident  to  this  ascertainment  of 
facts.  It  plays  the  part  of  judge  and  jury  in  a 


250  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


trial;  not  establishing  the  facts,  but  pronouncing 
upon  the  evidence.  It  needs  not  therefore  to  be 
separately  classified,  as  something  apart,  but  is 
truly  embraced  under  the  general  expression  of 
“  knowledge,”  exact  and  comprehensive.  In 
like  manner  the  diligence  and  patience  required 
for  exhaustive  examination  of  witnesses,  though 
proper  to  name,  form  no  separate  class.  They 
are,  let  us  say,  the  lawyers,  the  advocates,  whose 
business  is  to  bring  fully  out  the  testimony  by 
which  the  verdict  shall  be  decided;  but,  like 
the  critical  equipment,  they  simply  subserve  the 
one  bottom  purpose  of  clear  and  demonstrated 
knowledge. 

Knowledge  thus  established  is,  I  apprehend, 
the  material  with  which  the  historian  has  to  deal; 
out  of  which  he  has  to  build  up  the  artistic  creation, 
the  temple  of  truth,  which  a  worthy  history  should 
aim  to  be.  Like  the  material  of  the  architect  it 
will  be  found  often  refractory;  not  because  truth 
is  frequently  unpleasant  to  be  heard,  especially 
by  prepossessed  ears,  but  because  the  multiplicity 
of  details,  often  contradictory,  not  merely  in 
appearance  but  in  reality,  do  not  readily  lend 
themselves  to  unity  of  treatment.  It  becomes 
thus  exceedingly  difficult  to  present  numerous 
related  truths  in  such  manner  as  to  convey  an 
impression  which  shall  be  the  truth.  Not  only 


Subordination  in  Historical  Treatment  251 


may  the  formless  mass  of  ill-arranged  particulars 
affect  the  mind  with  the  sense  of  confusion,  like 
that  produced  by  a  room  crowded  with  inhar¬ 
monious  furniture;  not  only  may  it  be  difficult 
to  see  the  wood  for  the  trees;  but  there  may  be 
such  failure  in  grouping  that  the  uninstructed 
reader  may  receive  quite  erroneous  impressions 
as  to  the  relative  importance  of  the  several  inci¬ 
dents.  As  I  have  had  occasion  to  say,  in  reviewing 
a  military  history,  fidelity  of  presentation  does 
not  consist  merely  in  giving  every  fact  and  omitting 
none.  For  the  casual  reader  emphasis  is  essential 
to  due  comprehension:  and  in  artistic  work 
emphasis  consists  less  in  exaggeration  of  color 
than  in  the  disposition  of  details,  in  regard  to 
foreground  and  background,  and  the  grouping  of 
accessories  in  due  subordination  to  a  central  idea. 

Of  the  difficulty  here  existing  history  bears 
sufficient  proof.  Not  merely  the  discovery  of 
new  evidence,  but  different  modes  of  presenting 
the  same  facts,  give  contradictory  impressions  of 
the  same  series  of  events.  One  or  the  other  is  not 
true;  neither  perhaps  is  even  closely  true.  With¬ 
out  impeaching  the  integrity  of  the  historian,  we 
are  then  forced  to  impeach  his  presentment,  and 
to  recognize  by  direct  logical  inference  that  the 
function  of  history  is  not  merely  to  accumulate 
facts,  at  once  in  entirety  and  in  accuracy,  but  to 


252  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


present  them  in  such  wise  that  the  wayfaring  man, 
whom  we  now  call  “  the  man  in  the  street,”  shall 
not  err  therein.  Failing  here,  by  less  or  more, 
the  historian,  however  exhaustive  his  knowledge, 
by  so  far  shares  the  fault  of  him  who  dies  with 
his  treasures  of  knowledge  locked  in  his  own  brain. 
He  has  not  perfectly  communicated  his  gifts  and 
acquirements  to  his  brethren. 

This  communication  is  not  a  mere  matter  of 
simple  narrative,  nor  even  of  narrative  vivid  and 
eloquent.  All  of  us  know  histories  which  by  the 
amplitude  of  their  details  and  the  chronological 
sequence  of  occurrences  produce  in  the  end  much 
the  same  vague  generality  of  impression  that  is 
received  from  watching  a  street  movement  from 
a  window.  Here  and  there  an  incident  out  of 
the  common,  yet  often  of  the  most  trivial  in  itself, 
catches  the  attention,  perhaps  sticks  in  the 
memory;  but  of  the  entirety  nothing  remains 
but  a  succession  of  images  substantially  identical, 
to  which  there  is  neither  beginning  nor  end. 
Such  may  be  a  valid  enough  conception  of  the 
life  of  a  city  street,  or  of  the  general  external 
aspect  of  an  historic  generation.  Such  to  me  is 
the  interest  of  Froissart.  Having  the  gift  of 
pictorial  utterance,  he  passes  before  you  a  succes¬ 
sion  of  vivid  scenes,  concerning  any  one  of  which 
it  is  quite  immaterial  whether  it  be  directly  true 


Subordination  in  Historical  Treatment  253 


to  history.  It  is  true  to  nature.  You  have  realized 
on  the  outside  one  dominant  aspect  of  the  life 
of  that  bustling,  seemingly  inconsequent  genera¬ 
tion,  through  true  portrayal  and  frequent  itera¬ 
tion;  but  there  is  neither  beginning,  middle,  nor 
end,  only  surface  ebullition.  Take  the  incidents 
of  the  same  period  selected  and  grouped  by 
Stubbs  in  his  Constitutional  History,  and  you  see 
order  emerging  from  chaos,  the  continuous  thread 
of  life  which  was  before  Froissart,  which  underran 
his  time  —  though  it  does  not  appear  in  his 
narrative  —  and  which  flows  on  to  our  own  day. 

In  this  interrelation  of  incidents,  successive  or 
simultaneous,  history  has  a  continuity  in  which 
consists  its  utility  as  a  teaching  power,  resting 
upon  experience.  To  detect  these  relations  in 
their  consecutiveness,  and  so  to  digest  the  mass 
of  materials  as  to  evolve  in  one’s  own  mind  the 
grouping,  the  presentation,  which  shall  stamp 
the  meaning  of  a  period  upon  the  minds  of  readers, 
with  all  the  simple  dignity  of  truth  and  harmony, 
answers  to  the  antecedent  conception  by  the 
architect  of  the  building,  into  which  he  will  put 
his  stones  and  mortar.  Facts,  however  exhaustive 
and  laboriously  acquired,  are  but  the  bricks  and 
mortar  of  the  historian;  fundamental,  indis¬ 
pensable,  and  most  highly  respectable,  but  in 
their  raw  state  they  are  the  unutilized  possession 


254  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


of  the  one,  or  at  most  of  the  few.  It  is  not  till 
they  have  undergone  the  mental  processes  of  the 
artist,  by  the  due  selection  and  grouping  of  the 
materials  at  his  disposal,  that  there  is  evolved  a 
picture  comprehensible  by  the  mass  of  men. 
Then  only  are  they  in  any  adequate  sense  com¬ 
municated,  made  part  of  the  general  stock.  Work 
thus  done  may  be  justly  called  a  creation;  for 
while  the  several  facts  are  irreversibly  independent 
of  the  master’s  fabrication  or  manipulation,  the 
whole  truth,  to  which  they  unitedly  correspond, 
is  an  arduous  conception.  To  attain  to  it,  and 
to  realize  it  in  words,  requires  an  effort  of  analysis, 
of  insight,  and  of  imagination.  There  is  required 
also  a  gift  of  expression,  as  often  baffled  as  is  the 
attempt  of  the  painter  to  convey  to  others  his 
conception  of  an  historic  scene,  which,  indeed,  he 
may  find  difficulty  in  clearly  realizing  to  his  own 
mental  vision.  This  process,  however,  does  not 
create  history;  it  realizes  it,  brings  out  what  is 
in  it. 

Of  such  artistic  presentation  it  is  of  course  a 
commonplace  to  say  that  essential  unity  is  the 
primary  requirement.  It  must  be  remembered, 
however,  that  such  unity  is  not  that  of  the  simple, 
solitary,  unrelated  unit.  It  is  organic.  Like  the 
human  body,  it  finds  its  oneness  in  the  due  rela¬ 
tion  and  proportion  of  many  members.  Unity 


Subordination  in  Historical  Treatment  255 


is  not  the  exclusion  of  all  save  one.  The  very 
composition  of  the  word  —  unity  —  implies  multi¬ 
plicity;  but  a  multiplicity  in  which  all  the  many 
that  enter  into  it  are  subordinated  to  the  one 
dominant  thought  or  purpose  of  the  designer, 
whose  skill  it  is  to  make  each  and  all  enhance  the 
dignity  and  harmony  of  the  central  idea.  So 
in  history,  unity  of  treatment  consists  not  in 
exclusion  of  interest  in  all  save  one  feature 
of  an  epoch,  however  greatly  predominant,  but 
in  the  due  presentation  of  all;  satisfied  that, 
the  more  exactly  the  relations  and  proportions 
of  each  are  observed,  the  more  emphatic  and 
lasting  will  be  the  impression  produced  by  the 
one  which  is  supreme.  For  instance,  as  it  is  now 
trite  to  observe,  amid  all  the  abundance  of  action 
in  the  Iliad,  the  singleness,  the  unity,  of  the 
poet’s  conception  and  purpose  causes  the  mighty 
deeds  of  the  several  heroes,  Greek  or  Trojan, 
to  converge  ever  upon  and  to  exalt  the  supreme 
glory  of  Achilles.  It  would  have  been  quite 
possible,  to  most  men  only  too  easy,  to  narrate 
the  same  incidents  and  to  leave  upon  the  mind 
nothing  more  than  a  vague  general  impression  of 
a  peculiar  state  of  society,  in  which  certain  rather 
interesting  events  and  remarkable  characters  had 
passed  under  observation  —  Froissart,  in  short. 

I  speak  rather  from  the  result  of  my  reflections 


256  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


than  from  any  conscious  attempt  on  my  own 
part  to  realize  my  theories  in  an  historic 
work;  but  I  conceive  that  it  would  minister 
essentially  to  the  intrinsic  completeness  of  the 
historian’s  equipment,  and  yet  more  be  important 
to  his  usefulness  to  others  —  his  usefulness  as  a 
teacher  —  if,  after  accumulating  his  facts,  he 
would  devote  a  considerable  period  to  his  pre¬ 
liminary  work  as  an  artist.  I  mean  to  the  mental 
effort  which  I  presume  an  artist  must  make,  and 
an  historian  certainly  can,  to  analyze  his  subject, 
to  separate  the  several  parts,  to  recognize  their 
interrelations  and  relative  proportions  of  interest 
and  importance.  Thence  would  be  formed  a 
general  plan,  a  rough  model;  in  which  at  least 
there  should  appear  distinctly  to  himself  what  is 
the  central  figure  of  the  whole,  the  predominance 
of  which  before  teacher  and  reader  must  be 
preserved  throughout.  That  central  figure  may 
indeed  be  the  conflict  of  two  opposites,  as  in  the 
long  struggle  between  freedom  and  slavery,  union 
and  disunion,  in  our  own  land;  but  the  unity 
nevertheless  exists.  It  is  not  to  be  found  in 
freedom,  nor  yet  in  slavery,  but  in  their  conflict 
it  is.  Around  it  group  in  subordination  the 
many  events,  and  the  warriors  of  the  political 
arena,  whose  names  are  household  words  among 
us  to  this  day.  All  form  part  of  the  great  progress 


Subordination  in  Historical  Treatment  257 


as  it  moves  onward  to  its  consummation;  all 
minister  to  its  effectiveness  as  an  epic;  all  en¬ 
hance  —  some  more,  some  less  —  the  majesty, 
not  merely  of  the  several  stages,  but  of  the  entire 
history  up  to  that  dire  catastrophe  —  that  fall 
of  Troy  —  which  posterity  can  now  see  impend¬ 
ing  from  the  first.  This,  in  true  history,  is  present 
throughout  the  whole;  though  the  eyes  of  many 
of  the  chief  actors  could  neither  foresee  it  in  their 
day  nor  lived  to  behold.  The  moral  of  fate 
accomplished  is  there  for  us  to  read;  but  it  belongs 
not  to  the  end  only  but  to  the  whole  course,  and 
in  such  light  should  the  historian  see  and  maintain 
it.  Can  it  be  said  with  truth  that  the  figure  of 
Lady  Hamilton  throws  no  backward  shadow, 
no  gloom  of  destiny,  over  the  unspotted  days 
of  Nelson’s  early  career  ?  A  critic  impatiently 
observed  of  my  life  of  the  admiral  that  this  effect 
was  produced.  I  confess  that  upon  reading  this 
I  thought  I  had  unwittingly  achieved  an  artistic 
success. 

It  should  scarcely  be  necessary  to  observe  that 
artistic  insistence  upon  a  motive  does  not  consist 
in  reiteration  of  it  in  direct  words,  in  continual 
pointing  of  the  moral  which  the  tale  carries. 
That  true  art  conceals  its  artfulness  is  a  cheap 
quotation.  It  is  not  by  incessantly  brandishing 
Achilles  before  our  eyes,  or  never  suffering  him 


258  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


to  leave  the  stage,  that  his  preeminent  place  is 
assured  in  the  minds  of  the  audience.  Neverthe¬ 
less,  the  poet’s  sense  of  his  own  motive  must  be 
ever  present  to  him,  conscious  or  subconscious, 
if  his  theme  is  not  to  degenerate  from  an  epic 
to  a  procession  of  incidents;  and  this  is  just  the 
danger  of  the  historian,  regarded  not  as  a  mere 
accumulator  of  facts,  but  as  an  instructor  of  men. 
In  a  review  of  a  recent  biography  occurs  the  follow¬ 
ing  criticism  :  “  The  character  and  attainments  of 
the  man  himself  ”  —  who  surely  is  the  appointed 
centre  in  biography  —  “  are  somewhat  obscured 
by  the  mass  of  detail.  This  is  indeed  the  worst 
danger  incurred  by  the  modern  historian.  Where 
his  predecessor  divined,  he  knows,  and  too  often 
is  unable  to  manage  his  knowledge.  To  consult 
State  papers  is  not  difficult;  to  subordinate  them 
to  the  subject  they  illustrate  is  a  task  of  exceeding 
delicacy,  and  one  not  often  successfully  accom¬ 
plished.  The  old-fashioned  historian  thought  it 
a  point  of  honor  to  write  in  a  style  at  once  lucid 
and  picturesque.  The  modern  is  too  generally 
content  to  throw  his  material  into  an  unshapely 
mass;  ”  content,  in  short,  with  telling  all  he  knows. 
As  in  war  not  every  good  general  of  division  can 
handle  a  hundred  thousand  men,  so  in  history 
it  is  more  easy  duly  to  range  a  hundred  facts  than 
a  thousand.  It  appears  to  me  that  these  obser- 


Subordination  in  Historical  Treatment  259 


vations,  of  the  validity  of  which  I  am  persuaded, 
are  especially  necessary  at  the  present  day.  The 
accuracy  of  the  historian,  unquestionably  his  right 
arm  of  service,  seems  now  in  danger  of  fettering 
itself,  not  to  say  the  historian’s  energies  also,  by 
being  cumbered  with  over-much  serving,  to  for¬ 
getfulness  of  the  one  thing  needed.  May  not 
some  facts,  the  exact  truth  about  some  matters, 
be  not  only  beyond  probable  ascertainment,  but 
not  really  worth  the  evident  trouble  by  which 
alone  they  can  be  ascertained  ? 

I  once  heard  of  a  seaman  who,  when  navigating 
a  ship,  pleased  himself  in  carrying  out  the  cal¬ 
culated  definement  of  her  position  to  the  hundredth 
part  of  a  mile.  This,  together  with  other  refine¬ 
ments  of  accuracy,  was  perhaps  a  harmless  amuse¬ 
ment,  only  wasteful  of  time;  but  when  he  pro¬ 
ceeded  to  speak  of  navigation  as  an  exact  science, 
he  betrayed  to  my  mind  a  fallacy  of  appreciation, 
symptomatic  of  mental  defect.  I  speak  with  the 
utmost  diffidence,  because  of  my  already  con¬ 
fessed  deficiency  in  breadth  and  minuteness  of 
acquirement;  but  I  own  it  seems  to  me  that  some 
current  discussions  not  merely  demonstrate  their 
own  improbability  of  solution,  but  suggest  also 
the  thought  that,  were  they  solved,  it  really  would 
not  matter.  May  we  not  often  confound  the 
interest  of  curiosity  with  the  interest  of  importance. 


260  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


Curiosity  is  well  enough,  as  a  matter  of  mental 
recreation;  truth  is  always  worth  having;  but 
in  many  cases  it  may  be  like  the  Giant’s  Cause¬ 
way  to  Dr.  Johnson  —  worth  seeing,  but  not 
worth  going  to  see.  It  is  troublesome  enough  to 
handle  a  multitude  of  details  so  as  to  produce 
clearness  of  impression;  but  to  add  to  that  diffi¬ 
culty  a  too  fastidious  scrupulosity  as  to  exhausting 
every  possible  source  of  error,  by  the  accumulation 
of  every  imaginable  detail,  is  to  repeat  the  naviga¬ 
tor’s  error  by  seeking  to  define  an  historical  posi¬ 
tion  within  a  hundredth  of  a  mile.  Neither  in 
history  nor  in  navigation  do  the  observations, 
and  what  is  called  the  personal  equation,  justify 
the  expectation  of  success;  and  even  could  it  be 
attained,  the  question  remains  whether  it  is  worth 
the  trouble  of  attaining.  Lord  Acton’s  “  Study 
of  History  ”  is  in  this  respect  a  kind  of  epic, 
dominated  throughout  in  its  self-revelation  by 
the  question  why  so  learned  a  man  produced  so 
little.  May  not  the  answer  be  suggested  by  the 
vast  store  of  appended  quotations  lavished  upon 
the  several  thoughts  of  that  one  brief  essay  ? 

It  appears  to  me  sometimes  that  the  elaboration 
of  research  predicated  by  some  enthusiastic  dev¬ 
otees  of  historical  accuracy,  who  preach  accuracy 
apparently  for  its  own  sake,  is  not  unlike  that  of 
the  mathematicians  who  launched  a  malediction 


Subordination  in  Historical  Treatment  261 


against  those  who  would  degrade  pure  mathe¬ 
matics  by  applying  it  to  any  practical  purpose. 
Mathematics  for  mathematics  alone,  accuracy 
only  to  be  accurate,  are  conceptions  that  need 
to  be  qualified.  An  uneasy  sense  of  this  is  already 
in  the  air.  Since  writing  these  words  I  find  an¬ 
other  reviewer  complaining  thus:  “The  author 
is  content  simply  to  tell  facts  in  their  right  order, 
with  the  utmost  pains  as  to  accuracy,  but  with 
hardly  any  comment  on  their  significance.  Of 
enthusiasm  there  is  only  that  which  specialists 
are  apt  to  feel  for  any  fact,  in  spite  of  its  value.” 
There  is  a  higher  accuracy  than  the  weighing  of 
scruples;  the  fine  dust  of  the  balance  rarely  turns 
the  scale.  Unquestionably,  generalization  is  unsafe 
where  not  based  upon  a  multitude  of  instances; 
conclusion  needs  a  wide  sweep  of  research;  but 
unless  some  limit  is  accepted  as  to  the  number 
and  extent  of  recorded  facts  necessary  to  infer¬ 
ence,  if  not  to  decision,  observation  heaped  upon 
observation  remains  useless  to  men  at  large.  They 
are  incapable  of  interpreting  their  meaning.  The 
significance  of  the  whole  must  be  brought  out  by 
careful  arrangement  and  exposition,  which  must 
not  be  made  to  wait  too  long  upon  unlimited 
scrutiny.  The  passion  for  certainty  may  lapse  into 
incapacity  for  decision;  a  vice  recognized  in  mili¬ 
tary  life,  and  which  needs  recognition  elsewhere. 


262  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


I  have  likened  to  the  labor  of  the  artist  the 
constructive  work  of  the  historian,  the  work  by 
which  he  converts  the  raw  material,  the  discon¬ 
nected  facts,  of  his  own  acquirement  to  the  use 
of  men;  and  upon  that  have  rested  the  theory  of 
historical  composition,  as  it  appears  to  my  own 
mind.  The  standard  is  high,  perhaps  ideal;  for 
it  presupposes  faculties,  natural  gifts,  which  we 
are  prone  to  class  under  the  term  of  inspiration,  in 
order  to  express  our  sense  of  their  rarity  and 
lofty  quality.  This  doubtless  may  be  so;  there 
may  be  as  few  historians  born  of  the  highest  order 
as  there  are  artists.  But  it  is  worse  than  useless 
to  fix  standards  lower  than  the  best  one  can  frame 
to  one’s  self;  for,  like  boats  crossing  a  current, 
men  rarely  reach  as  high  even  as  the  mark  at 
which  they  point.  Moreover,  so  far  as  my  con¬ 
ception  is  correct  and  its  development  before  you 
sound,  it  involves  primarily  an  intellectual  process 
within  the  reach  of  most,  even  though  the  fire  of 
genius,  of  inspiration,  may  be  wanting.  That 
informing  spirit  which  is  indispensable  to  the 
highest  success  is  the  inestimable  privilege  of 
nature’s  favored  few.  But  to  study  the  facts 
analytically,  to  detect  the  broad  leading  features, 
to  assign  to  them  their  respective  importance, 
to  recognize  their  mutual  relations,  and  upon 
these  data  to  frame  a  scheme  of  logical  presenta- 


Subordination  in  Historical  Treatment  263 


tion  —  all  this  is  within  the  scope  of  many  whom 
we  should  hesitate  to  call  artists,  and  who  yet  are 
certainly  capable  of  being  more  than  chroniclers, 
or  even  than  narrators. 

In  fact,  to  do  this  much  may  be  no  more  than 
to  be  dryly  logical.  It  is  in  the  execution  of  the 
scheme  thus  evolved  that  the  difficulty  becomes 
marked;  like  that  of  the  artist  who  falls  short  of 
reproducing  to  the  eyes  of  others  the  vision 
revealed  to  himself.  Nevertheless,  simply  by 
logical  presentation  the  keenest  intellectual  grati¬ 
fication  may  be  afforded  —  the  gratification  of 
comprehending  what  one  sees  but  has  not  hitherto 
understood.  From  this  proceeds  the  delineation 
of  the  chain  of  cause  and  effect;  the  classification 
of  incidents,  at  first  sight  disconnected,  by  a 
successful  generalization  which  reveals  their  es¬ 
sential  unity;  the  exposition  of  a  leading  general 
tendency,  which  is  the  predominant  characteristic 
of  an  epoch.  These  processes  do  not,  however, 
end  in  mere  gratification;  they  convey  instruc¬ 
tion,  the  more  certain  and  enduring  because  of 
their  fascinating  interest. 

To  conceive  thus  the  work  of  the  historian  is 
perhaps  natural  to  my  profession.  Certainly, 
from  this  same  point  of  view,  of  artistic  grouping 
of  subordinate  details  around  a  central  idea,  I 
have  learned  to  seek  not  only  the  solution  of  the 


264  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


problems  of  warfare,  but  the  method  of  its  history; 
whether  as  it  concerns  the  conduct  of  campaigns, 
which  we  call  strategy,  or  in  the  direction  of 
battles,  which  we  define  tactics,  or  in  the  design 
of  the  individual  ship  of  war.  Unity  of  purpose 
—  exclusiveness  of  purpose,  to  use  Napoleon’s 
phrase  —  is  the  secret  of  great  military  successes. 
In  employing  this  word  “exclusiveness,”  which  re¬ 
duces  unity  to  a  unit,  Napoleon  was  not  weighing 
scrupulously  the  accuracy  of  his  terms.  He  was 
simply  censuring  the  particular  aberration  of 
the  officer  addressed,  who  was  so  concerned  for 
a  field  of  operations  not  immediately  involved  as 
to  allow  his  mind  to  wander  from  the  one  pre¬ 
dominant  interest  then  at  stake.  But,  though 
exaggerated,  the  term  is  not  otherwise  incorrect, 
and  the  exaggeration  is  rather  that  of  emphasis 
than  of  hyperbole.  Other  matters  may  need  to  be 
considered,  because  of  their  evident  relations  to 
the  central  feature;  they  therefore  may  not  be 
excluded  in  a  strict  sense,  but  equally  they  are 
not  to  usurp  the  preeminence  due  to  it  alone.  In 
so  far  its  claim  is  “  exclusive,”  and  their  own 
exists  only  as  ministering  to  it. 

The  military  historian  who  is  instructed  in  the 
principles  of  the  art  of  war  finds,  as  it  were  im¬ 
posed  upon  him,  the  necessity  of  so  constructing 
his  narrative  as  to  present  a  substantial  unity  in 


Subordination  in  Historical  Treatment  265 


effect.  Such  familiar  phrase  as  the  “  key  of  the 
situation,”  the  decisive  point  for  which  he  has 
been  taught  to  look,  upon  the  tenure  of  which 
depends  more  or  less  the  fortune  of  war,  sustains 
continually  before  his  mind  the  idea,  to  which 
his  treatment  must  correspond,  of  a  central 
feature  round  which  all  else  groups ;  not  only 
subordinate,  but  contributive.  Here  is  no  vague 
collocation  of  words,  but  the  concrete,  pithy  ex¬ 
pression  of  a  trained  habit  of  mind  which  domi¬ 
nates  writing  necessarily,  even  though  uncon¬ 
sciously  to  the  writer.  So  the  word  “  combina¬ 
tion,”  than  which  none  finds  more  frequent  use 
in  military  literature,  and  which  you  will  recall 
means  to  make  of  two  one,  reminds  him,  if  he 
needs  to  think,  that  no  mere  narrative  of  separate 
incidents,  however  vivid  as  word  painting,  fulfils 
his  task.  He  must  also  show  how  all  lead  up  to, 
and  find  their  several  meanings  in,  a  common 
result,  of  purpose  or  of  achievement,  which 
unifies  their  action.  So  again  “  concentration,” 
the  watchword  of  military  action,  and  the  final 
end  of  all  combination,  reminds  him  that  facts 
must  be  massed  as  well  as  troops,  if  they  are  to 
prevail  against  the  passive  resistance  of  indolent 
mentality;  if  they  are  to  penetrate  and  shatter 
the  forces  of  ignorance  or  prejudgment,  which 
conservative  impression  has  arrayed  against  them. 


266  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


It  is  not  in  the  coloring,  but  in  the  grouping, 
that  the  true  excellence  of  the  military  historian 
is  found;  just  as  the  battle  is  won,  not  by  the 
picturesqueness  of  the  scene,  but  by  the  disposi¬ 
tion  of  the  forces.  Both  the  logical  faculty  and 
the  imagination  contribute  to  his  success,  but  the 
former  much  exceeds  the  latter  in  effect.  A  cam¬ 
paign,  or  a  battle,  skilfully  designed,  is  a  work 
of  art,  and  duly  to  describe  it  requires  something 
of  the  appreciation  and  combinative  faculty  of 
an  artist;  but  where  there  is  no  appeal  over  the 
imagination,  to  the  intellect,  impressions  are 
apt  to  lack  distinctness.  While  there  is  a  certain 
exaltation  in  sharing,  through  vivid  narrative,  the 
emotions  of  those  who  have  borne  a  part  in  some 
deed  of  conspicuous  daring,  the  fascination  does 
not  equal  that  wrought  upon  the  mind  as  it  traces 
the  sequence  by  which  successive  occurrences 
are  seen  to  issue  in  their  necessary  results,  or 
causes  apparently  remote  to  converge  upon  a 
common  end.  Then  understanding  succeeds  to 
the  sense  of  bewilderment  too  commonly  pro¬ 
duced  by  military  events,  as  often  narrated. 
Failing  such  comprehension,  there  may  be  fairly 
discerned  that  “  it  was  a  famous  victory;  ”  and 
yet  the  modest  confession  have  to  follow  that 
“  what  they  fought  each  other  for  ”  —  what  the 
meaning  of  it  all  is  —  “  I  can  not  well  make  out.” 


Subordination  in  Historical  Treatment  267 


No  appointed  end  is  seen  to  justify  the  bloody 
means. 

This  difficulty  is  not  confined  to  military  his¬ 
tory.  It  exists  in  all  narrative  of  events,  which 
even  in  the  ablest  hands  tends  to  degenerate  into 
a  brilliant  pageant,  and  in  those  of  less  capable 
colorists  into  a  simple  procession  of  passers-by; 
a  more  or  less  commonplace  street  scene  to 
recur  to  a  simile  I  have  already  used.  It  is  the 
privilege  simply  of  the  military  historian  that, 
if  he  himself  has  real  understanding  of  the  matters 
he  treats,  they  themselves  supply  the  steadying 
centre  of  observation;  for  the  actions  are  those 
of  men  who  had  an  immediate  recognized  purpose, 
which  dictated  their  conduct.  To  be  faithful  to 
them  he  must  not  merely  tell  their  deeds,  but 
expound  also  their  plan. 

The  plan  of  Providence,  which  in  its  fulfilment 
we  call  history,  is  of  wider  range  and  more  com¬ 
plicated  detail  than  the  tactics  of  a  battle,  or  the 
strategy  of  a  campaign,  or  even  than  the  policy 
of  a  war.  Each  of  these  in  its  own  sphere  is  an 
incident  of  history,  possessing  an  intrinsic  unity 
of  its  own.  Each,  therefore,  may  be  treated  after 
the  fashion  and  under  the  limitations  I  have  sug¬ 
gested;  as  a  work  or  art,  which  has  a  central 
feature,  around  which  details  are  to  be  grouped 
but  kept  ever  subordinate  to  its  due  development. 


268  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


So,  and  so  only,  shall  the  unity  of  the  picture  be 
successfully  preserved;  but  when  this  has  been 
done,  each  particular  incident,  and  group  of 
incidents,  becomes  as  it  were  a  fully  wrought  and 
fashioned  piece,  prepared  for  adjustment  in  its 
place  in  the  great  mosaic,  which  the  history  of 
the  race  is  gradually  fashioning  under  the  Divine 
overruling. 

I  apprehend  that  the  analogy  between  military 
history  and  history  in  its  other  aspects  —  political, 
economical,  social,  and  so  on  —  is  in  this  respect 
closer  than  most  would  be  willing  at  first  to 
concede.  There  is  perhaps  in  military  history 
more  pronounced  definiteness  of  human  plan, 
more  clearly  marked  finality  of  conclusion,  and 
withal  a  certain  vividness  of  action,  all  of  which 
tend  to  enforce  the  outlines  and  emphasize  the 
unity  of  the  particular  subject.  A  declaration  of 
war,  a  treaty  of  peace,  a  decisive  victory,  if  not 
quite  epoch-making  events,  are  at  least  prominent 
milestones,  which  mark  and  define  the  passage 
of  time.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  observe,  how¬ 
ever,  that  all  these  have  their  very  definite  ana¬ 
logues  in  that  which  we  call  civil  history.  The 
Declaration  of  Independence  marks  the  consum¬ 
mation  of  a  series  of  civil  acts;  the  surrender 
of  Cornwallis  terminates  a  military  record.  The 
Peace  of  Westphalia  and  the  British  Reform 


Subordination  in  Historical  Treatment  269 


Bill  of  1832  are  alike  conspicuous  indications  of 
the  passing  of  the  old  and  the  advent  of  the  new. 
But  yet  more,  may  we  not  say  that  all  history  is 
the  aggressive  advance  of  the  future  upon  the 
past,  the  field  of  collision  being  the  present.  That 
no  blood  be  shed  does  not  make  the  sapping  of 
the  old  foundations  less  real,  nor  the  overthrow 
of  the  old  conditions  less  decisive.  Offence  and 
defence,  the  opposing  sides  in  war,  reproduce 
themselves  all  over  the  historic  field.  The  con¬ 
servative,  of  that  which  now  is,  holds  the  successive 
positions  against  the  progressive,  who  seeks 
change;  the  resultant  of  each  conflict,  as  in  most 
wars,  is  a  modification  of  conditions,  not  an 
immediate  reversal.  Total  overthrow  is  rare; 
and  happily  so,  for  thus  the  continuity  of  con¬ 
ditions  is  preserved.  Neither  revolution,  nor  yet 
stagnation,  but  still  advance,  graduated  and 
moderate,  which  retains  the  one  indispensable 
salt  of  national  well-being,  Faith;  faith  in  an 
established  order,  in  fundamental  principles,  in 
regulated  progress. 

Looking,  then,  upon  the  field  of  history  thus 
widened  —  from  the  single  particular  of  military 
events,  which  I  have  taken  for  illustration  — 
to  embrace  all  the  various  activities  of  mankind 
during  a  given  epoch,  we  find  necessarily  a  vast 
multiplication  of  incident,  with  a  corresponding 


270  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


complication  of  the  threads  to  which  they  severally 
belong.  Thus  not  only  the  task  is  much  bigger, 
but  the  analysis  is  more  laborious;  while  as  this 
underlies  unity  of  treatment,  the  attainment  of 
that  becomes  far  more  difficult.  Nevertheless 
the  attempt  must  be  made;  that  particular  feature 
which  gives  special  character  to  the  period  under 
consideration  must  be  selected,  and  the  relations 
of  the  others  to  it  discerned,  in  order  that  in  the 
preeminence  of  the  one  and  the  contributory 
subordination  of  the  others  artistic  unity  of  con¬ 
struction  may  be  attained.  Thus  only  can  the 
mass  of  readers  receive  that  correct  impression 
of  the  general  character  and  trend  of  a  period 
which  far  surpasses  in  instructive  quality  any 
volume  of  details,  however  accurate,  the  signif¬ 
icance  of  which  is  not  apprehended.  An  example 
of  the  thought  which  I  am  trying  to  express  is 
to  be  found  in  the  brief  summaries  of  tendencies 
which  Ranke,  in  his  History  of  England  in  the 
seventeenth  century,  interposes  from  time  to 
time  in  breaks  of  the  narrative.  This  is  not,  I 
fancy,  the  most  artistic  method.  It  resembles 
rather  those  novels  in  which  the  motives  and 
characters  of  the  actors  are  explained  currently 
instead  of  being  made  to  transpire  for  themselves. 
Nevertheless  the  line  of  light  thus  thrown  serves 
to  elucidate  the  whole  preceding  and  succeeding 


Subordination  in  Historical  Treatment  271 


narrative.  The  separate  events,  the  course  and 
character  of  the  several  actors,  receive  a  meaning 
and  a  value  which  apart  from  such  a  clew  they  do 
not  possess. 

I  conceive  that  such  a  method  is  applicable  to 
all  the  work  of  history  from  the  least  to  the 
greatest;  from  the  single  stones,  if  we  may  so 
say,  the  particular  limited  researches,  the  mono¬ 
graphs,  up  to  the  great  edifice,  which  we  may 
imagine  though  we  may  never  see,  in  which  all 
the  periods  of  universal  history  shall  have  their 
several  places  and  due  proportion.  So  coor¬ 
dinated,  they  will  present  a  majestic  ideal  unity 
corresponding  to  the  thought  of  the  Divine  Archi¬ 
tect,  realized  to  His  creatures.  To  a  consum¬ 
mation  so  noble  we  may  be  permitted  to  aspire, 
and  individually  to  take  pride,  not  in  our  own 
selves  nor  in  our  own  work,  but  rather  in  that 
toward  which  we  minister  and  in  which  we  believe. 
Faith,  the  evidence  of  things  not  seen  as  yet,  and 
the  needful  motive  force  of  every  truly  great 
achievement,  may  cheer  us  to  feel  that  in  the 
perfection  of  our  particular  work  we  forward  the 
ultimate  perfection  of  the  whole,  which  in  its 
entirety  can  be  the  work  of  no  one  hand.  It  may 
be,  indeed,  that  to  some  one  favored  mind  will  be 
committed  the  final  great  synthesis;  but  he  would 
be  powerless  save  for  the  patient  labors  of  the 


272  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


innumerable  army  which,  stone  by  stone  and 
section  by  section,  have  wrought  to  perfection 
the  several  parts;  while  in  combining  these  in 
the  ultimate  unity  he  must  be  guided  by  the  same 
principles  and  governed  by  the  same  methods 
that  have  controlled  them  in  their  humbler  tasks. 
He  will  in  fact  be,  as  each  one  of  us  is,  an  in¬ 
strument.  To  him  will  be  intrusted,  on  a  larger 
and  final  scale,  to  accomplish  the  realization  of 
that  toward  which  generations  of  predecessors 
have  labored;  comprehending  but  in  part,  and 
obscurely,  the  end  toward  which  they  were  tend¬ 
ing,  but  yet  building  better  than  they  knew  because 
they  built  faithfully. 


THE  STRENGTH  OF  NELSON 


THE  STRENGTH  OF  NELSON1 

A  UgUSty  I  905 


WITH  a  temperament  versatile  as  that  of 
Nelson,  illustrated  in  a  career  full  of 
varied  action,  it  is  not  easy  to  know  how  to  regard 
its  subject,  in  brief,  so  as  to  receive  a  clear  and 
accurate  impression;  one  which  shall  preserve 
justice  of  proportion,  while  at  the  same  time  giving 
due  emphasis  and  predominance  to  the  decisive 
characteristics.  Multiplicity  of  traits,  lending 
itself  to  multiplicity  of  expression,  increases  the 
difficulty  of  selection,  and  of  reproducing  that 
combination  which  really  constitutes  the  effective 
force  and  portrait  of  the  man.  The  problem  is 
that  of  the  artist,  dealing  with  a  physical  exterior. 
We  can  all  recall  instances  of  persons,  celebrated 
historically  or  socially,  in  whom  the  prominence 
of  a  particular  feature,  or  a  certain  pervading 
expression,  causes  all  portraits  to  possess  a 
recognizable  stamp  of  likeness.  As  soon  as 

1  This  paper  was  read  on  the  hundredth  anniversary  of  the 
Battle  of  Trafalgar,  October  21,  1905,  before  the  Victorian 
Club,  of  Boston,  U.  S.  A. 


276  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


the  pictured  face  is  seen  we  identify  the  original 
without  hesitation.  There  are  others  in  whom 
the  mobility  of  countenance,  the  variations  de¬ 
pending  upon  feeling  and  expression,  quite  over¬ 
power  in  impression  the  essential  sameness  pre¬ 
sented  by  features  in  repose. 

Great  indeed  must  be  the  difficulties  of  the 
artist,  or  the  writer,  who  has  to  portray  the  man 
capable,  within  a  half-hour,  of  such  diverse  moods 
as  Wellington  witnessed  in  his  one  only  inter¬ 
view  with  Nelson.  The  anecdote  is  too  familiar 
for  reproduction  here.  Less  well  known,  probably, 
or  less  remembered,  is  a  similar  testimony  borne 
by  two  officers,  Captains  Layman  and  Sir  Alex¬ 
ander  Ball,  who  served  with  him  under  varying 
circumstances. 


One  day,  after  tea  in  the  drawing-room  at  Merton,  Lord 
Nelson  was  earnestly  engaged  in  conversation  with  Sir  Samuel 
Hood.  Mr.  Layman  observed  to  Sir  Alexander  that  Lord 
Nelson  was  at  work,  by  his  countenance  and  mouth;  that  he 
was  a  most  extraordinary  man,  possessing  opposite  points  of 
character  —  little  in  little  things,  but  by  far  the  greatest  man 
in  great  things  he  ever  saw;  that  he  had  seen  him  petulant  in 
trifles,  and  as  cool  and  collected  as  a  philosopher  when  sur¬ 
rounded  by  dangers  in  which  men  of  common  minds  with 
clouded  countenance  would  say,  “  Ah  !  what  is  to  be  done  ?  ” 
It  was  a  treat  to  see  his  animated  and  collected  countenance 
in  the  heat  of  action.  Sir  Alexander  remarked  this  seeming 
inconsistency,  and  mentioned  that  after  the  Battle  of  the  Nile 


The  Strength  of  Nelson 


277 


the  captains  of  the  squadron  were  desirous  to  have  a  good 
likeness  of  their  heroic  chief  taken,  and  for  that  purpose 
employed  one  of  the  most  eminent  painters  in  Italy.  The 
plan  was  to  ask  the  painter  to  breakfast,  and  get  him  to  begin 
immediately  after.  Breakfast  being  over,  and  no  preparation 
being  made  by  the  painter,  Sir  Alexander  was  selected  by  the 
other  captains  to  ask  him  when  he  intended  to  begin;  to  which 
the  answer  was,  “  Never.”  Sir  Alexander  said  he  stared, 
and  they  all  stared,  but  the  artist  continued :  “  There  is  such 
a  mixture  of  humility  with  ambition  in  Lord  Nelson’s  coun¬ 
tenance  that  I  dare  not  risk  the  attempt  I  ” 


Contrast  with  such  an  one  the  usual  equable 
composure  of  Washington  or  Wellington,  and 
the  difficulty  of  a  truthful  rendering  is  seen;  but 
reflection  reveals  therein  likewise  the  intensely 
natural,  spontaneous,  impulsive  character,  which 
takes  hold  of  our  loves,  and  abides  in  affectionate 
remembrance. 

In  such  cases  how  can  there  but  be  marked 
diversities  of  appearance  in  the  attempted  repro¬ 
ductions  by  this  or  that  man,  painter  or  writer  ? 
Not  only  will  the  truthfulness  of  the  figured  face 
depend  upon  the  fleeting  mood  of  the  sitter;  the 
aptitude  of  the  artist  to  receive,  and  to  penetrate 
through  the  mask  of  the  instant,  is  an  even  greater 
factor.  Both  the  one  and  the  other  will  enter  into 
the  composition  of  the  resultant  portrait;  for  as, 
on  the  one  hand,  the  man  shows  himself  as  he 


278  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


for  the  moment  is,  so,  on  the  other,  the  power  to 
see  and  to  express  that  which  is  shown  depends 
upon  the  revelation  to  the  artist;  a  revelation 
due  as  much  to  his  own  insight  as  to  the  visible 
thing  before  him.  The  miracle  of  Pentecost  lay 
not  only  in  the  gifts  of  speech  bestowed  upon  the 
Apostles,  but  in  the  power  of  every  man  to  hear 
in  that  tongue,  and  in  that  tongue  only,  to  which 
he  is  born;  to  see  with  the  spiritual  vision  which 
he  has  received,  or  to  which  he  may  have  grown. 

In  this  respect  portrayal  by  pen  will  not  differ 
from  portrayal  by  pencil  or  by  brush.  The 
man  who  attempts  to  depict  in  words  a  character 
so  diverse  in  manifestation  as  that  of  Nelson 
will  reflect  from  what  he  sees  before  him  that 
aspect  of  the  man  with  which  he  himself  is  most 
in  touch.  The  writer  of  military  sympathies  will  — 
must  —  give  predominance  to  the  military  quali¬ 
ties.  Despite  his  efforts  to  the  contrary,  they  will 
make  the  deepest  impress,  and  will  be  most 
certainly  and  conspicuously  reproduced.  And  to 
a  degree  this  will  accord  with  the  truth;  for 
above  all,  undoubtedly,  Nelson  was  a  warrior. 
But  he  was  also  much  more,  and  in  virtue  of 
that  something  else  he  survives,  and  is  transmitted 
to  us  as  —  what  shall  I  say?  —  as  Nelson;  there 
is  no  other  word.  He  is  not  a  type;  still  less  does 
he  belong  to  a  class.  He  is  simply  himself — the 


The  Strength  oj  Nelson 


279 


man  Nelson;  a  man  so  distinct  in  his  individuality, 
that  he  has  thus  imposed  himself  on  the  con¬ 
sciousness  and  recollection  of  a  great  nation.  He 
rests  there,  simply  himself,  and  no  other;  and 
no  other  is  he,  nor  stands  near  him.  I  say  not 
that  he  is  higher  or  lower,  greater  or  less,  than 
any  other.  I  do  not,  at  least  now,  analyze  his 
qualities,  nor  seek  to  present  such  an  assembly 
of  them  as  shall  show  why  the  impress  of  in¬ 
dividuality  is  thus  unique.  I  only  draw  attention 
to  the  fact  that  this  is  so;  that  Nelson  now  lives, 
and  is  immortal  in  the  memory  of  his  kind,  not 
chiefly  because  of  what  he  did,  but  because  in 
the  doing  and  in  the  telling,  then  and  now,  first 
and  last,  men  have  felt  themselves  in  the  presence 
of  a  personality  so  strong  that  it  has  broken 
through  the  barriers  of  convention  and  reserve 
which  separate  us  one  from  another,  and  has 
placed  itself  in  direct  contact  with  the  inner 
selves,  not  of  contemporaries  only,  but  of  us  who 
never  saw  him  in  the  body.  We  have  not  only 
heard  of  him  and  his  deeds.  We  know  him  as 
we  do  one  with  whom  we  are  in  constant  inter¬ 
course. 

This  is  of  itself  an  extraordinary  trait.  Thus 
to  make  a  man  known,  to  reveal  a  personality,  is 
what  Boswell  did  for  Johnson;  but  he  accom¬ 
plished  this  literary  marvel  of  portraiture  by  the 


280  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


most  careful  and  minute  record  of  doings  and 
sayings.  His  is  a  built-up  literary  prodigy,  re¬ 
sembling  some  of  those  striking  Flemish  portraits, 
which  not  only  impress  by  their  ensemble,  but 
stand  inspection  under  a  magnifying  glass.  But 
what  Boswell  did  for  Johnson,  Nelson  has  done 
for  himself,  and  in  quite  other  fashion.  He  is 
revealed  to  us,  not  by  such  accumulation  of 
detail,  but  by  some  quality,  elusive,  perhaps  not 
to  be  detected,  by  reason  of  which  the  man  him¬ 
self  insensibly  transpires  to  our  knowledge  in 
his  strength  and  in  his  weakness.  We  know 
him,  not  by  what  his  deeds  or  his  words  signify; 
but  through  his  deeds  and  words  the  inner  spirit 
of  the  man  continually  pierces,  and,  while  we 
read,  envelops  us  in  an  atmosphere  which  may 
be  called  Nelsonic.  Such  certainly  seemed  to 
me  the  effect  upon  myself  in  a  year  given  to  his 
letters,  to  his  deeds,  and  to  his  recorded  words. 
I  found  myself  in  a  special  environment,  stimu¬ 
lating,  exalting,  touching;  and  while  we  confess 
that  there  are  morbid  symptoms  attendant  upon 
the  writing  of  biography,  tending  to  distort  vision, 
and  to  confuse  the  sense  of  proportion,  faults 
which  the  reader  must  appreciate  —  the  writer 
cannot  —  there  can  be  no  mistake  about  the 
moral  effect  produced,  and  the  outburst  of  this 
Trafalgar  Day  proves  it  to  be  not  limited  to  the 


The  Strength  of  Nelson  281 


biographer.  The  reserve  which  for  the  most  of 
us  cloaks  each  man’s  secret  being  from  the  knowl¬ 
edge  of  those  nearest  him  among  his  contem¬ 
poraries,  casts  no  such  impenetrable  veil  over 
the  personality  of  this  man  whom  we  never  saw  — 
who  died  just  one  hundred  years  ago  this  day. 
We  have  with  him  an  acquaintance,  we  feel 
from  him  an  influence,  which  we  have  not  with, 
nor  from,  one  in  a  score  of  those  whom  we  meet 
daily. 

Many  Lives  of  Nelson  have  been  written,  but 
no  one  of  them  marked  with  the  artistic  skill 
and  untiring  diligence  which  Boswell  brought 
to  his  task.  A  singular  proof  of  the  latter’s 
combined  genius  and  care,  which  I  do  not  think 
is  always  appreciated,  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact 
that  the  portrait  of  Johnson  is  surrounded  by  a 
gallery  of  minor  portraits,  as  real  and  living  as 
his  own,  though  duly  subordinated  in  impression 
to  the  central  figure  of  the  group.  This  is  indeed 
the  triumph  of  the  great  artist.  He  has,  so  to 
say,  succeeded  beyond  himself,  and  beyond  his 
intentions,  simply  because  he  is  great.  In  the 
way  of  portraiture  he  touches  nothing  that  he 
does  not  quicken  and  adorn.  The  same  certainly 
cannot  be  said  for  those  who  have  transmitted  to 
us  the  companions  of  Nelson,  in  their  relations 
to  their  chief.  Yet  we  know  Nelson  as  well  as 


282  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


we  know  Johnson,  and  more  usefully,  despite  every 
disadvantage  in  his  limners.  The  spell  of  his 
personality  has  compelled  them  to  reproduce  him; 
and  its  power  —  its  magic,  I  might  say  —  is  to 
be  found  in  that  influence  exerted  upon  them. 
In  Boswell’s  Johnson  we  have  the  vivid  repro¬ 
duction  of  a  man  of  the  past;  a  study  complete, 
interesting,  instructive,  but  not  to  a  reader  of 
to-day  influential  beyond  the  common  teachings 
of  biography.  In  Nelson,  who  died  but  twenty 
years  later,  we  have  a  living  inspiration.  He 
presents  a  great  heroic  standard,  a  pattern.  We 
set  ourselves  at  once  to  copy  him;  not  because, 
in  the  record  of  his  acts,  we  have  received  an 
ordinary  suggestion  or  warning,  but  because  heart 
answers  to  heart.  The  innate  nobility  of  theman’s 
ideals,  which  transpired  even  through,  and  in,  the 
lamentable  episode  which  sullied  his  career,  uplifts 
us  in  spite  of  ourselves,  and  of  all  that  was  amiss 
in  him.  The  jewel  shines,  even  amid  defilement. 
It  certainly  cannot  be  claimed  that  Nelson’s  un¬ 
flinching  professional  tenacity  is  nobler  than  John¬ 
son’s  brave  struggle  against  his  mental  depression 
and  numerous  bodily  infirmities;  his  life  unstained, 
though  without  Puritanic  affectation.  But,  as  a 
present  force,  Johnson  is  dead,  Nelson  is  alive. 
Nelson  is  no  mere  man  of  the  past.  Not  his 
name  only,  but  he  himself  lives  to  us;  still  speaks, 


The  Strength  0}  Nelson  283 


because  there  was  in  him  that  to  which  man  can 
never  die,  while  he  remains  partaker  of  the  Divine 
nature.  It  is  but  a  few  days  since  that  I  received 
a  letter  from  a  junior  officer  of  the  British  Navy, 
expressing  the  wish  that  all  young  officers  might 
be  ordered  to  master  the  career  of  Nelson,  because 
of  the  uplifting  power  which  he  himself  had 
found  in  the  ideals  and  actions  of  the  hero. 

What  is  the  secret  of  this  strange  fascination, 
which  has  given  Nelson  his  peculiar  place,  by 
which  it  may  be  said  of  him,  as  of  some  few  other 
worthies  of  the  past:  “He  being  dead  yet 
speaketh.”  It  certainly  is  not  merely  in  the 
standards  which  he  professed,  even  although  his 
devotion  to  them  continually  was  manifested, 
not  in  word  only,  but  in  deed;  yea,  and  in  the 
hour  of  death.  The  noblest  of  all,  the  dying 
words,  “  Thank  God  I  have  done  my  duty,”  is 
no  monopoly  of  Nelson’s.  You  may  count  by 
scores  the  men  of  English-speaking  tradition,  in 
Great  Britain  and  America,  who  have  brought 
as  single-minded  a  purpose  to  the  service  of  the 
“  stern  daughter  of  the  voice  of  God,”  and  have 
followed  her  as  unflinchingly  through  good  and 
ill.  But  how  many  of  them  who  have  departed 
exercise  a  conscious  influence  upon  the  minds 
of  the  men  of  to-day  ?  Their  deeds  and  examples 
doubtless  have  gone  to  swell  that  sum  total  of 


284  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


things,  by  which  the  world  of  our  generation  is 
the  better  for  the  lives  of  the  myriads  who  have 
lived  unknown  and  are  forgotten;  but  their 
influence,  their  present,  direct,  personal,  uplifting 
force  on  men  now  alive,  in  how  many  instances 
can  you  point  to  it  ?  And  to  what  one  other, 
among  the  heroes  of  Great  Britain,  from  whom 
it  is  so  generally  distributed  that  it  may  fitly  be 
called  national  ?  Despite  the  Nile  and  Trafalgar, 
there  may  be  several  who  have  more  radically 
and  permanently  affected  the  destinies  of  the 
Empire.  We  are  not  here  concerned  with  such 
analytic  computations,  or  with  estimates  of  indirect 
consequences  which  the  doer  of  the  deeds  could 
by  no  possibility  have  foreseen.  If  such  there 
be,  what  one  among  them  evokes  to-day  the 
emulative  affection  and  admiration  which  is  the 
prerogative  of  Nelson  ?  Whence  comes  this  ? 
Grant  even  the  cumulative  dramatic  force,  the 
immense  effectiveness  of  the  double  utterances, 
so  closely  following  each  other,  “  England  expects 
every  man  to  do  his  duty,”  and  “  Thank  God, 
I  have  done  my  duty,”  you  have  advanced  but  a 
step  towards  the  solution  of  the  question.  Why 
is  Nelson  still  alive,  while  so  many  other  sons 
of  duty  are  dead  ?  What  prophetic  power,  power 
to  speak  for  God  and  for  man,  was  in  this  man, 
that  such  enduring  speech  should  come  forth 


The  Strength  o /  Nelson 


285 


from  his  life;  that  he,  being  dead,  is  still  speak¬ 
ing? 

It  is  not  permitted  to  man  so  to  search  the  heart 
of  his  fellow  as  to  give  a  conclusive  reply  to  such 
a  question;  yet  it  is  allowable  and  appropriate 
to  seek  so  far  to  appreciate  one  like  Nelson  as 
at  least  to  approach  somewhat  nearer  towards 
understanding  the  secret  of  his  character  and  of 
its  power.  The  homage  to  duty  as  the  supreme 
motive  in  life,  and  the  strong  conviction  that 
there  are  objects  worthier  of  effort  than  money¬ 
getting  and  ease,  were  characteristics  possessed 
in  common  with  many  others  by  Nelson.  But, 
while  I  speak  with  diffidence,  I  feel  strongly  that 
the  mode  of  tenure  was  somewhat  different  in 
him  and  in  them.  The  recognition  of  duty,  and 
of  its  high  obligation,  is  impressed  upon  most  of 
us  from  without.  We  have  been  taught  it,  have 
received  it  by  the  hearing  of  the  ear,  from  others 
to  whom  in  like  manner  it  has  been  imparted  by 
those  who  went  before  them.  It  is,  so  to  say,  a 
transmitted  inheritance  —  “  in  the  air;”  perhaps 
not  to  quite  such  an  extent  as  might  be  desired. 
We  render  it  a  tribute  which  is  perfectly  sincere, 
but  still  somewhat  conventional.  This  condition 
is  not  to  be  despised.  The  compelling  power  of 
accepted  conventions  is  enormous;  but,  like 
much  religious  faith,  such  attention  to  duty  is 


286  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


not  founded  on  the  individual  bottom,  but  depends 
largely  on  association,  for  which  reason  it  will  be 
found  more  highly  developed  in  some  professions, 
because  it  is  the  tone  of  the  profession.  Un¬ 
questionably,  in  many  individuals  the  thought 
is  so  thoroughly  assimilated  as  to  become  the 
man’s  very  own,  as  hard  to  depart  from  as  any 
ingrained  acquired  habit;  and  to  this  we  owe  the 
frequency  of  its  manifestations  in  nations  where 
the  word  itself  has  received  a  dignity  of  recognition 
which  sets  it  apart  from  the  common  vocabulary  — 
deifies  it,  so  to  say. 

All  this  is  very  fine.  It  is  superb  to  see  human 
nature,  in  man  or  in  people,  lifting  itself  up  above 
itself  by  sheer  force  of  adhesion  to  a  great  ideal; 
to  mark  those  who  have  received  the  conception 
elevated,  not  through  their  own  efforts,  but  by 
force  of  association,  like  the  tonic  effect  of  an 
invigorating  atmosphere.  But  our  hard-won 
victories  over  ourselves  cannot  by  themselves 
alone  make  us  that  which  by  nature  we  are  not. 
Nature  has  been  suppressed  in  its  evil,  and 
upon  its  restless  revolt  good  enthroned;  but  the 
evil  lives  still  and  rebels.  The  palace  is  kept  and 
held  by  a  strong  man  armed;  but  ever  in  danger 
that  a  stronger  than  he,  whom  we  call  Nature, 
shall  return  in  force  and  retrieve  his  past  defeat. 
It  was  finely  said  of  Washington,  by  one  who 


The  Strength  0}  Nelson 


287 


knew  him  intimately  —  Gouverneur  Morris  — 
“Control  his  passions!  Yes;  and  few  men 
have  had  stronger  to  control.  But  many  men 
have  controlled  their  passions,  so  as  not  to  do 
that  to  which  they  were  impelled.  But  where 
have  you  known  one  who,  like  him,  always, 
under  whatever  conditions,  could  do,  and  did, 
what  the  duty  of  the  moment  required,  despite 
fatigue,  or  distaste,  or  natural  repulsion.”  The 
writer  who  made  this  comparison  had  moved 
amid  all  the  scenes  of  dire  distress  and  anxiety 
that  marked  the  American  War  of  Independence, 
and  had  personal  acquaintance  with  the  chief 
actors.  This  is  the  innate  positive  quality,  not 
the  acquired  negative  self-control,  battling  with 
self.  I  doubt  if  most  of  us  stop  to  realize  the 
full  force  of  the  word  “  innate,”  which  slips 
glibly  enough  from  our  tongues  without  apprecia¬ 
tion  of  its  significance.  Inborn;  this  is  not 
nature  controlled,  but  nature  controlling;  not 
the  tiger,  or  the  ape,  or  the  sloth,  held  by  the 
throat,  but  the  man  himself  in  the  fulness  of  his 
powers  exercising  his  natural  supremacy  over 
himself.  Such  was  duty  to  Nelson;  a  mistress, 
not  that  compelled  obedience,  but  that  attracted 
the  devotion  of  a  nature  which  intuitively  recog¬ 
nised  her  loveliness,  and  worshipped.  Like  the 
hearers  at  Pentecost,  he  recognized  in  her  voice 


288  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


the  tongue  to  which  he  was  born;  he  saw  her  — 
yes,  despite  his  one  great  fall,  we  may  say  it  — 
he  saw  her  fairer  than  the  daughters  of  men. 


Stern  Lawgiver!  Thou  dost  wear 

The  Godhead’s  most  benignant  grace; 

Nor  know  we  anything  so  fair 
As  is  the  smile  upon  thy  face. 

A  natural  character,  we  have  all  felt  the  at¬ 
tractiveness  of  such,  the  attractiveness  of  truth 
and  beauty;  but  when,  to  such  a  nature,  is  added 
nobility  as  well,  we  have  one  of  the  rare  com¬ 
binations  which  compels  homage.  Nelson  was 
eminently  natural,  affectionate,  impulsive,  ex¬ 
pansive;  but  it  is  this  singular  gift,  this  peculiar 
recognition  of  duty,  with  another  I  shall  mention, 
which  has  set  him  upon  his  pedestal,  given  him 
the  niche  which  only  he  can  fill.  In  the  spirits 
of  his  people  he  has  found  a  nobler  Westminster 
Abbey  than  that  of  which  he  dreamed.  But, 
you  may  ask,  how  do  you  demonstrate  that  he 
had  this  gift?  Alas,  I  am  not  a  Boswell;  I  wish 
I  were,  and  that  there  survived  the  records  of 
conversations  with  which  I,  or  another,  could 
reconstruct  his  image,  as  Boswell  drew  Johnson. 
Yet  when  a  career  opens  and  closes  upon  the  same 
keynote,  we  may  be  sure  of  the  harmonious  whole 


The  Strength  0}  Nelson 


289 


—  of  which,  indeed,  traces  enough  remain  to 
confirm  our  assurances.  You  know  the  two 
stories  of  childhood  handed  down  to  us.  The 
brothers  starting  for  school  after  Christmas 
holidays,  driven  back  by  the  weather,  and  started 
again  with  the  father’s  mandate,  “  You  may  return 
if  it  is  necessary;  but  I  leave  it  to  your  honor 
not  to  do  so  unless  it  is  really  dangerous  to  pro¬ 
ceed.”  It  seemed  dangerous,  and  one  was  for 
returning;  but  the  Nelson  said,  “No,  it  was  left 
to  our  honor.”  Not  the  word  “duty,”  no;  but 
the  essence  of  duty,  the  look  out  from  self,  the 
recognition  of  the  something  external  and  higher 
than  the  calls  of  the  body.  In  one  so  young  — 
he  was  but  twelve  when  he  went  to  sea  some  time 
after  this  —  it  is  Nature  which  speaks,  not  an 
acquired  standard.  In  later  years,  in  terms 
somewhat  fantastic,  he  said  he  beheld  ever  a 
radiant  orb  beckoning  him  onward.  Honor 
he  called  it,  the  twin  sister  —  rather  let  us  say 
the  express  image  —  in  which  duty,  regarding 
as  in  a  glass,  sees  herself  reflected.  Then,  again, 
there  is  the  story  of  stealing  the  fruit  from  the 
schoolmaster’s  pear-tree  —  a  trivial  enough  school¬ 
boy  prank,  risking  the  penalties  of  detection  which 
his  comrades  dared  not  face.  Neither  duty  nor 
honor  goes  to  such  a  feat  in  its  nakedness;  but 
the  refusal  to  eat  the  fruit,  the  proud  avowal  that 


290  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


he  went  only  because  the  others  feared,  bears 
witness  to  the  same  disregard  of  personal  advan¬ 
tage,  the  same  determination  of  action  by  con¬ 
siderations  external  to  self,  the  same  eye  to  the 
approval  of  the  consciousness  —  of  the  conscience 
—  which  spoke  in  the  signal  at  Trafalgar,  and 
soothed  the  dying  moments  by  the  high  testimony 
within:  not,  “I  have  won  renown;”  not  “I 
have  achieved  success;”  but,  “I  have  done  my 
duty.”  He  was  not  indifferent  to  success;  he 
was  far  from  indifferent  to  renown.  “  If  it  be  a 
sin  to  covet  glory,”  he  once  quoted,  “  then  am 
I  the  most  offending  soul  alive.”  But  the  solemn 
hour  which  gives  the  validity  of  an  oath  to  the 
statement  of  the  dying,  assuredly  avouches  to 
us  that  then  the  man,  as  once  the  child,  spoke  out 
the  true  secret  of  his  being  —  the  tongue  into 
which  he  was  born. 

And  in  this  also  is  the  secret,  not  only  of  his 
own  devotion  to  duty,  but  of  the  influence  of  his 
personality  upon  others;  both  in  the  infancy  of 
his  professional  career,  and  now  in  the  maturity 
of  his  immortal  renown.  What  he  thus  possessed 
he  possessed  naturally,  positively,  aggressively, 
and  therefore  contagiously.  He  had  root  in 
himself,  to  use  a  familiar  expression;  and  the 
life  which  was  thus  no  mere  offshoot  of  conven¬ 
tion,  but  his  very  own,  gave  itself  out  abundantly 


The  Strength  oj  Nelson 


291 


to  others,  multiplying  himself.  He  gave  out  by 
example;  he  gave  out  by  words,  uttered,  indeed, 
expressly,  yet  so  casually  that  the  impression 
resembles  the  fleeting  glimpse  of  an  interior, 
caught  through  the  momentary  tossing  aside  of 
a  curtain;  he  gave  out  through  the  heroic  atmos¬ 
phere  of  self-devotion  which  he  bore  about  him; 
he  gave  out  by  cordial  recognition  of  excellence 
in  others.  Any  other  man  who  did  his  duty, 
whether  comrade  or  subordinate,  was  to  him  a 
fellow  worshipper  at  the  shrine ;  his  heart  went  out 
to  him,  whether  in  failure  or  in  success,  if  only 
the  will  was  there.  No  testimony  is  clearer  or 
more  universal  than  that  to  his  generosity  in 
appreciation  of  others;  and  it  was  seen,  not  only 
in  recognition  of  achievement  already  accom¬ 
plished,  but  in  the  confident  expectation  of 
achievement  yet  to  be  effected.  The  original  form 
of  the  Trafalgar  signal,  spoken  by  himself,  “  Nel¬ 
son  confides  that  every  man  will  do  his  duty,” 
was  no  mere  casual  utterance.  It  summed  up 
the  conviction  and  habit  of  a  lifetime.  As  the 
words,  “  Thank  God,  I  have  done  my  duty,” 
were  his  dying  words  personally,  so  those  just 
quoted  may  be  said  to  have  been  his  last  words 
professionally.  Indeed,  he  himself  said  as  much, 
for  when  they  had  been  communicated  to  the 
fleet  he  remarked,  “  Now  I  can  do  no  more.  We 


292  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


must  trust  (confide)  to  the  great  Disposer  of  all 
events.”  His  great  career  ended  when  that 
signal  had  been  read  and  acknowledged. 

Because  in  himself  so  trustworthy,  he  trusted 
abundantly;  and  all  of  us  know  the  stimulus  of 
feeling  ourselves  trusted,  of  looking  forward  with 
certainty  to  just  appreciation  of  good  work  done. 
“  I  am  well  aware,”  wrote  one  of  his  younger 
captains,  “  of  the  good  construction  which  your 
Lordship  has  ever  been  in  the  habit  of  putting 
on  circumstances,  although  wearing  the  most 
unfavorable  appearances.  Your  Lordship’s  good 
opinion  constitutes  the  summit  of  my  ambition 
and  the  most  effective  spur  to  my  endeavors.” 
“  I  am  pleased,”  writes  another,  “  that  an  op¬ 
portunity  is  offered  for  showing  my  gratitude  in 
a  small  degree  for  his  almost  fatherly  kindness.” 
In  a  letter  of  instructions  to  a  captain  about  to 
encounter  some  perplexing  and  critical  conditions, 
after  prescribing  for  several  circumstances  that 
may  arise,  he  concludes,  in  the  case  of  the  unfore¬ 
seen,  “  You  must  then  act  as  your  judgment  may 
direct  you,  and  I  am  sure  that  will  be  very  proper.” 
If  delinquency  actually  occurred,  as  he  conceived 
it  had  in  the  case  of  Sir  Sidney  Smith,  his  wrath 
had  all  the  fierceness  of  trust  betrayed,  for  he  was 
a  man  impatient  and  of  strong  passions;  but 
otherwise  doubts  of  another’s  doing  his  duty  did 


The  Strength  of  Nelson  293 


not  occur  to  him.  His  confidence  in  himself, 
in  his  own  self-devotion  and  capacity,  made  him 
trustful  of  others,  and  inspired  them  with  devotion 
to  the  service  and  to  the  country,  for  his  sake,  and 
because  they  saw  it  in  him.  A  captain  who  met 
him  for  the  first  time  just  before  Trafalgar,  and 
who  fell  in  the  battle,  wrote  home,  “  I  have  been 
very  lucky  with  most  of  my  admirals,  but  I  really 
think  the  present  the  pleasantest  I  have  met 
with.  He  is  so  good  and  pleasant  that  we  all  wish 
to  do  what  he  likes,  without  any  kind  of  orders/’ 
This  was  the  clear  reflection  of  his  own  spirit, 
begot  of  his  own  confidence  in  others,  because 
he  met  them  and  trusted  them  as  himself.  Dutiful, 
probably,  in  any  event,  as  imitators  of  him  they 
were  more  so.  He  expected  in  others  what  he 
felt  in  himself,  and  diffused  around  him  the 
atmosphere  of  energy,  zeal,  and  happiness  in 
endeavor,  which  was  native  to  himself.  “  He 
had  in  a  great  degree,”  wrote  a  contemporary 
who  had  known  him  from  boyhood,  “  the  valuable 
but  rare  quality  of  conciliating  the  most  opposite 
tempers,  and  forwarding  the  public  service  with 
unanimity,  among  men  not  of  themselves  disposed 
to  accord.”  Yes;  but  the  unanimity  was  not 
that  of  accordant  opinion,  but  of  a  common 
devotion  to  a  common  object,  before  which 
differences  subsided;  to  duty,  seeing  in  others  a 


294  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


like  devotion,  a  like  purpose  to  do  their  best. 
This  spirit  Nelson  shed  about  him;  with  this  he 
inspired  others  in  his  day,  and  still  does  in  our 
own.  It  was  the  contagion  of  his  personality, 
continuous  in  action,  and  ever  watchful  against 
offence,  and  even  against  misunderstanding.  “  My 
dear  Keats,”  he  wrote  to  a  captain  whose  worn- 
out  ship  was  incorrigibly  slow  when  speed  was 
most  desirable,  “  I  am  fearful  you  may  think 
that  the  Superb  does  not  go  as  fast  as  I  could  wish. 
I  would  have  you  to  be  assured  that  I  know  and 
feel  that  the  Superb  does  all  which  is  possible  for 
a  ship  to  accomplish;  and  I  desire  that  you  will 
not  fret.”  “  My  dear  Collingwood,  I  shall  come 
out  and  make  you  a  visit;  not,  my  dear  friend, 
to  take  your  command  from  you,  but  to  consult 
how  we  may  best  serve  our  country  by  detaching 
a  part  of  this  large  force.”  St.  Vincent’s  testimony 
here  is  invaluable :  “  The  delicacy  you  have 

always  shown  to  senior  officers  is  a  sure  presage 
of  your  avoiding  by  every  means  in  your  power 
to  give  umbrage.”  He  wrote  himself,  “  If  ever  I 
feel  great,  it  is  in  never  having,  in  thought,  word, 
or  deed,  robbed  any  man  of  his  fair  fame.” 

Instances  of  this  delicate  consideration  for  the 
feelings  of  others,  dictated  often  by  appreciation 
of  their  temperaments  as  well  as  of  their  circum¬ 
stances,  could  be  multiplied.  But  we  read  them 


The  Strength  oj  Nelson  295 


imperfectly,  missing  their  significance,  if  we  see 
in  them  mere  kindliness  of  temper;  for,  though 
kindly,  Nelson  was  irritable,  nervously  sensitive 
to  exasperating  incidents,  at  times  impatient  to 
petulance,  often  unreasonable  in  complaint.  Open 
expression  of  these  feelings,  evidences  of  tempera¬ 
ment,  flit  often  across  his  countenance,  traversing 
the  unity  of  the  artist’s  vision  and  embarrassing 
his  conception.  Nelson  was  not  faultless;  but 
he  was  great.  It  is  not,  indeed,  unprecedented 
to  find  such  foibles  in  connection  with  much 
kindliness;  they  are  easy  concomitants  in  a  warm 
temper.  But  this  appreciation  and  consideration 
were  with  him  no  mere  kindliness  of  temper, 
though  that  entered  into  them.  They  were  the 
reflection  outward  of  that  which  he  knew  and 
experienced  within.  In  his  followers  he  saw 
himself.  To  use  the  quaint  expression  of  Sweden¬ 
borg,  he  projected  around  him  his  own  sphere. 
Because  duty,  zeal,  energy  inspired  him,  he  saw 
them  quickening  others  also;  and  the  homage 
he  intuitively  paid  to  those  qualities  themselves 
he  gave  to  their  possessors  whom  he  saw  around 
him.  Each  man,  unless  proved  recreant,  thus 
stood  transfigured  in  the  light  which  came  from 
Nelson’s  self.  This  spontaneous  recognition  took 
form  in  an  avowed  scheme  of  life  and  action, 
which  rested,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  upon 


296  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


the  presumption  in  others  of  that  same  devotion 
to  duty,  that  same  zeal  to  perform  it,  and,  in 
proportion  to  the  individual’s  capacity,  the  same 
certainty  of  achievement  which  he  found  in 
himself.  “  Choose  them  yourself,”  he  replied  to 
the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  when  asked  to 
name  his  officers.  “  You  cannot  go  amiss. 
The  same  spirit  actuates  the  whole  profession; 
you  cannot  choose  wrong.”  The  man  to  whose 
lips  such  words  rise  spontaneous  simply  attributes 
to  others  what  he  finds  within,  and  what  by 
experience  he  has  found  himself  able  to  transfer. 
Out  of  the  abundance  of  the  heart  he  speaks, 
and  by  his  words  he  is  justified. 

Closely  connected  with  this  characteristic,  as 
is  warp  with  woof,  interwoven  manifestation 
indeed  of  a  quality  essentially  one  and  the  same, 
is  a  trait  in  Nelson  upon  which  I  myself  have 
been  inclined  to  lay  an  emphasis  which  I  do  not 
find  in  other  writers.  So  far  as  analysis  can  draw 
lines  between  the  essential  features  of  a  particular 
character,  the  one  to  which  I  now  allude  is  pecul¬ 
iarly  military  in  its  effectiveness;  whereas  devotion 
to  duty,  and  confidence  in  others,  may  rather 
be  called  personal.  At  least  they  are  not  to  be 
attributed  exclusively  to  the  military  professions, 
much  as  these  undoubtedly  have  gained  from 
the  insistence,  approaching  monopoly,  with  which 


The  Strength  0}  Nelson 


297 


in  them  the  idea  of  duty  has  been  enforced,  as 
supreme  among  the  incentives  of  the  soldier.  To 
the  Happy  Warrior,  Duty  does  not  bar  devotion 
to  other  virtues,  except  in  rivalry  with  herself. 
Courage,  obedience,  fortitude,  Duty  recognizes 
them  all  and  admits  them;  but  not  as  equals. 
They  are  but  parts  of  herself;  the  children, 
not  the  mother.  Differing  one  from  another,  in 
her  they  find  that  which  unites  and  consecrates 
them  all.  But  while  from  all  Duty  exacts  much, 
there  are  gifts  which  she  cannot  confer;  and 
among  them  is  one  found  in  few,  but  conspicuous 
in  Nelson. 

In  my  own  attempt  to  deal  with  his 
career,  I  spoke  of  this  as  Faith;  and  the  word 
was  criticized  as  inadequate  and  misleading, 
apparently  because  I  was  thought  to  use  it  in  a 
narrowly  religious  sense.  Now,  I  do  not  think 
that  Nelson  would  have  rejected  religious  trust 
in  God  as  a  prime  motive  in  his  professional  action; 
but  certainly,  to  my  mind,  if  Jesus  Christ  spoke 
with  only  the  authority  of  a  man,  he  expressed 
a  profound  philosophy  when  He  placed  faith  at 
the  foundation  of  all  lofty  and  successful  action, 
religious  or  other.  But  while  faith  has  a  recognized 
technical  meaning  in  theology,  it  has  a  much 
wider  practical  application;  and  when  called 
confidence,  or  conviction,  it  is  more  easy  to  under- 


298  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


stand  its  value  in  the  perplexities,  the  doubtful 
circumstances,  which  go  to  make  all  life,  but 
especially  the  life  of  the  military  leader,  responsible 
for  great  issues,  such  as  fell  to  Nelson’s  determina¬ 
tion.  Then  conviction,  when  possessed,  becomes 
indeed  the  solid  substance  of  things  which  the 
man  cannot  see  with  his  eyes,  nor  know  by  ordinary 
knowledge.  It  is  the  bed-rock  upon  which  action 
rears  its  building,  and  stands  four  square  against 
all  the  winds  that  blow.  It  is  not  so  much  a 
possession  as  that  the  man  is  possessed  by  it, 
and  goes  forward;  not  knowing  whither  he  goes, 
but  sure  that,  wherever  the  path  leads,  he  does 
right  to  follow.  As  Nelson  trusted  his  fellows, 
so  he  trusted  the  voice  within,  and  for  the  same 
reason;  in  both  he  recognized  the  speech  to 
which  he  was  born. 

Most  of  us  know  what  it  is  to  be  tossed  to  and 
fro  by  hesitations,  and  thereby  too  often  deterred 
from  action,  or  weakened  in  it.  Can  any  one  who 
has  felt  this  inward  anguish,  and  the  feebleness 
of  suspense,  and  at  last  has  arrived  at  a  working 
certainty,  doubt  the  value  and  power  of  a  faculty 
which  reaches  such  certainty,  reaches  conviction, 
by  processes  which,  indeed,  are  not  irrational, 
but  yet  in  their  influence  transcend  reason  ?  How 
clearly  does  reason  sometimes  lead  us  step  by 
step  to  a  conclusion  so  probable  as  to  be  worthy 


The  Strength  o }  Nelson 


299 


of  being  called  a  practical  certainty,  and  there 
leave  to  our  unaided  selves  the  one  further  step 
to  acceptance;  the  step  across  the  chasm  which 
yawns  between  conviction  and  knowledge,  between 
faith  and  sight.  This  we  have  not  the  nerve  to 
take  because  of  the  remaining  doubt.  Here 
reason,  the  goddess  of  to-day,  halts  and  fails. 
The  leap  to  acceptance,  which  faith  takes,  and 
wins,  reason  cannot  make,  nor  is  it  within  her 
gift  to  man.  The  consequent  weakness  and 
failure  are  more  conspicuous  in  military  life  than 
in  any  other,  because  of  the  greatness  of  the 
hazards,  the  instancy  and  gravity  of  the  result, 
should  acceptance  bring  disaster.  The  track  of 
military  history  is  strewn  with  the  dead  reputa¬ 
tions  and  the  shattered  schemes  which  have 
failed  to  receive  the  quickening  element  of  con¬ 
viction. 

Of  all  inborn  qualities,  this  is  one  of  the 
strongest,  as  it  is  the  rarest;  for,  let  it  be  marked, 
such  conviction  consists,  not  in  the  particular 
conclusion  reached,  but  in  the  dominating  power 
with  which  it  is  held.  This  puts  out  of  court 
all  other  considerations  before  entertained,  —  but 
now  cast  aside,  —  and  acts;  acts  as  though  no 
other  conclusion  were  possible,  or  ever  had  been. 
This  to  me  has  always  invested  with  the  force  of 
a  most  profound  allegory  the  celebrated  incident 


300  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


of  Nelson  putting  the  glass  to  his  blind  eye,  when 
looking  at  the  signal  which  contravened  his 
conviction.  The  time  for  hesitations  had  passed; 
there  had  been  a  time  for  discussion,  but 
there  remained  now  but  one  road  to  success. 
Conviction  shuts  its  eyes  to  all  else;  the  man 
who  admits  doubts  at  such  an  instant  is  lost.  It 
is  again  single-mindedness,  the  single  eye,  the 
undoubting,  revealed  amid  new  surroundings. 
Conviction  is  one;  doubts  many.  At  the  moment 
of  this  sublime  exhibition,  the  words  of  the  by¬ 
stander  depict  Nelson  as  one  breathing  inspira¬ 
tion  :  “  Though  the  fire  of  the  enemy  had  slack¬ 

ened,  the  result  had  certainly  not  declared  in 
favor  on  either  side.  Nelson  was  sometimes 
animated,  and  at  others  heroically  fine  in  his 
observations.  ‘  It  is  warm  work,  and  this  day 
may  be  the  last  for  any  of  us  at  a  moment;  but 
mark  you,  I  would  not  be  elsewhere  for  thou¬ 
sands.’  ”  “  Leave  off  action  !  D -  me  if  I 

do.”  The  man  was  possessed,  in  the  noble  sense 
of  the  word. 

With  less  dramatic  force,  but  no  less  telling  and 
decisive  effect,  the  same  power  of  conviction  mani¬ 
fested  itself  in  a  peculiarly  critical  moment  of 
his  career,  near  the  close  of  his  life.  In  May, 
1805,  he  left  his  station  in  the  Mediterranean  to 
pursue  an  allied  fleet  to  the  West  Indies.  He  had 


The  Strength  of  Nelson  301 


done  this  without  other  authority  than  his  own 
inferences  from  the  data  before  him;  yielding,  to 
quote  a  French  admirer,  to  one  of  the  finest 
inspirations  of  his  genius.  The  West  Indies 
reached,  he  failed  to  get  touch  of  the  enemy,  owing 
to  misinformation  given  him;  and  they  started 
back  to  Europe,  leaving  no  certain  trace  of  where 
they  were  gone.  Opinions  and  rumors  clamored 
and  clattered  around  him;  certainty  could  not 
be  had.  He  has  recorded  the  situation  himself 
in  words  which  convey,  more  forcibly  than  my 
pen  can,  what  is  the  power  of  conviction.  “  So 
far  from  being  infallible,  like  the  Pope,  I  believe 
my  opinions  to  be  very  fallible,  and  therefore  I 
may  be  mistaken  that  the  enemy’s  fleet  has  gone 
to  Europe;  but  /  cannot  bring  myself  to  think 
otherwise ,  notwithstanding  the  variety  of  opin¬ 
ions  which  different  people  of  good  judgment 
form.”  “  My  opinion  is  firm  as  a  rock,  that 
some  cause  has  made  them  resolve  to  proceed 
direct  for  Europe.”  Can  conviction  use  stronger 
words  ? 

And  what  is  conviction  but  trust;  trust  in  the 
unseen  ?  Trust  not  irrational,  not  causeless,  not 
unable  to  give  some  account  of  itself;  but  still 
short  of  knowledge,  ignorant  in  part,  deriving  its 
power,  not  from  what  it  sees,  but  from  an  unseen 
source  within.  To  deny  the  existence  and  strength 


302  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


of  such  a  faculty  in  some  favored  men  is  to  shut 
one’s  eyes  to  the  experience  of  history,  and  of 
daily  life  around  us;  a  blindness,  or  a  perversity, 
quite  as  real  as  it  would  be  to  ignore  the  shilly¬ 
shally  vacillations  of  the  multitude  of  clever  men, 
who  never  find  in  themselves  the  power  to  act  upon 
their  opinions,  if  action  involves  risk,  because 
opinion  receives  not  that  inward  light  which  we 
called  conviction,  confidence,  trust,  faith.  In 
Nelson  this  confidence,  like  his  devotion  to  duty, 
and  his  trust  in  others,  envelops  his  record,  like 
an  atmosphere  which  one  insensibly  feels,  but  the 
power  of  which  is  realized  only  by  stopping  to 
reflect.  Lord  Minto,  who  had  known  him  inti¬ 
mately  from  the  very  beginnings  of  his  greatness, 
and  who  knew  the  navy  too,  wrote  after  his  death : 
“The  navy  is  certainly  full  of  the  bravest  men; 
but  there  was  a  sort  of  heroic  cast  about  Nelson 
that  I  never  saw  in  any  other  man,  and  which 
seems  wanting  to  the  achievement  of  impossible 
things,  which  became  easy  to  him.”  Not  that 
he  had  not  to  encounter  perplexities  and  doubts 
in  plenty.  There  is  little  singularity  in  con¬ 
viction  where  there  is  nothing  to  shake  it.  None 
of  us  have  trouble  in  admitting  that  two  and  two 
make  four.  But  as  Nelson’s  actions  are  followed, 
whatever  the  obscurity  of  the  conditions,  one  finds 
oneself  always  in  presence  of  a  spirit  as  settled  in 


The  Strength  oj  Nelson  303 


its  course,  when  once  decided,  as  though  doubt 
were  not  possible. 

Our  quest  has  been  the  strength  of  Nelson.  I 
find  it  in  the  inborn  natural  power  to  trust;  to 
trust  himself  and  others;  to  confide,  to  use  his 
own  word.  Whether  it  is  the  assurance  within, 
which  we  call  conviction,  or  the  assurance  without, 
which  we  call  confidence,  in  others  or  in  one’s 
own  action,  this  is  the  basic  principle  and  motive 
force  of  his  career,  as  Duty  was  its  guiding  light 
and  controlling;  standard.  I  make  less  of  his 
clear  perceptions,  his  sound  judgment,  of  the 
general  rational  processes  which  illuminated  his 
course,  as  I  also  do  of  the  courage,  fortitude, 
zeal,  which  illustrated  his  deeds.  All  these 
things,  valuable  as  they  are,  he  shared  with  others. 
He  possessed  them,  possibly,  in  an  unusual 
degree,  but  still  in  common  with  many  to  whom 
they  could  never  bring  success,  because  unas¬ 
sociated  with  that  indefinable  something,  which, 
like  a  yet  undiscovered  element  in  nature,  or  an 
undetected  planet,  we  recognize  by  its  workings, 
and  may  to  it  even  attribute  a  name,  though 
unable  as  yet  adequately  to  describe.  Genius, 
we  not  infrequently  say;  a  word  which,  not  yet 
defined,  stands  a  mute  confession  of  our  ignorance 
wherein  it  consists.  As  I  conceive  it,  there  is  no 
genius  greater  than  faith ;  though  it  may  well  be 


304  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


that  in  so  saying  we  have  but  given  another  name 
with  no  nearer  approach  to  a  definition. 

In  a  celebrated  funeral  oration,  which  we  all 
know,  the  speaker  says:  “  I  come  to  bury  Caesar, 
not  to  praise  him.”  It  is  for  no  such  purpose  that 
men  observe  this  day;  for  the  man,  the  memory 
of  whom  now  moves  his  people,  is  not  one  to  be 
buried,  but  to  be  praised  and  kept  in  everlasting 
remembrance.  True,  he  needs  not  our  praises, 
but  we  need  to  praise  him  for  our  own  sakes. 
The  Majesty  on  high  is  exalted  far  above  all 
praise,  yet  it  is  good  to  praise  Him ;  for  the  essence 
of  praise  is  not  the  homage  of  the  lips,  but  the 
recognition  of  excellence;  and  recognition,  when 
real,  elevates,  ennobles.  It  fosters  an  ideal 
which  tends  to  induce  imitation,  and  to  uplift 
by  sheer  force  of  appreciation  and  association. 
And  as  with  the  Creator,  so  with  the  excellent 
among  his  creatures.  We  need  not  ignore  their 
failings,  or  their  sins,  although  an  occasion  like 
the  present  is  not  one  for  dwelling  upon  these; 
but  as  we  recognize  in  them  men  of  like  frailities 
with  ourselves,  we  yet  perceive  that,  despite  all, 
they  have  not  only  done  the  great  works,  but  have 
been  the  great  men  whom  we  may  justly  reverence. 
That  they  in  their  weakness  have  had  so  much 
in  common  with  us  gives  hope  that  we  may  yet 
have  something  in  common  with  them  in  their 


The  Strength  oj  Nelson 


305 


strength.  It  is  the  high  grace  and  privilege  of  a 
man  like  Nelson  that  he  provokes  emulation 
rather  than  rivalry,  imitation  rather  than  com¬ 
petition.  To  extol  him  uplifts  ourselves.  As  it 
was  when  he  lived  on  earth,  so  it  is  now.  His  life 
is  an  inheritance  to  children’s  children;  of  his 
own  people  first,  but  after  them  of  all  the  nations 
of  the  earth. 


THE  VALUE  OF  THE  PACIFIC  CRUISE 
OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  FLEET,  1908 

Prospect  and  Retrospect 

Prospect:  The  Scientific  American,  December  7, 

I9°7- 

Retrospect:  Collier’s  Weekly,  August  29,  1908. 


THE  VALUE  OF  THE  PACIFIC  CRUISE 
OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  FLEET,  1908. 


Prospect 


HE  projected  movement  of  an  American 


A  fleet  of  sixteen  battleships,  with  attendant 
smaller  vessels,  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific 
coast  of  the  United  States  is  an  event  not  only 
important,  both  from  the  professional  and  national 
point  of  view,  but  striking  to  the  imagination. 
It  carries  in  itself  certain  elements  of  grandeur. 
It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  it  should  have 
attracted  particular  notice  from  the  press;  but 
the  effect  upon  the  imagination  of  several  journals 
has  been  such  as  to  approach  the  border  line  of 
insanity.  A  measure  designed  upon  its  face  to 
reach  a  practical  solution  of  one  of  the  most  urgent 
naval  problems  that  can  confront  a  nation  having 
two  seaboards,  extremely  remote  the  one  from 
the  other,  has  been  persistently  represented  as 
a  menace  to  a  friendly  power  —  Japan;  and 
so  effectively  has  this  campaign  of  misrepresenta¬ 
tion  been  carried  on,  so  successfully  has  an  ob- 


310  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


vious  and  perfectly  sufficient  reason  for  this  cruise 
been  ignored  in  favor  of  one  less  probable,  and, 
so  far  as  knowledge  went,  non-existent,  that 
certain  of  the  press  of  Japan,  we  are  told,  have 
echoed  the  cry. 

Not  only  so,  but  European  journals,  notably 
some  in  Great  Britain,  among  them  certain  which 
are  incessant  in  their  warnings  against  Germany, 
and  conscious  that  the  whole  distribution  of  the 
British  fleet  has  of  late  been  modified,  with  the 
object  of  increasing  the  battleship  force  quickly 
available  for  the  North  Sea,  where  their  only 
enemy  is  Germany,  nevertheless  affect  to  depre¬ 
cate  the  dispatch  of  a  United  States  fleet  from 
its  Atlantic  to  its  Pacific  coast,  where  it  will  be 
four  thousand  miles  from  Japan,  against  the  two 
or  three  hundred  which  separate  England  and 
Germany.  A  new  British  naval  base  has  been 
established  on  the  North  Sea.  The  naval  ma¬ 
noeuvres  of  this  autumn  (1907),  in  which  have 
taken  part  twenty-six  battleships  and  fifteen  to 
twenty  armored  cruisers,  that  is,  over  forty  ar¬ 
mored  vessels,  with  other  cruisers  and  torpedo 
boats  in  numbers,  have  been  in  the  North  Sea; 
one  coast  only  of  which  is  British  as  our  Pacific 
coast  is  ours.  The  Naval  Annual  for  this  year, 
a  publication  conservative  in  tone  as  well  as 
high  in  authority,  discusses  the  strategy  of  the 


Cruise  0}  TJ.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


311 


North  Sea  with  unhesitating  reference  to  Germany. 
I  take  from  it  the  statement  that  by  May,  1908, 
86  per  cent,  of  the  British  battleship  strength  will 
be  concentrated  in  or  near  home  waters.  Yet, 
in  the  face  of  all  this,  the  rulers  of  Great  Britain 
and  Germany,  at  this  very  moment  of  my  writing, 
find  no  difficulty  in  exchanging  peaceful  assur¬ 
ances,  the  sincerity  of  which  we  have  no  good 
reason  to  doubt.  Have  we  also  forgotten  that, 
upon  the  Emperor  William’s  famous  telegram 
to  Kruger,  a  British  special  squadron  was 
ordered  into  commission,  ready  for  instant  move¬ 
ment  ?  Whether  a  retort  or  a  menace,  even  so 
overt  a  measure,  in  home  waters,  gave  rise  to 
no  further  known  diplomatic  action.  We  Ameri¬ 
cans  are  attributing  to  other  people  a  thinness 
of  skin,  suggestive  of  an  over-sensitiveness  in 
ourselves  which  it  was  hoped  we  had  outgrown. 

Let  it  be  said  at  once,  definitely  and  definitively, 
that  there  is  in  international  law,  or  in  inter¬ 
national  comity,  absolutely  no  ground  of  offence 
to  any  state,  should  another  state,  neighbor  or 
remote,  see  fit  to  move  its  navy  about  its  own 
coasts  in  such  manner  as  it  pleases.  Whatever 
Germany  may  think  of  the  new  distribution  of 
the  British  navy,  she  says  nothing,  but  will  silently 
govern  her  own  measures  accordingly.  The 
statesmen  of  Japan,  who  understand  perfectly 


312  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


the  proprieties  of  international  relations,  know 
this  well,  and  doubtless  retain  their  composure; 
but  the  result  of  the  action  of  certain  of  the  Amer¬ 
ican  press  has  been  to  stir  up  popular  feeling 
in  both  countries,  by  the  imputation  to  the  United 
States  government  of  motives  and  purposes  which 
cannot  be  known,  and  which  prima  facie  are 
less  probable  than  the  object  officially  avowed. 
Whether  this  endeavour  to  rouse  ill  blood  has 
been  intentional  or  not,  is  of  course  known  only 
to  the  editors;  but  grave  ground  for  suspecting 
even  so  unworthy  a  motive  as  to  injure  the  national 
administration  is  fairly  to  be  inferred  from  such 
a  paragraph  as  I  shall  here  quote,  from  a  New 
York  journal  of  October  6.  My  chief  object  in 
quoting,  however,  is  not  to  impugn  motives, 
however  reasonable  such  construction,  but  to 
emphasize  the  essential  characteristic  of  the 
coming  movement  of  our  fleet: 

“  Suppose  that  soon  after  the  New  Orleans 
riots,  when  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Italy  were  ‘  strained,’  the  American  fleet  had 
been  sent  on  a  practice  cruise  to  the  Mediterranean. 

“  Suppose  that  soon  after  the  Venezuela  mes¬ 
sage,  Mr.  Cleveland  had  ordered  the  whole  Amer- 
can  fighting  naval  strength  to  take  a  practice 
cruise  off  Nova  Scotia  or  Jamaica.” 

Such  action,  in  either  supposed  case,  would  have 


Cruise  of  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


313 


been  wantonly  insolent  and  aggressive,  calculated 
to  provoke  hostilities,  and  such  as  no  statesman 
would  take,  unless  he  had  already  determined  to 
force  war,  or  saw  it  looming  large  on  the  horizon; 
as  when  the  British  fleet  was  sent  to  Besika  Bay 
in  1878.  The  insolence,  aggression,  and  provo¬ 
cation,  however,  would  have  been  the  demon¬ 
stration  off  the  coast  of  the  nation  with  whom 
diplomatic  difficulty  existed.  Occurring  when 
these  innuendoes  did,  in  the  midst  of  the  virulent 
campaign  of  imputation  of  warlike  purposes 
against  the  Administration,  the  inference  is  irre¬ 
sistible  that  there  was  deliberate  intention  to 
parallel  the  sending  of  our  fleet  from  our  one 
coast  to  our  other  to  a  measure  as  offensive  as 
those  named.  The  distinguishing  characteristic 
of  the  movement  now  projected,  from  the  in¬ 
ternational  point  of  view,  is  that  it  is  not  in  the 
nature  of  a  demonstration,  peaceful  or  hostile, 
off  the  coast  of  any  other  state,  much  less  off 
that  of  one  with  whom  our  relations  are  asserted 
by  the  press  to  be  delicate.  Not  every  man  in 
the  street,  however,  could  detect  the  fallacy. 
It  is  a  maxim  of  law  that  intention  can  only  be 
inferred  from  action.  So  wild  an  insinuation, 
in  the  columns  of  a  journal  distinguished  for  in¬ 
telligence,  can,  so  far  as  the  action  shows,  be 
attributed  only  to  a  willingness  to  mislead,  or  to 
a  loss  of  head. 


314  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


In  pursuing  the  next  aspect  of  this  cruise  to 
which  I  purpose  to  devote  attention,  I  am  led 
again  to  quote  the  same  journal: 

“  We  are  asked  to  believe  that  this  expedition 
to  the  Pacific  is  a  mere  ‘  practice  cruise.’  He 
must  be  a  miracle  of  innocent  credulity  who  be¬ 
lieves  it.  What  observant  men  perceive  in  this 
dangerous  situation  is  a  cataclysm  trained  and 
bridled  for  Theodore  Roosevelt  to  bestride  and 
run  amuck.” 

The  last  sentence  is  not  necessary  to  my  pur¬ 
pose;  but  I  preserve  it,  partly  for  that  gem  of 
metaphor,  “  a  cataclysm  trained  and  bridled,” 
and  partly  for  the  directness  of  the  charge  against 
the  President  of  preparing  conditions  that  must 
issue  in  war. 

For  the  rest,  if  to  believe  in  the  obvious  and 
adequate  motive  of  practice  for  the  fleet  is  to  be  a 
“  miracle  of  innocent  credulity,”  such  I  must  ad¬ 
mit  myself  to  be;  and  I  do  so  heartily.  I  am  not 
in  the  councils  of  either  the  government  or  the 
Navy  Department.  I  have  neither  talked  with 
nor  heard  from  any  person  who  from  official 
position  could  communicate  to  me  any  knowl¬ 
edge  of  the  facts.  My  own  information  has  been 
confined  throughout  to  the  newspapers.  Shortly 
after  the  purpose  to  send  the  fleet  became  known, 
and  counter  agitation  to  be  made,  I  had  occasion 


Cruise  oj  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


315 


to  write  to  a  British  naval  friend;  and  I  said  to 
him  then  that,  while  I  had  no  clue  to  the  motives 
of  the  Administration,  it  seemed  to  me  that  a 
perfectly  sufficient  reason  was  the  experience  to 
be  gained  by  the  fleet  in  making  a  long  voyage, 
which  otherwise  might  have  to  be  made  for  the 
first  time  under  the  pressure  of  war,  and  the  dis¬ 
advantage  of  not  having  experienced  at  least 
once  the  huge  administrative  difficulties  connected 
with  so  distant  an  expedition  by  a  large  body  of 
vessels  dependent  upon  their  own  resources. 
By  “  own  resources  ”  must  be  understood,  not 
that  which  each  vessel  carries  in  herself,  but 
self-dependence  as  distinguished  from  dependence 
on  near  navy  yards  —  the  great  snare  of  peace 
times.  The  renewal  of  stores  and  coal  on  the 
voyage  is  a  big  problem,  whether  the  supply 
vessels  accompany  the  fleet  or  are  directed  to 
join  from  point  to  point.  It  is  a  problem  of 
combination,  and  of  subsistence;  a  distinctly  mil¬ 
itary  problem.  To  grapple  with  such  a  question 
is  as  really  practical  as  is  fleet  tactics  or  target 
practice. 

To  this  opinion  I  now  adhere,  after  having 
viewed  the  matter  in  the  light  of  such  historical 
and  professional  thought  and  training  as  I  can 
bring  to  it.  Other  reasons  may  have  concurred; 
of  this  I  know  nothing.  The  one  reason,  practice, 


316  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


is  sufficient.  It  is  not  only  adequate,  but  impera¬ 
tive.  The  experiment  —  for  such  it  is  until  it 
has  become  experience  —  should  have  been  made 
sooner  rather  than  be  now  postponed.  That 
it  was  not  sooner  attempted  has  been,  probably, 
because  the  growth  of  the  navy  has  only  now 
reached  the  numbers,  sufficiently  homogeneous, 
to  make  the  movement  exhaustively  instructive. 

The  word  practice  covers  legitimately  many 
features  of  naval  activity,  which  differ  markedly 
and  even  radically  from  one  another,  though 
all  conducive  to  the  common  end  —  proficiency. 
I  may  perhaps  illustrate  advantageously  by  a  re¬ 
mark  I  have  had  occasion  to  make  elsewhere, 
upon  two  theories  concerning  the  summer  practice 
cruises  of  the  Naval  Academy.  There  were  — 
probably  still  are  —  those  who  advocated  spend¬ 
ing  most  of  the  allotted  time  in  quiet,  contracted, 
waters,  following  a  prearranged  routine  of  prac¬ 
tical  drills  of  various  descriptions,  which  would 
thus  be  as  little  as  possible  disturbed  by  weather 
or  similar  impediment.  Others  favored  the 
practice  vessels  putting  out  at  once  to  sea  for  a 
voyage  of  length,  amounting  often  to  five  or  six 
thousand  miles,  in  which  must  necessarily  be 
experienced  many  kinds  of  weather  and  other 
incidents,  reproducing  the  real  life  of  the  sea,  and 
enforcing  such  practical  action  as  the  variable 


Cruise  of  U .  S.  Atlantic  Fleet  317 


ocean  continually  exacts.  It  is  evident  that 
these  conceptions,  though  opposite,  are  not  con¬ 
trary  to  each  other,  but  complementary;  and  a 
moment’s  thought  shows  that  under  another 
phase  they  reappear  in  every  fleet,  if  its  active 
life  is  thoughtfully  ordered  with  a  view  to  full 
efficiency.  It  is  imperative  that  a  fleet,  for  a 
large  proportion  of  the  year,  seek  retired  waters 
and  relatively  equable  weather,  for  the  purposes 
of  drill  with  the  guns;  from  the  slow  graduated 
instruction  of  the  gunners,  the  deliberate  firing 
at  a  stationary  target,  and  from  a  ship  either  at 
rest  or  slowly  moving,  up  through  successive  ac¬ 
cretions  of  speed  of  ship,  and  of  discharges,  until 
the  extreme  test  is  reached  of  fast  steaming,  and 
firing  with  the  utmost  quickness  with  which  the 
guns  can  be  handled.  In  like  manner  the  ma¬ 
noeuvring  of  a  body  of  several  ships  in  rapid 
movement,  changing  from  one  formation  to 
another,  for  the  ultimate  purposes  of  battle, 
must  progress  gradually,  in  order  that  com¬ 
manding  officers  and  their  under-studies  may 
gain,  not  only  ability,  but  confidence,  based 
upon  habit;  upon  knowledge  of  what  their  own 
ships  can  do,  and  what  they  may  expect  from 
the  other  vessels  about  them.  Ships  in  battle  order 
must  keep  at  distances  which,  relatively  to  the 
speed  maintained,  are  short;  dangerously  short, 


318  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


except  where  compensated  by  the  sureness  of 
handling  based  on  long  practice.  It  is  clear  also 
that  alterations  in  the  personnel  of  a  fleet,  which 
are  of  frequent  occurrence,  make  constant  tacti¬ 
cal  drills  additionally  necessary. 

But  when  all  this  —  and  more  not  here  specified 
—  has  been  accomplished,  whether  at  the  Naval 
Academy  or  for  the  fleet,  what  has  been  done 
but  lay  the  necessary  foundation  upon  which  to 
rear  the  superstructure  of  the  real  life  of  the 
profession  ?  There  remains  still  to  fulfil  the 
object  —  very  different  from  mere  practice,  though 
dependent  upon  it  —  which  alone  justifies  the 
existence  of  a  navy.  The  pupil  of  the  Naval 
Academy  passes  naturally  and  imperceptibly  into 
the  routine  of  life  of  the  service  by  the  simple 
incident  of  being  ordered  to  a  sea-going  ship;  the 
single  ship,  the  cruiser,  gains  her  sufficient  experi¬ 
ence  by  the  mere  fact  of  staying  at  sea;  but  a  fleet 
tied  to  its  home  ports,  or  to  the  drill  ground,  does 
not  undergo,  and  therefore  does  not  possess, 
the  fulness  of  fleet  life.  Not  only  are  the  in¬ 
terruptions  numerous  and  injurious;  not  only 
does  the  easily  reached  navy  yard  sap  the  habit 
of  self-reliance;  but  out  in  the  deep,  dependent 
upon  itself  alone  and  for  a  long  period,  there 
await  a  fleet  on  a  distant  voyage  problems  so 
different  in  degree  from  those  of  a  vessel  alone 


Cruise  of  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


319 


as  practically  to  be  different  in  kind.  Multiply 
any  kind  of  difficulty  by  sixteen,  and  you  have 
passed  from  one  order  of  administration  to  another. 

The  movement  of  the  United  States  battle 
fleet  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  coast  is 
in  the  highest  sense  practical,  because  it  is  pre¬ 
cisely  the  kind  of  movement  which  the  fleet  of 
any  nation  may,  and  usually  will,  be  required  to 
make  in  war.  It  is  further  practical,  because  the 
United  States  has  a  Pacific  as  well  as  an  Atlantic 
coast,  and  has  not  a  navy  large  enough  to  be 
divided  safely  between  them.  The  question  is 
at  least  debatable,  whether  for  the  near  future 
the  Pacific  is  not  the  greater  centre  of  world 
interest;  as  it  certainly,  with  regard  to  our  own 
military  necessities,  is  one  of  greater  exposure  than 
the  Atlantic.  Like  France,  with  her  Mediter¬ 
ranean  and  Atlantic  shores,  the  United  States  is 
in  the  painful  military  dilemma  of  being  liable 
to  attack  on  one  side  while  the  fleet  is  on  the 
other;  but  our  distance  to  be  covered  is  so  much 
greater  than  that  of  France,  that  the  position  is 
vastly  more  embarrassing.  A  fleet  of  battleships 
leaving  Toulon,  full  coaled  and  victualed,  may 
reach  Brest  or  Cherbourg  without  renewing  the 
fuel  and  stores  in  its  holds;  but  a  fleet  leaving 
New  York  or  Norfolk  for  San  Francisco  has 
upon  its  hands  a  most  serious  administrative 


320  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


problem,  and  one  which  no  accuracy  of  gun¬ 
fire,  no  skill  in  tactics,  can  meet.  It  is  in  fact 
the  problem  of  Rozhestvensky,  to  use  an  illustra¬ 
tion  particularly  apt,  because  recent.  Can  our 
navy  in  such  case  expect  from  the  weak  states 
of  South  America  the  facility  for  recoaling,  etc., 
which  was  liberally  extended  to  the  Russian 
admiral,  to  the  somewhat  amazement  of  the  naval 
profession,  and  to  the  just  indignation  of  Japan  ? 

It  is  an  old  saying  that  an  army,  like  a  snake, 
moves  on  its  belly.  This  is  little  less  true  of  a 
navy.  In  the  foremost  naval  man  of  modern  times, 
in  Nelson,  we,  according  to  our  several  prepos¬ 
sessions,  see  the  great  strategist,  or  the  great 
tactician,  or  the  great  fighting  man;  but  the 
careful  student  of  his  letters  realizes  that,  under¬ 
lying  all,  is  the  great  administrator,  who  never 
lost  sight  or  forethought  for  the  belly  on  which 
his  fleet  moved.  The  unremitting  solicitude 
for  the  food  essential  to  the  health  of  his  crews; 
the  perpetual  alertness  to  seize  opportunity,  in¬ 
dicated  by  such  casual  note,  at  sea:  “Finished 
discharging  storeship  No.  — ;  ”  the  slipping  into 
Tetuan  to  fill  with  water,  because  little  progress 
toward  Gibraltar  could  be  made  against  the 
current  and  temporary  head  wind;  the  strong 
self-control,  holding  down  his  constitutional  im- 

7  O 

petuosity  to  move,  till  sure  that  all  has  been  done 


Cruise  o /  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


321 


to  make  movement  far  reaching,  as  well  as  ac¬ 
curate  in  direction;  the  whole  culminating  at 
the  end  of  his  life  in  a  wide  sweeping  movement 
across  the  Atlantic,  back  to  Gibraltar,  and  thence 
to  Brest,  a  period  of  three  months  —  about  equiv¬ 
alent  to  that  required  for  our  projected  transfer 
—  during  which  he  was  never  embarrassed  about 
stores  because  always  forehanded;  that  is  the 
way  —  speed,  not  haste  —  in  which  wars  are 
won.  It  was,  and  was  recognized  at  the  time  to 
be,  a  magnificent  instance  of  the  mobility  which 
is  the  great  characteristic  of  navies  as  fighting 
bodies;  not  the  mobility  which  consists  in  getting 
an  extra  half-knot  on  a  speed  trial  with  picked 
coal  and  firemen,  but  that  which  loses  no  time 
because  it  never  misses  opportunity.  At  the  end, 
when  he  came  off  Brest,  out  of  the  dozen  ships 
with  him,  all  but  two  were  turned  over  to  the 
admiral  there  commanding,  ready  for  any  call; 
to  blockade  or  to  fight.  Of  the  two,  one,  worn 
out  structurally,  he  had  retained  from  the  first 
chiefly  because  of  her  value  as  a  fighting  unit,  due 
to  an  exceptional  captain;  the  other,  his  own 
flagship,  had  been  over  two  years  from  a  home 
port,  yet  within  a  month  of  arrival  sailed  again  for 
his  last  battle.  Compared  to  these  its  antece¬ 
dents,  Trafalgar  is  relatively  a  small  matter. 

The  example  is  for  all  time.  Incidental  con- 


322 


Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


ditions  have  changed  since  then,  but  the  essential 
problem  remains.  Steamers  may  not  find  in  a 
calm,  or  in  an  unprofitable  head  wind,  the  pro¬ 
pitious  moment  for  clearing  a  storeship,  or  run¬ 
ning  into  a  near  port  to  fill  with  water;  but  the 
commander-in-chief  may  find  imposed  upon  him 
the  consideration :  Where  should  we  fill  with  coal, 
and  to  what  extent  beyond  the  bunker  capacity, 
in  order  to  make  the  successive  coalings,  and  the 
necessary  stretches  from  point  to  point,  most 
easy  and  most  rapid  ?  What  distribution  of  these 
operations  will  make  the  total  voyage  shortest 
and  surest  ?  What  anchorages  may  be  available 
outside  neutral  limits,  should  neutral  states  con¬ 
sider  coal  renewal  and  other  refreshment  an 
operation  of  war  not  to  be  permitted  within  their 
jurisdiction  ?  What  choice  is  there  among  these 
anchorages,  for  facility  due  to  weather  ?  If  driven 
to  coal  at  sea,  where  will  conditions  be  most  pro¬ 
pitious  ?  For  concrete  instances:  How  much  of 
the  wide  and  shoal  estuary  of  the  La  Plata  is 
within  neutral  jurisdiction  ?  Is  the  well-known 
quietness  of  the  Pacific  between  Valparaiso  and 
the  equator  such  that  colliers  can  lie  alongside 
while  the  ships  hold  their  course  ?  If  so,  at  what 
speed  can  they  move  ?  Then  the  mere  operation 
of  transferring  the  coal,  or  other  stores,  under 
any  of  these  circumstances  is  done  more  rapidly 


Cruise  oj  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


323 


the  second  time  than  the  first;  and  the  third 
than  the  second.  At  what  points  of  the  voyage 
should  additional  colliers  join,  having  reference, 
not  only  to  the  considerations  above  mentioned, 
but  also  to  the  ports  whence  they  sail,  that  the 
utmost  of  their  cargo  may  go  into  the  fleet  and 
the  least  be  expended  for  their  own  steaming  ? 
It  is  always  well  to  consider  the  worst  difficulties 
that  may  be  met.  From  the  north  tropic  on  the 
one  side  to  the  same  latitude  on  the  other,  the 
whole  voyage  of  an  American  fleet  will  be  in 
foreign  waters,  except  when  on  the  ocean  common. 
Upon  what  hospitality  can  it  count  in  war  ? 

I  hold  it  to  be  impossible  that  a  fleet  under 
a  competent  commander-in-chief  and  competent 
captains  —  not  to  mention  the  admirable  junior 
official  staff  of  our  navy,  of  highly  trained  officers 
in  the  prime  of  life  —  can  make  the  proposed 
voyage  once,  even  with  the  advantages  of  peace, 
without  being  better  fitted  to  repeat  the  operation 
in  war.  No  amount  of  careful  pre-arrangement 
in  an  office  takes  the  place  of  doing  the  thing 
itself.  It  is  surely  a  safe  generalization,  that  no 
complicated  scheme  of  action,  no  invention,  was 
ever  yet  started  without  giving  rise  to  difficulties 
which  anxious  care  had  failed  to  foresee.  If 
challenged  to  point  out  the  most  useful  lesson 
the  fleet  may  gain,  it  may  be  not  unsafe  to  say: 


324  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


its  surprises,  the  unexpected.  If  we  can  trust 
press  reports,  surprise  has  already  begun  in  the 
home  water.  The  fleet  apparently  has  not  been 
able  to  get  ready  as  soon  as  contemplated.  If 
so,  it  will  be  no  small  gain  to  the  government 
to  know  the  several  hitches;  each  small,  but 
cumulative. 

In  my  estimation,  therefore,  the  matter  stands 
thus:  In  the  opinion  of  Sir  Charles  Dilke  —  than 
whom  I  know  no  sounder  authority,  because  while 
non-professional  he  has  been  for  a  generation  a 
most  accurate  observer  and  appreciative  student 
of  military  and  naval  matters  —  the  United 
States  navy  now  stands  second  in  power  only  to 
that  of  Great  Britain;  but  it  is  not  strong  enough 
to  be  divided  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
coasts.  Both  are  part  of  a  common  country ;  both 
therefore  equally  entitled  to  defence.  It  follows 
inevitably  that  the  fleet  should  be  always  ready, 
not  only  in  formulated  plan,  but  by  acquired  ex¬ 
perience,  to  proceed  with  the  utmost  rapidity  — 
according  to  the  definition  of  mobility  before 
suggested  —  from  one  coast  to  the  other,  as 
needed.  That  facility  obtained,  both  coasts  are 
defended  in  a  military  sense.  By  this  I  do  not 
mean  that  an  enemy  may  not  do  some  flying 
injury  —  serious  injury  —  but  that  no  large  oper¬ 
ation  against  the  coasts  of  the  United  States 


Cruise  of  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet  325 


can  prosper  unless  the  enemy  command  the  sea; 
and  that  he  cannot  do,  to  any  effect,  if  within 
three  months  a  superior  United  States  force  can 
appear.  Rozhestvensky  took  longer;  but  could 
he  have  smashed  Togo,  as  Togo  did  him,  what 
would  have  been  the  situation  of  Japan,  for  all 
the  successes  of  the  preceding  fourteen  months  ? 
Evidently,  however,  the  shorter  the  transit  from 
the  Pacific  to  the  Atlantic,  the  greater  will  be  the 
power  of  the  fleet  for  good;  just  as  it  would  have 
been  better  if  Rozhestvensky  —  assuming  his 
success  —  had  come  before  Port  Arthur  fell, 
or  better  still  before  its  fleet  was  destroyed.  Such 
mobility  can  be  acquired  only  by  a  familiarity 
with  the  ground,  and  with  the  methods  to  be 
followed,  such  as  Nelson  by  personal  experience 
had  of  the  Mediterranean  and  of  the  West  Indies; 
of  the  facilities  they  offered,  and  the  obstacles 
they  presented.  Such  knowledge  is  experimental, 
gained  only  by  practice.  It  is  demonstrable,  there¬ 
fore,  that  the  proposed  voyage  is  in  the  highest 
degree  practical;  not  only  advisable,  but  im¬ 
perative.  Nor  should  it  be  a  single  spasm  of 
action,  but  a  recurrent  procedure;  for  admirals 
and  captains  go  and  come,  and  their  individual 
experience  with  them.  Why  not  annual  ?  The 
Pacific  is  as  good  a  drill  ground  as  the  At¬ 
lantic. 


326  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


Retrospect 

Since  the  preceding  words  were  written,  the 
cruise  of  the  fleet  as  then  contemplated  has  taken 
place;  and  on  this  day  of  present  writing  the 
journey  has  just  been  resumed  by  its  second  de¬ 
parture  from  a  Pacific  home  port,  San  Francisco, 
for  Honolulu.  Sufficient  experience  has  already 
been  gathered  to  permit  a  certain  amount  of 
retrospective  estimate  of  the  results  of  the  experi¬ 
ment. 

There  are  two  fundamental  factors  in  military 
efficiency:  the  moral  and  the  material.  Under 
these  two  heads  all  details  of  effectiveness  can 
be  ranged.  Neither  is  without  the  other;  but  in 
order  of  precedence  the  moral  —  for  which  not 
without  advantage  we  have  borrowed  a  foreign 
distinctive  name,  morale  —  comes  easily  first. 
The  great  Napoleon  has  said :  “  In  war,  morale 
always  prevails.”  It  is  in  this,  particularly,  that 
the  benefit  of  this  experiment  was  realized  up  to 
the  time  that  the  crews,  in  whom  morale  or  the 
reverse  soonest  shows  itself,  came  again  in  touch 
with  home  ports  and  the  influences  which  attach 
to  them.  To  put  the  matter  in  modern  terms, 
the  cruise  from  Hampton  Roads  to  Magdalena 
Bay,  and  thence  to  our  Pacific  ports,  affected  the 
ships’  companies  by  a  change  of  environment, 


Cruise  oj  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet  327 


and  of  occupations.  The  utility  of  such  change 
was  testified  by  Nelson  during  his  weary  two 
years’  blockade  of  Toulon.  “  The  great  thing  in 
all  military  service  is  health  ”  (moral  as  well  as 
physical).  “  It  is  easier  to  keep  men  healthy  than 
to  cure  them.  Situated  as  this  fleet  has  been 
without  a  friendly  port,  I  have  [secured  health] 
by  changing  the  cruising  ground,  not  allowing 
the  sameness  of  prospect  to  satiate  the  mind; 
sometimes  by  looking  at  Toulon,  Villefranche, 
Barcelona,  and  Rosas;  then  running  round  Mi¬ 
norca,  Majorca,  Sardinia,  and  Corsica;  and  two 
or  three  times  anchoring  for  a  few  days.”  In 
consequence  of  the  precautions,  of  which  this 
was  one,  the  physician  to  the  fleet,  who  joined 
after  eighteen  months’  blockade  work  —  no 
friendly  port  —  wrote  that,  out  of  the  flagship’s 
840  men,  only  one  was  in  bed  for  illness,  and 
that  the  other  ten  vessels  were  in  equal  condi¬ 
tion. 

To  the  crews  of  our  Atlantic  fleet,  however, 
the  great  beneficial  element,  the  moral  alterative, 
was  not  chiefly  in  the  foreign  ports;  they  con¬ 
tributed  merely,  and  somewhat  in  excess,  that 
element  of  recreation,  of  amusement,  which  is 
recognized  in  the  proverb  about  “  All  work  and 
no  play.”  The  moral  malady  was  not  confine¬ 
ment  to  their  ships.  The  gain  in  morale,  to  officers 


328  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


and  to  men,  was  in  the  surroundings  which  in 
common  life  show  themselves  as  “  home,”  and 
as  “  self-dependence.”  The  regularized  life  of 
the  sea  on  a  long  passage,  the  enforced,  and 
therefore  contented,  confinement  to  the  family 
for  happiness  and  comradeship,  the  steady, 
placid  fulfilment  of  the  round  of  small  duties,  all 
having  their  evident  use  and  meaning,  correspond 
to  the  normal  conditions  which  for  the  large 
majority  of  men  fill  up  the  void  of  mental  un¬ 
easiness  consequent  upon  lack  of  occupation,  or 
upon  restless  aimlessness  of  pursuit.  Nothing 
so  settles  as  does  an  observed  routine,  the  details 
of  which  justify  themselves  to  a  man’s  under¬ 
standing.  Such  a  life  may  become  monotonous, 
and  require  a  break;  but  I  hazard  little  in  sub¬ 
mitting  to  the  mass  of  mankind  that,  upon  the 
whole,  fixed  employment  and  the  presence  of 
constant  associates,  family,  friends,  acquaintance, 
give  the  solid  ground  upon  which  usefulness  and 
happiness  are  built.  This  is  the  steady,  healthy 
diet  of  life;  promotive  of  cheerfulness,  efficiency, 
and  reasonable  self-esteem. 

Considerations  such  as  these  have  always 
made  the  home  stations  distasteful,  professionally, 
to  naval  officers.  I  say  professionally;  because, 
doubtless,  personally  there  is  something  attractive 
in  beino;  on  a  coast  where  a  short  leave  to  visit 

O 


Cruise  of  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet  329 


one’s  family  may  be  periodically  obtained,  or 
where  the  family  may  come  where  the  ship  is 
without  too  heavy  expense  of  travel.  But  it  is, 
perhaps,  rather  by  perpetual  experience  than  by 
formal  consideration  that  the  responsible  officers 
come  to  realize  that  this  agreeable  feature  means 
to  their  subordinates  —  and  to  themselves  — 
a  double  service,  of  the  ship  and  of  the  family, 
which  invariably  lessens  usefulness  to  both  by 
friction  between  the  two.  Let  neither  be  denied, 
but  rather  both  be  insured  by  allotting  to  each 
the  appointed  occasion,  the  time  which  belong  to 
all  things  under  the  sun,  and  upon  which  the 
other  may  not  trespass. 

The  Pacific  cruise  eliminated  a  rivalry,  the 
inevitable  tendency  of  which  is  hate  toward  one 
and  love  toward  the  other;  needless  to  say  which 
draws  more  strongly.  When  they  are  in  compe¬ 
tition,  an  element  of  perfunctoriness  drags  on 
the  skirts  of  duty,  which  is  not  neglected ;  but 
its  conditions  become  less  beloved.  The  morale 
is  lowered.  This  result  is  exasperated  and  exag¬ 
gerated  by  the  navy  yard;  recourse  to  which 
becomes  easy,  at  the  sacrifice  of  the  self-depend¬ 
ence  which  ought  to  be  the  pride  of  ship  as 
of  man,  and  which  has  been  and  has  continued 
the  laudable  boast  of  the  Atlantic  fleet  through  its 
late  Pacific  cruise.  Not  only  is  work  which  a  self- 


330  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


respecting  ship  should  do  for  itself  thrown  upon 
the  yard,  but  the  presence  of  the  yard  mechanics, 
scattered  hither  and  yon,  driving,  tinkering,  and 
hammering,  reproduce  exactly  in  kind,  and  to  a 
distracting  degree,  what  we  experience  in  house¬ 
cleaning,  or  in  the  case  of  somewhat  extensive 
house  repairs.  The  comfort  which  home  means, 
the  ordered  life  which  makes  the  household  both 
efficient  and  happy,  disappear  for  the  time. 
Such  things  have  to  be  —  occasionally;  but  to 
be,  say  half  the  year,  becomes  unendurable  and 
destructive.  “  Sameness  of  prospect,”  such  as 
this,  soon  “  satiates  ”  —  and  vitiates.  How  much 
worse  if  to  discomfort  be  added  the  interruption 
of  the  pursuits  upon  which  the  maintenance  of 
the  family  efficiency  depends.  While  repairs  are 
going  on  drills  are  interrupted;  drills  of  some 
kinds  can  not  be  held  at  all;  everything  is  dis¬ 
arranged;  routine  lies  in  broken  fragments;  and 
while  such  confusion  impedes  the  ordinary  ac¬ 
tivities  of  the  ship  the  question  naturally  arises: 
Why  can  not  I,  and  I,  and  I,  be  spared  to  this  or 
that  outside  purpose  ?  The  ship  doesn’t  need 
me.  This  does  not  tend  to  serenity,  nor  promote 
happiness;  and  certainly  does  not  add  to  effi¬ 
ciency.  Restlessness  and  unsettlement  pre¬ 
vail. 

This  outline  of  conditions,  and  the  suggested 


Cruise  of  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet  331 


analogies,  may  serve  to  facilitate  appreciation 
of  that  effect  of  the  cruise  which  took  the  ships 
out  of  the  country  for  four  consecutive  months. 
These  general  considerations  underlie  an  un¬ 
derstanding  of  the  specific  results.  No  usual 
amount  of  external  ceremonial  intercourse  with 
the  authorities  of  foreign  ports,  no  disturbance 
depending  upon  such  “  functions,”  or  other 
shore  association,  compares  with  the  internal 
disorganization  attendant  upon  navy  yard  re¬ 
pairs.  One  reason  for  the  difference  is  patent. 
Repairs  done  by  the  ship’s  own  men,  under  the 
ship’s  own  officers,  are  susceptible  of  an  adjust¬ 
ment  which  takes  into  account  the  other  needs 
of  the  vessel.  There  is  unity  of  direction.  In 
consequence,  at  sea  during  this  cruise,  there  was 
magnificent  opportunity  to  perfect  the  ships’ 
companies  in  all  ship  drills  essential  for  battle. 
All  hands  were  on  board  for  long  spells  of  time; 
during  which,  whatever  repairs  might  be  going 
on,  there  were  continual  drills  in  handling  guns, 
supplying  ammunition,  loading,  sighting,  fire 
control,  and  all  the  details  pertaining  to  efficiency 
in  action;  the  results  of  which  would  also  be 
visible  in  the  subsequent  target  practice  in  Mag¬ 
dalena  Bay,  and  in  battle,  should  such  need  un¬ 
happily  arise.  At  a  navy  yard  the  repairs,  when 
authorized,  are  done  under  the  officers  of  the 


332  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


yard,  who,  in  arranging  the  manner  and  rate  of 
progress,  have  to  consider  matters  not  pertaining 
to  the  particular  vessel;  such  as  the  requirements 
of  other  ships,  the  total  force  of  mechanics  at 
their  disposal,  the  necessity  of  utilizing  the  ex¬ 
pensive  skilled  labor  throughout  all  the  working 
hours,  which  are  drill  hours  as  well.  There  is 
duality  of  management.  The  yard  predominates; 
and,  in  the  interests  of  the  country,  must  pre¬ 
dominate,  necessarily. 

The  ships  having  been  thrown  upon  them¬ 
selves  alone,  under  unified  control,  the  concen¬ 
tration  of  minds  and  hearts  upon  the  vessels  and 
the  fleet,  and  the  long  deliverance  from  distracting 
and  disturbing  alien  elements  within,  have  pro¬ 
moted  self-dependence  and  enabled  the  organic 
life  of  the  ships’  companies  to  gain  vigor;  by 
constituting  within  itself  those  grouping  of  kin¬ 
dred  interests  and  associations  which  reproduce 
home  and  social  life,  and  add  distinctly  to  the 
vitality  of  the  whole.  That  this  has  been  so  is 
known  from  high  official  testimony  on  board  the 
fleet;  it  is,  however,  also  a  commonplace  of 
naval  observation  at  all  times  and  periods.  “  To 
being  so  long  at  sea,”  wrote  Nelson,  “  do  we 
attribute  our  being  so  healthy.”  Further  evidence 
to  this  is  borne  by  the  statement  in  the  daily 
papers  that  upon  leaving  San  Francisco,  July  7, 


Cruise  of  U .  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


333 


out  of  the  13,000  men  who  arrived  only  129  1  — 
one  per  cent  —  were  absent  from  roll-call;  of 
whom  it  was  believed  by  the  naval  officials  not 
more  than  one-fourth  were  intentional  desertions. 
This  is  a  testimony  to  improved  morale.  Also,  as 
all  naval  experience  past  and  present  testifies, 
the  movement  of  many  ships  together  works  in 
the  same  direction.  Proximity  and  competition 
maintain  the  natural  emulation  between  vessels, 
stimulated  often,  and  in  this  instance  conspicu¬ 
ously,  by  contests  instituted  by  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  whose  supervision  was  continued,  despite 
bodily  illness.  He  thus  utilized  the  universal 
human  disposition  to  rivalry,  as  a  powerful  lever 
for  raising  the  standards  of  efficiency  and  per¬ 
formance. 

This  intensifying  of  ship  life  corresponds  exactly 
to  the  expansion  of  individual  powers,  when 
health  succeeds  illness,  when  success  follows 
upon  failure,  when  congenial  surroundings  of 
climate  or  of  fortune  take  the  place  of  enervating 
atmosphere  or  cramped  resources.  This  is  the 
greatest  result,  because  it  lies  at  the  bottom;  it 
is  as  the  foundation  to  a  house,  still  more  as  the 
root  to  a  plant.  The  consequences  of  improved 

1  When  the  fleet  left  Hampton  Roads,  the  exact  numbers 
carried  were:  officers,  654;  seamen,  12,891;  marines,  1,237. 

I  do  not  understand  the  latter  to  be  included  in  the  statement 
as  to  desertions. 


334  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


morale  so  enter  into  the  material  advances  made 
as  to  be  not  perfectly  distinguishable  in  effect. 
A  quantitative  analysis  is  impossible;  yet  concrete 
visible  gains,  parallelling  the  desertion  record,  can 
be  stated.  Despite  previous  tactical  drills,  the 
sixteen  vessels  at  the  outset  were  now  going 
ahead,  now  stopping,  now  backing,  at  irregular 
time  intervals,  in  order  to  regain  position  lost  by 
their  own  fault,  or  that  of  their  neighbors.  Within 
a  month  they  were  holding  their  steady  way, 
250  yards  from  the  stern  of  one  to  the  bow  of 
its  follower,  in  four  columns  abreast  each  other, 
with  an  evenness  of  progress  that  suggested  their 
being  tied  together.  This  was  the  difference 
between  the  drill-ground  and  the  steady  habit 
of  the  march ;  between  the  lecture  room  and  the 
practice  of  a  profession.  It  manifests  not  merely 
the  developed  capacity  of  each  captain  or  deck 
officer,  but  the  confidence  gained  by  experience  of 
how  the  man  in  the  other  ship  will  act;  the  con¬ 
trast  between  school  and  life.  It  is  the  touch  of 
the  elbow,  which  in  times  past  symbolized  the 
mutual  reliance  of  trained  soldiers,  as  compared 
with  the  lack  of  that  quality  which  has  been 
responsible  for  the  disasters  of  militia. 

Consider,  too,  how  much  this  regularity  will 
conduce  to  the  movements  of  the  battlefield; 
necessarily  simple,  but  with  equal  necessity  to 


Cruise  of  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


335 


be  mutual  —  not  common  only  —  and  dependable. 
In  the  particular  voyage  little  time  could  be 
spared  for  formal  tactical  drills,  because  the  itin¬ 
erary  left  no  sufficient  margin  for  the  purpose. 
This  was  a  loss,  which  in  repetition  could  be 
obviated  by  a  greater  allowance  of  time  from 
start  to  finish,  carrying  the  double  advantage  of 
more  time  at  sea,  with  its  quiet,  fixed  routine. 
The  first  voyage  also  was  accompanied  inevitably 
by  hospitalities  that  would  naturally  not  ob¬ 
tain  to  any  like  extent  on  the  second  and  third; 
which  would  thus  become  more  distinctly  mili¬ 
tary,  without  sacrificing  the  enjoyment  of  foreign 
ports.  Nevertheless  the  manoeuvres  incidental 
to  the  march,  and  the  very  regularity  of  the  forma¬ 
tion,  contribute  greatly  to  develop  the  tactical 
faculty,  and  in  these  there  was  much  experience. 
In  formal  manoeuvres,  handling  is  apt  to  be  done 
by  one  or  two  principal  officers;  on  the  march 
every  deck  officer  has  a  chance.  Consider  further 
what  cooperation  elsewhere  is  needed,  and  there¬ 
fore  was  obtained,  to  support  the  skill  of  the  deck 
officer.  All  the  motive  power  must  act  with  a 
precision  to  which  constant  watchfulness  and  a 
certain  degree  of  foresight  are  requisite.  Upon 
all  the  parties  concerned  in  obtaining  these  re¬ 
sults  presses  the  public  opinion  of  the  ship;  like 
the  pride  of  a  regiment  in  its  colors,  or  of  a  college 


336  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


in  its  team.  An  avoidable  break,  or  an  avoidable 
hot  journal,  is  not  the  fault  of  all  on  board;  but 
it  is  the  mortification  of  all,  for  it  involves  the 
reputation  of  “  the  ship.”  Besides,  the  whole 
fleet  is  waiting,  looking  on,  perhaps  with  swear 
words  at  detention.  Any  one  who  has  found  him¬ 
self  a  centre  of  observation  under  mortifying  cir¬ 
cumstances  can  recall  how  painfully  slow  the 
moments  while  struggling  for  extrication. 

Conditions  not  so  immediately  visible  as  these 
can  be  judiciously  brought  under  the  same  moral 
pressure  of  the  shipmates.  Fuel  consumption,  for 
instance,  may  not  be,  will  not  be,  of  itself  a  matter 
of  much  concern  to  the  private  seaman;  but  in¬ 
stitute,  as  was  instituted,  competition  in  economy, 
with  published  results,  and  at  once  emulation  is 
aroused.  Whatever  is  achieved  is  to  the  credit  of 
the  ship;  every  man  has  an  inch  added  to  his 
heels,  as  really  as  though  he  himself  had  saved  the 
coal.  Such  is  the  moral  factor,  not  to  be  estimated 
in  decimal  terms  of  proportion;  a  source  of  un¬ 
told  energy  upon  demand.  For  material  result, 
the  saving  of  coal  during  the  last  8,210  miles  was 
such  that,  had  it  been  obtained  also  in  the  first 
5,227,  the  economy  would  have  been  2,390  tons; 
or  over  2  1-2  per  cent,  on  the  total  consumption, 
had  the  first  rate  of  expenditure  been  maintained. 
This  is  an  achievement  far  from  contemptible 


Cruise  oj  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


337 


in  these  days  of  low  interest.  Doubtless  it  also 
maybe  improved  upon;  but,  even  as  it  stands,  it 
shows  the  effect  of  moral  influences  upon  stoking. 

Economy  even  which  ends  in  itself  is  commend¬ 
able,  if  it  be  a  real  economy;  we  all  know  the  dear¬ 
ness  of  a  cheap,  inferior  article.  It  is  a  good  habit; 
and  at  the  least  means  force,  or  means,  saved  for 
other  purposes.  In  naval  coal  saved,  while  main¬ 
taining  the  same  speed  —  without  which  you  have 
merely  acquired  an  inferior  article  —  it  means 
either  ability  to  go  farther,  or  to  go  an  equal 
distance  at  a  more  rapid  rate;  economy  of  space 
or  economy  of  time  —  convertible  terms.  The 
strategic  value  of  both  is  readily  understood. 
When  to  this  cheering  achievement  is  added  that 
the  vessels  showing  it  reached  port  after  a  voyage 
of  over  13,000  miles  in  as  good  condition  as  re¬ 
gards  efficiency  of  engines  as  when  they  started, 
or  better,  the  double  event  is  more  than  encour¬ 
aging.  It  is  a  revelation.  Few  believed  that  it 
could  be  done.  Prophecies  of  vessels  disabled 
abounded;  and  to  the  no  small  surprise  of  the 
instructed  —  which  all  of  us  can  be  —  are  again 
renewed  in  prospect  of  a  similar  voyage. 

Thus  we  learn  from  one  of  the  journals  which 
most  persistently  harped  on  the  imagined  hostile 
purpose  of  the  original  despatch  of  the  fleet, 
that  “  the  months  required  for  the  next  journey 


338  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


will  take  the  best  of  the  life  and  efficiency  out 
of  our  fine  ships  of  war.  When  they  get  back 
to  Hampton  Roads  every  one  of  them  will  have 
to  be  repaired  at  great  cost  and  at  once.  The 
boilers  and  other  machinery  in  nearly  every  ship 
will  have  to  be  torn  to  pieces.  This  means  that 
for  months  after  the  fleet  has  returned  to  the 
Atlantic  the  country  will  continue  to  be  deprived 
of  the  possible  services  of  these  ships  in  an 
international  emergency.  The  cost  will  be  tre¬ 
mendous,  but  the  grave  feature  is  the  helplessness 
of  the  country  meanwhile,  and  the  opportunity 
of  a  foreign  nation  to  strike.”  Why  this  should 
be  said,  unless  in  hope  to  injure  the  Adminis¬ 
tration,  is  hard  to  understand.  One  is  reminded 
somewhat  pathetically  of  the  words  of  Admiral 
Villeneuve  to  his  captains,  within  a  year  before 
he  lost  Trafalgar.  “  We  have  no  reason  to  fear 
the  sight  of  the  English  squadron.  Their  seventy- 
fours  have  not  five  hundred  men  on  board;  they 
are  worn  out  by  long  cruising.”  In  this  he  echoed 
his  master,  Napoleon,  and  it  was  so  far  true  that 
Nelson  himself  was  then  writing  of  his  “  crazy 
ships;”  “not  a  storeship  a  week  would  keep 
them  in  repair.”  A  month  later  Villeneuve 
wrote  again :  “  The  squadron  appeared  very 

fine  in  port,  crews  drilling  well;  but  as  soon  as 
a  storm  came  all  was  changed.  They  were  not 


Cruise  of  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


339 


drilled  in  storms.”  “  These  gentlemen,”  com¬ 
mented  Nelson,  “  are  not  used  to  the  hurricanes, 
which  we  have  braved  twenty-one  months  without 
losing  mast  or  yard.” 

There  lies  before  me  a  letter  to  the  New  York 
“  Herald  ”  from  Lieutenant-Commander  Lloyd 
H.  Chandler,1  principal  aid  to  Admiral  Evans, 
and  who  commanded  a  squadron  of  torpedo- 
boat  destroyers  sent  from  our  Atlantic  Coast  to 
Manila  some  years  ago.  He  writes  from  Mag¬ 
dalena  Bay:  “  As  for  readiness  for  further  travel, 
it  may  be  stated  that  there  is  not  a  ship  in  the 
fleet  whose  machinery  is  not  in  much  better 
condition  than  when  she  left  Hampton  Roads. 
Many  little  matters  which  lacked  adjustment, 
as  machinery  does  after  dockyard  overhauling, 
have  been  corrected,  and  now  every  ship  is  run¬ 
ning  as  smoothly  as  can  be  desired,  and  is  ready 
for  any  duty  which  may  be  assigned  her.”  This, 
again,  is  sea  efficiency  against  the  port,  or  merely 
drill,  habit.  The  improvement  in  the  steaming 
and  efficiency  of  the  torpedo  flotilla  seems  to  have 
been  even  more  decisive  than  in  those  of  the  battle¬ 
ships.  “  They  improved  steadily  in  the  condition  of 

1  New  York  “  Herald,”  March  29,  1908.  I  have  quoted 
much  from  the  letter  of  Lieutenant-Commander  Chandler, 
using  at  times  his  own  words.  I  would  recommend  any  person 
interested  in  the  subject,  and  having  access  to  a  file  of  the 
“  Herald,”  to  read  the  whole  letter. 


340  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


their  machinery  during  the  period  of  their  hardest 
service.”  The  fleet  on  arrival  in  Magdalena  Bay 
was  ready  to  proceed  at  once  to  target  practice, 
so  far  as  motive  power  was  concerned;  to  use 
the  characteristically  graphic  expression  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  they  were  prepared  equally 
“  for  a  fight  or  a  frolic.”  The  targets  were  placed 
at  once,  but  the  doing  this  with  the  precision  of 
modern  methods  requires  time. 

If  this  were  the  case  after  13,437  miles,  without 
prolonged  stops  for  repair,  why  not  rather  hope 
that  the  two  months’  rest  at  our  Pacific  ports  may 
have  sent  the  fleet  out  with  no  greater  draw¬ 
backs  than  the  need  again  to  adjust  the  dockyard 
work  ?  Of  course,  machinery  does  suffer  wear 
and  tear;  but  it  also  may  suffer  rust.  What  is 
worse,  the  engine-room  force  may  grow  rusty. 
There  is  no  reason  to  apprehend  for  the  fleet  more 
than  the  dangers  of  the  sea,  which  ships  are  meant 
to  meet.  Short  of  total  disablement,  which  there 
is  no  cause  to  expect,  the  gain  in  the  morale  of 
men  not  suffered  to  rust  will  outweigh,  as  in  the 
case  of  Nelson  and  Villeneuve,  the  loss  by  wear 
and  tear  to  ships  or  engines.  Unless  the  ships 
can  not  steam  at  all,  they  will  manoeuvre  and 
fight  better. 

A  very  interesting  feature  of  this  extremely 
satisfactory  result  in  the  machinery  is  that  the  run, 


Cruise  of  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


341 


one  of  the  longest,  if  not  the  very  longest,  made 
by  a  fleet  of  battleships,  has  been  accomplished 
under  the  new  system,  instituted  by  law  in  1899, 
by  which  the  two  corps  of  the  line  and  engineer 
officers  were  merged  into  one.  The  substantial 
effect  of  this  change  was  to  restore  the  conditions 
obtaining  in  the  days  of  sail,  when  the  seamen 
who  fought  the  ship  were  also  in  charge  of  the 
motive  power.  Grave  fears  were  felt  and  ex¬ 
pressed  in  many  quarters  that  the  same  class  of 
officers  could  not  perform  both  duties  efficiently; 
that  the  engines  especially  would  suffer  from 
being  in  charge  of  men  who  had  not  been  trained 
exclusively  to  take  care  of  machinery.  What 
the  results  to  machinery  were  from  this  long 
voyage  has  just  been  stated.  Of  the  sixteen 
battleships  participating,  Lieutenant-Commander 
Chandler  tells  us  that  the  steam  departments  of 
four  only  were  in  charge  of  the  old  engineer  corps. 
The  remaining  twelve  had  had  no  connection  with 
it,  nor  had  received  any  engineering  education 
other  than  that  which  by  the  new  system  is  given 
to  every  officer  of  “  the  line  ”  —  the  name  now 
common  to  the  officers  of  the  bridge,  the  gun, 
and  the  engine.  In  the  torpedo  flotilla  there  was 
but  one  officer  of  the  former  “  engineer  corps,” 
Lieut. -Commander  Hutch  I.  Cone,  and  he  had 
military  command  of  the  whole  body;  the  men 


342  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


in  charge  of  the  several  engines  were  products  of 
the  new  system.  The  conclusions  reached  from 
this  very  practical  test  may  be  accounted  among 
the  gains  of  the  cruise. 

The  questions  of  supply  —  of  fuel,  of  provisions, 
and  of  other  stores  —  have  been  met  in  part  by 
the  occasional  prearranged  meetings  with  colliers; 
in  part  by  accompanying  colliers,  by  the  presence 
of  two  general  supply  vessels,  and  of  one  equipped 
for  making  repairs  more  extensive  than  the  or¬ 
dinary  resources  of  a  ship  permit;  a  kind  of 
floating  navy-yard,  with  the  advantage  of  being 
under  the  same  control  as  the  fleet  itself.  These 
methods  of  administration  were  planned  before 
the  sailing  of  the  fleet;  its  progress  has  contributed 
forcibly  to  further  elucidation,  both  by  the 
successes  and  the  shortcomings  of  the  arrange¬ 
ments  made.  “  The  work  has  been  done  in  the 
most  satisfactory  manner;  nevertheless,  we  see 
several  ways  in  which  we  could  improve.”  Much 
useful  experience  was  gained  in  the  details  of 
organization  for  transferring  from  the  storeships 
to  the  sixteen  vessels  of  the  fleet.  It  was  found 
also  that  the  repair  ship  would  be  bettered  by 
having  some  classes  of  mechanics,  not  allowed, 
nor  necessary,  to  a  ship  in  ordinary  commission. 
This  is  but  another  case  of  our  common  ex¬ 
perience  that  doing  things  reveals  difficulties  and 


Cruise  of  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


343 


perfects  methods.  A  fleet  on  voyage  is  an  army 
on  the  march,  an  army  in  campaign;  where  the 
problems  are  essentially  different  from  those  of 
an  army  in  garrison,  or  on  the  battlefield,  but 
equally  vital  to  efficiency.  In  no  other  way  than 
voyaging  can  these  problems  of  subsistence  be 
solved  by  practical  tests.  It  is  correctly  remarked 
by  Lieutenant-Commander  Chandler  that  “  ex¬ 
perience  in  moving  a  fleet  from  one  scene  of 
operation  to  another  is  the  first  gain.”  It  is 
first  in  importance  as  well  as  in  order.  Not  only 
questions  of  supply,  but  the  strategic  questions 
of  steaming  radius  at  several  speeds,  upon  which 
depends  the  rapidity  with  which  a  fleet  can  be 
transferred;  what  the  rate  of  coal  expenditure 
which  will  give  the  longest  distance  and  attendant 
speed  without  recoaling.  The  present  writer 
would  have  liked  to  see  also  tested  the  question 
of  transferring  coal  and  stores  under  the  possible 
conditions  of  war;  of  neutral  ports  refusing  their 
shelter  for  such  operations.  While  this  was  not 
tried,  we  are  told  that  satisfactory  results  were 
attained  in  rapidity  of  coaling  in  port. 

In  conclusion,  it  may  safely  be  believed  that  in 
the  increased  home  life  so  promoted,  in  the  pride 
felt  for  the  ship,  and  in  the  fleet,  have  been  realized 
elements  of  moral  force  which  will  assert  them¬ 
selves  in  a  greater  attachment  to  the  navy  as  a 


344  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


profession  —  what  the  French  call  esprit  de  corps 
—  in  a  consequent  greater  willingness  to  enlist 
and  to  remain  in  the  service,  and  in  a  more 
effective  attainment  of  results  in  matters  of  tactics 
and  target  practice;  due  to  exactly  that  moral 
stimulus  which  confidence  in  one’s  self  and  one’s 
companions,  the  pride  of  achievement  and  glow 
of  competition,  induce  everywhere  and  in  all 
men.  In  Magdalena  Bay  the  crews  came  to 
target  practice,  and  such  other  practical  work 
as  the  conditions  admitted,  with  ship  pride  in¬ 
tensified,  with  greater  “  fitness  to  win.”  Their 
progress  round  the  world,  being  a  condition  of 
almost  incessant  movement,  has  promoted  well¬ 
being  of  body  and  mind  by  the  influence  which 
variety  of  interest  and  change  of  scene  has  always 
been  seen  to  exert;  but,  in  all  this  broadening 
of  the  mind  and  engaging  of  the  attention,  the 
one  constant  factor  has  been  the  Fleet.  Its  own 
excellence,  its  daily  improvement,  the  welcome 
accorded  it  in  all  parts,  have  been  the  immediate 
cause  of  a  healthy  pride  which  actually  is  that 
of  patriotism;  seeing  the  nation  behind  its  repre¬ 
sentative  force. 

Finally,  no  notice  of  effects  in  the  fleet  would 
be  adequate  which  failed  to  recognize  explicitly  the 
indebtedness  of  the  nation  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  Admiral  Evans.  Despite  the  bodily 


Cruise  of  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


345 


sickness  of  which  the  newspapers  kept  us  in¬ 
formed,  and  which  prevented  his  personal  share 
in  honors  and  welcomes  extended  to  his  command, 
to  him  has  been  due  the  perfect  work  of  organi¬ 
zation,  by  which  the  great  body  under  his  com¬ 
mand  has  been  enabled  to  move,  day  by  day, 
and  from  port  to  port,  fulfilling  all  its  duties 
without  a  hitch.  The  happy  result  entitles  him 
to  the  first  place  in  the  credit  won  by  the  fleet 

—  not  only  in  his  own  country,  but  everywhere 
by  men  capable  of  appreciating  naval  results. 

Reverting  to  the  threatening  international  as¬ 
pect  which  certain  of  our  newspapers  sought  to 
attribute  to  this  movement,  it  may  be  permitted  to 
observe  that  their  action  was  peculiarly  incon¬ 
siderate  and  ill-timed,  not  to  say  unpatriotic; 
because,  whether  designedly  or  not,  it  conduced 
to  perilous  international  exasperation  at  the 
moment  when  a  very  delicate  international  question 
could  be  seen  to  be  pending.  It  is  vain  to  ignore 
that  the  entire  English  speaking  Pacific  seaboard 

—  British  Columbia,  our  own  States  of  Wash¬ 
ington,  Oregon,  and  California,  the  Common¬ 
wealths  of  Australasia  —  is  set  as  one  man  against 
Asiatic  immigration.  Directed  against  the  as  yet 
formless  mass  of  Chinese  population,  this  feel¬ 
ing  might  not  threaten  immediate  danger;  but 


346  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


in  the  Japanese  it  confronts  a  highly  organized 
government,  a  people  substantially  homogeneous, 
of  chivalrous  military  spirit,  conscious  of  recent 
great  achievement,  and  naturally  resentful  of  an 
exclusion,  which,  because  confined  to  Asiatics,  may 
easily  be  imagined  invidious  in  temper,  as  it  is 
in  act,  and  may  readily  take  on  an  appearance 
of  asserted  superiority  of  race.  Such  conditions 
are  like  sensitive  explosives;  to  approach  which 
by  stirring  up  national  feeling,  imputing  to  one 
government  hostile  purpose  in  exercising  its 
unquestionable  and  inoffensive  right  to  move  its 
navy  where  it  will,  either  in  its  own  waters  or 
on  the  international  common,  the  sea,  is  to  imi¬ 
tate  the  man  who  enters  a  magazine  with  a  lighted 
torch.  Doubtless,  statesmen  on  either  side  will 
understand  law  and  comity,  will  appreciate  con¬ 
ditions  accurately,  and  will  keep  their  heads; 
but  peoples  under  manipulated  excitement  some¬ 
times  escape  control  and  force  the  hands  of  their 
rulers. 

The  American  newspapers  which  thus  acted, 
whether  of  malice  prepense  towards  the  govern¬ 
ment  in  power,  or  through  mere  wanton  pro¬ 
fessional  stirring  up  a  subject  for  public  interest, 
or  perhaps  through  sheer  ignorance  in  matters 
on  which  they  professed  to  teach,  may  enjoy 
the  knowledge  that  the  agitation  originating 


Cruise  of  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


347 


with  them  served  to  point  the  pen  of  European 
periodicists,  daily  and  other,  to  the  discredit  of 
their  country.  Doubtless,  these  reflected  impu¬ 
tations  upon  the  American  people  and  their 
magistrates  were  accepted  by  readers;  why  not, 
since  Americans  themselves  gave  them  vogue  ? 
I  subjoin  some  extracts  from  a  magazine  sent  me 
by  an  English  friend.  If  somewhat  entertaining, 
from  the  ingenuity  of  the  misrepresentations,  they 
may  serve  to  reveal  to  Americans  generally  what 
we  owe  to  the  perverse  coloring  given  to  national 
action  by  American  journalists. 


“  About  the  period  when  these  lines  appear  in  print  the 
civilized  world  in  both  hemispheres  will,  according  to  the 
American  Press,  be  following  with  palpitating  interest  the  prog¬ 
ress  made  by  the  gigantic  fleet  which,  in  obedience  to  the 
orders  of  President  Roosevelt,  is  now  slowly  working  its  way 
from  the  mouth  of  the  Chesapeake  to  the  far  distant  waters 
of  Japan.  .  .  .  When  we  ask,  ‘  What  is  the  object  of  this  enor¬ 
mous  outlay,  and  how  is  it  calculated  to  impress  any  naval 
nation  with  terror  ?  ’  we  ask  in  vain.  .  .  . 

“  If  ever  America  should  attempt  to  carry  on  a  war  with  any 
powerful  nation  abroad,  she  would  be  hopelessly  handicapped. 
This  inferiority  would  be  due  to  the  hard  fact  that  the  United 
States  has  hitherto  proved  incapable  of  keeping  up  a  formi¬ 
dable  navy  in  time  of  peace.  ...  In  consequence  of  the  non¬ 
descript  character  of  the  rank  and  file  in  American  regiments 
and  American  men  of  war,  discipline  can  only  be  maintained 
by  excessive  and  often  brutal  severity.  .  .  .  Under  these  cir 


348  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


cumstances,”  (of  unwillingness  of  men  to  enter  the  services), 
“  the  United  States  is  not  in  a  position  to  send  a  fleet  abroad  to 
conduct  a  serious  campaign  against  japan  or  any  foreign  first 
class  power,  such  as  Japan  has  shown  herself  to  be. 

“  The  policy  of  bluff  is  a  recognized  device  of  American 
statesmanship.  .  .  .  The  first  idea,  therefore,  which  would 
suggest  itself  to  American  statesmanship  would  be  to  bluff,  by 
sending  to  Japanese  waters  an  enormous  fleet,  not  intended 
to  fight,  but  designed  to  overawe  the  Japanese  by  the  mere 
fact  of  its  presence.  If  a  policy  of  bluff  should  prove  successful 
in  cowing  the  Japanese,  the  President’s  fellow  countrymen 
will  exult  in  his  triumph.” 


“  When  the  Roosevelt  armada  reaches  the  shores  of  Japan 
there  will  be  only  two  courses  for  the  American  Government 
to  pursue.  Either  it  must  present  some  form  of  ultimatum 
to  the  Mikado,  to  be  accompanied  by  a  covert  threat  of  hostile 
action  in  the  event  of  its  refusal,  or  the  fleet  must  return  to 
America,  after  having  made  a  futile  demonstration.” 


Like  its  American  models,  this  English  peri¬ 
odical  overlooks  the  obvious  in  order  to  present 
a  fancy  picture.  In  view  of  these  illuminating 
comments,  let  it  be  hoped  that  hereafter  a  more 
rational  tone  may  be  adopted  by  our  press;  or, 
if  not,  that  the  public  will  accurately  value  journal¬ 
istic  hysteria.  It  is  not  by  the  unpatriotic  course 
of  abandoning  national  rights  as  to  our  navy 
that  the  notorious  causes  of  international  differ¬ 
ence  then  existing  can  be  amended;  but  rather 


Cruise  of  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


349 


by  directing  attention  to  the  obvious  fact  that 
the  distinction  between  ourselves  and  the  great 
peoples  of  Japan  and  China  is  not  primarily 
one  of  race,  or  color,  much  less  one  of  asserted 
superiority  on  our  part,  but  of  divergent  develop¬ 
ment  through  thousands  of  years.  What  we  call 
our  civilization,  —  that  is,  the  spiritual,  intellectual 
and  political  development  of  the  countries  of 
Europe,  America,  and  in  some  degree  of  Western 
Asia,  —  derives  from  Palestine,  Greece  and 
Rome.  The  immigrants  whom  we  are  apt  to 
think  most  undesirable,  the  Slavic  Jew  and  the 
Southern  Italian,  inherit  from  these  sources  in  their 
measure,  as  really  as  our  wisest  and  our  best. 
There  is  a  radical  oneness  of  origin  and  develop¬ 
ment  which  favors  assimilation.  During  ages, 
that  waste  tract  of  Central  Asia  known  as  the 
Roof  of  the  World  shut  off  China,  Japan,  and 
the  adjoining  countries  from  communication 
with  Europe.  Until  the  last  century  this  seclu¬ 
sion  was  welcomed  and  enforced  by  themselves; 
thereby  also  evincing  a  spirit  radically  and  es¬ 
sentially  different  from  that  which  spread  the 
Teutons  over  the  Roman  Empire,  and  has  brought 
America,  Africa,  and  India  under  European 
civilization  and  rule.  The  Farther  East  grew  up, 
and  evolved  its  own  splendid  civilizations  in 
isolation,  as  far  as  Europe  is  concerned. 


350  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


Unless  prepared  to  deny  the  influence  of  pro¬ 
longed  continuous  environment,  of  concentrated 
heredity,  —  of  in-breeding,  so  to  say,  —  it  can 
not  but  be  admitted  that  such  different  streams 
of  derivation  must  issue  in  dissemblance,  spir¬ 
itual,  intellectual  and  political,  unfavorable  to 
present  assimilation.  Nor  can  this  result  of 
three  thousand  years  be  seriously  modified  in  a 
single  century,  even  by  the  marvellous  aptitude 
with  which  Japan  has  adopted  Western  methods; 
a  matter  very  different  from  Western  sentiment, 
tradition  and  ideals,  the  true  moulders  of  popular 
character.  After  four  centuries  of  intercourse,  two 
of  which  in  very  close  contact,  India  still  remains 
Indian  in  thought  and  manners;  inspirit  substan¬ 
tially  unchanged  by  the  West.  Such  profound 
essential  divergences  prevent  the  community  of 
outlook  essential  to  a  common  citizenship,  or 
to  a  common  domicile;  contact,  if  extensive  and 
close,  particularly  when  between  the  less  reflective 
classes,  will  not  promote  harmony,  but  intensify 
discord.  This  truth  unhappily  is  too  evident  for 
insistence.  It  is  no  new  thing,  but  is  seen  where- 
ever  the  Asiatic  and  the  European  are  thrown 
together;  not  in  the  accidental  amenities  of  per¬ 
sonal  intercourse,  but  on  any  scale  large  enough  to 
be  called  social.  They  do  not  blend  socially.  The 
difference  in  color  doubtless  serves  in  some  degree 


Cruise  of  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


351 


to  obtrude  and  emphasize  the  difference  of  ante¬ 
cedents;  but  it  is  actually  slight  when  contrasted 
with  the  East  Indians,  whose  achievements  in 
thought  and  in  art,  like  those  of  the  Saracens, 
have  evidenced  their  equality  with  Europeans 
in  mental  and  spiritual  endowments.  In  view 
of  such  facts,  assumptions  of  superiority,  based 
on  color  only,  are  preposterous.  On  the  other 
hand,  where  the  difference  of  color  is  most  marked, 
in  the  African  negro,  the  presence  of  whom  and 
his  descendants  in  the  United  States  constitutes 
so  great  a  problem,  the  difficulty  of  political  in¬ 
corporation,  though  great,  is  less.  Color  is  there 
the  chief  factor,  because  at  the  moment  of  contact 
between  the  two  races  it  accompanied  and  em¬ 
phasized  a  racial  inferiority  of  development, 
intellectual,  social  and  political.  This  condition 
was  prolonged  up  to  a  half-century  ago,  by  slavery; 
and  the  time  which  has  since  elapsed  has  not 
sufficed  to  annul  it.  To  whatever  causes  that 
original  inferiority  be  attributed,  the  negro  could 
not,  and  cannot,  oppose  to  the  influence  of  the 
white  any  such  barrier  of  subtle  and  elaborate 
philosophies  of  life  as  prevail  in  the  East.  These, 
incarnated  in  long  standing  highly  organized 
communities,  constitute  the  backbone  of  resistance 
to  the  intrusion  of  European  ideals  on  the  part 
of  the  ancient  religious  and  social  systems  of 


352  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


China,  India  and  Japan;  and,  by  their  effect 
on  the  individual  members  of  those  commun¬ 
ities,  through  generations  of  inheritance,  ren¬ 
der  them  as  a  rule  inapt  to  political  assimilation 
with  us.  It  is  a  matter  for  reasonable  appre¬ 
hension  that  unrestricted  immigration,  accom¬ 
panied  with  naturalization,  would  result  in  Asiatic 
immigrants  voting  substantially  together,  in  mass; 
and  the  United  States  already  has  too  much 
experience  of  such  solidarities,  dependent  upon 
other  considerations  than  those  of  public  good,  or 
of  private  interests,  which  tend  to  counterbalance. 
On  the  other  hand,  immigration  with  citizenship 
denied  would  not  only  be  a  state  of  things  foreign 
to  the  spirit  of  our  institutions,  but  would  pro¬ 
voke  greater  discontent  than  exclusion;  a  dis¬ 
content,  too,  to  which  it  would  be  less  easy  to 
make  a  rational  reply. 

If  these  things  be  so,  let  thinking  men,  whether 
they  belong  to  the  one  race  or  to  the  other,  habit¬ 
uate  their  minds  to  the  reconciling  fact  that  pref¬ 
erence  for  the  predominance,  within  their  na¬ 
tional  borders,  of  the  civilization  to  which  they 
are  accustomed,  need  not,  and  should  not,  imply 
any  offensive  claim  of  superiority.  This,  realized 
by  the  thoughtful,  may  spread  throughout  the 
mass.  It  is  an  essential  preliminary  to  under¬ 
standing;  and,  possibly,  in  the  remote  end  to 


Cruise  of  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 


353 


a  community  of  standards,  to  a  common  out¬ 
look. 

Since  writing  the  above,  the  cable  reports  the 
fleet’s  arrival  at  Manila,  after  a  voyage  from 
San  Francisco  closely  approaching  in  length  that 
from  Hampton  Roads  to  Magdalena.  Admiral 
Sperry,  successor  to  Admiral  Evans,  is  quoted 
as  saying  that  since  the  warships  had  been  thrown 
on  their  own  resources,  without  the  convenience 
and  support  of  a  navy  yard,  their  efficiency  had 
been  greatly  increased.  This,  he  added,  was  par¬ 
ticularly  true  of  the  engineering  department. 
Upon  this  depends  mobility,  the  particular  char¬ 
acteristic  of  navies,  regarded  as  a  fighting  force; 
and  the  maintenance  of  such  efficiency  is  perhaps 
the  severest  requirement  of  this  prolonged  ex¬ 
perience. 

The  remarks  attributed  here  to  Admiral  Sperry 
accord  with  those  of  Lieut. -Commander  Chandler, 
—  before  quoted.  The  ships  arrived  at  Manila 
a  day  late,  owing  to  failure  of  colliers  to  join  on 
time  at  Albany.  This  postponed  departure  by 
sixty  hours;  that  much  of  this  was  made  up  adds 
to  the  evidence  of  efficiency.  The  incident  touches 
the  question  of  supply,  vital  to  such  operations. 
In  war,  it  might  have  been  disastrous;  occurring 
in  peace,  it  prompts  remedial  precautions. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE:  A  CON¬ 
SISTENT  DEVELOPMENT 


\ 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


HE  formulation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 


X  as  distinguished  from  its  origin,  resulted,  as 
is  universally  understood,  from  the  political  con¬ 
ditions  caused  by  the  revolt  of  the  Spanish  colonies 
in  America.  Up  to  that  time,  and  for  centuries 
previous,  the  name  Spain  had  signified  to  Europe 
in  general  not  merely  the  mother  country,  but  a 
huge  colonial  system,  with  its  special  economical 
and  commercial  regulation;  the  latter  being  de¬ 
termined  through  its  colonial  relations,  upon  the 
narrowest  construction  of  colonial  policy  then 
known,  which  was  saying  a  great  deal.  Spain 
stood  for  the  Spanish  Empire,  divisible  primarily 
into  two  chief  components,  Spain  and  Greater 
Spain;  the  mother  country  and  the  colonies. 
The  passage  of  time  had  been  gradually  reversing 
the  relative  importance  of  the  two  in  the  appre¬ 
hension  of  other  European  states.  In  Sir  Robert 
Walpole’s  day  it  was  believed  by  many  besides 
himself  that  Great  Britain  could  not  make  head 
against  France  and  Spain  combined.  The  naval 
power  of  Spain,  and  consequently  her  political 


367 


358  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


weight,  still  received  awed  consideration;  a  relic 
of  former  fears.  This  continued,  though  in  a  di¬ 
minished  degree,  through  the  War  of  American 
Independence;  but  by  the  end  of  the  century, 
while  it  may  be  too  much  to  affirm  that  such 
apprehension  had  wholly  disappeared,  —  that  no 
account  was  taken  of  the  unwieldy  numbers  of 
ill-manned  and  often  ill-officered  ships  that  made 
up  the  Spanish  navy,  —  it  is  true  that  a  Spanish 
war  bore  to  British  seamen  an  aspect  rather 
financial  than  military.  It  meant  much  more  of 
prize  money  than  of  danger;  and  that  it  did 
so  was  due  principally  to  the  wealth  of  the 
colonies. 

This  wealth  was  potential  as  well  as  actual,  and 
in  both  aspects  it  appealed  to  Europe.  To 
break  in  upon  the  monopoly  enjoyed  by  Spain, 
and  consecrated  in  international  usage  both 
by  accepted  ideas  and  long  prescription,  was  an 
object  of  policy  to  the  principal  European  mar¬ 
itime  states.  It  was  so  conspicuously  to  Great 
Britain,  on  account  of  the  pre-eminence  which 
commercial  considerations  always  had  in  her 
councils.  In  the  days  of  William  III.,  the  pros¬ 
pective  failure  of  the  Spanish  royal  house  brought 
up  the  question  of  what  other  family  should 
succeed,  and  to  whom  should  be  transferred  the 
great  inheritance  won  by  Columbus,  Cortfez  and 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


359 


Pizarro.  Thenceforth  the  thought  of  dividing 
this  spoil  of  a  decadent  empire  —  the  sick  man  of 
that  day  —  remained  in  men’s  memory  as  a 
possible  contingency  of  the  future,  even  though 
momentarily  out  of  the  range  of  practical  politics. 
The  waning  of  Spain’s  political  and  military 
prestige  was  accompanied  by  an  increasing  under¬ 
standing  of  the  value  of  the  commercial  system 
appended  to  her  in  her  colonies.  The  future 
disposition  of  these  extensive  regions,  and  the 
fruition  of  their  wealth,  developed  and  unde¬ 
veloped,  were  conceived  as  questions  of  universal 
European  policy.  In  the  general  apprehension 
of  European  rulers,  these  were  regarded  as  affect¬ 
ing  the  European  balance  of  power. 

It  was  as  the  opponent  of  this  conception,  the 
perfectly  natural  outcome  of  previous  circum¬ 
stances  and  history,  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
entered  the  field;  a  newcomer  in  form,  yet  having 
its  own  history  and  antecedent  conditions  as 
really  as.  the  conflicting  European  view.  Far 
more  than  South  America,  which  had  seen  little 
contested  occupation,  the  Northern  continent  had 
known  what  it  was  to  be  the  scene  of  antagonistic 
European  ambitions  and  exploitation.  There 
had  been  within  her  territory  a  balance  of  Eu¬ 
ropean  power,  in  idea,  if  not  in  achievement,  quite 
as  real  as  any  that  had  existed  or  been  fought 


360  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


for  in  Europe.  Canada  in  the  hands  of  France, 
and  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  in  alien  control, 
were  matters  of  personal  memory  to  many,  and 
of  very  recent  tradition  to  all  Americans  in  active 
life  in  1810.  Florida  then  was  still  Spanish,  with 
unsettled  boundary  questions  and  attendant  evils. 
Not  reason  only,  but  feeling,  based  upon  experi¬ 
ence  of  actual  inconvenience,  suffering,  and  loss, 
—  loss  of  life  and  loss  of  wealth,  political  anxiety 
and  commercial  disturbance,  —  conspired  to  in¬ 
tensify  opposition  to  any  avoidable  renewal  of 
similar  conditions.  To  quote  the  words  of  a 
distinguished  American  Secretary  of  State  — 
for  Foreign  Affairs  —  speaking  twenty  years 
ago,  “  This  sentiment  is  properly  called  a  Doctrine, 
for  it  has  no  prescribed  sanction,  and  its  assertion 
is  left  to  the  exigency  which  may  invoke  it.” 
This  accurate  statement  places  it  upon  the  surest 
political  foundation,  much  firmer  than  precise 
legal  enactment  or  international  convention,  that 
of  popular  conviction.  The  sentiment  had  existed 
beforehand;  the  first  exigency  which  invoked 
its  formulated  expression,  in  1823,  was  the  an¬ 
nounced  intention  of  several  great  Powers  to 
perpetuate  by  force  the  European  system,  whether 
of  colonial  tenure,  or  balance  of  power,  or  monar¬ 
chical  forms,  in  the  Spanish  colonies;  they  being 
then  actually  in  revolt  against  the  mother  country, 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


361 


and  seeking,  not  other  political  relations  to 
Europe,  but  simply  their  own  independence. 

This  political  question  of  independence,  how¬ 
ever,  involved  also  necessarily  that  of  commer¬ 
cial  relations;  and  both  were  interesting  to  out¬ 
side  states.  So  far  as  then  appeared,  renewed 
dependence  meant  the  perpetuation  of  com¬ 
mercial  exclusion  against  foreign  nations.  This 
characterized  all  colonial  regulation  at  that 
time,  and  continued  in  Spanish  practice,  in  Cuba 
and  other  dependencies,  until  the  final  downfall 
of  Spain’s  diminished  empire  in  1898.  It  must 
be  recognized,  therefore,  that  all  outside  parties 
to  the  controversy,  all  parties  other  than  Spain 
and  her  colonies,  which  had  special  incitements 
of  their  own,  were  influenced  by  two  classes  of 
motives,  —  political  and  commercial.  These  are 
logically  separable,  although  in  practice  inter¬ 
twined.  The  incentive  of  the  continental  Powers 
—  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia,  with  the  sub¬ 
sequent  accession  of  France  —  was  primarily 
political.  Their  object  was  to  perpetuate  in 
South  America  political  conditions  connected 
with  the  European  system,  by  breaking  down 
popular  revolt  against  absolutist  government, 
and  maintaining  the  condition  of  dependence 
upon  Spain.  Whither  this  might  lead  in  case  of 
armed  intervention,  which  was  contemplated, 


362  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


was  a  question  probably  of  the  division  of  spoil; 
for  in  the  end  Spain  could  hardly  pay  the  bill 
otherwise  than  by  colonial  cessions.  But  whether 
the  movement  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  as  it  was 
self-styled,  issued  merely  in  the  suppression  of 
popular  liberties,  or  introduced  further  a  European 
balance  of  power  with  its  rivalries  and  conflicts,  its 
wars  and  rumors  of  wars,  both  results  were  polit¬ 
ically  abhorrent  to  American  feelings  and  disturb¬ 
ing  to  American  peace.  They  gave  rise  to  distinctly 
political  objections  by  the  people  and  statesmen 
of  the  United  States.  In  consequence  of  these 
sentiments,  the  exigency  of  the  moment  called 
out  the  first  reasoned  official  expression  of  the 
national  conviction  and  purpose,  now  known  as 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Subsidiary  to  this  political 
motive,  but  clearly  recognized  and  avowed,  was 
the  legitimate  inducement  of  commercial  interest, 
benefited  by  the  rejection  of  European  rule,  and 
to  be  injured  by  its  restoration. 

It  will  not  be  expected  that  a  British  Tory 
administration,  before  the  Reform  Bill  of  1832 
and  with  the  protective  system  and  Navigation 
Act  in  full  force,  should  have  shared  the  particular 
political  prepossessions  of  the  American  States. 
These  were  closely  concerned  geographically, 
had  been  lately  themselves  colonies,  and  were 
but  very  recently  emerged  from  a  prolonged  con- 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


363 


flict  with  British  commercial  regulations,  based 
upon  the  ancient  conception  of  colonial  adminis¬ 
tration.  Still,  Great  Britain  also,  in  addition  to 
commercial  ambitions  and  interests  greater  then 
than  those  of  the  United  States,  the  outcome  of 
a  century  of  effort  against  Spanish  monopoly, 
did  have  a  distinct  political  leaning  in  the  matter. 
There  ran  through  both  political  parties  a  real 
and  deep  sympathy  with  communities  struggling 
for  freedom.  The  iniquity  of  suppressing  such 
efforts  by  the  external  force  of  third  parties,  not 
immediately  concerned,  was  strongly  felt.  There 
was  accepted  also  among  British  statesmen  a 
clearly  defined  rule  of  conduct,  which  had  been 
conspicuously  illustrated  in  the  early  days  of  the 
French  Revolution,  still  a  matter  of  recent  memory 
in  1820,  that  interference  in  the  intestine  struggles 
of  a  foreign  country,  such  as  those  then  afflicting 
both  the  Spanish  kingdom  and  colonies,  was 
neither  right  in  principle  nor  expedient  in  policy. 

Basing  its  action  firmly  on  these  convictions, 
the  British  Ministry,  under  the  influence  of  Can¬ 
ning,  intimated  clearly  that,  while  neutral  towards 
the  intervention  of  the  Holy  Alliance  in  Spain 
itself,  to  restore  there  the  old  order  of  things,  it 
would  not  permit  the  transport  of  armies  to 
South  America  for  a  like  purpose.  The  course  of 
the  Alliance  in  Spain  was  viewed  with  disapproval; 


364  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


but  it  did  not  immediately  concern  Great  Britain 
to  an  extent  demanding  armed  resistance.  The 
case  of  the  colonies  was  different.  Intervention 
there  would  be  prejudicial  to  British  mercantile 
enterprise,  already  heavily  engaged  in  their  trade 
and  economical  development;  while  politically, 
the  occupation  of  the  Peninsula  by  French  armies 
would  be  offset  by  the  detachment  of  the  colonies 
from  their  previous  dependence.  To  the  effect 
of  this  British  attitude  the  position  of  the  United 
States  government,  defined  by  President  Monroe 
in  his  Message  of  December,  1823,  constituted 
a  powerful  support,  and  the  news  of  it  caused 
general  satisfaction  in  England.  However  mo¬ 
tived,  the  two  English-speaking  countries,  without 
formal  concert,  still  less  in  alliance,  occupied  the 
same  ground  and  announced  the  same  purpose. 
Spain  might  conquer  her  colonies  unaided,  if 
she  could;  neither  would  interfere;  but  the  at¬ 
tempt  of  other  Powers  to  give  her  armed  assist¬ 
ance  would  be  regarded  by  each  as  unfriendly 
to  itself. 

From  this  momentary  identity  of  position 
exaggerated  inferences  have  been  drawn  as  to  the 
identity  of  impulses  and  community  of  sentiment 
which  had  brought  either  state  to  it.  So  far  was 
this  from  being  true,  that  on  December  31,  1823, 
only  four  weeks  after  Monroe’s  celebrated  Mes- 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


365 


sage,  probably  then  received  in  England,  Canning 
wrote  to  the  British  minister  to  Spain :  “Monarchy 
in  Mexico  and  monarchy  in  Brazil  would  cure  the 
evils  of  universal  democracy  and  prevent  the 
drawing  of  the  line  of  demarcation  which  I  most 
dread — America  versus  Europe.  The  United 
States  naturally  enough  aim  at  this  division.”  1 
The  opposition  of  ideas  is  plain.  It  was  a  case  of 
two  paths  converging;  not  thenceforth  to  unite, 
but  to  cross,  and  continue  each  in  its  former 
general  direction,  diverging  rather  than  approxi¬ 
mating.  Though  crumbling  before  the  rising 
stream  of  progress,  the  ideas  appropriate  to  the 
eighteenth  century  had  not  yet  wholly  disappeared 
from  British  conceptions;  still  less  had  the  prac¬ 
tice  and  policy  of  the  state  conformed  them¬ 
selves  to  the  changed  point  of  view,  which  in 
the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  began  to 
characterize  British  statesmanship  with  reference 
to  colonies.  The  battles  of  reformed  political 
representation  and  of  free  trade  were  yet  to  fight 
and  win;  old  opinions  continued  as  to  the  com¬ 
mercial  relationship  of  colonies  to  the  mother 
country,  although  modification  in  details  was 
being  introduced.  The  West  Indies  were  still 
the  most  important  group  in  the  British  colonial 

1  Stapleton’s  “  Canning  and  his  Times.”  Quoted  in  Moore’s 
International  Law  Digest,  Vol.  VI.  p.  410. 


366  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


system,  and  one  of  the  latest  acts  of  Canning, 
who  died  in  1827,  was  to  renew  there  commercial 
discrimination  against  the  United  States;  a  meas¬ 
ure  which,  however  prompted,  could  scarcely 
be  said  to  reflect  the  image  of  the  Monroe  Doc¬ 
trine. 

For  a  generation  then  to  come,  British  states¬ 
men  remained  under  the  domination  of  habits  of 
thought  which  had  governed  the  course  of  the 
two  Pitts;  and  they  failed,  as  men  usually  fail, 
to  discern  betimes  changes  of  condition  which 
modify,  if  not  the  essentials,  at  least  the  appli¬ 
cation  even  of  a  policy  sound  in  general  principle. 
In  1823,  not  ten  years  had  elapsed  since  the 
British  government  had  contemplated  exacting 
from  the  United  States,  as  the  result  of  our  pros¬ 
tration  at  the  close  of  the  War  of  1812,  territorial 
cessions  and  concessions  which  might  make  an 
American  of  to-day,  ignorant  of  the  extremes  to 
which  his  country  was  then  reduced,  gasp  with 
amazement.  How  then  could  it  be  that  Great 
Britain,  which  for  centuries  had  been  acquiring 
territory,  and  to  whom  the  Americas  were  still 
the  most  immediate  commercial  interest,  should 
heartily  accept  the  full  scope  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  as  applicable  to  the  extension  of  her 
own  dominion,  by  conquest  or  otherwise,  to  any 
part  of  the  American  continents  where  she  did 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


367 


not  at  that  moment  have  clear  title  ?  As  a  matter 
of  fact  she  did  not  in  any  wise  accept  this.  The 
American  declaration  against  “  the  extension  of 
the  system  of  the  Allied  Powers  to  any  portion  of 
this  hemisphere  ”  was  welcomed  as  supporting 
the  attitude  of  Great  Britain;  for  the  phrase, 
in  itself  ambiguous,  was  understood  to  apply,  not 
to  the  Quintuple  Alliance  for  the  preservation  of 
existing  territorial  arrangements  in  Europe,  to 
which  Great  Britain  was  a  party,  but  to  the  Holy 
Alliance,  the  avowed  purpose  of  which  was  to 
suppress  by  external  force  revolutionary  move¬ 
ments  within  any  state  —  a  course  into  which  she 
had  refused  to  be  drawn.  But  the  complementary 
declaration  in  the  President’s  Message,  that 
“  the  American  continents  are  henceforth  not  to 
be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization 
by  any  European  Power,”  was  characterized 
in  the  Annual  Register  for  1823  as  “  scarcely  less 
extravagant  than  that  of  the  Russian  ukase  by 
which  it  was  elicited,”  which  forbade  any  foreign 
vessel  from  approaching  within  a  hundred  miles 
of  the  Russian  possession  now  known  as  Alaska. 
The  British  government  took  the  same  view; 
and  in  the  protocol  to  a  Conference  held  in  1827 
expressly  repudiated  this  American  claim. 

There  was  therefore  between  the  two  countries 
at  this  moment  a  clear  opposition  of  principle, 


368  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


and  agreement  only  as  to  a  particular  line  of 
conduct  in  a  special  case.  With  regard  to  the  in¬ 
terventions  of  the  Holy  Alliance  in  Europe,  Great 
Britain,  while  reserving  her  independence  of 
action,  stood  neutral  for  the  time;  but  through 
motives  of  her  own  policy  showed  unmistakably 
that  she  would  resist  like  action  in  Spanish  Amer¬ 
ica.  The  United  States,  impelled  by  an  entirely 
different  conception  of  national  policy,  now  first 
officially  enunciated,  intimated  in  diplomatic 
phrase  a  similar  disposition.  The  two  supported 
one  another  in  the  particular  contingency,  and 
doubtless  frustrated  whatever  intention  any  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  Holy  Alliance  may  have  entertained 
of  projecting  to  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  their 
“  union  for  the  government  of  the  world.”  In 
America,  as  in  Europe,  Great  Britain  deprecated 
the  intrusion  of  external  force  to  settle  internal 
convulsions  of  foreign  countries;  but  she  did 
not  commit  herself,  as  the  United  States  did,  to 
the  position  that  purchase  or  war  should  never 
entail  a  cession  of  territory  by  an  American  to  a 
European  state;  a  transaction  which  would  be 
in  so  far  colonization.  In  resisting  any  transfer 
of  Spanish  American  territory  to  a  European 
Power,  Great  Britain  was  not  advancing  a  general 
principle,  but  maintaining  an  immediate  interest. 
Her  motive,  in  short,  had  nothing  in  common 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


369 


with  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Such  principles  as 
were  involved  had  been  formulated  long  before, 
and  had  controlled  her  action  in  Europe  as  in 
America. 

The  United  States  dogma,  on  the  contrary, 
planted  itself  squarely  on  the  separate  system 
and  interests  of  America.  This  is  distinctly  shown 
by  the  comments  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  John 
Quincy  Adams,  in  a  despatch  to  the  American 
minister  in  London,  dated  only  two  days  before 
Monroe’s  Message.  Alluding  to  Canning’s  most 
decisive  phrase  in  a  recent  despatch,  he  wrote: 

Great  Britain  could  not  see  any  part  of  the  colonies  trans¬ 
ferred  to  any  other  Power  with  indifference.  We  certainly  do 
concur  with  her  in  this  position ;  but  the  principles  of  that 
aversion,  so  far  as  they  are  common  to  both  parties,  resting 
only  upon  a  casual  coincidence  of  interests,  in  a  national  point 
of  view  selfish  1  on  both  sides,  would  be  liable  to  dissolution 
by  every  change  of  phase  in  the  aspects  of  European  politics. 
So  that  Great  Britain,  negotiating  at  once  with  the  European 
Alliance  and  with  us  concerning  America,  without  being  bound 
by  any  permanent  community  of  principle,  would  still  be  free 
to  accommodate  her  policy  to  any  of  those  distributions  of 
power,  and  partitions  of  territory,  which  for  the  last  half-century 
have  been  the  ultima  ratio  of  all  European  political  arrange¬ 
ments. 

For  this  reason  Adams  considered  that  recog¬ 
nition  of  the  independence  of  the  revolted  colonies, 

1  Adams’  italics. 


370  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


already  made  by  the  United  States,  in  March, 
1822,  must  be  given  by  Great  Britain  also,  in 
order  to  place  the  two  States  on  equal  terms  of 
co-operation.  From  motives  of  European  policy, 
from  which  Great  Britain  could  not  dissociate 
herself,  she  delayed  this  recognition  until  1825; 
and  then  Mr.  Canning  defined  his  general  course 
towards  the  Spanish  colonies  in  the  famous  words, 
“  I  called  the  New  World  into  existence  to  re¬ 
dress  the  balance  of  the  Old.  I  resolved  that, 
if  France  had  Spain,  it  should  not  be  Spain  with 
the  Indies.”  His  coincidence  with  the  policy  of 
the  United  States  is  thus  seen  to  be  based,  and 
properly,  upon  British  interests  as  involved  in  the 
European  system;  but  that,  so  far  from  being 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  is  almost  the  opposite  of 
it. 

Nor  was  it  only  in  direction  that  the  impulses 
of  the  two  States  differed.  They  were  unequal  in 
inherent  vital  strength.  The  motive  force  of  the 
one  was  bound  to  accumulate,  and  that  of  the 
other  to  relax,  by  the  operation  of  purely  natural 
conditions.  An  old  order  was  beginning  to  yield 
to  a  new.  After  three  centuries  of  tutelage  Amer¬ 
ica  was  slipping  out  of  European  control.  She 
was  reaching  her  majority  and  claiming  her  own. 
Within  her  sphere  she  felt  the  future  to  be  hers. 
Of  this  sense  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  an  utter- 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


371 


ance.  It  was  a  declaration  of  independence;  not 
for  a  single  nation  only,  but  for  a  continent  of 
nations,  and  it  carried  implicitly  the  assertion 
of  all  that  logically  follows  from  such  independence. 
Foremost  among  the  conditions  ensuring  its 
vitality  was  propinquity,  with  its  close  effect  upon 
interest.  Policy,  as  well  as  war,  is  a  business 
of  positions.  This  maxim  is  perennial;  a  gen¬ 
eration  later  it  was  emphasized  in  application 
by  the  peopling  of  the  Pacific  coast,  the  incidental 
discovery  of  gold  in  California,  and  the  conse¬ 
quent  enhanced  importance  of  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama  to  the  political  strategy  of  nations. 
All  this  advanced  the  Monroe  Doctrine  on  the 
path  of  development,  giving  broader  sweep  to 
the  corollaries  involved  in  the  original  proposi¬ 
tion;  but  the  transcendent  positional  interest 
of  the  United  States  no  more  needed  demonstra¬ 
tion  in  1823  than  in  1850,  when  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  was  made,  or  than  now,  when  not 
the  Pacific  coast  only,  but  the  Pacific  Ocean  and 
the  farther  East,  lend  increased  consequence  to 
the  Isthmian  communications. 

The  case  of  the  United  States  is  now  stronger, 
but  it  is  not  clearer.  Correlatively,  the  admission 
of  its  force  by  others  has  been  progressive;  gradual 
and  practical,  not  at  once  or  formal.  Its  formu¬ 
lation  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  not  obtained 


372  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


the  full  legislative  sanction  even  of  the  country 
of  its  origin;  and  its  present  development  there 
rests  upon  successive  utterances  of  persons  offi¬ 
cially  competent  to  define,  but  not  of  full  authority 
to  commit  the  nation  to  their  particular  expres¬ 
sions.  So,  too,  international  acquiescence  in  the 
position  now  taken  has  been  a  work  of  time,  nor 
can  there  be  asserted  for  it  the  final  ratification 
of  international  agreement.  The  Monroe  Doc¬ 
trine  remains  a  policy,  not  a  law,  either  munic¬ 
ipal  or  international;  but  it  has  advanced  in 
scope  and  in  acceptance.  The  one  progress  as 
the  other  has  been  the  result  of  growing  strength ; 
strength  of  numbers  and  of  resources.  Taken 
with  position,  these  factors  constitute  national 
powers  as  they  do  military  advantage,  which  in 
the  last  analysis  may  always  be  resolved  into  two 
elements,  force  and  position. 

In  the  conjunction  of  these  two  factors  is  to  be 
found  the  birth  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and 
its  development  up  to  the  present  time.  It  is  a 
product  of  national  interest,  involved  in  position, 
and  of  nafidnal  power  dependent  upon  population 
and  resources.  These  are  the  permanent  factors 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine;  and  it  can  not  be  too 
strongly  realized  by  Americans  that  the  perma¬ 
nence  of  the  Doctrine  itself,  as  a  matter  of  inter¬ 
national  consideration,  depends  upon  the  main- 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


373 


tenance  of  both  factors.  To  this  serious  truth 
record  is  borne  by  History,  the  potent  mother 
of  national  warning  and  national  encouragement. 
That  the  Doctrine  at  its  first  enunciation  should 
not  at  once  have  obtained  either  assent  or  in¬ 
fluence,  even  in  its  most  limited  expression,  was 
entirely  natural.  Although  not  without  an  an¬ 
tecedent  history  of  conception  and  occasional 
utterance  by  American  statesmen,  its  moment  of 
birth  was  the  announcement  by  Monroe;  and 
it  had  then  all  the  weakness  of  the  new  born, 
consequent  upon  a  national  inadequacy  to  the 
display  of  organized  strength  which  had  been 
pathetically  manifested  but  ten  years  before. 
After  the  destruction  of  the  rule  of  Spain  in  her 
colonies,  except  in  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  Great 
Britain  remained  the  one  great  nation  besides  the 
United  States  possessed  of  extensive  territory  in 
America.  She  also  was  the  one  state  that  had 
had  experience  of  us  as  an  enemy,  and  known  the 
weakness  of  our  military  system  for  offensive 
action.  What  more  natural  than  that  she  should 
have  welcomed  the  first  promulgation  of  the 
Doctrine,  in  its  original  scope  directed  apparently 
merely  against  a  combination  of  Continental 
Powers,  the  purposes  of  which  were  offensive 
to  herself,  and  yet  fail  to  heed  a  root  principle 
which  in  progress  of  time  should  find  its  appli- 


374  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


cation  to  herself,  contesting  the  expansion  of  her 
own  influence  in  the  hemisphere,  as  being  part 
of  the  European  system  and  therefore  falling 
under  the  same  condemnation  ?  Yet  even  had  she 
see  this,  and  fully  appreciated  the  promise  of 
strength  to  come,  it  was  to  be  expected  that  she 
should  for  the  mean  time  pursue  her  own  policy, 
irrespective  of  the  still  distant  future.  It  may  be 
advantageous  to  retard  that  which  ultimately 
must  prevail;  and  at  all  events  men  who  head 
the  movements  of  nations  are  not  able  at  once  to 
abandon  the  traditions  of  the  past,  and  conform 
their  action  to  new  ideas  as  yet  unassimilated 
by  their  people. 

There  is  then  this  distinguishing  feature  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  classifies  it  among 
principles  of  policy  that  are  essentially  permanent. 
From  its  correspondence  to  the  nature  of  things, 
to  its  environment,  it  possessed  from  the  first  a 
vitality  which  ensured  growth  and  development. 
Under  such  conditions  it  could  not  remain  in 
application  at  the  end  of  a  half-century  just  what 
it  had  been  in  terms  at  the  beginning.  Appre¬ 
hended  in  leading  features  by  American  states¬ 
men,  and  by  them  embraced  with  a  conviction 
which  the  people  shared,  —  though  probably  not 
fully  understanding,  —  it  received  from  time  to 
time,  as  successive  exigencies  arose  to  provoke 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


375 


assertion,  definitions  which  enlarged  its  scope; 
sometimes  consistently  with  its  true  spirit,  some¬ 
times  apparently  in  excess  of  evident  limitations, 
more  rarely  in  defect  of  them.  But  from  the 
fact  of  Great  Britain’s  existing  territorial  pos¬ 
sessions  in  America,  and  from  her  commercial 
pre-eminence  and  ambitions,  to  which  territorial 
acquisition  is  often  desirable,  it  was  also  in  the 
nature  of  things  that  with  her  successive  conten¬ 
tions  should  arise.  If  not  a  balance  of  power,  such 
as  had  distracted  Europe,  at  least  opposing  scales 
had  existed  from  the  first;  connected,  not  per¬ 
haps  with  the  European  system  as  a  whole,  but 
certainly  with  a  most  important  component  of 
that  system.  Moreover,  the  strength  of  Great 
Britain  in  America,  relatively  to  the  United 
States,  was  not  American  strength,  but  European 
strength.  It  was  therefore  unavoidably  invidious 
to  the  sentiment  breathed  in  the  Monroe  Doc¬ 
trine,  and  much  more  so  when  the  United  States 
was  weak  than  when  she  became  strong. 

From  these  circumstances,  it  has  been  through 
discussion  with  Great  Britain  chiefly  that  the 
Doctrine,  marking  the  advance  of  the  sentiment, 
has  progressed  from  definition  to  definition,  no 
one  of  which  is  final  in  an  authoritative  sense, 
because  in  no  case  clothed  with  full  legislative 
sanction;  but  possessing,  nevertheless,  the  weight 


376  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


which  attaches  to  the  utterances  of  those  who 
both  by  personal  ability  and  official  position  are 
recognized  as  competent  interpreters.  Such  enun¬ 
ciations,  ex  cathedra,  have  the  force  of  judicial 
decisions,  accepted  as  precedents  to  a  degree 
dependent  upon  the  particular  person,  or  upon 
subsequent  general  acceptance.  Not  in  every 
case  have  the  positions  of  American  administra¬ 
tions  in  this  matter  been  endorsed  by  their  suc¬ 
cessors  or  the  public. 

It  is  vain,  therefore,  to  argue  narrowly  concern¬ 
ing  what  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is,  from  the  pre¬ 
cise  application  made  of  it  to  any  one  particular 
emergency.  Nor  can  there  be  finality  of  definition, 
antecedent  to  some  national  announcement,  for¬ 
mally  complete,  which  it  is  to  be  hoped  will  never 
be  framed;  but  which,  if  it  were,  would  doubtless 
remain  liable  to  contrary  interpretations,  sharing 
therein  a  fate  from  which  neither  the  enactments 
of  legislatures  nor  the  Bull  of  a  Pope  can  claim 
exemption.  The  virtue  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
without  which  it  would  die  deservedly,  is  that, 
through  its  correspondence  with  the  national 
necessities  of  the  United  States,  it  possesses  an  in¬ 
herent  principle  of  life,  which  adapts  itself  with 
the  flexibility  of  a  growing  plant  to  the  successive 
conditions  it  encounters.  One  of  these  conditions 
of  course  is  the  growing  strength  of  the  nation 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


377 


itself.  As  Doctor  Johnson  ungraciously  said  of 
taxing  Americans  for  the  first  time,  “  We  do 
not  put  a  calf  to  the  plough;  we  wait  till  he  is 
an  ox.”  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  without  breach 
of  its  spirit,  can  be  made  to  bear  a  burden  to 
which  the  nation  a  hundred  years  ago  was  un¬ 
equal;  but  also,  as  our  present  Chief  Magistrate 
has  wisely  warned  us,  if  we  now  propose  to  assume 
a  load,  we  must  see  to  it  that  the  national  strength 
is  organized  to  endure  it.  That  also  is  a  matter  of 
national  policy,  quite  as  important  as  the  Doc¬ 
trine  itself. 

For  these  reasons  it  is  more  instructive,  as  to 
the  present  and  future  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  to 
consider  its  development  by  successive  exhibitions 
in  the  past  than  to  strive  to  cage  its  free  spirit 
within  the  bars  of  a  definition  attempted  at  any 
one  moment.  Such  an  attempt  the  present 
writer  certainly  will  not  make.  The  international 
force  of  the  proposition  lies  in  its  evolution,  sub¬ 
stantially  consistent,  broadening  down  from  prec¬ 
edent  to  precedent;  not  in  an  alleged  finality. 

The  aversion  manifested  by  the  American 
government  of  the  War  of  Independence  towards 
any  attempted  restoration  of  French  dominion 
in  Canada,  may  be  justly  considered  a  premo¬ 
nition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  anticipatory  of 
the  ground  taken  by  both  Monroe  and  Canning 


378  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


against  a  transfer  of  Spanish  colonies  to  any 
other  European  Power.  At  the  earlier  period 
no  remonstrance  was  raised  against  such  trans¬ 
fers  of  West  India  islands,  which  occurred  fre¬ 
quently  during  both  that  war  and  those  of  the 
French  Revolution  and  Napoleonic  period.  The 
cession  of  Louisiana  by  Spain  to  France,  in  1801, 
excited  the  keenest  susceptibilities.  It  is  bootless 
to  surmise  how  far  resistance  might  have  been 
carried;  the  inoperativeness  of  the  transaction 
did  not  permit  the  full  consequences  to  develop. 
Objection,  however,  appears  to  have  turned  upon 
the  more  immediate  and  special  motive  of  the 
substitution  of  a  strong  Power  for  a  weak  one, 
in  control  of  an  artery  of  trade  essential  to  our 
people,  rather  than  upon  the  formulated  dogma 
that  American  territory  was  not  matter  for  political 
exchange  between  European  states.  Moreover,  it 
needed  no  broad  maxim,  wide-reaching  in  ap¬ 
plication,  to  arouse  popular  feeling,  and  guide 
national  action,  in  a  matter  of  such  close  and 
evident  importance.  Repulsion  Was  a  matter 
of  instinct,  of  feeling,  which  did  not  need  to  give 
account  of  itself  to  reason.  The  Louisiana  ques¬ 
tion  laid  its  hand  upon  the  heart  of  the  nation. 
It  concerned  the  country,  not  the  hemisphere; 
and  in  principle  did  not  lead  out  beyond  itself, 
pointing  to  further  action.  It  had  finality. 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


379 


The  real  stepping-stone  by  which  national  in¬ 
terest  advanced  to  hemispheric  considerations 
was  Cuba.  From  every  circumstance  this  island 
was  eminently  fitted  to  point  the  way  of  the 
future;  to  be  the  medium,  and  to  mark  the 
transition  from  a  strictly  continental  policy  to 
one  that  embraced  the  hemisphere.  Cuba  is 
larger  by  one  third  than  Ireland,  and  lies  across 
the  approach  to  the  Gulf  coast  of  the  United 
States  as  Ireland  does  those  to  Great  Britain 
from  the  Atlantic.  It  possessed  in  a  very  high 
degree  the  elements  of  power,  from  its  position, 
size,  and  resources,  which  involved  immense 
possibility  for  development  of  strength.  Its  in¬ 
trinsic  value  was  therefore  very  great;  but  further, 
while  it  had  relations  to  our  continental  territory 
only  less  important  than  the  lower  course  of  the 
Mississippi,  it  nevertheless  did  not  belong  to  the 
continent,  to  which  the  Jeffersonian  school  of 
thought,  in  power  from  1801  to  1825,  would 
strictly  confine  national  expansion.  The  point 
where  a  powerful  navy  would  be  needed  to  main¬ 
tain  the  integrity  of  the  national  possessions 
marked  the  limit  of  advance  in  the  theory  of 
Jefferson.  Nevertheless,  to  him  also,  minimizing 
possibly  the  need  of  a  fleet  to  ensure  access  over 
so  narrow  a  strip  of  sea,  “  the  addition  of  Cuba 
to  our  confederacy  is  certainly  exactly  what  is 


380  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


wanted  to  round  our  power  as  a  nation  to  the 
point  of  its  utmost  interest.”  To  prevent  its 
falling  as  yet  into  the  hands  of  any  other  European 
Power,  he  expressed  to  Monroe  in  1823  ^ls  aP“ 
proval  of  entering  with  Great  Britain  into  a  joint 
guarantee  to  preserve  the  island  to  Spain;  for 
this,  he  argued,  would  bind  the  most  dangerous 
and  most  suspected  Power.  On  subsequent 
information,  however,  that  Great  Britain  had 
stated  positively  that  she  would  not  acquire  for 
herself  any  Spanish  colony  under  the  present 
distress  of  Spain,  he  retracted  this  opinion;  for 
why,  said  he,  by  engaging  in  joint  guarantee, 
concede  to  her  an  interest  which  she  does  not 
otherwise  possess  ?  Before  this,  however,  Great 
Britain  had  offered  to  assure  the  island  by  her 
own  sole  action,  on  condition  of  Spain  acknowl¬ 
edging  the  independence  of  her  Continental 
colonies;  thus  constituting  for  herself  an  interest 
from  which  Jefferson  would  have  debarred  the 
consent  of  the  United  States. 

To  such  a  point  anxiety  for  American  ends, 
and  consciousness  of  American  lack  of  organized 
strength,  would  then  carry  a  practical  statesman 
of  keen  American  instincts.  To  join  with  a 
European  state  in  guaranteeing  an  American  in¬ 
terest  was  not  yet  an  anachronism.  A  like  anxiety 
and  a  like  consciousness  were  responsible  for 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


381 


the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  which  proved  so 
fertile  a  source  of  diplomatic  contention  and 
national  ill-will  in  later  days.  Monroe’s  Secre¬ 
tary  of  State,  John  Quincy  Adams,  the  con¬ 
temporary  and  survivor  of  Jefferson,  had  clearer 
views  and  stronger  purpose.  Recognizing  in 
Cuba  an  importance  to  the  United  States  scarcely 
inferior  to  any  part  of  the  then  existing  Union, 
he  held  that  there  were  still  numerous  and  for¬ 
midable  objections  to  territorial  dominion  beyond 
sea.  The  aim  of  his  policy  therefore  was  that 
Spain  should  retain  Cuba;  but  when  he  suc¬ 
ceeded  Monroe  in  the  Presidency,  in  1825,  having 
received  the  suggestion  of  a  joint  guarantee  by 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  United  States,  upon 
the  condition  of  Spain  acknowledging  the  inde¬ 
pendence  of  the  Spanish-speaking  continent,  he 
replied  merely  that  the  matter  would  be  held 
under  advisement,  and  followed  this  in  1826  by 
an  express  refusal:  “  We  can  enter  into  no  stipu¬ 
lations  by  treaty  to  guarantee  the  islands.”  At  the 
same  time  it  was  clearly  stated  that  “  the  United 
States  would  not  consent  to  the  occupation  of 
Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  by  any  other  European 
Power  than  Spain,  under  any  contingency  what¬ 
ever.”  Persistence  and  advance  on  this  line 
are  indicated  by  the  words  of  Webster,  when 
Secretary  of  State  in  1843.  “The  Spanish  Gov- 


382  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


ernment  has  been  repeatedly  told  that  the  United 
States  would  never  permit  the  occupation  of 
Cuba  by  British  agents  or  forces  upon  any  pretext; 
and  that,  in  the  event  of  any  attempt  to  wrest 
it  from  her,  she  might  rely  upon  the  whole  mili¬ 
tary  and  naval  resources  of  the  nation  to  aid  in 
preserving  or  recovering  it.”  In  1851  a  farther 
advance  in  definition  is  marked.  An  intimation 
was  received  that  Great  Britain  and  France 
would  give  orders  to  their  squadrons  in  the  West 
Indies  to  protect  the  coasts  of  Cuba  from  fili¬ 
bustering  expeditions,  fitted  out  in  the  United 
States.  Such  an  action,  it  was  replied,  “  could 
not  but  be  regarded  by  the  United  States  with 
grave  disapproval,  as  involving  on  the  part  of 
European  sovereigns  combined  action  of  protect¬ 
orship  over  American  waters.” 

By  this  time  the  discovery  of  gold  in  California, 
and  the  developing  interest  of  the  Pacific,  had  con¬ 
stituted  the  Isthmus  a  second  stepping-stone,  as 
Cuba  had  been  the  first,  leading  the  United  States 
to  recognize  an  external  territorial  interest;  not 
indeed  extra-continental,  but  much  more  severed 
from  her  approach  by  natural  and  military  ob¬ 
stacles  than  ever  Cuba  could  be.  The  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty,  framed  in  1850,  was  the  outward 
sign  of  a  far-reaching  interest,  that  embraced  with 
the  Isthmus  all  the  Caribbean  regions  through 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


383 


which  lay  the  road  to  it.  Of  this  an  indication 
was  given  by  a  renewed  proposal,  made  in  concert 
by  Great  Britain  and  France,  that  they  with  the 
United  States  should  enter  into  a  joint  disclaimer 
of  all  intent,  now  or  hereafter,  to  obtain  posses¬ 
sion  of  Cuba.  The  reply  to  this,  given  in  De¬ 
cember,  1852,  was  that  to  enter  into  such  a  com¬ 
pact  “  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  princi¬ 
ples,  the  tradition,  and  the  policy  of  the  United 
States.”  The  proposition  involved  in  fact  an 
alliance,  similar  in  principle  to  that  by  which  the 
great  Powers  of  Europe  guaranteed  the  settle¬ 
ment  of  Vienna;  and  its  being  made  implied  a 
sense  of  a  balance  of  power  and  interests  in  the 
American  hemisphere,  in  which  European  gov¬ 
ernments  would  form  a  preponderant  constituent. 
The  administration  of  that  day  had  no  desire 
to  get  Cuba,  for  it  apprehended  from  it  serious 
peril  to  the  Union  of  the  States,  which  had  just 
passed  with  difficulty  through  one  of  those  crises 
that  presaged  the  great  war  of  1861  to  1865.  In 
1853  the  opposite  party  came  into  power,  identi¬ 
fied  with  the  policy  of  strengthening  the  institution 
of  slavery.  To  that  end  the  acquisition  of  Cuba 
became  a  prominent  object;  not  with  the  simple 
view,  held  by  Jefferson  and  Adams,  of  rounding 
off  and  securing  the  national  domain,  but  to 
hold  and  control  a  slave  region,  the  present  con- 


384  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


ditions  and  future  promise  of  which  were  believed 
to  imperil  the  system  in  the  Southern  States. 

The  nation  was  already  entered  upon  the  rapids 
which  swept  it  down  to  sectional  war  and  revolu¬ 
tion.  Nevertheless,  during  this  period  was  suc¬ 
cessfully  fought  out  the  diplomatic  battle  with 
Great  Britain  concerning  the  Mosquito  Coast 
and  the  Honduras  Bay  islands.  That  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer  Treaty  secured  to  Nicaragua  and 
Honduras  the  surrender  of  these,  the  British 
title  to  which  was  disputed,  had  been  the  belief 
of  the  United  States.  This  was  the  quid  pro 
quo  for  her  departure  from  traditional  policy, 
by  entering  into  a  joint  guarantee  of  an  Ameri¬ 
can  canal,  and  of  territory  belonging  to  an  Amer¬ 
ican  State.  She  was  already,  by  treaty  with 
Colombia,  sole  guarantor  of  transit  across  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  would  have  preferred 
to  be  such  in  the  case  of  the  Nicaraguan  Canal; 
but  the  claim  of  Great  Britain  to  the  Mosquito 
Coast,  though  denied  by  the  United  States,  in¬ 
volved  the  Atlantic  terminus  —  San  Juan,  or 
Greytown.  It  was  a  question  of  fight  or  com¬ 
promise;  and  the  United  States,  though  power¬ 
ful  for  many  reasons  as  a  weight  in  international 
balances,  was  not  yet  strong  enough  to  go  to 
war  over  a  disputed  title.  The  concession  which 
she  understood  herself  to  have  made  was  that 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


385 


of  accepting  a  joint  guarantee  with  a  European 
Power  for  an  American  interest  and  enterprise; 
the  concession  she  was  to  receive  was  the  aban¬ 
donment  of  British  political  control  over  the 
regions  mentioned.  To  her  surprise  she  found 
that  the  British  understanding  was  not  that  they 
would  abandon  what  they  had,  but  that  they 
would  not  press  their  tenure  beyond  that  actually 
enjoyed.  The  controversy  terminated  in  the  prev¬ 
alence  of  the  United  States  contention;  so  that 
in  i860  the  President  was  able  to  report  to  Con¬ 
gress  a  settlement  perfectly  satisfactory  to  him. 

In  this  prolonged  discussion  the  influence  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  not  only  evident,  but 
predominant.  Alike  in  what  it  knowingly  sur¬ 
rendered,  —  the  privilege  of  sole  guarantee,  — 
and  in  what  it  obtained  —  the  relinquishment 
of  a  doubtful  title  to  American  territory  —  the 
spirit  of  the  Doctrine  was  consciously  and  con¬ 
tinuously  in  the  minds  of  the  American  statesmen 
and  people;  and  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
the  general  principle,  as  distinguished  from 
sensitiveness  over  particular  incidents,  gained 
decisively  both  in  definiteness  and  depth  of  im¬ 
pression.  There  was  advance  from  theory  to 
action,  even  if  action  had  been  limited  to  verbal 
insistence;  and  the  outcome  was  positive,  if 
not  wholly  satisfactory  on  the  score  of  our  own 


386  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


concessions.  The  subsequent  intervention  of 
Louis  Napoleon  in  Mexico  came  most  aptly  to 
confirm  this  result.  Nothing  could  have  been 
more  opportune.  The  principle  became  concrete 
in  a  striking  instance.  The  interference  of  a 
European  ruler  with  the  internal  affairs  of  an 
American  state  had  gone  to  the  point  of  over¬ 
throwing  its  government,  and  establishing  a 
monarchy  in  its  place ;  and  this  not  only  happened 
just  across  the  border,  but  coincided  with  the 
immense  organization  of  force  left  by  the  War 
of  Secession.  Action  here  was  yet  more  positive 
and  convincing.  Again  the  United  States  ob¬ 
tained  by  pressure  the  restitution  of  American 
control  over  American  territory,  asking  no  com¬ 
pensation  beyond  the  satisfaction  of  principle 
vindicated. 

The  realization  of  power,  forced  upon  national 
consciousness  by  the  prodigious  exertions  of  the 
War  of  Secession,  could  not  but  be  felt  in  sub¬ 
sequent  external  policy.  Of  this  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  a  leading  element.  From  its  enun¬ 
ciation  in  1823  it  had  grown  slowly  to  1850,  the 
year  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty.  The  accept¬ 
ance  in  this  instrument  of  a  joint  guarantee  with 
a  European  State  over  American  territory  was 
felt  to  be  in  violation  of  its  general  spirit,  and 
was  substantially  an  admission  of  national  weak- 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


387 


ness,  of  which  the  compromise  measures  of  the 
same  year  were  an  internal  indication.  The 
foundations  of  the  Union  were  shaking.  At 
nearly  the  same  moment,  1850-51,  the  United 
States  co-operated  with  France  and  Great  Britain 
to  compel  peace  between  Haiti  and  Santo  Do¬ 
mingo.  These  steps,  scarcely  consistent  with  the 
tradition,  were  under  the  same  political  adminis¬ 
tration,  although  the  death  of  President  Taylor 
involved  a  change  in  head  and  members.  Shortly 
before  its  close  in  1853,  the  Secretary  of  State,  in 
a  paper  that  commanded  wide  approval,  used 
words  which  have  value  as  indicating  the  point 
so  far  reached  by  national  vision: 

It  has  been  a  steady  rule  of  our  policy  to  avoid  as  far  as 
possible  all  disturbance  of  existing  political  relations  of  the 
West  Indies.  We  have  felt  that  any  attempts  on  the  part  of  any 
of  the  great  maritime  powers  to  obtain  exclusive  advantages 
in  any  one  of  the  islands  would  be  apt  to  be  followed  by  others, 
and  to  end  in  converting  the  archipelago  into  a  theatre  of 
national  competition. 

This  was  a  policy  of  marking  time,  the  de¬ 
parture  from  which  at  the  present  day  is  evident, 
—  if  the  United  States  is  to  be  reckoned  among 
maritime  powers.  An  advance  in  position  was 
indeed  close  at  hand.  The  exigency  of  the  Isth¬ 
mus,  already  felt,  was  about  to  invoke  a  fresh 


388  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


assertion  of  the  predominant  political  interest 
of  the  nation  against  European  influence  there; 
both  in  general,  as  American  territory,  and  in 
particular,  as  the  line  of  communication  between 
our  Pacific  and  Atlantic  coasts.  Point  was  given 
to  this,  and  its  importance  emphasized  to  the 
national  consciousness  during  this  decade,  by  the 
prolonged  discussion  over  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,  which  centred  attention  upon  the  re¬ 
lations  of  the  Isthmus  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
If  one  administration  in  1856  suggested  a  joint 
guarantee  for  the  neutrality  of  the  transit  zone, 
its  successor  in  1857  hastened  to  affirm  that  such 
a  procedure,  in  common  with  other  Powers, 
was  inconsistent  with  the  policy  of  the  United 
States;  and  the  President  in  successive  messages 
strongly  urged  the  purchase  of  Cuba. 

Despite  occasional  inconsistencies,  the  general 
tendency  is  manifest  throughout.  The  period 
1850-1860  was  one  of  suspended  action,  but  of 
rapid  progress  in  the  realm  of  idea.  Opinion 
was  expanding,  and  hardening  into  conviction; 
but  the  anxieties  and  uncertainties  attending 
incipient  civil  convulsion  are  unfavorable  to 
external  effectiveness.  The  return  to  quiet  was 
not  merely  to  former  conditions,  but  to  vastly 
enlarged  conception  of  national  interests  and 
strength.  The  constraint  upon  Napoleon  III. 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


389 


to  leave  Mexico,  in  1867,  was  the  act  of  the  ad¬ 
ministration  that  directed  the  War  of  Secession. 
To  it  succeeded  the  Presidency  of  General  Grant, 
among  whose  first  utterances  is  found,  in  1869, 
that  American  “  dependencies  of  European  Powers 
are  no  longer  regarded  as  subjects  of  transfer 
from  one  European  Power  to  another.”  Upon 
this  advance  in  position  the  Secretary  of  State, 
Mr.  Fish,  a  year  later  commented  thus: 

This  is  not  a  policy  of  aggression,  but  it  opposes  the  creation 
of  European  dominion  on  American  soil,  and  its  transfer  to 
other  European  Powers;  and  it  looks  hopefully  to  the  time 
when,  by  the  voluntary  departure  of  European  governments 
from  this  continent  and  the  adjacent  islands,  America  shall  be 
wholly  American.  It  does  not  contemplate  forcible  intervention 
in  any  legitimate  contest;  but  it  protests  against  permitting 
any  such  contest  to  result  in  increase  of  European  power  or 
influence.1 


This  hope  of  a  voluntary  departure  was  not 
infrequently  expressed  by  the  same  Secretary  to 
the  British  Minister,  1869-71,  during  the  dis¬ 
cussions  antecedent  to  the  Treaty  of  Washington; 
and  it  was  grounded  in  part  at  least  upon  the 
well-known  disposition  then  of  many  British  states¬ 
men  to  foster  the  detachment  of  the  colonies 
from  the  mother  country.  On  American  lips 
1  My  italics. 


390  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


the  words  were  scarcely  more  than  a  pious  as¬ 
piration,  towards  conditions  which  would  remove 
still  further  the  chance  of  European  entangle¬ 
ments.  Though  congruous  in  spirit,  they  form 
no  part  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  in  origin 
was,  and  in  scope  still  is,  essentially  conservative, 
not  revolutionary;  expressly  disclaiming,  indeed, 
all  purpose  to  infringe  existing  conditions. 

The  national  consciousness  of  a  peculiar  and 
critical  relation  to  the  Central  American  isthmus 
is  reflected  in  another  utterance  of  Secretary 
Fish : 

No  attack  upon  the  sovereignty  of  New  Granada  has  taken 
place  since  the  [guarantee]  treaty  of  1846,  though  this  Depart¬ 
ment  has  reason  to  believe  that  one  has  been  on  several  occasions 
threatened,  but  has  been  averted  by  a  warning  from  this  Gov¬ 
ernment  as  to  its  obligations  under  the  treaty. 

The  position  thus  indicated  was  maintained 
by  following  administrations,  which  laid  especial 
stress  upon  the  isthmian  conditions.  These  had 
become  the  focus,  upon  which  converged  all  the 
national  feelings  and  policy  which  united  to 
elicit  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Particular  indis¬ 
position  was  expressed  to  any  joint  guarantee: 

The  President  (1881)  is  constrained  to  say  that  the  United 
States  cannot  take  part  in  extending  an  invitation  for  a  joint 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


391 


guarantee,  and  to  state  with  entire  frankness  that  the  United 
States  would  look  with  disfavor  at  an  attempt  at  concert  or 
political  action  by  other  Powers  in  that  direction. 

It  was  joint  guarantee,  together  with  joint 
disclaimer  of  acquiring  future  tenure  over  any 
part  of  Central  America  in  order  to  control  the 
canal,  that  brought  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty 
into  conspicuous  disfavor;  probably  as  seeming 
to  imply  equality  of  political  interest  between  the 
United  States  and  the  other  guaranteeing  and 
self-denying  Power.  The  equality  does  not  exist, 
and  apparent  admission  by  ourselves  was  even 
more  distasteful  than  its  suggestion  by  others. 
It  was,  as  has  been  said,  “  a  consent  to  violate 
the  traditional  and  time-honored  policy  of  the 
country.”  Increasing t  discontent  in  the  United 
States,  and  the  logic  of  events  affecting  the  re¬ 
lations  of  nations,  led  to  the  supersession  of 
this  treaty  by  the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty,  rati¬ 
fied  by  the  United  States  Senate,  December  16, 
1901.  By  this  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  was 
“superseded”  byname;  the  construction,  regu¬ 
lation  and  management  of  the  Canal  was  left  in 
the  hands  of  the  United  States,  solely  and  entirely, 
with  the  reservation  of  its  neutralization  upon 
terms  already  applying  to  the  Suez  Canal;  and 
the  responsibility  of  safe-guarding  the  Canal  and 
enforcing  neutrality  was  to  her  alone  intrusted. 


392  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


Though  necessarily  traced  only  in  outline, 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  seen  to  be  a  policy  sub¬ 
stantially  consistent  throughout,  manifesting  ad¬ 
vance  in  expression  and  expansion  in  application; 
both  proofs  of  essential  vitality.  Yet,  neglecting 
the  occasional  fluctuations  to  which  all  progress 
is  liable,  it  may  fairly  be  said  that  the  entire 
history  is  contained,  as  in  a  seed,  in  a  definition 
of  Monroe’s,  rarely  quoted,  of  the  year  (1824) 
following  the  one  so  widely  known: 

The  deep  interest  we  take  in  their  [the  Spanish  colonies]  in¬ 
dependence,  which  we  have  acknowledged,  and  in  their  enjoy¬ 
ment  of  all  the  rights  incident  thereto,  especially  in  the  very 
important  one  of  instituting  their  own  governments,  has  been 
declared.  ...  It  is  impossible  for  European  governments  to 
interfere  in  their  concerns,  especially  in  those  alluded  to,  with¬ 
out  affecting  us;  indeed  the  motive  which  might  induce  such 
interference  in  the  present  state  of  the  war  would  appear  to 
be  equally  applicable  to  us. 


This  does  not  indeed  explicitly  state  every  several 
proposition  of  subsequent  administrations;  but 
of  those  which  have  remained,  endorsed  by  the 
general  consent  of  the  nation,  all  are  to  be  found 
in  germ,  though  not  in  development,  in  the  above 
words.  Though  firm  as  well  as  clear,  they  bear 
the  impress  of  national  immaturity  and  conse¬ 
quent  weakness.  The  fear,  known  to  have  been 
entertained  by  some  of  Monroe’s  Cabinet,  that 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


393 


the  motives  impelling  the  Holy  Alliance  to  in¬ 
tervene  in  South  America  might  entail  similar 
steps  towards  the  United  States,  would  doubtless 
be  scouted  now;  but  the  wary  attitude  of  to-day, 
with  its  increased  scope  of  assertion,  simply 
reproduces  what  in  the  earlier  period  was  appre¬ 
hension. 

It  is  considered  by  the  United  States  essential 
to  her  interests  and  peace  to  withstand  the  be¬ 
ginnings  of  action  which  might  lead  to  European 
intervention  in  the  internal  concerns  of  an  Amer¬ 
ican  state,  or  render  it  contributive  in  any  way 
to  the  European  system,  a  makeweight  in  the 
balance  of  power,  a  pawn  in  the  game  of  Euro¬ 
pean  international  politics;  for  such  a  condition, 
if  realized,  brings  any  European  contest  to  this 
side  of  the  Atlantic;  and  the  neighborhood  of 
disputes,  as  of  fire,  is  perilous.  A  rumor 
of  the  transfer  of  a  West  India  island,  or  such 
an  occurrence  as  the  difficulty  between  Venez¬ 
uela,  Germany,  and  Great  Britain,  engages 
instant  and  sensitive  attention.  This  does 
not  imply  doubt  of  the  wisdom  and  firmness 
of  the  government,  but  indicates  an  instinctive 
political  apprehension,  not  elicited  by  greater 
and  immediate  interests  in  quarters  external  to  the 
continents.  It  is  remembered  that  intervention 
was  contemplated  in  our  own  deadly  intestine 


394  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


struggle,  because  of  its  effect  upon  European 
interests,  although  only  economic;  for  we  were 
embarrassed  by  no  political  dependence  or  re¬ 
lation  to  Europe.  Public  sentiment  intends 
that  such  a  danger  to  the  American  continents, 
the  recurrence  of  which  can  only  be  obviated  by 
the  predominant  force  and  purpose  of  this  country, 
shall  not  be  indefinitely  increased  by  acquies¬ 
cing  in  European  governments  acquiring  re¬ 
lations  which  may  serve  as  occasions  for  inter¬ 
ference,  trenching  upon  the  independence  of 
action  of  American  states,  or  upon  the  integrity 
of  their  territory. 

It  is  evident  that  for  a  nation  to  owe  money 
to  a  foreign  government,  directly  or  by  guarantee, 
is  a  very  different  political  condition  to  that  of 
indebtedness  contracted  in  open  market  to  in¬ 
dividuals.  It  is  evident  that  a  disputed  boundary 
is  a  perennial  source  of  danger;  and  of  implicit 
threat  where  there  is  a  great  difference  of  strength. 
Such  an  ember  might  kindle  into  a  flame  at  a 
moment  otherwise  unpropitious  for  the  United 
States  to  assert  its  traditional  policy;  just  as  the 
long-standing  Transvaal  trouble  might  very  con¬ 
ceivably  have  been  precipitated  into  war  at  a 
moment  most  inconvenient  to  Great  Britain.  As 
it  was,  her  course  in  other  quarters  is  believed 
to  have  been  embarrassed  by  the  South  African 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


395 


War.  It  is  the  part  of  wisdom,  and  substantially 
of  justice,  to  exclude  such  occasions  of  offence, 
or  to  insist  upon  timely  settlement  where  they 
exist. 

Granting  the  military  effect  of  the  Isthmus  and 
Cuba  upon  the  United  States,  it  is  clear  that  for 
them  to  contract  relations  of  dependence  upon 
a  European  Power  would  involve  the  United 
States  and  the  same  Power  at  once  in  a  net  of 
secondary  relations,  potential  of  very  serious 
result.  Why  acquiesce  in  such  ?  But  the  funda¬ 
mental  relations  of  international  law,  essential 
to  the  intercourse  of  nations,  are  not  hereby 
contradicted.  National  rights,  which  are  summed 
up  in  the  word  independence,  have  as  their  cor¬ 
relative  national  responsibility.  Not  to  invade 
the  rights  of  an  American  state  is  to  the  United 
States  an  obligation  with  the  force  of  law;  to 
permit  no  European  State  to  infringe  them  is 
a  matter  of  policy;  but  as  she  will  not  acquiesce 
in  any  assault  upon  their  independence  or  terri¬ 
torial  integrity,  so  she  will  not  countenance  by 
her  support  any  shirking  of  their  international 
responsibility.  Neither  will  she  undertake  to 
compel  them  to  observe  their  international  obli¬ 
gations  to  others  than  herself.  To  do  so,  which 
has  been  by  some  argued  a  necessary  corollary 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  would  encroach  on  the 


396  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


very  independence  which  that  political  dogma 
defends;  for  to  assume  the  responsibility  which 
derives  from  independence,  and  can  only  be 
transferred  by  its  surrender,  would  be  to  assert  a 
quasi  suzerainty.  The  United  States  is  inevitably 
the  preponderant  American  Power;  but  she  does 
not  aspire  to  be  paramount.  She  does  not  find 
the  true  complement  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
in  an  undefined  control  over  American  States, 
exercised  by  her  and  denied  to  Europe.  Its 
correlative,  as  forcibly  urged  by  John  Quincy 
Adams  at  the  time  of  formulation,  and  since 
explicitly  adopted  by  the  national  consciousness, 
is  abstention  from  interference  in  questions  ter¬ 
ritorially  European.  These  I  conceive  embrace 
not  only  Europe  proper,  but  regions  also  in 
which  propinquity  and  continuity,  or  long  recog¬ 
nized  occupancy,  give  Europe  a  priority  of  interest 
and  influence,  resembling  that  which  the  Monroe 
policy  asserts  for  America  in  the  American  con¬ 
tinents  and  islands.  In  my  apprehension  Europe, 
construed  by  the  Doctrine,  would  include 
Africa,  with  the  Levant  and  India,  and  the  coun¬ 
tries  between  them.  It  would  not  include  Japan, 
China,  nor  the  Pacific  generally.  The  United 
States  might  for  very  excellent  reasons  abstain 
from  action  in  any  of  these  last  named  quarters, 
in  any  particular  instance;  but  the  deterrent 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


397 


cause  would  not  be  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  legiti¬ 
mate  deduction. 


When  this  article  first  appeared,  (February, 
1903),  the  English  Review  in  which  it  was  printed 
made  the  comment  that  “  Americans  on  their 
side  must  recognize  that  their  attitude  has  made 
the  relations  between  European  Powers  and 
South  American  states  —  many  of  which  are  no 
creditable  proteges  —  peculiarly  difficult,  if  not 
impossible.  .  .  .  Surely,  as  time  goes  on,  and  as 
the  great  Republic  increases  its  strength  and  re¬ 
sources,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  must  ultimately 
develop  the  present  American  ‘  preponderance’ 
into  an  American  ‘  paramountcy  ’  over  South 
American  states.  Then  power  and  responsi¬ 
bility  will  be  united,  instead  of  being  divided  as 
they  are  at  present.” 

I  fancy  that  few  American  statesmen,  of  the 
Northern  continent  or  of  the  Southern,  would 
be  willing  to  admit  an  approach  towards  para¬ 
mountcy.  Preponderance  asserts  only  a  concrete 
evident  fact:  of  weight  attaching  to  greater  num¬ 
bers,  wealth,  and  consequent  immediate  resources. 
Paramountcy  carries  an  invidious  political  im¬ 
plication.  It  is,  however,  true  that  within  the 
last  five  years  development,  consecutive  hitherto, 


398  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


has  progressed  in  one  direction  suggested,  a 
species  of  divergement,  like  that  of  a  new  branch 
thrown  out  by  a  tree:  the  admission  that  a 
twofold  responsibility  follows,  logically  and  ac¬ 
tually,  upon  the  avowal  of  purpose  to  use  national 
force  in  case  specified  conditions  should  occur. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  reached  the  point  of 
denying  to  European  Powers  the  international 
right  of  acquiring  territory  as  the  result  of  hos¬ 
tilities,  if  these  be  with  an  American  common¬ 
wealth.  A  dilemma  is  thus  confronted.  A 
common  international  right  is  contested  on  the 
ground  of  national  policy.  National  policy,  it  is 
true,  is  as  strictly  an  international  right  as  is  the 
acquisition  of  territory  by  war;  but  to  the  one  and 
the  other  it  is  increasingly  necessary  that  they 
justify  themselves  to  reason.  As  the  American 
Declaration  of  Independence  runs,  “  A  decent 
respect  to  the  opinions  of  mankind  ”  must  enter 
into  determinations.  The  colonies  had  a  right 
to  revolt,  responsible  to  themselves  only;  yet, 
to  justify  their  course  to  the  world  was  not  only 
politic,  but  educative  to  their  own  consciences. 

Five  years  ago  there  was  pending  between 
Venezuela  and  her  creditors  a  contention,  which 
by  the  armed  demonstration  of  Germany,  Great 
Britain,  and  Italy,  resulted  in  a  convention,  in¬ 
stituting  a  commission,  that  sat  at  Caracas,  to 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


399 


adjudicate  all  the  claims  against  Venezuela. 
The  question  of  priority  of  payment  —  and  that 
alone  —  was  referred  to  the  Hague  Tribunal, 
which  decided  in  favor  of  the  three  demon¬ 
strating  Powers;  much  to  the  disgust  of  many 
Americans.  The  interesting  point  in  this  trans¬ 
action,  as  touching  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  was 
that  one  of  the  three  nations  which  took  the 
action  named,  Germany,  was  at  pains  antece¬ 
dently  to  express  to  the  American  government 
that  “we  consider  it  of  importance  to  let  first  of 
all  the  government  of  the  United  States  know 
about  our  purposes,  so  that  we  can  prove  that 
we  have  nothing  else  in  view  than  to  help  those 
of  our  citizens  who  have  suffered  damages.  .  .  . 
We  declare  especially  that  under  no  circum¬ 
stances  do  we  consider  in  our  proceedings  the 
acquisition  or  the  permanent  occupation  of  Vene¬ 
zuelan  territory.”  ...  If  other  measures  “  do  not 
seem  efficient,  we  would  have  to  consider  the 
temporary  occupation  on  our  part  of  different 
Venezuelan  harbor  places,  and  the  levying  of 
duties  in  those  places.”  1 

President  Roosevelt  in  reply  accepted  the  as¬ 
surance  thus  given.  In  his  Message  to  Congress 
a  week  before  he  had  said,  with  apparent  reference 

'John  Bassett  Moore’s  International  Law  Digest,  Vol.  VI. 
p.  588.  My  italics. 


400  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


to  the  Venezuelan  situation,  “  The  Monroe 
Doctrine  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  commercial 
relations  of  any  American  Power.  .  .  .  We  do 
not  guarantee  any  state  against  punishment  if 
it  misconducts  itself,  provided  that  punishment 
does  not  take  the  form  of  the  acquisition  of 
territory  by  any  non-American  Power.”  1  There 
can  be  little  doubt,  however,  that  American  sen¬ 
sitiveness  to  proceedings  of  this  character  was 
increasing;  not  merely  in  the  government,  but 
more  especially  in  the  government  as  reflecting 
the  mind  of  the  people.  To  the  British  am¬ 
bassador  regret  was  expressed  that  “  European 
Powers  should  use  force  against  Central  and 
South  American  countries,  though  the  United 
States  could  not  object  to  steps  taken  for  redress 
of  injuries,  provided  that  no  acquisition  of  territory 
was  contemplated.  ”  2 

The  Venezuelan  incident  elicited  also  the 
presentation  to  the  United  States  government, 
by  that  of  the  Argentine  Republic,  of  a  proposed 
“  Doctrine,”  which  has  been  called  by  the  name 
of  Calvo,  the  Argentine  publicist  who  formu¬ 
lated  it;  and  likewise  by  that  of  Drago,  the 
minister  who  presented  it.  The  principle  ad¬ 
vocated  by  this  doctrine  was  “  that  the  public 

1  Moore,  Vol.  VI.  p.  590. 

3  Ibid.  p.  592. 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


401 


debt  cannot  occasion  armed  intervention,  or  even 
the  actual  occupation  [temporary  or  permanent] 
of  the  territory  of  American  nations  by  a  European 
Power.”  Drago’s  letter  invited  a  declaration  to 
that  effect,  with  the  authority  and  prestige  of  the 
United  States.  1  Such  a  pronouncement  would 
have  been  a  very  serious  addition  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine;  for  it  would  have  committed  the 
United  States,  upon  its  sole  responsibility,  to  the 
forbiddal  of  measures  heretofore  sanctioned  by 
international  law,  and  purposed,  if  necessary,  in 
the  Venezuelan  case.  No  alternative  means  of 
reparation  was  suggested,  except  patience  on 
the  part  of  creditors. 

Close  upon  the  Venezuelan  incident  has  fol¬ 
lowed  the  interposition  of  the  United  States  in 
the  financial  affairs  of  the  Dominican  Republic; 
consequent,  it  is  true,  upon  the  request,  and 
therefore  upon  the  formal  initiative  of  the  Domin¬ 
ican  government  itself.  The  action  of  the  United 
States  has  thus  been  one  of  friendly  offices,  in  their 
most  inoffensive  nature.  The  case  is  somewhat 
unique  in  its  distinguishing  features;  for,  owing 
to  the  frequency  of  revolutions,  unequalled  even 
in  Spanish  American  countries,  a  Dominican 
government  had  been  often  little  more  than  the 

1  Moore,  Vol.  VI.  pp.  592-593.  The  several  propositions 
of  M.  Drago  are  there  summarized. 


I 


402  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


temporarily  successful  revolutionist.  Still,  by  in¬ 
ternational  law  the  government  recognized  is  the 
government  internationally.  Political  anarchy 
had  led  to  financial  anarchy;  and  by  reciprocal 
action  financial  anarchy  promoted  political,  for 
a  government  to  be  strong  must  command  money. 
A  revolution,  successful  or  not,  depended  for 
momentary  maintenance  upon  the  possession 
of  a  sea  port  and  levying  there  the  import  dues, 
which  the  regular  government  thus  lost.  By 
the  successive  —  or  simultaneous  —  mismanage¬ 
ments  of  governments,  regular  and  revolutionary, 
the  debts  of  the  republic  had  reached  a  figure 
which,  whether  as  to  interest  or  principal,  could 
be  discharged  only  by  an  administration  which 
should  be  secure  as  well  as  skilful.  Both  American 
and  European  creditors  were  clamoring  for  pay¬ 
ment.  The  only  means  to  insure  this  was  a 
settled  possession  of  the  ports  of  entry,  to  which 
no  Dominican  Government  was  adequate.  Such 
general  possession  by  another  State  would  be 
political  intervention,  and  occupancy;  which, 
while  temporary  in  name,  must  from  the  amount 
of  debt  to  be  discharged  be  so  prolonged  as  to 
suggest  permanency.  We  have  before  us  the 
example  of  occupancy  drifting  into  permanency 
in  Egypt;  where  the  wish  of  one  party  in  England 
certainly  was  to  terminate  quickly  the  occupa- 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


403 


tion  which  to  this  day  still  exists,  with  no  prospect 
of  speedy  conclusion. 

Such  intervention  in  Asiatic  or  African  com¬ 
munities  has  both  precedent  and  necessity  in  its 
favor.  It  has  been  just  in  principle,  righteous  in 
act,  and  expedient  in  issue.  In  America,  and 
by  a  non-American  State,  it  runs  up  against  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  except  where  occupancy  is 
avowedly  and  evidently  temporary.  The  United 
States  in  the  case  of  Venezuela  had  regretted,  but 
not  objected  to,  a  step  concerning  which  assur¬ 
ances  had  been  given,  and  a  probable  end  was 
discernible.  No  such  near  probability  existed 
in  Santo  Domingo,  where  at  the  same  time  con¬ 
ditions  were  unbearable  and  insoluble.  The 
question  loomed  on  the  horizon,  —  and  above 
it,  —  Could  the  United  States  refuse  to  permit 
an  indefinite  occupancy  of  ports,  in  order  to 
receive  the  duties,  and  do  no  more  than  refuse  ? 
or  would  she  by  such  refusal  incur  a  responsi¬ 
bility  that  must  be  faced  ?  In  fact,  though  no 
threat  of  war  wTas  heard,  or  made,  refusal  would 
give  just  cause  for  a  foreign  action,  which  ulti¬ 
mately  might  necessitate  armed  resistance;  that 
is,  War. 

President  Roosevelt  in  a  message  to  the  Senate 
of  February  15,  1905,  transmitting  the  protocol 
concluded  with  the  Dominican  Republic,  said. 


404  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


“  In  view  of  our  past  experience  and  our  knowl¬ 
edge  of  the  actual  situation  of  the  Republic, 
a  definite  refusal  by  the  United  States  Govern¬ 
ment  to  take  any  effective  action  looking  to  the 
relief  of  the  Dominican  Republic,  and  to  the 
discharge  of  its  own  duty  under  the  Monroe  Doc¬ 
trine,  can  only  be  considered  as  an  acquiescence 
in  some  such  action  by  another  government.” 
If,  under  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  no  duty  rests  of 
establishing  political  or  financial  order  in  an  Ameri¬ 
can  State,  the  words  italicized  seem  none  the  less 
to  assert  the  duty  of  opposition  to  European 
intervention;  and  this  is  again  intimated  in  the 
same  message.  The  proposed  measures  “  se¬ 
cure  the  Dominican  Republic  against  over-seas 
aggression.  This  in  reality  entails  no  new  obli¬ 
gation  upon  us;  for  the  Monroe  Doctrine  means 
precisely  such  a  guarantee  on  our  part.”  1 
Under  the  circumstances,  and  by  the  request 
of  the  Dominican  government,  the  custom  houses 
of  the  republic  have  been  placed  under  the  admin¬ 
istration  of  the  United  States;  with  stipulations 
as  to  the  distribution  of  the  revenues  between 
the  Dominican  government  and  its  creditors, 
European  and  American.  A  near  precedent 
for  this  step  existed  in  an  analogous  agreement 
made  a  short  time  before  with  the  United 
1  Moore,  Vo!.  VI,  pp.  526,  527. 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


405 


States,  by  which  the  custom  houses  at  two  ports 
had  been  placed  in  charge  of  an  American  fiscal 
agent,  to  insure  payment  of  specific  dues  to 
American  creditors,  as  fixed  by  a  committee  of 
arbitrators.  The  present  arrangement  went  into 
operation,  substantially,  March  31,  1905,  when  the 
President  of  the  Dominican  Republic  appointed  an 
American  citizen  General  Receiver  of  customs, 
with  specified  powers  and  obligations.  The  treaty, 
which  for  the  time  of  its  duration  makes  the 
United  States  the  financial  agent  for  the  Republic 
in  the  receipt  and  management  of  customs  dues, 
was  not  ratified  until  May,  1907.  Under  its  terms 
the  President  of  the  United  States  has  appointed 
the  Receiver.  The  political  result  has  been  to 
promote  internal  quiet,  by  disabling  would-be 
revolutionists  from  supplying  themselves  with 
money  through  the  customs.  The  financial  results 
have  been  a  cessation  in  the  increase  of  the 
public  debt;  the  promotion  of  necessary  public 
improvements;  and  the  accumulation  in  the  Re¬ 
public’s  treasury  of  a  fund  of  over  three  million 
dollars. 

An  end,  however  beneficent,  does  not  neces¬ 
sarily  justify  the  means;  but,  independent  of 
the  fact  that  the  action  of  the  United  States  was 
by  request,  the  extremity  of  the  occasion,  which 
is  the  justification  of  the  remedy,  is  sufficiently 


406  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


shown  by  the  reluctance  and  refusal  of  the  United 
States  to  interfere,  on  one  side  or  the  other, 
with  previous  forcible  reclamations  of  debt  from 
American  communities  by  European  govern¬ 
ments.  It  neither  withstood  the  reclamation,  nor 
undertook  to  interfere  with  the  debtor  nation’s 
management  of  its  internal  affairs,  in  order  to 
increase  its  ability  to  pay,  and  by  such  means 
to  remove  the  cause  for  European  action.  On 
the  one  hand  it  declined  to  associate  itself  with 
such  action,  on  the  other  to  acquiesce  in  payment 
by  cession  of  territory  under  any  form  threatening 
permanency;  both  in  the  spirit  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  With  this  reservation,  the  United 
States  hitherto  had  simply  stood  aside,  leav¬ 
ing  the  parties  to  reach  an  arrangement,  because 
such  an  issue  seemed  probable.  No  other 
action,  nor  pre-determination,  was  called  for 
before  a  case  presented  itself  where  no  promise 
of  satisfactory  solution  within  the  limits  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  could  be  seen.  Such  a  case 
arose  at  last  in  Santo  Domingo. 

The  species  of  development  marked  by  the 
Santo  Domingo  incident  is  evident,  logical,  and 
irresistible.  The  stage  reached  may  reasonably 
be  deplored,  as  may  every  increase  of  national 
responsibility,  however  unavoidable;  but  in  the 
instinctive  aversion  of  the  American  people  to 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


407 


international  meddling,  and  in  their  profound, 
and  indeed  exaggerated,  belief  in  the  capacity 
of  all  peoples  in  general  to  manage  adequately 
their  own  affairs,  will  be  found  a  sound  coun¬ 
teractive  to  precipitate  or  unconciliatory  action. 
The  request  of  the  Dominican  Government  in 
the  particular  instance  was  but  the  repetition 
of  similar  advances  made  before;  action  there¬ 
fore  was  neither  hasty  nor  coercive;  but  it 
is  impossible  reasonably  to  gainsay  the  state¬ 
ment  which  appears  in  the  opening  paragraphs 
of  President  Roosevelt’s  Message : 

“  It  has  for  some  time  been  obvious  that  those  who  profit 
by  the  Monroe  Doctrine  must  accept  certain  responsibilities 
along  with  the  rights  which  it  confers;  and  that  the  same  state¬ 
ment  applies  to  those  who  uphold  the  Doctrine.  ...  It  is  in¬ 
compatible  with  international  equity  for  the  United  States 
to  refuse  to  allow  other  Powers  to  take  the  only  means  at  their 
disposal  of  satisfying  the  claims  of  their  creditors,  and  yet  to 
refuse,  itself,  to  take  any  such  steps.”  1 


There  is  in  the  treatment  of  the  Dominican 
incident  continuity  of  principle,  but  there  is 
also  more  than  simple  progress.  Monroe’s  as¬ 
sertion,  that  the  American  continents  were  not 
thereafter  to  be  considered  subjects  for  European 
colonization,  for  instance,  develops  not  only 
1  Moore,  VI.  p.  519. 


408  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare 


successively  but  obviously.  In  the  hands  of 
President  Grant  (1870)  it  has  become  that  an 
existing  colony  may  not  be  transferred  to  another 
European  state;  with  President  Cleveland,  that 
an  existing  colony  may  not  be  extended  at  the 
expense  of  a  neighbor;  with  President  Roose¬ 
velt  that  territory  may  not  be  acquired  as  the 
result  of  hostilities.  The  interposition  in  Santo 
Domingo  is  not  so  much  a  corollary  of  the  original 
proposition,  —  an  obvious  consequence,  —  as  it 
is  a  turn  in  a  river,  or  a  divergence,  resembling 
that  of  a  new  branch  put  forth  by  a  tree.  That 
a  policy  framed  to  assure  the  independence  of 
certain  states  should  lead  irresistibly  to  interfer¬ 
ence  in  functions  attendant  upon  independence  is 
something  of  a  paradox;  but  paradoxes  are  not 
amusing  only,  but  instructive.  In  objecting  to 
“  the  extension  of  the  European  system  to  any 
portion  of  the  American  hemisphere,”  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  had  in  view  several  dangers;  one  of 
which  was  the  interference  of  stronger  states 
with  weaker,  as  in  Europe.  1  In  “  European 
system  ”  the  noun  as  well  as  the  adjective  had 
importance.  But  from  this  beginning  the  logic 
of  events  has  inevitably  developed  the  necessity 
of  interference  by  American  Powers  —  not  nec- 

1  See  Dana’s  Wheaton,  Summary  of  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Moore  VI.  p.  597.  Also  pp.  402,  403 ;  Monroe’s  Message. 


The  Monroe  Doctrine 


409 


essarily  the  United  States  —  with  one  another, 
and  in  one  another’s  affairs,  in  cases  which  it 
may  reasonably  be  believed  will  always  be  very 
exceptional  and  extreme,  but  are  not  impossible 
of  occurrence.  And  this  is  not  the  logic  of  events 
only,  but  of  principles.  The  Doctrine  has  not 
been  merely  the  sport  of  circumstances;  for  its 
essential  principle  was  to  insure  American  safety 
and  peace  hy  excluding  European  intervention. 
Consequently,  conditions  which  tend  towards 
such  intervention,  and  would  justify  it,  morally 
and  internationally,  must  by  the  American  nations 
be  remedied;  if  not  by  the  state  responsible, 
then  by  others.  This  end  was  involved  in  the 
beginnings,  though  it  was  not  then  obvious. 

If  this  paradox  then  be  a  legitimate  develop¬ 
ment,  the  objection  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
is  not  now  the  Doctrine  of  Monroe  has  no  standing 
ground  in  fact  or  principle.  To  state  the  qualities 
of  an  apple  and  of  an  apple  tree  is  to  formulate  a 
series  of  paradoxes;  but  all  the  same  the  apple  is 
the  fruit  of  the  tree.  The  name  Monroe  Doctrine 
is  therefore  accurate,  as  well  as  serviceable.  It  is 
not  only  convenient,  as  a  heading  under  which  to 
group  a  series  of  national  attitudes.  It  is  exact, 
because  it  expresses  a  continuity  which  is  that  of 
life;  of  a  vital  principle,  fruitful  in  consequences 
just  because  it  is  alive. 


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